A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

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Dedicated to
the hallowed memory
of my father
late J. N. Sengupta

सप्तनिष्कोज्झितामितां वाजसनेयिकां मम ।
सप्तसप्तिस्वधामस्थो भर्गदेवो महीयताम् ॥

FOREWORD

This is a highly specialised book dealing with an important epistemological question having bearing on the different systems of Indian Philsophy. To get an idea of the nature and scope of this book we should start with acquainting ourselves with certain technical terms touching on the subject. We may conveniently do so.

The title of the book indicates that it is a critical study of the theories of Viparyaya. Now what is Viparyaya? Śaṅkarācārya defines it very tersely, but clearly enough, as 'a cognition of thatness in something other than that'. Let us have a concrete example. The typical example cited in books dealing with the subject will serve our purpose very well. When we look at a shell of the mother of pearl, known as nacre, we may perceive it as such. This is a case of correct perception. But sometimes it does happen that its silver-white lustre may mislead us to take it to be a piece of silver. This, in psychological terminology, is known as illusion. It is to be contrasted with what is known as hallucination, where we perceive a thing without there being any objective basis for it.

In Indian epistemology also there is a similar scheme of terminology. A false perception is called Bhrama. This may be subdivided into two classes. In one case there is an objective basis but the cognition is faulty, as in the example cited above, where nacre is mistakenly perceived as silver. It is, therefore, called Sālambana Bhrama. In the other kind there is no objective basis at all as in hallucination. It is, therefore, called Nirālambana Bhrama. Now Viparyaya refers to the first kind of faulty perception. It may be, therefore, taken as synonymous with illusion in a general way. To be precise, it refers to errors of perception of all varieties.

There is another term with which acquaintance is essential. That is Khyāti. In ordinary parlour Khyāti means cognition. But as a technical term used in Indian epistemology, it has acquired a different connotation. Here it stands for the same thing as illusion. Accordingly the different theories of illusion are known as Khyātivāda.

Ordinarily, epistemology forms a distinct part in philosophy, just as Ontology does. While the latter confines itself to the study of being, the former is occupied with the study of knowledge. They are distinct provinces of Philosophy and form separate parts. In Indian Philosophy, however, they have converged and even got linked up together. The reason is this. There are many schools of Indian Philosophy which deny reality to the objective world. For example, we may refer to the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika Schools of Buddhist Philosophy. The most typical example is provided by the Advaita School of Vedānta Philosophy propounded by Śaṅkarācārya. It is an extreme form of abstract monism in which the Brahman alone is considered real and the perceptual world is explained away as a pure illusion. For the purpose of explaining away the testimony of the senses, which contradicts the theory propounded by such philosophical systems, it became necessary to build up a special theory of epistemology to reinforce the ontological part. In the process, therefore, epistemology joined hands with ontology and thus became linked up with it. That also explains why the theory of illusion assumed such disproportionate importance in our philosophical systems.

In this context, it is understandable why the different conflicting theories of illusion grew up as integral parts of different philosophical systems. In the process they ramified into an intricate mass of complicated philosophical thought. The subject, therefore, calls for special treatment. To make the understanding of the shades of difference marking out the various theories easy, the need is felt for a book which will undertake a comprehensive survey of them. Not that the subject has not received attention from authors who specialised in Indian Philosophy. They do not, however, meet the full requirements of a scholar who is interested in a comprehensive study of the subject. There are histories of Indian Philosophy written by renowned scholars which touch on the subject, but the treatment is fragmentary. Again, there are specialised books which exclusively deal with this subject. Unfortunately, however, they restrict their studies to the principal theories of illusion only. They are not, therefore, sufficiently comprehensive. The need for a comprehensive study of this complicated subject is still left unattended.

The present book, in my opinion, is competent to meet this need. The author has taken great pains to collect together all the various theories of illusion. He has been able to trace out as many as fourteen theories of which about half a dozen only are well-known. This will indicate the comprehensive character of this book. Moreover, under each major theory are grouped together theories which are marked off from one another by minor shades of difference. The theory of Anyathā-Khyāti is an illustration on point. This is shared by many schools of philosophy each accepting it in a different way. All these theories have been enumerated and their differences explained. The book thus exhaustively deals with all theories of illusion.

This survey is followed by an analytical study of each theory. To do proper justice to them, a whole chapter has been devoted to the study of each. After that there is a critical appreciation in which the author brings out the weak and strong points of a particular theory. In this connection, he has taken all necessary pains to see that the treatment is exhaustive. He has referred to the exposition given by different scholars and assessed their merits. Where necessary he has not hesitated to criticise even renowned writers in the true philosophical spirit which pays homage only to the altar of truth.

At the end of the book the author has ventured on a theory of illusion of his own. His approach is eclectic. Without entering into the details of his thesis, it may be said that he discovers many facets of the subject and says that the difference between the principal theories lies in the fact that they have put emphasis on one of them only in preference to the others. From these premises he draws the conclusion that from the overall point of view, there is involved a co-existence of contradictories as propounded in the Acintyakhyāti-vāda propounded by Śrī Caitanya and elaborated by Jīva Goswāmī. Whether we accept his conclusion or not, this clearly indicates that the author has adopted an impartial attitude in the study of this complicated subject, a point which evidently adds to the merit of the book,

Rabindra Bharati,
Calcutta
15th May, 1965

Hiranmay Banerjee
Vice-Chancellor

PREFACE

Viparyaya is an important and gripping epistemological problem finding its place of pride in all the different systems of Indian philosophy. The literature bearing on the problem is so vast, varied and intricate that it is really difficult to present in the short compass of a sizable book all the diversified reflections of the different Sanskritic philosophers, whose number and volume of total output are, to say the least, definitely heart-depressing.

The deliberations of my fore-runners in the field are in some cases incidental and fragmentary. In other cases where Viparyaya is the principal or sole concern of the author, the discussion generally pertains to three, four or, at best, five widely current theories of Viparyaya from sectarian stand-point, leaving out of account not only the other theories, but also the different variants and ramifications of the well-known theories. So, the systematic and unbiased presentation of the different thories of Viparyaya together with a critical evaluation of each was a genuine desideratum. And I have perhaps been overbold in addressing myself to this titanic task, and I, theorefore, meekly offer this book to the indulgence of scholars.

Nevertheless, I want very humbly to submit that my work embodies discovery of new facts observed by myself, of new relations of facts observed by others and constitutes an almost exhaustive study and criticism of the published Sanskrit and English works on the subject. The special features of the book may be broadly outlined thus :—

(i) The first Chapter distinguishes Viparyaya from the Yoga and the Buddhist Vikalpa and from Saṁśaya. Different causes of Viparyaya and its classification dealt with exhaustively.

(ii) The Chapters II—VII deal with theories which are all but unknown or are most imperfectly known. The myth about Bhāskara advocating Anyathākhyāti has been shown to be baseless in Chapter VI.

(iii) In Ch. VIII it has been shown that Sadasat-khyāti is the real Sāṁkhya theory of Error ; three different interpreta-

tions of the theory offered. In Ch. IX it has been shown that Vaibhāṣikas did not uphold Ātma-khyāti. The difference between Viparyaya and Saṁvṛti-satya according to Yogācāra brought out—a point perhaps not discussed by others. A new interpretation of the philosophic position of Yogācāra. In Ch. X I have suggested a new interpretation of the term 'Mādhyamika' and of Mādhyamika philosophy.

(iv) A new interpretation of the Satkhyāti of Rāmānuja, new arguments against it and its variants presented in Ch. XI. In Ch. XII the implications of the Prābhākara theory have been interpreted anew and the view that the older Prābhākaras accepted a third unitary cognition to explain Viparyaya has been disproved and its real sponsor has been traced out.

(v) In Ch. XIII Anyathākhyāti with all its variants has been discussed. A new interpretation of the Yoga view. Maṇḍana's view and the hitherto unexplored dimensions of Kumārila's theory discussed. The Mādhva theory discussed. In Ch. XIV Anirvacanīyakhyāti has been most exhaustively presented. In Ch. XV the Acintyakhyāti of Śrījīva has been presented. In Ch. XVI an eclectic theory of viparyaya has been presented.

In spite of my best efforts, I could not avoid typographical and linguistic blemishes. For all these and for my claim to originality, I crave the indulgence of the masters and of my fore-runners in the field. If I have contradicted many, I have done it by learning much from them and, therefore, mean offence to none.

My sincerest and grateful thanks are due to our most humane Vice-Chancellor of wide erudition who very kindly has prefaced my book with an excellent Foreword. I must thank that radiating, scholarly personality, Dr. Gaurinath Sastri, Principal, Govt. Sanskrit College, West Bengal for offering me all facilities to use the Sanskrit College Library, for taking keen interest in the progress of the work and for going through a few chapters of the book and suggesting improvement thereon. Thanks are also due to Shri. D. Debnath, M. A., Secretary to the Vice-Chancellor for his tenacious interest in publishing the book,

weathering all the storms raised by me now and then. The manager and the compositors of the National Printing Works deserve hearty thanks for rushing the book through the Press amidst heavy odds. It now remains for me to refer with delightful tears to one Dr. Bhattacharya (who should remain incognito), who has been a perpetual source of inspiration to me right from the beginning of my career. He was and is the never-failing propelling force behind my literary pursuits and exhorted, enthused, scolded and battered me with words even like a dictator to make a man of me. I had better stop here, for my words are too effete to express adequate loving gratitude to him.

Rabindra Bharati University THE AUTHOR
19th May, 1965.

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A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

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CHAPTER I

Introductory

"And what then is Viparyaya" ?—One might ask like the Jesting Pilate without waiting for a reply. But, despite all such malign banters, the fact remains that we live in a world of eternal antinomies, a world that is astir with the ever-contending forces of attraction and repulsion, of good and evil, of right and wrong, of truth and falsity. Indeed, like the problem of evil the problem of Viparyaya also is a hard fact of life in contemplation and in action and philosophers and the mass of the people alike have viewed the phenomenon with great misgiving. Down through the centuries of cultural evolution, it has posed as an ontological puzzle, an epistemological curio and a psychological abberration. Hence, Viparyaya has a rightful claim to a systematic study and, as a matter of fact, it has grown to be a major epistemological problem of the philosophies of the East and the West. We, therefore, propose here to attempt a thorough and systematic study of the problem in the light of the deliberations of our Indian Philosophers.

Vallabhācārya in his Nyāya-līlāvatī classifies cognition under two heads, viz., Vidyā and Avidyā. He subdivides Avidyā again into four distinct categories, namely, Saṁ-s'aya, Viparyaya, Svapna and Anadhyavasāya[1]. Puruṣottama also in his prasthāna-ratnākara makes a five-fold division of determinate cognition in which Viparyāsa comes second[2]. The yoga-sūtra of Patañjali considers Viparyaya as one of the five psychical modes (Vṛtti) enunciated in the system[3]. Māṇikya-nandin begins his Parīkṣā-mukha-sūtram with a rigid differentiation of Viparyaya from Pramāṇa as follows : "Pramāṇād artha-saṁsiddhistad-ābhāsād Viparyayaḥ (PMS., Sl. i). Dharmakīrti, the great Buddhist logician, also says : "Atasmiṁstad-graho bhrāntiḥ."

One may not, if at all, see eye to eye with Puruṣottama when he places Viparyāsa under determinate cognition ; but, all must unhesitatingly admit that all the schools of Indian philosophy,

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[1] "Prakās'o buddhiḥ. Sā ca dvividhā vidyā cāvidyā ca. Tatrāvidyā Saṁ s'aya-viparyaya-svapnānadhyavasāya-lakṣaṇā". (NLV., p. 40).

[2] "........Savikalpakaṁ tu pañca-vidham, Saṁs'aya-viparyāsa-nis'caya-smṛti-svāpa-bhedāt". (PR. p. 14).

[3] "Vṛttayaḥ pañcatayyaḥ kliṣṭākliṣṭāḥ .Pramāṇa-viparyaya-vikalpa-nidrā-smṛtayaḥ". (YS., 1.5 and 1.6).

idealist and realist, orthodox and heterodox, are at one in accepting error or Viparyaya as a hard fact of experience. Not to speak of the Samkarites, whose whole system hinges upon Adhyāsa and Avidyā, even the Vedānta schools of Bhāskara, Madhva, Nimbārka, Vallabha and S'rījīva and the systems of Sāṁkhya, Nyāya and the Kumārila school of Pūrva-mīmāṁsā as also the pratyabhijñā and other schools of S'aiva philosophy, besides the systems noticed previously, openly affirm the verity of Error as a distinct cognitive phenomenon. Rāmānuja and Prabhākara also pay homage and fealty to the officious self-assertion of Error, but only relegate it to the domain of our overt action (Pravṛtti) So, error as a sheer fact of experience has never been called into question in Indian philosophy. On the contrary, experience has dispelled the mist of improbability (Asambhāvanā) with regard to it and has imbued it with a reality indubitable and incontestable. One may profitably refer here to the observations of Citsukha on the philosophic attitude that rules out invalid cognition. Besides pointing out that there is an amplitude of causes and conditions which can account for invalid cognition, he curtly asks an unanswerable question to the opponent in the following manner : "What would the opponent say about the cognition of the form 'there is invalid cognition' ? He cannot condemn it as invalid on pain of self-contradictory perdition. Hence, he is compelled to take it as valid and eventually to concede the existence of invalid cognition. ("Kiṁ cāyathārtha-pratyayo' stītyasya pratyayasya yathārthatve tasya sālambana-tvāya kas'cid api ayathārtha-pratyayo' bhyupeya " Tp., p. 62). The implication of the argument is that one cannot maintain a position that threatens with doom one's role as a disputationist. Veṇkaṭanātha clearly asserts the unreasonableness of such a position in the following s'loka : "Na sarvasyāpramāṇatvaṁ svapakṣasya svataḥ kṣateḥ/Na sarvasya pramāṇatvaṁ svapakṣasyā-nyataḥ Kṣateḥ/ /" Np., p. 31, Chowkhāmbā ed.). So, now that error has been shown to be a fact of experience on the strength of arguments and the common consensus of opinion of philosophers of divergent affiliations, we can proceed with it as a subject of our scrutiny. (cf. "Sambhāvitaḥ Pratijñāyāṁ pakṣaḥ sādhyeta hetunā/Na tasya hetubhistrāṇam utpatanneva yo hataḥ/ /")

In pursuance of the traditional maxim "Lakṣaṇa-pramāṇā-bhyāṁhi vastu-siddhiḥ", our study of Error presupposes a definition, though tentative, of Error. In the yoga-sūtra of patañjali 'Viparyaya' is defined as 'a false cognition that takes note of something other than the really presented sense-datum' (cf. 'Viparyayo mithyā-jñānam atad-rūpa-pratiṣṭham". Ys. I. '8). The great S'aṁkara defines error as 'Atasmiṁstad-buddhiḥ' (S'B. on BS., p. 4, vvp.), i.e. an error is 'a cognition of thatness in something other than that : Dharma-kīrti also defines error as "Atasmiṁstad-graho bhrāntiḥ".

It appears from the above that error is an invalid cognition in which one thing is cognised as another, in which we perceive one thing, while the presented sense-datum is some other thing.

We can for the time being rest contented with such a working definition ; but, even here and now we must carefully distinguish between error and doubt (Saṁs'aya), on the one hand, and between error and the Buddhist categories of thought (Vikalpa) on the other. Indeed, the yoga philosophy does not recognise a separate psychical mode called 'Saṁs'aya', but includes it in 'Viparyaya'. Bhojarāja in his Rājamārtaṇḍa-vṛtti explicitly states : "Saṁs'ayo' pyatad-rūpa-pratiṣṭhatvāt mithyājñānam, yathā sthāṇurvā puruṣoveti". (RMV. on YS., p. 4). Hence it is imperative that we should draw a clear line of demarcation between Viparyaya and Saṁs'aya to avoid unnecessary complications in our study of error.

The Nyāya-sūtra of Gotama defines Saṁs'aya in general as the cognition of mutually contrary entities in one and the same substratum ("............Vimars'aḥ Saṁs'ayaḥ", NS., I. 1.23). S'aṅkara Mis'ra also defines saṁs'aya likewise as follows: "Ekasmin dharmiṇi virodhi nānāprakārakaṁ jñānaṁ saṁs'ayaḥ" (upa., VS. II. 2.17). Though neo-logicians do not accept two or more positive entities as the two counter-entities of doubt and assert to the contrary that a doubt-judgment is expressed in the form 'whether it is A or not', 'Sthāṇurna vā' in which only one term is positive (cf. "Sa Saṁs'ayo matiryā Syādekatrābhāva-bhāvayoḥ". BP. Ka. 130), all other thinkers are at one in upholding both the terms of a doubt-judgment as positive. Even Vis'vanātha, a neo-logician, tacitly confirms this universally accepted position when he says : "Kiṁsvinnaro vā sthāṇurvetyādi-buddhistu saṁs'ayaḥ" (Bp., Kā. 129). A viparyaya, however, is expressed in the form 'Idaṁ rajatam', the presented datum in this case being a nacre only. It is now easy to see that both error and doubt are generally concerned with perception, both involve an element of smṛti as also the perception of the common properties of the counter-entities. If we analyse the psychosis or psychoses of a doubt-judgment like 'Sthāṇurvā puruṣovā', we shall find that the eye, though in intercourse with the trunk of a tree, perceives only those properties which are common to both the trunk and a man and does neither perceive the specific properties of any, nor the mutually excluding properties of the two and the perceiver only calls to mind the specific properties of both. (cf. ".......... Puro'vasthite dharmiṇi ūrdhvatvādi-sādhāraṇa-dharma-grahaṇāt sthāṇu-puruṣa-gata-vis'eṣāgrahaṇād-ubhaya-vis'eṣasmṛteḥ saṁs'ayo bhavati". (NM., p. 167, Chowkhāmbā. Also "Sāmānya-pratyakṣāt vis'eṣāpratyakṣāt ubhayavis'eṣasmṛtes'ca saṁs'ayaḥ". Vs. II. 2.17). In an error of the form 'Idaṁ rajatam', the eye contacts a nacre,

but perceives only those properties which are common to both a nacre and a silver, the specific properties of the nacre or the mutually excluding properties of the nacre and the silver not being perceived, and the perceiver calls to mind in this case the specific properties of the silver which the eye then seems to perceive. Thus, while in doubt the specific properties of both the entities are called to mind, in error only those of one are brought before the mind (cf. "Saṁs'aye hyubhayavis'eṣasmaraṇaṁ Kāraṇamiha tvanyatara-vis'eṣa-smaraṇamiti vis'eṣaḥ', NM., p. 167). Moreover, a doubt is a case of indecision, of a hesitant query and excitement, whereas an error has a stamp of certitude and self-composure all about it. Furthermore, the locus of a doubt is veiled from us only in a restricted sense, while that of an error practically completely save for its characteristic of 'thisness' only. To be all the more critical, a doubt is generally dispelled by the non-perception of the specific properties of one of the entities aided by inductive reasoning (Tarka) and the perception of those of the other, as Vācaspati Mis'ra holds, while an error is corrected by the perception of the locus only. Again, a doubt emerges with its dubious character unconcealed, while an error puts on the guise of a valid cognition and only very rarely does it carry along with it the stamp of erroneousness. To put it in other words, a doubt remains a doubt even though known as such, while an error, except for very peculiar cases like the world-illusion, is never during its live career known as such and it vanishes a moment before the sense of erroneousness dawns. (cf. "Sākṣātkṛte tvadhiṣ-ṭhāne samanantaranis'citiḥ/Adhyasyamānaṁ nāstīti bādha ityu-cyate budhaiḥ/ /" (V. Si. Muk., p. 127). Thus we see that a doubt and an error are to be distinguished on various grounds. A doubt, however, may give rise to an error and an error, in its turn, may also end in a doubt. So, logically or psychologically, it is not possible to speak of any invariable anteriority or posteriority in this regard.

We are now confronted with the task of analysing the difference between Viparyaya and Vikalpa of the Buddhists. The yoga-sūtra of patañjali considers vikalpa as a psychosis (Vṛtti) having no objective counterpart, but arising out of verbal knowledge (cf. "S'abdajñānānupātī Vastus'ūnyo vikalpaḥ/Ys. I. 9.). The commonest example of a pātañjala vikalpa is 'Rāhoḥ S'iraḥ'. As stated in the vyāsa-Bhāṣyam, this vikalpa is not to be included in viparyaya inasmuch as it helps linguistic usage and is unavoidably linked up with our common-sense pattern of thought. This vikalpa is but a vague ideation arising out of positive, predicative and negative terms and is thus of three kinds, namely, (1) *Vastuvikalpa,* (2) *Kriyāvikalpa,* and (3) *Abhāva*-vikalpa. To put it in the words of Carveth Read, a vikalpa is a 'conception

on the strength of concepts representing nothing'. But this vikalpa is not to be equated with the vikalpa or the kalpanā of the Buddhists. According to the Buddhists, the indeterminate perception which takes note of the 'Svalakṣaṇa' only of the presented datum is the only valid perception ; the *determinate* perception is presentative-representative in character and here the mind is more a lender than a borrower. It invests the cognitum with a name, a universal and the like which are not its part and parcel, nor are even anything having objective reality and as such it is invalid. For, such a position cannot stand the scrutiny of the correspondence theory of truth as is advocated by the Buddhists (cf. "Artha-*sārūpyamasya* pramāṇam......" NV. Ch. I, p. 103. Peterson's edition). By vikalpa the Buddhists thus understand this 'Nāma', 'Jāti' etc. which are unsubstantial (cf. "Vikalpo vastunirbhāsād-asaṁvādādupaplavaḥ" Pv. ; also 'Vikalpo nāmasaṁśrayaḥ' Ibid). Dignāga says 'Nāmajātyādyasaṁ-yutam' by way of explaining the word 'Kalpanā'. Dharmakīrti in his NB says : "Abhilāpa-saṁsarga-yogya-pratibhāsa-pratītiḥ kalpanā" (p. 103, Peterson's ed.). That is to say, a 'Kalpanā' is that kind of cognition whose content is apt to be associated with verbal expressions. To be brief, a 'Kalpanā, or a 'Vikalpa' is a purely subjective construction, a figment of imagination and has no objective reality behind it. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his Nyāya-Mañjarī explains this 'Kalpanā' thus : "These subjective constructions are five-fold ; namely, genus, quality, action, name and substance. And these are called 'Kalpanā, since they assume difference in identity and identity in difference. (cf. "Pañca caitāḥ kalpanā bhavanti—jātikalpanā guṇa-kalpanā kriyā-kalpanā nāmakalpanā dravya-kalpanā ceti. Tāśca Kvacidabhede' pibheda-kalpanāt kvacicca bhede' pyabheda-kalpanāt kalpanā ucyante". NM., p. 122, Beng. ed.). These conceptual constructions do not arise from the sense-datum and, thus being divorced from the objective reality, are characterised by a variable, blurred *apprehension* and this accounts for their invalidity. (cf. "Vikalpa-vijñānaṁ tvarthānnotpadyate. Tataḥ Pratibhāsa-niyama-hetorabhāvād-aniyata-pratibhāsam". NB. T., p. 10).

Now, a question naturally arises. If these vikalpas are mere conceptual constructions not conversant with reality and are sheer 'perversion of relations' as Dr. S. Mookerji so aptly characterises them, why are they not sublated even like errors and illustions ? The answer is that a vikalpa does not partake of the character of errors and illusions. When one entity appears as another as in the case of the solar rays being perceived as water, we have scope for a subsequent sublative experience. This is just the domain of errors and illusions. But, here in regard to vikalpa, the conceptual constructions like the genus are not

discrete and distinct entities beside the self-characterised 'svalakṣaṇa and as such they are not amenable to cognition as distinct entities. On the contrary, all these vikalpas of identity and difference refer to the suigeneris individual as their substratum. So, no contradicting cognition occurs with regard to them, as they never present themselves as distinct entities. Hence, these vikalpas are not of the nature of Viparyaya. They are not to be reckoned as valid cognitions either, since the genus etc. are unsubstantial. So, these vikalpas are neither 'pramāṇa', nor 'Viparyaya', but belong to a third category. (cf. "Tat kathamāsu bādhakaḥ pratyayo na jāyate s'uktikā-rajata-buddhivat ? Ucyate—yatra vastu vastv-antarātmanā' vabhāsate, tatra bādhako bhavati marīciṣviva jala-buddhau ; iha tu na jātyādi vastvantaramasti, yato vastva-ntarātmanāsya graho bhavet. Vyaktiviṣayā evaite sāmā-nādhikaraṇya-vaiyadhikaraṇya-vikalpāḥ. Tasmād vastavantarā-navabhāsiṣveṣu na bādhaka-pratyayo jāyate. Tasmānna viparya-yātmāno vikalpāḥ. na caite pramāṇam, etad-ullikhyamānasya jātyāderapāramārthika-tvāt. Ata eva pramāṇa-viparyayābhyā-manya eva vikalpa ityācakṣata ityalaṁ vistareṇa". (NMP., P. 124) ; Even if the Buddhist is pushed to a tight corner and marooned by the deluge of onslaughts of the rival philosophers, he can readily have recourse to a strategic retreat and hold fast to the irreducible minimum of the import of the word 'kalpanā' as his last citadel reiterating with added vehemence the insuperable claim of verbal association, whether actual or potential, as the unassailable import of 'Kalpanā'. Dr. Mookerji brings this position into bold relief when he unswervingly states : "........ S'āntarakṣita.... had to admit at last that verbal association alone is sufficient to characterise kalpanā" (Flux, P. 284). Indeed, S'āntarakṣita in his Tattvasaṁgraha fought hard to maintain his original position, but ultimately gave in and took resort to blinking prudery which practically left his venerable master in the lurch. (cf. "Satyaṁ lokānuvṛttye'dam uktaṁ nyāyavide' dṛs'am/iyān eva hi s'abde'smin vyavahārapathaṁ gataḥ/ /" T. S., Sl. 1228).

Now, we can easily appreciate the special features of each of the triad, namely, the Pātañjala Vikalpa, the Buddhist Vikalpa and Error. Though a Pātañjala Vikalpa assumes difference in identity except in cases of Abhāva-Vikalpa, it differs from the Buddhist Vikalpa in this regard that in it both the terms of judgment are real, though in a different context, while in the latter one term is unreal and imaginary. The main point about the Pātañjala Vikalpa is its unthinkability in a particular context or absolutely in the case of Abhāva-Vikalpa, though our linguistic habit and work-a-day thought-pattern under-lying it adheres to it unwittingly. Though it might seem paradoxical, our relational thought has a tendency to queer, if not Quixotic, abstractions, and we thus arrive at an absolute that is relative and workable.

The Pātañjala Vikalpa is the result of this tendency of abstraction, while a Buddhist Vikalpa is akin to the 'categories of thought' of Kant, in the sense of spontaneous thought-construction involved in cognition. While the latter is a 'working error', as Dr. Mookerji points out so felicitously, the former is a working thinkable. The Buddhists even like the Sankarites, postulate different grades of reality, viz. (1) 'Saṁvṛti-satya' which is equivalent to the 'Vyāvahārika satya' of the sankarites, and (2) 'paramārtha satya'. (cf. Dve satye samupās'ritya buddhānāṁ dharmades'anā/ Loke saṁvṛ ti-satyañca satyañca paramārthataḥ//") The vikalpas are saṁvṛ ti-satya', while errors are 'Saṁvṛtimithyā'. If the latter give to 'an airy nothing a local habitation and a name', the former are fairly 'true to the kindred points of heaven and home'. An error, however, is neither an abstraction, nor a conceptual construction, but is a common cognitive phenomenon with all the airs of normalcy, though seldom surviving the acid test of an identity parade.

So, we can safely and summarily dispose of Vikalpas of whatever brand as having no essential bearing upon a study of errors and illusions.

II

Before embarking straightaway on a study of errors, it is necessary that we should be conversant with the different varieties of Error as also its varying causes and conditions. An observation, that is cooped up within a narrow compass and shuts out the ever-expanding diversity of experience, is apt to be condemned as malobservation. Indeed, a sweeping induction that fights shy of too much of afferent stimuli turns out verily to be a protean untruth. A study of error must comprise a systematic explanation of any kind of error and should not be slipshod and fragmentary, erratic and shaky. It is possible only when our theorising looks facts in the face and reckons with the richness and variety of errors and illusions. So, we propose here to classify errors from different points of view.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his NM. speaks of two distinct kinds of error, namely, (1) one that is peripherally excited, and (2) one that is centrally excited. (cf. "Tathāhi dvividhā bhrāntirbāhyendriyajā mānasī ca". NM., P. 110, Chowkhāmbā). The former has some sense-datum for its excitant and is so called 'Sālambana bhrama' i.e. an illusion proper. The latter, which is purely mental, has no external stimuli to contend with and is 'nirālambana'. So, in modern terminology it is 'hallucination'. The former, again, is subdivided by Jayanta into two according as it is due to some defects in the external stimuli (Viṣaya-doaṣ)

or due to defects of the peripheral organs (Indriya-doṣa). The experience of a fiery circle from a revolving fire-brand (Ālātacakra) is an instance of the first type, while the experience of a yellow conch-shell is an instance of the second type being due to the jaundiced eye. Puruṣottama, however, in his Prasthāna-ratnākara contends that, in the ultimate analysis, illusions must be assigned to defects of peripheral organs inasmuch as these defects are inalienably necessary for any illusion to occur and also as it is in harmony with the law of parsimony (lāghava). (cf. "Ayaṁ ca viṣayadoṣāt Karṇadoṣācca bhavati .... Vastutastvāvas'yakatvātlāghavācca Karaṇ adoṣadeveti nis'cayaḥ" PR., p. 16-17). The Mādhvas take exception to this position and hold that organic disorder is no cause of illusion, but that does not make it a hallucination either. They assert that in an illusion there is nothing wrong with the sensory stimuli, the sensory mechanism and the afferent and efferent nervous tracts ; but what happens is that 'the incoming stimuli are wrongly interpreted' as R. Nāgarāja S'armā puts it in his 'Reign of Realism'. Be that as it may, Jayanta's classification is based upon the varying nature of the exciting cause of error. As an instance of hallucination, we may cite the perception of the image of the beloved when she is really far off. S'rīdhara, author of the Nyāyakandalī divides peripherally excited errors into 'nirvikalpaka' and 'savikalpaka'. The former, according to him, is due to pathological disorders of the peripheral organs alone and are simply presentative. The yellow conch-shell is an instance in point. The rope-snake, on the contrary, is an example of the savikalpaka type. This classification of S'rīdhara rests upon the intrinsic nature of invalid cognition. Jayasiṁhasūrī, again, in his Nyāyatātparyadīpikā divides viparyaya (Error) as follows :— "Viparyayo dvidhā' nubhūyamānāropaḥ smaryamāṇāropas'ca" (p. 60, Cal. ed.). That is to say, the first kind of error is a superimposition of an actually perceived object on another object present to a sense-organ. An illusory perception of bitter molasses, of a yellow conch-shell and, according to Jayasiṁha, of the double moon even belongs to this kind of error. The other kind of error occurs when a memory-image is superimposed upon a presented sense-datum. The rope-snake or the nacre-silver is an instance of this variety. Evidently this classification takes note of the nature of the super-imposed entity. From a different standpoint, errors may be divided into 'Sopādhika' i.e. those that are caused by some adventitious adjuncts (upādhi) contaminating the presented sense-data, and 'nirupādhika' i.e. those that make no room for any such contaminating factor. The red crystal is an example of the first variety, while the rope-snake and the like are instances of the second. From the stand-point of causal efficiency, the Buddhists, again, draw a line between two kinds of

error which they call "Saṁvādī' and 'Visaṁvādī' respectively. As Dharmakīrti proclaims, "Bhrāntirapi Sambandhataḥ pramā". When an error, as for example, the cognition of the ray of a jewel as the jewel itself, brings in its wake successful activity, it is "Saṁvādī' and when it is the other way round, it is called 'Visaṁvādī' (cf. 'Maṇipradīpaprabhayor-maṇi-buddhyā' bhidhāvatoḥ/Mithyājñānāvis'eṣe'pi Vis'eṣo'rthakriyāṁ prati", PB). Again errors may be divided into timeless (Anādi) and temporal ones. The world-illusion, which has no beginning in time, is of the former type and the illusion of the rope-serpent, the nacre-silver etc., which are ushered into being at particular points of time, are of the second order. There is, yet again, another type of errors that is of an abiding nature and, despite the corrective cognition, persists as a psychological phenomenon all the same. This is indicated by Vācaspati by explaining the word 'Avabhāsa' in S'aṅkara's definition of Adhyāsa as 'Avasanno' vamato vā bhāso' vabhāsaḥ' where, as Amalānanda says, 'avasāda' means 'uccheda' i.e. destruction and 'avamāna' means logical sublation (cf. "Avasāda ucchedaḥ avamāno yauktikatiras-kāraḥ" VK., p. 18). These in their turn may again be divided into (1) those that are called empiric realities by the Samkarites, and are never corrected de facto and (2) those that are corrected only when the frame of reference is altered. The world-illusion is of the first type and the illusions of the bent stick, of the yellow conch-shell, of a parallax and the like are of the second order. Adhyāsa, which is the central point of viparyaya according to the samkarites, has been sub-divided in the following manner : (1) Svarūpādhyāsa i.e. integral superimposition ; e.g. 'I am this', 'I am a man' etc. (2) Saṁsargādhyāsa as in the case of 'my body' etc., (3) Āhāryādhyāsa i.e. purposive superimposition which is adopted by the s'āstras in regard to symbolic worship (Pratīkopāsanā) as in the case of a slab of stone of a certain shape being considered as Viṣṇu, (4) Dharmādhyāsa i.e. attributive superimposition, (5) Dharmyadhyāsa i.e. substantive superimposition, (6) Sambandhādhyāsa (7) Arthādhyāsa i.e. superimposition of one cognitum upon another, and (8) Jñānādhyāsa i.e. cognitional superimposition. Thus we see that Viparyaya admits of various classes and sub-classes which should be carefully scanned before building up any epistemological theory or any theory about errors.

As regards the causes of various types of Viprayaya, Jayanta makes the following statement : More often than not an error is invested with a form presented in recollection and the cause of this recollection varies according to the exigencies of the situation. Sometimes it is the cognition of similarity and sometimes it is due to lust, sorrow and the like ; somewhere it is the habitual perception of an entity and elsewhere it is caused by the cataract of the eye ; now it is evoked by somnolence and then it

appears in the wake of anxiety; elsewhere it is due to the pathological disorder of the bodily humours and, in the absence of any other observable cause, 'Adṛṣṭa' (merit or demerit) is to be assumed as the cause. (cf. "Ākāraḥ smṛtyupārudhaḥ prāyeṇa sphurati bhrame / smṛteṣu kāraṇaṁ kiñcit Kadācid bhavati kvacit / / Kvacit sādṛs'yavijñānaṁ kāmas'okādayaḥ kvacit / kvacittaddars'anābhyāsastimiraṁ cakṣusaḥ kvacit / / kvacinnidrā kvaciccintā dhātūnāṁvikṛtiḥ kvacit / Alakṣyamāṇe taddhetāvadṛṣṭaṁ smṛtikāraṇaṁ // NM., P. 101, 2nd pt., Beng. ed.).

Dharmakīrti in his NB asserts that organic disorders like cataract, fast movement, journey by boat and irritation of the bodily humours are some among the various causes of error. (cf. Timirās'ubhramaṇa-nauyāna-saṁkṣobhādyanāhita-vibhramaṁ jñānaṁ pratyakṣam, NB., P. 103, Peterson's ed.)

Dharmottara in his gloss on NB analyses the said causes and classifies them one by one. Thus he calls cataract and the like the organic causes of error; fast movement is a cause that has the cognitum as its substratum; the error arising during a journey by boat is caused by the peculiar conditions of the conveyance. Finally, errors arising out of 'Saṁkṣobha' are assigned to the physical state of the perceiver as their cause. Dharmottara thinks, however, that in the ultimate analysis, the perversion of sense-organs is the cause of errors; for, how can organic error at all emerge when the organ is quite alright? (cf. "Sarvaireva ca vibhrama-kāraṇair-indriya-viṣayabāhyādhyātmikās'raya-gatair indriyameva vikartavyam. Avikṛte indriya indriya-bhrāntyayogāt". NBT., p. 12, Peterson's ed.). Without going into further details, we may profitably bottle up the various causes of error in the following manner: Error is due either to (1) defects in the conditions of perception, or to (2) wrong operation of the sense-organs with regard to their objects (Asamprayoga), or due to (3) subconscious impressions. The first type may be subdivided thus: (i) defects in the external stimuli, e.g. similarity, mobility, distance etc., (ii) the movement of our conveyance which gives rise to illusions like the parallax, (iii) defects in the external medium of perception, e.g. ālokamalīmasatva, refraction of light etc., (iv) pathological disorders of the peripheral organs, (v) pathological disorders of the bodily humours, (vi) defects in the central sensory (manodoṣa) and (vii) defects in the self.

Though errors may arise from pseudo-inference and pseudo-scriptures, indeed from any pseudo-pramāṇa, we are here principally concerned with errors of perception, and are not inclined to deal with the errors of inference, analogy, presumption and the like (cf. "Sa ca pratyakṣānumānāgamābhāsebhyo jāyate" PC., P. 134, C. U. ed.).

III

Error as a psychological phenomenon had been a veritable bugbear to the Indian philosophers of every age and it had gnawed disquietingly into their logical consciousness and had ridden roughshod over their ontological conscience and its complacent moorings. Philosophy, if anything, is a critique of knowledge, and the problem of error is bristling with so many epistemological perplexities of grave concern that no philosophy can conscientiously play false with it and turn a deaf ear to its persistent and sumptuous bickerings. Every philosophy has its own scheme of epistemology and India also had witnessed through the ages a long array of epistemological systems which evince an irredeemable bable of tongues that threaten to make confusion worse confounded. Indeed, as Dr. S. N. Das Gupta observes, "There is a lot of confusion in this concept of error or ignorance, and the philosopher incapable of explaining it is content with leaving it untouched as the flourish of the irrational in experience". (Philosophical essays, P. 229). Without sharing the sarcasm concealed in the above observation, we can safely submit that the problem is a titanic one and it grew a thousand-fold more problematic with our philosophers because of their ontological obsessions and the religious fetishes which served as bottle-necks to free intellectual output. As Dr. Asutosh Bhattacharya observes in his "Studies in Post-Samkara dialectics" with abundant insight and felicity of expression, "Epistemological estimation should be based upon the testimony of psychology and logic and it is bound to err when metaphysical preoccupations are allowed to warp the epistemological vision". Indeed, our illustrious philosophers seem to be guilty of putting the cart before the horse ; it seems to be a transparent truism that their epistemology was a direct deduction from their metaphysics instead of being the other way round. Their religious bias grafted on their intellectual vision inelastic ontological specks and they could hardly go the way of a freelance in philosophic wrangles*. We, however, hear it told that a certain philosophy is realistic in epistemology and idealistic in metaphysics. But, in the ultimate analysis, it seems to be a pious platitude without even a semblance of truth. This bias accounts for the fact why much of their intellectual energy, with its unparalleled vigour and acuteness, was misspent on a wild-goose chase. We do not intend here to adjudge the methodology of our indigenous philosophies, nor the psychological conscience of our philosophers. Our endeavour here is only to highlight the curious fact that every system of Indian philosophy had its

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* I make this bitter comment rather by way of self-criticism. In point of fact, all conscious thought-constructions proceed more or less from sub-conscious ideational urges.

own epistemology whether it had the sanction of experience or not. That is why the problem of error has been discussed by every philosopher in his own way and the result is that we get as many theories of error as there are systems of philosophy in our country.

A theory of error goes by the name of 'Khyātivāda' in Indian philosophy. Though the word 'Khyāti' has been from time immemorable used in the sense of cognition, it etymologically means both 'cognition' and 'presentation' (to cognition) and the logic underlying the christening of a theory of error as 'Khyātivāda' is that such a theory has to discuss and assure itself of the ontological character of the 'presentation' in question. The philosopher engaged in a study of error has to explain the entitative value of the presentation, its why and how and thus 'the presentation' is his principal concern. So, it is not inept to use the word Khyātivāda for a theory of error.

The number of Khyātivādas current in Indian philosophy is almost a legion. Sometimes a single name represents theories which are widely divergent in their minute details and which, in fact, have been differently propped up. Not only this ; there are at least a few instances where two theories pass by the same name, but have nothing in common except the finally demonstrated conclusion. We shall even chance upon theories passing under the identical name where there is no agreement even in conclusion. Indeed, appearances will certainly be deceptive in this regard and we should not patch up any facile equation, deluded by the advances of nomenclature. On the other hand, we have evidence of a few theories being each differently named by different philosophers. The situation grows all the more perplexing, when we find these theories being classified now ontologically, then psychologically and logically. Thus Vimuktātman in his Iṣṭasiddhi classifies the principal theories of illusion thus :—"Rajataṁ bhāti yad bhrāntau tat sadeke pare tvasat/ Anye' nirvacanīyaṁ tadāhustena vicāryyate/ /" (IS., Sl. 2, ch. I, G.O.S.). He then proceeds to subdivide the 'satpakṣa' into three distinct theories, namely, Ātmakhyāti, Akhyāti and Anyathākhyāti. (cf. "Tatra satpakṣa-stridhā bhinna·–Ātmakhyātir-akhyātir-anyathākhyātiriti". Ibid, p. 40). The word 'Satkhyāti', however, invariably and unwittingly brings to our mind the ontological theory of error of the great Rāmānuja whose toursde force to support it are symptomatic of a peculiar feature of Indian philosophy. On the other extreme, it seems apparently to pass one's understanding how the Buddhist theory of Ātmakhyāti with its patent idealistic nuances could be emboxed within 'Satkhyāti' along with Akhyāti and Anyathākhyāti. So, we must steer clear of any kind of fetishism or idolatry in our metaphysical quest,

lest we fail to capture the real spirit of the dissertations of our masters.

The great S'aṅkara in his superb "Adhyāsa-bhāṣyam" puts forward the different theories of error one by one by way of explaining the concept 'Adhyāsa'. He does not, however, affix any names to these theories, but his scholiasts zealously address themselves to this purpose and never fail to point out that this or that theory belongs to this or that school. S'aṅkara begins his discussion with his own definition of 'Adhyāsa' which is as follows: "smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ" (SB., Pp. 17-18, A. K. S'āstri's ed.). According to S'aṅkara, then, Adhyāsa is a presentation, simulating recollection, of some precognised entity in some other entity.

He then notices with abundant brevity the divergent views on this issue. As he himself says, "taṁ kecit anyatrā-nyadharmādhyāsa iti vadanti. Kecittu yatra yadadhyāsastasyaiva viparītadharmatvakalpanām ācakṣate iti". (Ibid, pp. 18-32). The commentator Amalānanda in his Vedāntakalpataru points out that the first view is to be called Ātmakhyāti which is upheld, as Apyaya Dīkṣita persuades us, by all the three Buddhist schools of the Vaibhāṣikas, the sautrāntikas and the yogācāras. (cf. "Anyatrānyadharmādhyāsa iti bhāṣyaṁ dharmagrahaṇena buddhyākāratvasūcanādātmakhyātyanuvādārtham". VK., pp. 25-26; also "Bāhyāstitvavādinor-vaibhāṣika-sautrāntikayoḥ sat s'uktis'akalādikamadhiṣṭhānam, tannāstitva-vādino yogācārasya tvavidyākalpitaṁ tadadhiṣṭhānamityevaṁ matabhedenādhiṣṭhānabhedamāhetyarthaḥ" VKP., pp. 26). The second view he calls Akhyātivāda and the third he asserts to be Anyathākhyātivāda. Thus we get from S'aṅkara evidence of four different theories of error including his own view called Anirvacanīyakhyāti.

Prabhāchandra in his Prameyakamala-Mārtaṇḍa speaks of seven different theories of illusion, namely, (1) Akhyāti, (2) Asatkhyāti, (3) Prasiddhārthakhyāti, (4) Ātmakhyāti, (5) Anirvacanīyārthakhyāti, (6) Viparītārthakhyāti and (7) Smṛtipramoṣa or Vivekākhyāti. (cf. "Kiñca ayaṁ Viparyayo'khyātim, Asatkhyātim, Prasiddhārthakhyātim, Ātmakhyātim, sad-asattvādyanirvacanīya-khyātim, viparītārtha-khyātim, smṛtipramoṣaṁ vābhipretya nirākriyeta prakārāntarāsambhavāt?" PKM., p. 48, NSP.). Vādidevasūrī, another Jaina philosopher, and Jayasiṁhasūrī mention another theory of error called 'Alaukikārthakhyāti', thus bringing the number of khyātivādas to eight. (cf. "Atra vādināṁ vivekākhyātyakhyātyasatkhyātiprasiddhārthakhyātyātmakhyāti - sadasattvādyanirvacanīyārtha - khyātyalaukikārtha - khyātiviparīta-khyātirūpā aṣṭau vipratipattayaḥ santi. NTD., p. 66, Cal. ed.). We can further add to this long list the satkhyāti of

Rāmānuja and some other Vaiṣṇava philosophers and the sadasatkhyāti of sāṁkhya. So, the number of khyātivādas ultimately mounts to ten in all. We are, then, concerned here with these ten theories of Error and our endeavour should be to present and elucidate these theories one by one and to examine the arguments for and against them and finally to submit our own observations on them, however modest they might be. But, we should be failing in our duty if we do not mention here the nirviṣaya-khyāti of the followers of Patañjali and Niradhiṣṭhāna-khyāti as pointed out by Veṇkaṭanātha and Anyakhyāti of Bālakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa, a thinker of the S'uddhādvaita school of Vallabhācārya. We shall briefly discuss these theories also and make our observations thereon.

IV

The traditional method of examining a theory of error is to raise the queries of why and how with regard to the origin of the illusory experience, the consequent activity prompted by it, and its subsequent sublation. That is to say, we are to explain the genesis of the illusion psychologically, and try to show in conformity with a particular theory how the experience prompts one to activity and how it is finally sublated. If any theory fails to give a good account of itself in these three aspects of the problem, it invariably stands self-condemned. We also shall advisedly follow this method of appraisal in our proposed study of errors.

A theory of errors and illusions may be studied from different points of view. Thus, we may approach the problem psychologically and logically, or ontologically, or even physiologically. While logic and psychology are invariably connected with metaphysics, physiology does, on no account, share a similar privilege. Not that metaphysics shuts out the results of physiological investigations,—for, it is said to systematise the data supplied by the different sciences—but that it reduces the latter to a poor stature by using it as grist for its ontological mill. Logic and psychology, on the other hand, are the two tentacles of this giant-worm with which it absorbs anything it comes across. Indeed, it brings home to our mind the patent difference between metaphysics and the sciences, we mean the difference in attitude. Two molecules of hydrogen, when chemically combined with one molecule of oxygen, gives you water is no manner of explanation for a philosopher. That is why physiology, however well-intentioned it might be, has no real claims in the domain of philosophy, of which it might at its best serve as a hinterland, and hence we excuse ourselves the task of attacking the problem from that standpoint. This attitude of ours should

not be construed as being prompted by or being quite on all fours with that of our philosophers ; for, it will be a travesty of truth to assert that our philosophers had nothing to do with the physiology of errors. On the contrary, they, as facts amply bear out, did certainly attempt here and there a physiological analysis of the phenomenon of error as a foreward to their theoretic formulations, but their analysis in this regard was conspicuous by its brevity and it never attained any measure of self-sufficiency. Nor should we be misconstrued as attaching practically no importance on a physiological study. That is not surely at the back of our mind. Indeed, physiology can serve as a concrete corrective to the vagaries of metaphysical abstractions, to the logical and even psychological extravagances and in this aspect its services may be requisitioned by us now and then ; but, we shall, in general, avoid bringing in physiological issues in our proposed study.

Philosophy in India was never a strange interlude or an atrocious parenthesis in our life. On the contrary, it was the philosophy of life actually lived and as such it was never divorced from religion whose raison d'être was supplied by it. If 'work is worship' is the provencal proverb, 'contemplation is worship' is the Indian adage. In the circumstances, Indian philosophy of the last two millenia had been sectarian and denominational, to say the least. This fact fostered in our philosophers, to some extent, illogical tenaciousness, prejudiced thinking, inequitous criticism and facile claptrap which seem obnoxious to a moderner who grows instantly allergic to all these vagaries of our philosophers. We, however, propose to take here an impartial, nonsectarian attitude and shall try our level best to assess the intrinsic worth of every theory without any bias or bigotry. So, our method of approach will be partly in agreement with our philosophers and disharmonious in those parts where a modern mind will naturally rise in revolt against them for their unrealistic exuberance of wrangles, quibbles and other uncharitable contrivances.

CHAPTER II

NIRVIṢAYAKHYĀTI

This is a theory of errors which one comes across very rarely in the history of Indian philosophy. We find reference to this Nirviṣayakhyāti in Veṅkaṭanātha's Nyāyaparis'uddhi, Nyāya-siddhāñjana and Tattvamuktākalāpa. But Veṅkaṭa's treatment of this Khyāti was perhaps never followed up seriously by any of his successors ; nor can we possibly point out any illustrious predecessor of his who might have advocated such a view or discussed it with a view to its refutation. Vyomas'ivācārya, however, in his Vyomavatīvṛtti on Pras'astapāda Bhāṣya of Vais'eṣika Sūtras might seem to refer to such a view. Let us present here the situation in its original setting. Pras'astapāda in his Bhāṣya, while discussing Viparyaya, refers to a rather unusual phenomenon. He says that there are cases where, though no sense-perception is actually in evidence, one has the consciousness of having sense-perception. As an instance, he cites the case of one who seems to visualise nocturnal darkness, when what he actually sees is the cloudless sky which is like the inert ocean and is as dark as a huge lump of pulverized collyrium. (cf. "Asatyapi pratyakṣe pratyakṣābhimāno bhavati yathā vyapagata-ghana-paṭalamacala-jalanidhisadṛs'am ambaram añjanacūrṇa-punja-s'yāmaṁ s'ārvaraṁ tama iti". P. Bh., P. 538). Here Vyomas'ivācārya places on record the fact that some explain the above statement of Pras'astapāda as referring to Nirviṣaya Viparyaya. (cf. "Asatyapi Pratyakṣe pratyakṣābhimāna ityādinā nirviṣayaṁ Viparyayamāheti Kecit". (VV., p. 541). Indeed, it is rather difficult to decipher what Pras'astapāda and Vyomas'iva intend to bring home to our mind here. Apparently it might seem that they are simply referring to a particular variety of errors that is nirviṣaya. But, here nirviṣaya cannot be taken to mean 'content-less' inasmuch as nocturnal darkness is the content in the example cited by Pras'astapāda ; nor can we equate it with 'nirālambana viparyaya' ; for, in that case, Pras'astapāda should have had no occasion for describing vividly the external environs of the invalid cognition in question. The situation grows all the more intriguing when we focus our attention upon the words 'Asatyapi pratyakṣe'. For, how can one hold that one does not have any sense-perception despite the fact that one sees nocturnal darkness? If one argues that perception is denied simply because one does not in this case see nocturnal darkness in reality, then the argument holds equally good in many other cases of error. Apart

from that, one cannot deny the character of perception to such a cognition, whatever the cognitum might be. One might, however, try to bring such a cognition into line with cases of acquired perception like 'Surabhi candanaṁ pas'yāmi' ; but the example cited by Pras'astapāda does not warrant such a hypothesis. In the circumstances, it is extremely risky to make any definite pronouncement on this issue. It seems, however, pretty sure that what we get here is but a variety of errors and has nothing to do with any theory of error. So, it is futile to trace here the origin of the Nirviṣayakhyāti as defined by Veṅkaṭa. (Incidentally, it may be pointed out here that Pras'astapāda hits upon a simple truth about Viparyaya expressed naively by him in "Asatyapi pratyakṣe pratyakṣābhimānaḥ". We seem to perceive where there is no real perception. This, however, leads to Anyathā-khyāti.)

S'rīnivāsadāsa, a scholiast of Veṅkaṭa's Nyāyaparis'uddhi, however, fathers this theory upon a minor section of Advaitins and substantiates his position by quoting from a book of this school a hemistich which asserts that in an error one has a contentless psychosis which is but a semblance of cognition (cf. "yathāhuḥ jñāne nirviṣayā vṛttirjñānābhāsatayeṣyate "NS., on NP., p. 52, chowkhāmbā). Since my aim is more critical than historical, I have readily excused myself the task of tracing the hemistich to its source. Curiously enough, the scholiast seems to be rather shaky and in doubt about the truth of his statement and suggests as an alternative the Pātañjala Vikalpa which might stand here for nirviṣayā khyāti (cf. "Yadvā S'abdajñānānupātī vastus'ūnyo vikalpa" iti nara-s'ṛṅgādi-s'ravaṇānantaramavas'yaṁ bhavatyeva nirviṣayā vṛttiryā sā vikalpa itipātañjalāḥ.") As we have already seen in our 'Introductory', a pātañjala vikalpa can by no means be called a viparyaya, not to speak of its representing a theory of error. It is really strange how S'rīnivāsa, a scholar of no mean repute, could make such an unwary statement and how Dr. S. N. Das Gupta could glide over it by simply referring to this theory in the following words: "Veṅkaṭa mentions Nirviṣayā khyāti through linguistic usage of the followers of Patañjali". Be that as it may, the theory has not been elucidated by Veṅkaṭa in his Nyāyaparis'uddhi where he only refutes it in the s'loka "Viṣayālīka-bhāvādau" etc. But, S'rīnivāsa supplies us with the rationale of this theory in his commentary called Nyāyasāra. He says : A certain section of Advaitins actuated by a zeal for avoiding the irrationality in the aspect of subsequent sublation of an invalid cognition in general, or as sought to be established in the theory of Anirvacanīya-khyāti, assert that the cognitions of the nacre-silver type have no content at all. If an invalid cognition has a content, what on earth does throw it into dis-repute and taint it as invalid ? So, they would argue, it has no content and only

then can it be contradicted and sublated. In our everyday experience, we see that a cognition sets at naught another just preceding it. The cognition of a jar that wakes up in my mind at this moment must make headway through the ashes of the cognition of (say) a piece of cloth of the previous moment. But, that does not invalidate the cognition of the jar. Moreover, a cognition lasts either for a moment or for two, and then it dies a natural death. So, it is only a truism to point out that contradiction or sublation is of a piece with cognition and that can ill afford to draw an invidious distinction between cognition and cognition. Again, it passes one's understanding how a cognition differing from another in its content, can sound its death-knell and why a latter cognition should enjoy the proud privilege of cancelling a previous one and not vice versa. Nor can one assuredly hit upon the proper object of Bādha (Sublation) : Is it the cognition that is sublated, or the cognitum, or else our behaviour prompted by the cognition ? Neither of the alternatives stands to reason and hence it is safe to conclude that an invalid cognition is devoid of any content. Thus, as presented by S'rīnivāsa, the theory robs peter to pay Paul in that it outright disposes of the verdict of experience and welcomes reason as the sole 'open sesame' to philosophical problems. Its rationalism is also a negativistic one born of a kind of atrophy of reason itself.

Veṅkaṭa finds fault with this theory and criticises it in the following s'lokas : "Viṣayālīkabhāvādau khyātyantara-parigrahaḥ/ Anullekhastu rūpyādidhīrityuktyā nibarhitaḥ". Let us sum up the arguments of Veṅkaṭa against this theory, following the gloss of S'rīnivāsa. The opponent is to explain what he means by 'Nirviṣaya'. It may mean the non-existence of the viṣaya (cognitum) ; but that would be giving quarter to Asatkhyāti, which theory can by no means be accepted simply because what is an utterly naught can never be cognised. Or, it may mean indescribable subsistence (mithyātva) which would fling open the gates for Anirvacanīyakhyāti. The word may, again, mean the absence of viṣaya in the particular locus. That would transport the opponent into the unwelcome realms of Anyathākhyāti. For, the opponent then cognises as present in a particular place an object that is really absent there. Thus, in any of these views of the situation, Nirviṣayā Khyāti is resolved into some other khyāti. If, however, the opponent means to say that no object appears in an invalid cognition, he contradicts himself. For, how can a cognition be called a cognition of silver, unless a silver is revealed in that cognition, and how, again, can one maintain in the same breath that this is a cognition of silver, though no silver appears in it ? Thus this theory stands self-condemned (cf. "Nirviṣayas'abdena kiṁ viṣayasyālīkatvam ucyate uta pratipanno-pādhiniṣṭhābhāvapratiyogitvātmakaṁ mithyātvam ucyate āhosvit

tatrāvidyamānatvaṁ yadvā viṣayānullekha eva. Ādye' satkhyātyāpattiḥ. Na ceṣṭāpattiḥ. Pratītiviṣayasyālīkatvavyāghātāt. Dvitīye' nirvacanīyakhyātireva syāt. Tṛtīye'nyathākhyātiḥ. Tatrāvidyamānasya vidyamānatvena bhānābhyupagamāt. Caturthe rajatādijñānasya nirviṣayatvam ityuktirvyāvṛttaiva syāt. Rajatādyanullekhe kathaṁ tasya rajatajñānatvaṁ rajatajñānatve ca kathaṁ rajatānullekha iti doṣānāha". NS., P. 52, Chowkhāmbā).

We for ourselves beg to submit here further that a psychosis without a content is a monstrous absurdity. It is not a psychosis of the cognition of absence as is evidenced in sleep (cf. "Abhāvapratyayālambanā vṛttirnidrā" YS. I. 10.) ; nor one of the cognition of a nonexistent as is upheld by the Mādhyamikas ; for, in the former, 'absence' itself is the content of the cognition and in the latter, the 'nonexistent' is the content. But, the psychosis in question has no content to prop upon. So, such a psychosis can never come into being ; even if we grant it a hypothetical and tentative life, it can have no conative potentialities in it and we can never know when it is sublated. Even if we grant its sublation, we must accept the subsequent cognition with whatsoever content as its sublator and should not wait for a particular cognition of the type 'This is a nacre' for the sublation of the invalid cognition 'This is silver'. Moreover, once you grant a psychosis without a content, you cannot shut it out even at the stage of liberation and an element of erroneousness dogs your steps even at that ultimate stage of pure consciousness. So, such a view of errors cannot stand to reason.

Veṅkaṭa in his Tattvamuktākalāpa and his vṛtti on it called Sarvārthasiddhi, however, furnishes the rationale of the theory in a slightly different manner and his order of treatment of the different theories of errors suggests that this theory was upheld by a Buddhist school. The s'loka dealing with this theory is the 30th one in the 4th chapter called Buddhisara and the s'lokas immediately preceding it present the different Buddhist theories of errors.

The vṛtti Sarvārthasiddhi on the S'l. 27 remarks : "Now are being refuted the different views put forward by the Buddhists accepting extra-mental reality" (cf. "Atha bāhyārthavādibauddhakalpitāḥ paksāḥ pratikṣipyante". SS. on TMK.). The Vṛtti introduces the S'l. 29 with the remark : "Now (the author) presents Niradhiṣṭhānakhyāti as advanced by certain Buddhists accepting extra-mental reality". So it appears that this view was sponsored by a Buddhist school of philosophers.

In TMK. and SS. the theory has been presented as follows : Advocates of different theories of errors are constrained to accept in the ultimate analysis either the Akhyāti view of Prabhākara or

Anyathākhyāti. The former will lead to a denial of cognition itself and the latter will bring in its wake Asatkhyāti. So, to avoid these two unwelcome contingencies, some advocate the theory of Nirviṣayā khyāti following the maxim of the eyes being fixed upon something other than what appears in cognition (Anyāsaktadṛṣṭinyāya). The maxim of Anyāsaktadṛṣṭi may best be explained by a reference to the following s'loka "Jalpanti sārdham anyena pas'yantyanyaṁ savibhramāḥ/Manasā cintayantyanyaṁ ke nāma yoṣitāṁ priyāḥ//". That is to say, we are to call into request here something analogous to the psychological phenomenon of split personality. In an invalid cognition of the type 'This is silver', the eye is fixed upon a nacre which is different from what appears in cognition. Thus, the cognition of silver not being occasioned by anything, Nirviṣayā khyāti is the only view that is acceptable as a theory of errors. It appears from the above that 'viṣaya' is here taken to mean the sense-datum, the external excitant of a cognition. The theory, then, turns out to be an idealistic one which does not feel the necessity of having recourse to an external object to explain a cognition. But, Veṅkaṭa shows that this view can explain neither the origin of an invalid cognition, nor the behaviour prompted by it, nor even its subsequent sublation and erroneousness. If the 'nirviṣayatā' means absence of the cognitum in the locus in question, it leads to Anyathākhyāti. Moreover, if what is 'nirviṣaya' appears as 'Saviṣaya' ('having a content'), then again, we stumble into the domain of Anyathākhyāti. If, however, the 'nirviṣaya' appears as such in experience, it can prompt no activity at all. If, on the other hand, the 'nirviṣayatā' means universal absence, the theory becomes reduced to Asatkhyāti. Moreover, we beg to point out, that if 'nirviṣaya' means a cognition having no sense-datum, the theory may possibly explain hallucinations only and not also illusions. So, the theory is untenable from whatever standpoint we approach it.

CHAPTER III

NIRADHIṢṬHĀNAKHYĀTI

It is Veṅkaṭa, again, who acquaints us with a theory of errors styled 'Niradhiṣṭhānakhyāti'. That great philosopher of the Vis'iṣṭādvaita school treats of this theory also in his NP., Nyāyasiddhāñjana and TMK. Here too, as in the case of Nirviṣayakhyāti discussed before, the Sarvārthasiddhi commentary on TMK. and the Nyāyasāra on NP. differ in introducing the doctrinal peculiarities of the theory. While according to Nyāyasāra, it is a theory upheld by the Mādhyamikas, the Sarvārthasiddhi commentary attributes it to a school of Buddhist realists. Nyāyasiddhāñjana of Veṅkaṭa records an endeavour of proving non-locative presentation by means of the following inference :— All cognitions like perception etc. are without any substratum inasmuch as they are cognitions even like dream-cognitions (cf. "Pratyakṣādipratyayo nirālambanaḥ pratyayatvāt svāpnapratyayavat" NSi., p. 227). The argument is characteristic of the Buddhist idealist and it makes no room for any distinction between valid and invalid cognitions from the objective standpoint. Still it furnishes us with the rational basis of the theory under discussion. According to this theory, all errors are characterised by a superimposition of something upon a sheer nothing ; not that there is a locus of superimposition that melts into nothingness on scrutiny, but that there is no locus at all and as such no question of superimposition at all arises. What this theory makes the most of is its stubborn denial of any externalisation or localisation even within the mind or outside it of the content of an invalid cognition.

The difference between this theory and the theory called Nirviṣayakhyāti is that while the latter emphasises, according to S'rīnivāsa, the contentlessness of an invalid cognition and is rather ontological to that extent, the former, regardless of the ontological status of the cognitum, knocks outright the bottom of the muchaccredited substratum of an invalid cognition and denies the operation of any mental projection in such cognitions. The final implication of the theory may be made out to be a bit different from what we have adumbrated above. We may maintain that the main point of this theory is to show that erroneous cognitions are not occasioned by any external entities, that they have no 'Ālambana Pratyaya', to borrow a Buddhist term ; they are the bubbles of erratic secretions of consciousness which are not a whit conditioned by any spatiotemporal complex as excitants. Whichever interpretation we give our seal of approval on, this theory,

though akin to Asatkhyāti of the Mādhyamikas in certain respects, cannot be made to converge with it because it has no ontological goods to deliver to us. Let us now see how the theory has been represented in the aforesaid commentaries. The upholders of this theory point out that we have erroneous perception of a mass of hair and the like when we shut our eyes ; Such a perception has assuredly no substratum. For, if there were one, it would have been cognised both at the time of the invalid perception and at the time of the sublating cognition. But, our experience fails to present any such substratum to us. Since experience, and not abstract logic, is the final court of appeal in all philosophical disputations, we must accept invalid cognitions as having no substratum. If one argues that the experience of an illusory mass of hair is but recollection, the ready retort would be that the experience is impressed with a 'thisness' which rules out its being a recollection which must be characterised by 'thatness'. If it is argued that a groundless error is an impossibility and one must accept some real entity as the ground of an error, the upholder of this theory would point out that an unreal, fancied ground may explain an error even as in the opponent's view an error is explained on the assumption of a fancied knower, of one who is the fancied substratum of defects. This last argument is found in NP. and, if we attach much importance on it, it comes into line with Asatkhyāti to a degree. (cf. "Na ca niradhiṣṭhāna-bhramāsambhavāt bhramādhiṣṭhānaṁ kiñcit pāramārthikaṁ tattvam ās'rayitavyaṁ doṣās'rayatva-jñātṛtvā pāramārthye'pi bhramopapattivat adhiṣṭhānāpāramārthye'pi bhramopapatteriti". NS. on NP., P. 47, Chowkhāmbā).

Now, let us turn to its refutation. NP, and following it, NS, hold that the content of a wrong cognition in this view is non-existent, thus equating it completely with Asatkhyāti (cf. "Atrāsadeva bhavatām" etc. NP., P. 47 ; Chowkhāmbā) and ask the question whether that non-existent entity appears in cognition as being here or not ; if the answer is in the affirmative, the opponent is forced into conceding a ground of error ; if it is the other way round, the opponent denies not only the ground of an invalid cognition, but invalid cognition itself ; for, it appears as being here. All cognitions have certain spatio-temporal determinations without which they cannot come into being. So, to deny the ground of an error is to deny its spatiotemporal characterisation and thereby to deny error itself. The SS. commentary further argues that to deny the ground of an error is to deny its determinant which would lead one to the contingency of accepting any erroneous cognition anywhere. Moreover, the darkness within the eyeball is the ground of the invalid cognition of a mass of hair. So, it is futile to talk of groundless errors. Furthermore, if the upholders of the view maintain that what appears as 'this'

in such an invalid cognition is 'not-this', then they unwittingly embrace Anyathākhyāti and can no longer maintain their own position.

It may be pointed out here that such a view takes note of only a few of invalid experiences and makes wild generalisations on that basis and thus fails to grasp the real magnitude of the problem which has to reckon with diverse types of erroneous experiences.

Thus, this theory, when examined, either leads to admission of the contradictory, or to denial of such wrong cognition itself, or to Anyathākhyāti. So, it is indefensible.

CHAPTER IV

AKHYĀTI

Akhyāti is generally known as the theory of errors maintained by the Prābhākara school of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. Not only the philosophers of the Prābhākara school, including s'ālikanātha, Bhavanātha and even Prabhākara himself, call their own theory of errors 'Akhyāti', but philosophers of different schools follow suit and invariably use the term 'Akhyāti' to refer to the Prābhākara theory. In certain Jaina treatises, however, like Prameya-Kamalamārtaṇḍa and Nyāya-Kumuda-candra of Prabhācandra, and Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra of Vādidevasūrī with its gloss Syādvādaratnākara the Prābhākara theory of errors is styled 'Smṛtipramoṣa' and beside it another theory of errors called 'Akhyāti' is discussed. The above-named writers nowhere clearly indicate the school of thinkers who sponsored this theory, but simply content themselves with a statement like the following: 'Bhrāntim Akhyātim Ācakhyuḥ saṁkhyāvinmāninaḥ pare/" (SVR., p. 124). But the expression 'Saṁkhyāvinmāninaḥ' seems to definitely refer to the Sāṁkhyas who, according to many modern scholars advocated the theory of Akhyāti. Still, the editor of PKM. points out in the foot-note that this view was maintained by the cārvākas. In view of the fact that the cārvākas certainly accept perception as Pramāṇa and do not deny the reality of the external world so far as it is apprehended through the senses, it seems difficult to take the editor at his word readily.

But, this sceptical attitude is abandoned to a great extent when we find that no less a person than Mm. Gopīnāth Kavirāj calls the cārvāka theory of errors 'Asatkhyāti'. That great savant in his introduction to his translation of Nyāyakusumāñjali refers to the cārvāka thus: 'To the chārvāka, who assumes asat-khyāti for an object not rightly cognised..." (SARA. B.S., Vol. 2., p. 182). Not that I intend to equate Akhyāti with Asatkhyāti, but that I want to point out that Akhyāti proposed to be discussed presently is not a far cry from Asatkhyāti and that if Asatkhyāti be accepted as the cārvāka view of errors, the editor's note referred to above is not much wide of the mark. The fact of the matter is that, contrary to current imperfect information about them, the cārvākas had at least three schools of which one school, called the Vaitaṇḍikas, rejected even perception as a valid source of knowledge. These aesthetic wranglers headed by Jayarās'i Bhaṭṭa are otherwise known as Tattvopaplava-vādins and they are alleged to deny all tattvas without exception. Naturally this amounts to

S'ūnyavāda and Asat-khyāti. So, we may for the time being echo the words of the said editor and take Akhyāti as representing the view-point of these cārvākas in regard to errors.

Let us now elucidate the theory as represented in PKM., NKC. and SVR. The cārvākas advocating this theory argue thus: In an invalid cognition of the type 'this is silver', the cognition reveals a piece of silver to the perceiver, but this cognition can not have for its object a real, existent silver; for, in that case, the cognition would not have been condemned as invalid. Nor, on that account does the cognition reveal the absence of silver; for, it takes the form of a positive proposition predicating silver. Nor can it be said that it reveals a nacre as its object, as that would raise the cognition to the status of a valid one. Neither can it be maintained that a nacre is apprehended in the form of silver; for, the one is different from the other, and experience dces not record any fact of, say, a piece of cloth, which is other than a pitcher, being apprehended in the form of a pitcher. So, the invalid cognition is but without any content; for, nothing characterisable is revealed in such a cognition.

The theory has been refuted on the following grounds: If nothing at all appears in invalid cognition, how can they be individualised and known one from the other? How can you name one 'the wrong cognition of water' and the other 'the wrong cognition of silver' unless anything appears in the respective cognitions? Moreover, if such a hypothesis be at all acceptable, it would lead to a confusion of invalid cognition with deep sleep. Waking after a deep sleep, we are used to saying that we apprehended nothing during it. The upholder of Akhyāti maintains that an invalid cognition apprehends nothing and as such any and every state of deep sleep would be that of an invalid cognition, a contingency, which is ridiculous, to say the least. (cf. "Bhrāntisuṣuptāvasthayo-ravis'eṣaprasaṅgas'ca" PKM., p. 49). If, however, by akhyāti the champions of the theory mean not the absence outright of any object of cognition, but merely slightness of apprehension, taking the negative particle in the term Akhyāti to mean 'tadalpatā', even then they can ill afford to save their skin. For, what do they endeavour to connote by 'slightness of apprehension' and how does such an attenuated apprehension come into being? If it means the nonrevelation of the cognitum as it really is, its implication is that the invalid cognition presents its cognitum as something different from what it is and this invariably leads to Viparītakhyāti at the expense of Akhyāti. So, Akhyāti as a theory of errors cannot fare any the better than its analogues discussed before, namely, Nirviṣaya-khyāti and Niradhiṣṭhānakhyāti.

In the treatment of this theory of Akhyāti Prabhācandra and Vādideva make no distinction between 'Ālambana' and 'Viṣaya' which terms are readily interchangeable with them. Generally 'ālambana' means 'an excitant', 'a substratum', rather 'a sense-datum' of a cognition and 'Viṣaya' is the object or content of a cognition. But, no such distinction between the two is at all possible with a Jaina philosopher, since he does neither subscribe to the theory of Prāpyakāritā (Efficiency exercised through contact) of the Naiyāyikas with regard to visual perception, nor does he accept the causal theory of knowledge of Nyāya where a sense-datum occasions a cognition (cf. "Nārthālokau kāraṇaṃ paricchedyatvāt tamovat" PMS. II. 6). So, when Prabhācandra says, "Tato nirālambanaṁ jalādi-viparyaya-jñānam" (PKM., p. 49), what he means to say is that an invalid cognition has no content. So, it is definitely wrong to remark that, according to the theory of Akhyāti, an error is 'purely a hallucination' (cf. India psychology—J. N. Sinha). Indeed, prabhācandra is unhesitatingly clear on this point when he says, "Ato na Kiñcidatra jñāne khyāti iti siddhā akhyātiḥ" (NKC., p. 60). This may tempt us to equate this theory of Akhyāti with the Nirviṣayakhyāti discussed before. But, while the latter theory takes an invalid cognition to be devoid of content ontologically, the former demonstrates the impossibility of any attempt at characterising its content and hence concludes that it is contentless. This is quite in consonance with the polemical attitude of Jayarās'i and other cārvākas who deny all Pramāṇas and Prameyas as being at all definable and demonstrable. Scholars are generally inclined to interpret this attitude as being in accord with the Mādhyamika nihilism. But, can't it be maintained that what these much-maligned philosophers mean to say is that they do neither discard the objective, entitative existence of things, nor throw overboard the insuperable claim of perception as a means of proof, but contend that inference or any other kind of reasoning cannot define the inalienable nature of anything as discrete from other things? If this interpretation be acceptable, these scholars headed by Jayarās'i may be called thorough-going sensationists who accept nothing beyond sensation.

Be that as it may, it is our humble contention that Prabhācandra is not right in raising an alarm to the effect that, if the view of akhyāti be acceptable, there will be no distinction between an invalid cognition and cognition in deep sleep. This argument, however, has not been contrived by Prabhācandra for the first time. Maṇḍana in his Vibhrama-viveka brings this charge against the theory of Akhyāti upheld by the Prābhākaras in the following lines: "Akhyāteravis'eṣeṇa syāt suṣupte'pi vibhramaḥ/Akhyātiḥ khalu tatrāpi na cākhyātirvis'iṣyate//" VV., Sl. 9, p. 2). But, we fail to realise any force of this argument

against the Akhyāti we have discussed here. Our cognition in deep sleep is not devoid of a content; on the contrary, absence of any cognition, or nescience, as an Advaitin will put it, is its content. But, in Akhyāti we have no content or characterisable content at all. So, Akhyāti should not be charged thus with having merged all distinctions between an erroneous cognition and the cognition in deep sleep.

CHAPTER V

ALAUKIKAKHYĀTI

Vyomas′ivācārya in his Vyomavatī Vṛtti on Pras′astapāda's Bhāṣya, while discussing the problem of ascertaining beyond all inconsistency the 'Ālambana' of an invalid cognition, incidentally suggests that one might try to easily steer clear of such a disquieting contingency by contending that a supernatural silver is the object of an invalid cognition of the type 'This is silver' (cf. "Athālaukikaṁ rajatamevāsya viṣayamiti" etc. VV., p. 540). He does not, however, care to record as to which school of thinkers subscribed to this view and we may easily construe it as an anticipatory device calculated to wriggle out of the impasse created by the question of an Ālambana of an invalid experience. Though certain other theories of dubious origin seem to be distant echoes of this theory of Alaukikakhyāti or Alaukikārthakhyāti, the theory is hardly traceable to its origin and no welcome light is thrown before us by the scholars of the orthodox schools in this regard. Sudars′anācārya in his Advaitacandrikā refers to a view that in an invalid cognition of the type 'this is silver' what occurs is that the nacre is transformed into silver at the time of the cognition and fathers it upon the theorists of momentariness i.e. the Buddhists. (cf. "Na ca Kṣaṇikamatānusāreṇa s′uktireva rajatajñānasamaye rajatākāreṇa pariṇamate iti yuktam" Ad. C.,P. 7). This makes the confusing situation worse confounded ; for, no such actual view has been as yet discovered in any Buddhist treatise, though it is not at all inconsistent with the fundamental tenets of the Buddhists ("cf. Jñānasahabhūrevārtho bhogyatvāt sukhādivat" V. Bhā. on YS. IV. 16).

This statement also seems to be an anticipatory argument without any factual basis. Again, Raṅgoji Bhaṭṭa refers to a view of the Digambara Jainas to the effect that at the time of the invalid cognition of silver, a real silver comes into being (cf. "Nāpi pāramārthikasyaiva rajatasyotpattiriti digambaramataṁ sādhu," ADCI., p. 47). Though our acquaintance with the Jaina philosophy is anything but wide, we feel rather sure that it would be really a job to try to bear Raṅgoji out from the philosophical treatises of the Jaina Digambara school. On the contrary, Prabhācandra, who is a champion of the Digambara school, does not even refer to such a view, not to speak of committing himself to it as the theory of error of his school. Be that as it may, these two views of suspect historical basis are not in tune with the Alaukikakhyāti which is now on the anvil.

This theory of Alaukikakhyāti is included by Jayasiṁhasūrī in his list of different theories of error and Vādideva as also Prabhācandra discuss and refute this theory in their works. Prabhācandra, who treats of this theory in NKC., does not enlighten us about its author, but Vādideva in his Syādvādaratnākara assures us that the theory was offered as a new dispensation by a lumberheaded Mīmāṁsaka (cf. "Acchekamīmāṁsakavedhasā'tra prakalpitāṁ nūtanasṛṣṭikalpām/Nirmūlanāś'ārthamimāmidānīmalaukikakhyātimupakṣipāmaḥ//" SVR., P. 134). It is really difficult to identify the poor mīmāṁsaka who had been pulled by the ear and put to shame and ridicule by Vādideva and to salvage his name from the sea of our lost heritage. It is common knowledge that Prabhākara advanced the theory of Vivekākhyāti and the other mīmāṁsaka, Kumārila, held fast to the theory of Anyathākhyāti. History reveals to us the name of another mīmāmsaka, Murāri Mis'ra, whose works are all but lost to us. Beside other minor points, we know this much about him that he advocated the theory of self-validity of knowledge like his compatriots, but instead of propping it up on the hypothesis of triple consciousness (Tripuṭī-saṁvid) of the Prābhākaras or on the basis of an inference on grounds of 'Knownness' generated in the known object (jñātatāliṅgakānumānam) as maintained by Kumārila, asserted that the validity was ascertained by an introspection (Anuvyavasāya) of the form 'Ghaṭatvena ghaṭamahaṁ jānāmi'. From this we can arrive merely at a negative conclusion that Murāri Mis'ra can by no means be a thorough-going Asatkhyātivādin (We use the word 'thorough-going' advisedly ; for, almost all the khyātivādas involve, however implicitly, an element of Asatkhyāti). So, at the present state of our knowledge, it is difficult to determine who was the target of the pungent words of humour of Vādi deva. Let us, therefore, drift from such an enquiry to and focus our attention upon the theory itself as presented to us by the afore-said Jaina writers.

The protagonists of this Alaukikakhyāti maintain that the silver apprehended in the invalid cognition 'this is silver' exists here and now even as it does in the valid cognition of the same form. But, since all theories of error evince incongruity under logical duress, and since the real character of the entity presented in a wrong cognition eludes all logical determination, whether it belongs to the external world or is within us, we are to assume that what is presented before us is a supernatural entity. To elucidate, it is supernatural not in the sense of being anything supramundane, but in that it does not lend itself to any logical determination, any conceptual categorisation. Vādideva, while explaining it, says : What is known by a silver-cognition is called silver ; now the silver that is found in the silver-merchant's shop is laukika, and

what is different from this silver is called Alaukika. Thus, this theory is quite confident of the existence of silver apprehended in an invalid cognition, but asserts in the same breath that this silver does not answer to our normal experience of silver inasmuch as its ontological character cannot be determined. The theory starts with empiricism and realism and then makes a compromise with rationalism. Contrary to the attitude of the Advaitins,who maintain the theory of Anirvacanīyakhyāti, this theory holds that failure to characterise a thing does not tell upon the ontological status of the thing. What is intuited need not necessarily be expressible. So, an invalid cognition presents something that is real in every sense ; only it is not of the ordinary order of things, but is Alaukika.

Prabhācandra refutes the theory in the following manner : What is exactly meant by 'Alaukikatva' of the content of an invalid cognition ? It might mean 'to be invested with a different form' ('Anyarūpatvam'), or an altogether different causal efficiency ('Anyakriyākāritvam'), or a different causality (Anyakāraṇaprabhavatvam), or absence of causality (Akāraṇaprabhavatvam'). The first alternative cannot be accepted ; for, in point of appearance, there is no difference between a valid and an invalid cognition. Moreover, if the invalid cognition present a different from, Alaukika-khyāti becomes reduced to viparītakhyāti. The second alternative, too, does not stand to reason. If one thing is capable of discharging the function of a different thing, then it becomes unnecessary to assume different causes for different effects ; for, one cause can serve as the matrix of all effects. The same argument disposes of the third alternative also. The fourth alternative also on scrutiny shares the same fate. For, if this Alaukika content is uncaused, is it something existent or not ? If it is existent, permanency will hang upon it like a dead-weight which it can never hope to shake off ; for, an entity that is existent and uncaused at the same time can never be impermanent. (We are to note here that this statement holds good only in regard to a positive entity ; for, the negative entity called 'Prāgabhāva' is an uncaused existent and is all the same impermanent). If this position be accepted, then no subsequent sublation is at all possible. If, however, it is non-existent, how does the cognition take a positive form like 'this is silver' ? If a jar is non-existent,no positive cognition of the form 'this is a jar' is at all possible even in a dream. If the opponent demurs and takes the plea that the non-existent is cognized as existent through some error, then it becomes Viparīta-Khyāti.

Vādideva offers the following arguments in refuting this theory : If an alaukika silver is apprehended as such in a wrong cognition of silver under discussion, no activity can follow ; if

however, that alaukika silver is cognised as laukika, then it will be Viparīta-khyāti. Moreover, if this invalid cognition of silver is occasioned by an alaukika silver, then since it is perceptible, it will reveal its particularities more and more according as the perceiver comes near it more and more. In that case, this alaukika silver will have to be accepted as equally real like a laukika one and no bādha will then be possible. If, however, it is held that the sublating cognition denies the 'laukikatva' of the alaukika silver, even then it is not quite on all fours with experience. For, the sublating cognition of the form 'this is not silver' denies silver only and does not reveal its supernatural character by denying its 'laukikatva'. Moreover, what has a scope for predication can only be denied ; a laukika silver has no such scope here and hence cannot be denied by the said sublating cognition. If it has really any scope, then the negation will mean that what is taken as laukika is in fact alaukika and this will set the stage for Viparītakhyāti. Moreover, in this case we cannot have a recognition of the form 'this piece of nacre was previously apprehended by me as a silver'. So, this view is illogical and as such cannot be maintained.

Furthermore, we beg to submit that once we go beyond reason and accept anything as alaukika, we drift away from the realm of philosophy which is a speculative science. Here reason goes beyond itself and thus spells its own disaster and utter undoing. We may further point out that the theory shows a sham regard for experience ; for, experience does not show off the content as alaukika which position it arrives at only through reason that commits suicide on that very account.

CHAPTER VI

PRASIDDHARTHAKHYĀTI

This theory, as its very name indicates, may be set off against Alaukikakhyāti discussed presently. Jayasiṁha sūrī mentions it in his list of Khyātivādas, while Prabhācandra and Vādideva discuss it, give the lie direct to it and throw it completely out of gear in their works. It is, again, the editor of PKM. who assures us that this theory was advocated by Bhāskara, the Vedantist and in the Sāṁkhya system. Whether this assurance has any factual or theoretic basis or not, we shall discuss towards the end of this chapter. Let us for the present set ourselves the task of elucidating the theory as explained by Prabhācandra and Vādideva.

The upholders of this theory contend that what appears in an invalid cognition can by no means be something non-existent. A non-existent like the sky-flower can never be presented in a cognition. Moreover, Asatkhyāti cannot account for the multiplicity and variety of erroneous experiences. So, 'what appears in an invalid cognition is a non-existent' is a proposition that has to give in before the irrepressible claims of logic. Hence, the cognitum of an invalid cognition is an objective reality established by the normal means of proof. It cannot be urged against this position that this fancied reality, when placed upon the crucible of reason, loses its solidity, develops strange elusive symptoms and melts away into nothingness. For, reason is a mere tool at the hands of experience ; reason that denies and runs counter to experience commits suicide or wends the way of infinite spiral regressus. Abstract reasoning divorced from experience is a bane, and not a boon and it can never even dream of locking into embrace any objective reality. So, too much reliance on abstract reasoning should not encourage one to contraband the cargo of experience and cast it to the four winds. (cf. "Na cāsya vicāryamāṇasyāsattvam ; vicārasya pratītivyatirekeṇānyasyāsambhavāt" PKM., p. 49). Esse est percipi is an incontrovertible fact of our life. Even one's palm is accepted to be existent only on the strength of one's apprehension of the same. This apprehension is in evidence even in the case of an invalid cognition. So, what is apprehended there must be taken to be something existent. Though what is apprehended in an invalid cognition does not lend itself to re-apprehension at a subsequent point of time, still it must be admitted that it certainly exists at the time of apprehension. Otherwise, short-lived entities like lightnings will be robbed of their undisputed existence. So, an invalid cognition presents a real object which is existent in the universally accepted sense of the term (cf. "Yadyapyuttarakālaṁ

tathā so'rtho nāsti, tathāpi yadā pratibhāti tadā tāvadastyeva, anyathā vidyudāderapi sattvasiddhirna syāt". PKM., pp. 49-50).

But this theory, Prabhācandra argues, does not stand to reason. If what is apprehended in an invalid cognition is real, there is nothing to differentiate an error from a valid cognition. Moreover, water, silver, serpent and the like that are apprehended in invalid cognitions do not instantly die out without leaving any trace behind like lightnings. So, if real water be revealed in a mirage-water cognition, the subsequent cognition should reveal at least the damping effect of water on the ground ; but this is never in evidence. Again, if the cognitum of such an invalid cognition possess a reality commensurate with the reality of entities of normal experience, it would be equally well noticed by all present there even like a lightning. Moreover, if two cognitions both reveal reality, neither can serve as the sublator of the other. So, Prabhācandra concludes that this theory is not at all maintainable (cf. "yathāvasthitārthagṛhītitvāvis'eṣe hi bhrāntābhrāntavyavahārābhāvaḥ syāt. Api cottarakālamudakāderabhāve 'pi taccihnasya bhūsnigdhatāderupalambhaḥ syāt. Na khalu vidyudādivadudakāderapyās'ubhāvī niranvayo vinās'aḥ kvacidupalabhyate Sarvataddes'adraṣṭṛṇāmavisaṁvādenopalambhas'ca vidyudādivadeva syāt. Bādhyabādhakabhāvas'ca na prāpnoti ; sarvajñānānāmavitathārthaviṣayatvāvis'e āt" P.K.M., p. 50).

Vādideva avails himself of the commonest conceit of controverting a theory of error and argues thus against this theory in his Syādvāda-ratnākara : The theory is in no wise blameless. The upholders of this theory of Prasiddhārthakhyāti maintain that the so-called illusory nacre-silver, the rope-serpent and the like do certainly exist at the point-instants of their presentation in cognition. But, this contention does not stand to reason. It might be asked : Where does the nacre-silver etc. exist at the particular point-instant of its presentation ? Does it exist at some other place (which is beyond the ken of one's observation at that particular moment), or in the locus of the nacre itself ? If the second alternative be accepted, the nacre-silver etc. comes to stand on a par with any object of normal sense-experience, becomes a 'Prasiddha artha' ('an object indisputably established through experience') in every sense, and there is no reason why it should not be cognised by others in the self-same locus at that particular point-instant. But, it is a patent fact that phenomena like the nacre-silver avoid the outrage of public vision and reveal themselves to a chosen this or that perceiver. If, however, the first alternative is pressed forward, the question would be pertinently raised how an entity that is elsewhere, if not also elsewhen, would be intuited here, say, in the locus of a nacre. If it is conceded that the silver does not exist in the locus of the nacre, the assertion of its existence elsewhere can have no bearing on the cognition

in question and it is as good as non-existent. Even though, for argument's sake, it be accepted that an elsewhere silver can be cognised here in the locus of the nacre, it instantly resolves the theory into the much-maligned theory of Viparītakhyāti. For, the silver cognised as here is really other than being here, i.e. is elsewhere. So, what is really elsewhere is presented as being here, as being other than what it is. So, Prasiddhārtha-khyāti is ultimately reduced to Viparītakhyāti (cf. "Athānyades'ālambino'pi kaladhautādeḥ . . . . s'uktikādes'e pratibhāso'bhyupagamyate. Hanta tarhi samāyātā seyaṁ tapasvinī viparītakhyātireva'. Syā. Vā. Rat., p. 127).

It is now easy to draw a line of demarcation between Prasiddhārtha-khyāti and Alaukikārtha-khyāti. Both the theories start with empiricism and hold fast to the fact of perception. To both what appears as content in perception is sacrosanct and to question its reality is to question perception itself as a source of knowledge. In this regard their sensationistic realism is on a par with the attitude of the Sankarite illusionists who assert that the existence of an object is determined by what appears in a cognition (cf. 'yathāsaṁvidavabhāsādhīnatvād arthanis'cayasya' PPV., p. 159, Cal. Skt. Series. Also, 'tasmād yad yathā khyāti tat tathā 'styeveti sthitam'. IS., p. 42). But, while Prasiddhārtha-khyāti makes a fetish of perception and its deliverance and shuts out logical scrutiny, the latter opens up the gates for reason to sit in judgment over the content of perception. In other words, the former theory makes no compromise with rationalism, but persistently asserts that perception affirms not only the reality of its content, but also its real modality, even the modality of reality, if there be any. That is to say, when one mistakes a nacre for a silver, the silver so presented is to be taken as real like any other silver of common experience. For, experience does not show it off as something different from ordinary silver. Hence to call the silver real on the strength of cognition and then to assess its reality as being of a different order from the common species is to evince half-heartedness symptomatic of what is so elquently illustrated in Ardhakukkuṭī-Nyāya. But, this is exactly what Alaukikārthakhyāti does by weighing anchor from the mooring of perception and letting the content be blasted by the billows of the unchartered ocean of reason. Herein lies the real difference between the two theories and the parting of ways is signalled by the sudden emergence of reason in the latter theory.

The raison d'être of this theory of Prasiddhārthakhyāti has been only partially stated so far. This theory makes bold to assert that privacy is not profanation and that commonalty of experience need not be the unfailing test of truth. It is the negative idolatry of abjuring the idolatry of time and individuality that endeavours to transport truth to the transcendental realm of

ethereal non-temporality and impersonality. Vox Populi is not necessarily Vox Dei and the validity of a cognition need not await the approval of the populace. Indeed, one's own feelings and emotions, which are solely private to oneself, are certainly as real as cognitions that are shared in common by a multitude of men. Otherwise, the whole of our mental life consisting of the manifold of psychical phenomena would be reduced to a sheer non-entity. So, according to this theory, a nacre-silver should not be rejected as unreal simply on grounds of privacy of the experience.

It is interesting to note in this connection that a few writers have fathered an almost identical theory upon the Digambara Jainas. Prakās'ātmayati, while discussing the nature of Adhyāsa in his PPV., joins issue with his opponents one after another and raises a pointer from the standpoint of an adversary in the following manner : "Well then, let the reality of what is presented in a cognition be affirmed in the accredited locus ; for, thus may be avoided the defects of prolixity of assumption and the like" (cf. "Astu tarhi pratipannopādhāveva yathāpratipatti paramārthatvam, Kalpanāgauravādidoṣaparihārāditi" PPV., p. 211, Cal. Skt. Series). Akhaṇḍānanda, while explaining this statement of Vivaraṇa in his Tattva-dīpanam, assures us that the pointer in question is from the standpoint of Digambaras who hold that the object of an illusory cognition should be adjudicated as real in deference to cognition itself (cf. "Pratītyanurodhena bhrāntiviṣayasya paramārthatvameṣṭavyamiti Digambaraḥ S'aṅkate" TD., p. 211). From this it appears that Digambaras were rather disgusted with the different theories of illusion, all of which evinced a hectic ardour for unwarranted assumptions, and, in strict pursuance of the Law of Parsimony (cf. "Kalpanālāghavaṁ yatra taṁ pakṣam rocayāmahe" MMD.), concluded that the phenomena like the nacre-silver are real and not illusory.

Again, Raṅgojī Bhaṭṭa in his Advaita-cintāmaṇi, while disposing of the rival theories of illusion, states that the Digambaras assert the becoming of a real silver at the time of the cognition of a nacre-silver and then refutes it as unsound (cf. "Nāpi pāramārthikasyaiva rajatasyotpattiriti Digambara-mataṁ sādhu" ADCH., p. 47). The theory fathered upon the Digambaras by Prakās'ātman and his scholiast Akhaṇḍānanda is almost identical with Prasiddhārtha-khyāti with this much of difference that here the inductive reasoning known as 'Lāghava Tarka' is pressed into request to benumb the discursive mind and compel it to accept unquestioningly the verdict of perception. But the Digambara theory as presented by Raṅgojī goes a step further beyond the bounds of Prasiddhārtha-khyāti and assumes the origination of a piece of silver in the locus, a real piece of silver and not a subsistent one like that of the Advaitins. It is queer how such a theory could be upheld by the Digambaras without prejudice to

their epistemological postulations. Indeed, the Digambaras do not subscribe to the causal theory of knowledge. To them, knowledge is not creation, but revelation (cf. "Atajjanyamapi tatprakās'akam"// and "Pradīpavat"// PMS. 2/8-9). So, it becomes difficult to decipher how a new piece of silver would be ushered into being at the time of the cognition of a nacre-silver. Even without dilating upon the theoretic absurdity of such a contingency being pressed forward by the Digambaras, it may be straightaway submitted here that neither of the two theories noticed presently is to be found in the works of Vādideva, Prabhācandra and such other Digambara Jaina scholars of repute. Nor can these theories be interpreted as being variants of Anyathākhyāti which is the view of the Digambaras ; for, Prakās'ātman refutes that theory separately and Raṇgojī also discusses the theory of Anyathākhyāti just after the Digambara theory in question.

Now, we can go into the question whether this theory of Prasiddhārtha-khyāti might be brought into line with the view upheld by Bhāskara, the Vedantist, and, in the Sāṇkhya system in regard to illusory cognition. As for Bhāskara, he was a celebrated commentator on the Brahma-sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa and championed the philosophic view known as "Bhedābheda-vāda". This doctrine of Bhedābheda is mainly concerned with causation. To Bhāskara, the cause and the effect stand in a relation of difference-cum-nondifference. Viewed from the standpoint of the effect, there is multiplicity and the manifold of existence is an undeniable reality. But, from the standpoint of the cause, there is no difference, no distinction, no bable of sensations ; All multiplicity is resolved into the oneness of the cause. (cf. "Kāryarūpeṇa nānātvam abhedaḥ kāraṇātmanā/Hemātmanā yathā'bhedaḥ kuṇḍalādyātmanā bhidā//Bhā. Bhā. p. 18, Chowkhāmbā ; Also 'Kāraṇasyāvasthā-mātraṁ kāryaṁ vyatiriktāvyatiriktam', p. 93, Ibid.). The world with its endless panorama of differences is not unreal or illusory as the Sankarites would induce us to believe, but is real. To Bhāskara, our bondage even is real and even as a real jar is reduced to nothingness by breaking it with a cudgel, so we attain salvation by breaking off our bondage which is a stern reality. Bhāskara pooh-poohs the Vivarta-vādin's postulation of the falsity of world-appearance. He finds fault with the ego-centric predication of falsity or otherwise of the world. As he argues, the world cannot be taken to be false with regard to the seekers of salvation and real with regard to others. Indeed, one cannot reasonably maintain that colour is a non-Ens with the blind, though a reality with others. Verily, the nature of entities is an invariable constant and does not vary with the variation of the perceiving agent. It does not stand to reason that the double moon was a previous reality and is a subsequent unreality. (cf. "Tasmād yatkiñcidetat yat prapañce mithyātvaprati-

jñānam. Na ca puruṣāpekṣayā mithyātvaṁ satyatvaṁ vā prapañcasya kalpayituṁ s'akyaṁ, mumukṣūn prati mithyā itarān prati satyamiti. Na hi rūpamandhān prati asatyamitarān prati satyamiti s'akyaṁ vaktum. Na hi puruṣa-svarūpānurodhino bhāvā yena tadapekṣayā satyatvamasatyatvaṁ vā bhajeran . . . . Na hi dvicandraḥ prāgāsīt pas'cānnāstīti yujyate" (Ibid., p. 18). Thus, according to Bhāskara, the world is not an unsubstantial appearance, but a reality. Keeping in view this ontological affirmation of the reality of the world, one might readily take it for granted that Bhāskara advocates a similar reality for the content of an illusory perception ; for, philosophy aims at arriving at a system of general principles and it possibly ill affords a philosopher to be a realist in matters of metaphysics, while being an idealist in epistemology. So, it might seem well nigh sure that, according to Bhāskara, an illusory cognition presents a content, say, a nacre-silver that is real in the current, accredited sense of the term. That is why the editor of PKM. has suggested that Bhāskara championed Prasiddhārtha-khyāti in regard to illusions. But, facts seem to belie such a contention. Indeed, abstract theorising and hasty generalisation have led many scholars astray on this question, including savants of the stature of Dr. S. N. Das Gupta, Prof. Hiriyanna and the like who have discovered in Bhāskara a champion of Anyathā-khyāti. Let us hear what a young scholar says with an almost gripping conviction on this point, "This alternative of real transformation . . . . of the substratum into the illusory object is the very old view of Anyathā-khyāti as advocated by Bhagavad Bhāskara, who admits both difference and non-difference . . . . in every relational knowledge. This view is, therefore, not the Naiyāyika's own, but borrowed from Bhāskara" (Dr. B. Sen Gupta's A Critique of the Vivarana school, p. 63). Mm. Jogendranāth also holds an identical view in this regard (vide Viv. on AS., Pt. I, p. 122). But, we shall presently see that Bhāskara held an altogether different view.

While discussing that the reality of an entity is independent of any ego-centric characters and that the world is real, Bhāskara makes a significant observation to the effect that it is yet to be proved that perceptual knowledge and the like are of an ontological status similar with that of the cognition of the double moon. This shows that normal perception, which is a valid one, taking, as it does, the real world for its sense-data, according to Bhāskara, is different from the cognition of the double moon. Hence, it necessarily follows that when the former is valid and real, the latter is invalid and unreal. Bhāskara further points out that no causal defect can be brought to bear upon the fancied falsity of the world even like the defective eyesight in cases of illusory perceptions. (cf. "Dvicandrajñānatulyatvaṁ pratyakṣādestvapekṣyate// . . . . Na ca timiravat prapañcamithyātve kāraṇa-doṣo

gṛhyate", Ibid, p. 18). Again, while commenting on the Brahmasūtra 'Vaidharmyācca no svapnādivat' (BS. 2.2.29), Bhāskara attacks the contention of the Advaitins that unlike a dream the waking state is not self-invalidated, is not sublated of itself and points out that this cannot be a special characteristic of the waking state; for, even in dreams falsity is brought home to us through subsequent cognitions. Indeed, the cognition of a nacre-silver can in no wise comprehend its own falsity (cf. "yat tu pratyakṣādīnāṁ svato mithyātvaṁ nāsti paratastu mithyātvamiti kiṁ vis'iṣyocyate. Nanu sarvatra svapnādāvapi parata eva mithyātvaṁ gamyate, na svato, na hi rajatajñāne tad-gata-mithyātvaṁ gṛhyate" (Ibid., p. 124). Here Bhāskara himself declares in no uncertain terms that the nacre-silver is false. Then, while commenting on the sūtra "Māyāmātraṁ tu kārtsnyena anabhivyakta-svarūpatvāt" (BS. 3.2.3), he condemns dream-cognition as a 'Māyā', as a cognition having no external object to account for its origin and as being a purely mental construct prompted by the recollection of what was previously cognised in a different spatio-temporal setting. A dream-creation is, according to him, the achievement of an individual soul, not of God whose creation is undoubtedly real. Thus, dreams and nacre-silver cognitions are false according to Bhāskara (cf. "Svapne Sṛṣṭirmāyā-mātraṁ na bāhyārtho'stīti mātragrahaṇam. Kā punariyaṁ māyā ? Arthas'ūnyapratyayaḥ . . . . Des'āntara-kālāntarānubhūtānus-maraṇāt . . . . Jīvasya saiṣā sṛṣṭiḥ sukha-duḥkha-pratibhāsanāt nes'varasya . . . . Is'varasya tu yā sṛṣṭirākās'ādiviṣayā sā paramā-rthaiva" (Ibid, p. 161). A cursory perusal of the expression 'Des'āntara-kālāntarānubhūtānusmaraṇāt' may tempt one to equate the theory with Anyathā-khyāti ; but, the point to be particularly noted here is that Bhāskara does not affirm the elsewhere or else-when existence of a nacre-silver, but only asserts that the content of such an illusory cognition is a thing being remembered and not an external object. Hence, we can safely conclude that Bhāskara was an advocate neither of Prasiddhārtha-khyāti, nor of Anyathākhyāti, but of a pure falsity of the illusory cognitions. We do not, however, preclude the possibility of Bhāskara's theory being reduced easily to Anyathā-khyāti by showing that, according to him, the content of recollection appears as the content of perception in illusory cognitions. But, these devices of reduction of one theory into another are of no avail in determining the essential character of a theory and in christening the theory with a suitable name. Indeed, it may be shown that almost any other theory of illusion may be reduced to any other theory. Never-theless, a theory maintains its distinctness by what it particularly stands for and singularly emphasises. So, we find no cogent reasons for dubbing Bhāskara as an Anyathā-khyāti-vādin.

Now, let us turn to the consideration of this theory of Prasiddhārtha-khyāti being professed by the Sāṁkhyas. No ancient or modern writer on Indian philosophy seems to assert in unison with the editor of PKM. that the Sāmkhya system sponsors the theory of Prasiddhārtha-khyāti. On the contrary, some hold that the sāṁkhya makes room for Akhyāti or Vivekākhyāti, while others insist on the theory being no other than Sadasatkhyāti. So far as the Sāṁkhya sūtras are concerned, it is undeniable that they advocate the theory of Sadasat-khyāti as clearly stated in the Sūtra "Sadasat-khyātirbādhābādhāt" (SS. 5.56). Since we shall have occasion of studying this theory separately in a subsequent chapter, we do not like here to open any discussion on this theory. But, whatever may be the accredited thesis of the Sāṁkhya system, there are reasons which might delude one into asserting Prasiddhārtha-khyāti as the theory of illusion of the Sāṁkhyas. The Sāṁkhya advocates the doctrine of Satkāryavāda (i.e. pre-existence of the effect in the cause) as opposed to the Asat-kārya-vāda or Ārambha-vāda of Nyāyavais'eṣika and even there it zealously adheres to Pariṇāmavāda as against the Vivarta-vāda of the Advaitins. Causation to Sāṁkhya, therefore, primarily means a progressive unfoldment, a move from the implicit to the explicit, from the unmanifest to the manifest. So, creation is not the emergence of anything new, but a perpetual rehearsal of the old. It is as though the Ova of Eve contained all the multitude of future generations of people. Thus, the world is a reality both in its manifest and unmanifest aspects. Moreover, knowledge is but psychosis with the Sāṁkhya and a psychosis, that merely rests on psychological objectivity, and, not on ontological objectivity, seems to be an unusual phenomenon with it. These two fundamental postulates of the Sāṁkhya make it rather probable that Prasiddhārtha-khyāti is assuredly the theory which the Sāṁkhya advances to explain an illusory experience. But, as we have already stated, facts point to an altogether different conclusion. Here also abstract reason trots out concrete facts of commission in the Sāṁkhya sūtras whence arises the misconception of the editor of PKM.

CHAPTER VII

ANYA-KHYĀTI

Dr. S. N. Das Gupta in his monumental work, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 4 springs a pleasant surprise by his welcome discovery of a new theory of error as implicitly suggested by Vallabhācārya, a Vaiṣṇava philosopher and religious reformer of the 16th century and subsequently elaborated by his followers. As Dr. Das Gupta himself observes inter alia, "Taking his cue from Vallabha, Bālakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa tries to evolve a philosophic theory of error according to the Vallabhite school . . . . This view of illusion is called anya-khyāti i.e. the apprehension of something other than that with which the sense was in contact". (Vide A Hist. of Ind. Phi., Vol. IV, p. 359). Though his treatment of this theory is unfortunately a bit confusing and is apt to delude one into believing that Bālakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa was the solitary champion of this theory, it transpires clearly from a study of the literature of this school, that not only Bālakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa alias Lālu Bhaṭṭa, but also Puruṣottamajī Mahārāja tries to formulate this theory of Anya-khyāti in his works. Bāla kṛṣṇa seeks to establish this theory in his Khyātivivekaḥ, which is an appendage to his work named prameya-ratnārṇavaḥ, following the subodhinī commentary of Vallabha on the third skandha of the Bhāgavatam. Puruṣottama sponsors this theory in his Prasthāna-ratnākaraḥ and khyātivādaḥ, the latter being a brief philosophical tract included in an anthology of philosophical essays styled 'Vādāvalī'. From the writings of these two scholars, Anyakhyāti has come to stand as the Vallabhite theory of error.

The current popular verdict, however, runs counter to such a position and Vallabha is generally supposed to uphold the theory of Satkhyāti in perfect accord with the metaphysical assertions of his system. Thus, we find S. C. Bhāratī, a Sankarite scholar of the modern age, remark in his treatise called 'khyāti-vādaḥ' : "Vallabha-matakhyātistu sat-khyātyantargatā" (p. 71). Though one might easily discover in the disquisitions of Puruṣottamji Mahārāj a ready endorsement of the Sat-Khyāti theory, it is nevertheless undeniable that the Vallabhaites held a different view of error, which they christened as Anya-Khyāti. Here too the popular assertion as voiced in the above statement of S. C. Bhāratī is guilty of intellectual somnambulism that thrives on metaphysical abstractions which are sometimes widely divergent from the real deductions of a system. However, let us see what Vallabha himself has to say on this vexed question and then we shall present the views of his successors who have endeavoured

to develop the views of the master into a rigid philosophical system.

Vallabha, like many other Vaiṣṇava compatriots, asserts that the domain of sense-experience is not unitary in character. The senses are in no way inherently degenerate and as such they need not necessarily present a sham show before us. In normal sense-experience what one intuits is a hard fact and its reality is indubitable. What one perceives as a jar in one's wakeful consciousness persists as such even after the lapse of many years. But, this persistence is not shared by the objects intuited in dreams, or illusions[1]. So, to Vallabha our experiences are two-fold—veridical and non-veridical. The world-experience is a veridical one in as much as it is not apt to be sublated like the objects of dream-experience. The world, therefore, is a reality. Indeed, the effect is non-different from the cause and is as much real as the cause itself. Non-difference does in no wise imply falsity[2]. So far Vallabha seems to advocate a dichotomy of sense-experience where truth and falsity are the two contradictories that exhaust together the universe of discourse.

Are we then to conclude that Vallabha's scheme of epistemology does not necessitate the postulation of a tertium quid on the ontological plane, of a reality that is neither true, nor false, but indescribable—a subsistent, neutral reality ? But, such a conclusion seems unwarrantable. While discussing the ontological status of dream-cognitions, Vallabha asserts in his Aṇubhāṣyam that s'ruti undoubtedly speaks of creation in dreams, but it does not hold any brief for its reality[3]. That is to say, there is creation in dream, but that is false. This is nothing but Vivartavāda of the Advaita philosophers. Here denial of 'Satyatvam' can mean nothing but 'mithyātvam' in the advaitic sense. It is, however, difficult to decipher what Vallabha intends to convey by the word 'mithyā' as used by him in his writings. As presently pointed out, a dream-creation is 'Mithyā' to him in the strictly Advaitic sense. Elsewhere we find him condemning a superimposed quality or characteristic of an entity to which it does not really belong as being 'Mithyā'. The rock and roll of water is attributed to the moon reflected in it and the moon seems to be rocking to and fro. This phenomenon of the moon is called

1. Svapnādiṣu tadānīmeva svapnānte vā vastuno 'nyathābhāvopalambhāt/ na tathā jāgarite varṣānantaramapi dṛs'yamānaḥ stambhaḥ stambha eva/(P. 159, Aṇu—Bhāsya, Biblio. Indi).

2. "Kāryasya Kāraṇānanyatvaṁ na mithyātvam" (P. 144, Ibid).

3. S'rutiḥ sṛṣṭimevāha na tasya satyatvamapi (P. 216, Ibid)

'Mithyā' by Vallabha.[4] Likewise Vallabha says elsewhere in regard to the world that it has no 'mithyātva' like the nacre-silver.[5]

In both these cases, 'mithyātva' might mean complete negation, but that seems to be doubtful ; because Vallabhaites reject the very concept of atyantābhāva (not only as a category) in their metaphysical speculations[5a]. It might then mean indescribability of the Advaitins. In the first alternative, an error or an illusion is an Asatkhyāti, and in the second, it is Anirvacanīyakhyāti from the ontological stand-point. Even if the first alternative seem to be preferable, a dream-cognition must be characterised as Anirvacanīyakhyāti ; or perhaps we may delve deeper here and observe that appearance is not reality and what appears need not be real even at the time of appearance. If such an extreme position be acceptable, Vallabha's theory becomes nothing but Asatkhyāti. This is quite in conformity with the following remark of Bālabodhinī, a gloss on Aṇubhāṣyam of Vallabha : "Ato' gamyāgamanaṁ svāpnikaṁyathā na satyaṁ tathā sarve svāpnikā padārthāḥ asatyāḥ".

Vallabha unfortunately seems to present a congeries of disparate ideas which ill affords to form into a rigid philosophical system. Thus in subodhinī he remarks in a place that considered from one aspect everything is real, though from another everything is false.[5b] So, from such an aspect in which truth is ubiquitous, an error is nothing false and Vallabha should be taken to advocate the theory of Satkhyāti. Again, while commenting on the Bhāgavata s'loka, "ṛte' rthaṁ yat" etc. (II. 9. 33), he says that our intellect, confused by Māyā, considers things to be otherwise, though the things do not become otherwise.[6] Here the words 'anyathā manyante' seem to suggest the theory of Anyathākhyāti from the psychological stand-point, though ontologically affirming Asatkhyāti through the implication of the words 'na tu padārthā anyathā bhavanti'. Continuing, he says, "An invalid perception

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4. "Yathā jale candramasaḥ pratibimbitasya tena jalena kṛto guṇaḥ kampādidharmaḥ āsanno vidya-māno mithyaiva dṛs'yate na vastutascan drasya", (P. 358, Subodhini)

5. "na tu mithyātvaṁ s'uktirajatavat iti s'rīmadācāryairuktam" (p.-7 Khyātivivekaḥ).

5a. "Evam anyonyābhāve nirākṛite padārtha-mātrasya sarva-rūpatvena atyantābhāvo'pi dūrīkṛto jñeyaḥ" (p. 2, Pr. R. of Bālakṛṣṇa). But Vallabha might possibly not subscribe to this view.

5b. "Prakārabhedena sarvameva satyaṁ sarvam asatyam ityarthaḥ".

6. "Tayā vyāmohitā buddhiḥ padārthān anyathā manyate, na tu padārthā anyathā bhavanti".

does not ascertain any object. Otherwise, the world would have been of the perverted form as perceived in an invalid cognition. Hence, some sort of "Viṣayatā" is to be assumed whereby our invalid perception might become shorn of any content or sense-datum"[7]. Here the last line suggests Nirviṣayakhyāti. Proceeding further, he says : "As the lunar double is created by Māyā and one does not assume two moons in deference to one's experience, so Viṣayatā too is created by Māyā. This Viṣayatā has two facets. Through one it acts as an enveloper of the real nature of a thing and through the other it occasions an otherwise cognition. The first one keeps concealed the Brahmic nature of things and the second reveals the empiric world. The diverse means of proof are called into request to set at naught both these contingencies"[8]. Here we find that even the world of our sense-experience is not real, when divorced from its Brahmic nature.

From what we have so far discussed about Vallabha's philosophy, it appears that he accepts two grades of reality : the ultimate metaphysical reality and the empiric reality. Outside these two, there is mere appearance, a sham show which has objectivity bereft of reality. How, then, does it differ from the conclusions of the Advaita school ? But such questions apart, the writings of Vallabha as surveyed presently seem to suggest as many as five different theories of error, viz. Asatkhyāti, Anirvacanīya-khyāti, Satkhyāti, Anyathākhyāti and Nirviṣayakhyāti of which the fourth emphasises the psychological aspect, while the others reveal the ontological status of the object of an invalid cognition. However, we do not find any trace of a theory like Anyakhyāti in his writings. Still, a casual statement to the effect 'Viparyāso bhinnārtha-pratipādakaḥ' in his Subodhinī might possibly have suggested the theory of Anya-khyāti to his followers. Anyway, his followers have fathered the theory upon him and have tried to supply the philosophical rationale of this theory. Let us now see how they seek to establish Anyakhyāti as the Vallabhaite theory of error.

Bālakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa prefaces his critique of errors and illusions by certain metaphysical observations which epitomise the fundamentals of S'uddhādvaita philosophy to which he tightly tethered his conscience. He asserts that all the attributes of Brahman are

7. "Bhrānatpratītestu nārthaniyāmakatvam/ Anyathā bhramadṛṣṭyā gṛhītaṁ jagat bhramarūpameva syāt/ Ato viṣayatā Kācit svīkartavyā yayā dṛṣṭirnirviṣayā syāt" (Subodhinī).

8. Yathā candrādyābhāsaḥ Māyayaive janyate, na tu pratītyanurodhena candradvayaṁ kalpyate ; evaṁ viṣayatāpi māyayā janyate..............sā ca viṣayatā dvidhā ācchādikaikā anyathā-pratītihetus'cāparā tatraikā Brahma-rūpatāṁ na prakās'ayati, ekā tu jagadrūpā viṣayatā ; tadubhayavyāvṛttyartham sarvāṇi pramāṇānīti bhāvaḥ" (Ibid).

present in every entity of this world ; but, God regulates the emergence of certain attributes in one and the subsidence of them in others. So, ontologically speaking, everything is every other thing, and everything exists everywhere and as such everything is Brahman. So, there is no ontological necessity of assuming the categories of numerical difference or Anyonyābhāva and absolute absence or Atyantābhāva[9]. Thus, everything being Brahman, there is no real scope for the contingency of an erroneous cognition. Still, Māyā, the deluding principle, confounds the intellect of the Jīva, creates in it an illusory object in the likeness of a real entity of the objective world and projects it upon the sensedatum. In the circumstances, we, in our attempt at cognising the presented datum, cognise the projected entity also and thus the cognition, being qualified by the cognition of this exotic entity, becomes damned as erroneous. So, it is the cognition of a deluded man that is illusory ; the external object is not tainted in anyway. He expounds the position further in his Khyātivivekaḥ thus : The sense-datum is not presented in its true nature and the intellect, spurred ahead by the resurgent impression of silver and the discovery of the common attribute of glitter, creates silver on that locus. It is this conceptual ('bauddha') silver—not mental (mānasa), to be sure, as he warns us against such a supposition—that is apprehended by the intellect. It is verily not an object of the visual perception in its generic stage. But, in the subsequent specific stage, the silver, which is fancied into existence and as such is internal, is intuited by the intellect and not by the senses[10]. Thus, since in an invalid cognition, a silver, which is other than what is apprehended by the senses, is cognised, it is called Anyakhyāti [11]. This conceptual entity is called intermediate creation and is illusory [12]. Following Subodhinī, Bālakṛṣṇa points out that the cognition tainted by Viṣayatā is invalid. Viṣayatā sometimes takes the form of an attribute and sometimes it becomes a substantive. Thus, in an invalid cognition like 'the pitcher is

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9. 'Ataḥ Pramāṇa-siddhābhyāmāvirbhāva-tirobhāvābhyāṁ sarva-kārya siddhau nānyonyābhavo' ṅgīkartavyaḥ/ ..... Evaṁ anyonyābhāve nirākṛte padārthamātrasya sarvarūpatvena atyantābhāvo'pi cūrīkṛto jñeyaḥ (Pr. R., P. 2).

10. "Tadidaṁ bauddham eva rajataṁ buddhyā viṣayīkriyate na tu sāmānyajñāne cakṣurviṣayībhūtam iti vivekaḥ.........Vis'eṣajñāne tu rajatasya Kalpitatvena āntaratvād buddhyaive grahaṇam, na tvindriyaiḥ" (P. 3, Khy. Vi.)

11. 'Evaṁsati indriyeṇa gṛhyamaṇād viṣayāt s'uktyādirūpāt anyasya rajatādeḥ khyātiranya.khyātirityucyate" (Ibid, P. 3).

12. "Ayameva buddhau 'bhātaḥ padārthaḥ āntarālikī sṛṣṭirityucyate/ tasyaiva mithyātvam" (Ibid, P. 4).

revolving', the revolving character is a Viṣayatā. Similarly, when I perceive a yellow conch-shell, the yellow-ness is a viṣayatā. This viṣayatā is out and out a falsity. Hence, things do not turn otherwise ; it is rather under the spell of viṣayatā that they appear otherwise.

From the foregoing discussion it transpires that a nacre-silver and such-like phenomena are 'mithyā' or illusory according to Bālakṛṣṇa, though from the psychological standpoint, he calls it Anyakhyāti. The point to be particularly noted here is that the 'Anya' here is not an elsewhere or elsewhen reality, but an intermediate conceptual creation which is internal in its location. But, this internal presentation too is not a reality. Thus, it is neither the Anyathā-khyāti of the Naiyāyikas despite the fact of 'padārthānām anyathābhānam' being admitted, nor Ātmakhyāti of the yogācāra Buddhists. Still, it smacks of both these theories, though ontologically it stoops towards illusionism. The theory of Anyakhyāti thus seems to betray an ostentatious parade of sectarian exclusiveness that must carve out a separate path for itself though the facts hardly warrant such an attempt.

Let us now address ourselves to an appraisal of the advocacy of puruṣottamjī Mahārāj in support of Anyakhyāti. Puruṣottama defines a Viparyāsa or an error as that kind of objective knowledge which apprehends an object other than that with which the sense is in contact[13]. According to him, an error errs not in omission, but in commission. Thus, in the case of a nacre-silver, right knowledge apprehends the nacre only ; but, the cognition lapses into invalidity the moment it apprehends an additional element of silver. He avers that the cognitum of an erroneous cognition is nothing non-existent ; on the contrary, it is an elsewhere reality. He explains the genesis of an error thus : The latent impressions of previous experiences are welled up by excitants and the intellect then assumes the form of those flashed-out objects which are projected outwards by Māyā. The buddhi thus transformed and objectified screens the presented datum completely or partially and is apprehended in that locus. Thus, in an error, some other thing—a creation of Māyā is apprehended and so it is called Anyakhyāti.

It is interesting to note in this connection that puruṣottama does not hesitate to toe the line with the Naiyāyikas in accepting two kinds of sense-contact : laukika (normal) and alaukika (supra-normal). The latter he subdivides into three : sāmānya, yogaja and Māyā. The last is, as he says, called into request to present non-existent objects before the buddhi. This Māyā represents, as he himself explains, the jñāna-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti of

13. 'Viparyāsas . samprayuktabhinnārthamātra-pratipādakaṁ bāhyaṁ jñānam (P. 16, Pr. Ra.'

the Naiyāyikas.[14] At bottom, then, the theory of Puruṣottama is not different from the Nyāya theory. While Nyāya highlights the psychological aspect, he lays more stress on the ontological aspect of it. Indeed, if he could avoid the bottle-neck of sectarian obsessions, his theory would have fitted squarely into the theoretic scheme of Nyāya. But, he abhors the idea of Anyathā-tva for its irrationality. He discusses this in his Khyātivāda and shows that Anyathātva cannot mean a new creation, or a transformation, or even a special kind of identity of the substantive, or of the adjunct, or even of the qualified substantive.[15]

We must, however, distinguish between the two theories in two respects at least. First, the supra-normal Pratyāsatti called Māyā by Puruṣottama has no reference to any elsewhere reality (though he speaks of such a reality in a different context—See supra) which is assured by the object intuited through jñāna-lakṣaṇa-Pratyāsatti of Nyāya. Secondly, Māyā does not present the illusory silver in the locus of the nacre as is done by Nyāya Pratyāsatti, but merely presents it to the intellect, which, however, projects it outwards upon the locus of the nacre. (Elsewhere, however, he attributes all these to Māyā where it is possibly not a Pratyāsatti). So, the reality that is affirmed of a nacre-silver by Nyāya cannot be asserted with regard to the nacre-silver of Puruṣottama's conception. To him it is nothing but a silver of the reflective consciousness, though projected outwards upon the sense-datum. But, in Vādāvalī he does not accept this position in an absolute sense. While discussing the theory of Rāmānuja in that brochure, he says that, according to Rāmānuja, inasmuch as silver really exists in nacre, the cognition of a nacre-silver is a valid one and such a cognition is to be termed Akhyāti. Puruṣottama readily gives his seal of approval on such a position with certain qualifications. He points out that everything exists everywhere ; still one has to assume the disappearance of objects other than actually present with a view to drawing a line of demarcation between error and truth. He further asserts that those who are completely established in knowledge or in yoga cognise anything anywhere. So, the theory of Akhyāti holds good in their cognitions of the nacre-silver type. But, in the case of ordinary mortals, some past impression is aroused and the intellect being characterised by such impression is projected outwards by Māyā ; as a result, one apprehends the attributes of a silver and the like

14. "Sa tāvallaukikālaukika-bhedena dvidhā / Tatrālauki Kastridhā/-Sāmānya-yogaja-Māyā-bhedāt/.........Tṛtīyā tvavidyamānānāṁ buddhāvupasthāpane. Ata eva Naiyāyikānāṁ jñāne pratyāsatti-bhramaḥ". (Pp. 116-117, Ibid).

15. "Kimidam anyathātvaṁ nāma ārambho vipariṇāmas-tādātmyav-is'eṣo vā ? so'pi vis'iṣṭasya vā, vis'eṣaṇasya vā, vis'eṣyasya vā ?" (P. 122, Khy. Vā.)

and hence Anyakhyāti is proper here. For, the word Anya, as he says, means similar and in an error one verily apprehends the attributes similar to those intuited in the sense-datum. So, according to him, Akhyāti and Anyakhyāti are the two theories to be accepted with proper demarcation of their provinces of application.

We need not attempt here any refutation of such a theory ; because, it is blistering with so many contradictions and confusion of thought that it can be easily resolved into, as has been already shown, many of the other traditional Khyātis. Moreover, its fundamental postulates are open to serious objection and its disapproval of Atyantābhāva, which fact perhaps makes them advocate Anya-Khyāti, is highly illogical and unproved. And the rejection of the concept of Anyonyābhāva by Bālakṛṣṇa carries with it the consequent rejection also of Anya-Khyāti as a concept.

CHAPTER VIII

SADASAT-KHYĀTI

The Sāṁkhya-Sūtras place on the anvil the problem of illusion, and, after much debate and deliberation, offer a solution in the following Sūtra-"Sadasat-Khyātirbādhābādhāt" (SS. VI. 56).

From this the plain fact emerges that the Sāṁkhya upholds the Sadast-Khyāti theory of illusion. This fact has been noted by many scholars and readily accepted too. Thus S. C. Bhāratī refers to this theory of the sāṁkhya in his brochure called 'Khyāti-Vādaḥ'. Dr. J. N. Sinha in his History of Indian philosophy says, "The Sāṁkhya advocates the doctrine of Akhyāti, Vivekākhyāti or Sadasat-Khyāti." (Vol. 1, p. 134). Mr. Rājendra Nāth Ghosh also in his Introduction to Advaita-siddhi observes that the Sāmkhyas generally advocate the doctrine of Sadasat-Khyāti (p. 367). Mr. K. C. Bhattacharya, the great philosopher of the renascent India, is emphatic in his assertion that Sadasat-Khyāti is the characteristic theory of illusion of the Sāṁkhya. Despite all these, many scholars seem to attach little importance on the particular Sūtra formulating such a theory. To them such a theory ill affords to be representative of the Sāṁkhya philosophy. Some of them even go the length of knocking the bottom of such a thesis on the ground of dubious origin of the Sāṁkhya Sūtras which can in no wise be placed earlier than the 9th Cen. A.D. Indeed, as they point out, the Sāṁkhya primarily means the Sāṁkhya-Kārikā of Īs'vara-Kṛṣṇa supplemented by the Māṭhara-Vṛtti. All the philosophers of note of medieval India starting from the great S'aṁkara down to Vidyāraṇya draw exclusively upon this treatise with a view to presenting the doctrinal essentials of the Sāṁkhya. But, the fact of the matter is that no trace of Sadasat-Khyāti can be discovered in this treatise. In the circumstances, scholars have generally ignored the verdict of the Sāṁkhya-Sūtras and have taken Akhyāti to be the proper theory of illusion of the Sāṁkhya. Not only Dr. Sinha[2], but also Dr. S. N. Das Gupta[3], and Prof.

1. See Ph. 14. 25-27. Khyāti-Vādaḥ by S. C. Bhāratī.

2. See Ante., Dr. Sinha's Hist. of Indian Phil., Vol. 1.

3. "The Viparīta-khyāti or Anyathā-khyāti theory of illusion is accepted by the Nyāya, Vais'eṣika and the yoga, the Akhyāti theory by Mīmāṅsā and Sāṅkhya and the Ātma-Khyāti by the Buddhists." (P. 385, Dr. Das Gupta's Hist. of Indian Phil., Vol. I.).

Hiriyanna[4] subscribe to this view unequivocally. The first two scholars approach the problem from a metaphysical standpoint, while Prof. Hiriyanna emphasises the theory of selective apprehension of the Sāṁkhya and has recourse to an epistemological and psychological view-point to arrive at an identical conclusion. But, Dr. Tatia is neither here, nor there, and smells the rat at this point. He finds fault with these scholars, though almost peremptorily, for their supposed zeal to equate the theory of the Sāṁkhya with the Akyhāti theory of the Prābhākaras. As he himself says, "There is an unfortunate tendency to interpret the Sāṁkhya theory of error on substantially the same lines with Prabhākara's theory. There is not the slightest warrant for this supposition. The Sāṁkhya must believe in positive error" (P. 99, Dr. N. Tatia's studies in Jaina Phil.). But, the enthusiastic scholar does not stop here. He takes great pains to induce us to believe that Aviveka is the theory of error of the Sāṁkhya as well as of the yoga. (Pray, sir ! is then Aviveka something purely positive, and is it really different from Vivekākhyāti ?) Dr. Tatia emphatically asserts that "the yoga and the Sāṁkhya do not differ as regards their conception of Viparyaya or Avidyā" (Ibid., P. 93). In this connection he brings the Pañca-kleśas of the yoga ; viz. Avidyā, Asmitā, Rāga, Dveṣa and Abhiniveśa into line with the five varieties of Viparyaya of the Sāṅkhya, namely, Tamas, Moha, Mahāmoha, Tāmisra and Andha-tāmisra. He, then, assures us of "passages in the yoga-bhāṣya which imply the doctrine of Aviveka as well" (P. 97, Ibid). He does not, however, rest awhile to consider the serious implication of the difference between implication and proclamation in regard to theorising on errors and illusions. Thus, extending the frontiers of the yoga into the domain of the Sāṁkhya, he, then, looks across the province of discourse and observes, 'On the other hand, there is a passage quoted in the yoga-bhāṣya and ascribed to the great Sāṅkhya exponent Pañcaśikha by Vācaspati which can easily be interpreted as implying the doctrine of Anyathā-khyāti for the Sāṅkhya

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4. "It may not indeed amount to an error of commission (Viparīta-khyāti) ; but, it is partial, and, so far as it is uot recognised to be partial, it becomes an error, though only an error of omission (Akhyāti)". (P. 47, The Sāṅkhya by Prof. Hiriyanna, The Cultural Heritage of India).

system'. (P. 97, Ibid.). Dr. Tatia thus means to say that since the yoga implies the Sāṁkhya theory of Aviveka, and, the Sāṁkhya in its turn implies the yoga theory of Anyathā-khyāti, both the schools share the same pasture and uphold an identical theory of illusion. It is like arguing that since a consonant is sometimes preceded by 'An', the specific article for vowels, and a vowel likewise is preceded by 'A', the article for consonants, vowels and consonants are co-extensive and are identically articled. Such arguments based on implication are quite unavailing in our enquiry. But, granting such an identical theory, what is that theory ? Let us hear Dr. Tatia in his own words, "The truth seems to be that both the systems, the yoga and the Sāṁkhya, had a common theory of error, and that was the theory of Aviveka" (P. 97, Ibid.). Splendid philosophy, indeed, based on vaulting abstraction ! But, what a poor metaphysical husbandry ! Philosophy is nothing but abstraction ; but, the spring-board of abstraction differs from one system to another. No two systems weigh anchor from the same region or in an identical manner. Indeed, if we could make abstractions according to our sweet will, there would not have been a legion of theories of illusion. It will be shown, as we proceed with our study, that every such theory implies a certain element of Akhyāti, Anyathā-khyāti and Asat-khyāti. But, that does not debar an exponent from advocating his own peculiar theory of illusion.

Dr.Tatia has completely lost sight of this necessary perspective and has made wild intrusions into unchartered regions. Anyway, the learned doctor now looks mighty serious and pounces upon the concept of Avidyā and its operation upon Buddhi. This operation, as he says, may be interpreted either as an atrophy of the function of Buddhi, which leads to the theory of Aviveka, or, as misguiding the Buddhi which results in the theory of Anyathā-khyāti. Now, since 'The yoga and the Sāṁkhya, had a common theory of error, and that was the theory of Aviveka', as the writer himself assures us, are we to conclude, to avoid contradiction, that the theory of Anyathā-khyāti was a later development in the yoga ? But, then, the yoga-sūtra 'Viparyayo mithyā-jñānam atadrūpa-pratiṣṭham' (Ys. I.8.) has to be knocked out of existence. Dr. Tatia with a sphinx-like smile may read out for us from the Geeta, 'Ekaṁ

Sāṁkhyañca yogañca yaḥ paśyati Sa paśyati'. But, this talk of the basic unity of the two systems is of as much help to us in our philosophical quest as is that of 'Sarvaṁ khalvidaṁ Brahma' for a worldly-wise, work-a-day man.

In point of fact, Dr. Tatia has missed the subtle points of difference between the Sāṁkhya and the yoga. Though it is generally held that the Sāṁkhya and the yoga are complementary, the former supplying the metaphysics and the latter the practical discipline, the difference between the two can by no means be overlooked. Thus, it may be shown that the Sāṁkhya understands the Guṇas in terms of feelings, while the yoga understands them as the triplicity of mental functions. Indeed, while in the yoga the faculty of will steals the lime light, the Sāṁkhya oscillates between thinking and feeling faculties. The Sāṁkhya does not make room for any immanent change as accepted by the yoga. Moreover, it advocates a continuity between life (Bhoga) and reflection leading to Apavarga, while the yoga does not. Then, again, the conception of the will is different in the two systems. To the Sāṁkhya, it is a function of Buddhi. There is also an essential difference between the two systems in regard to the conception of Bhoga.

To quote Prof. K. C. Bhattacharya : "Bhoga is no function of the pure self either to yoga or to Sāṁkhya, but as a function of buddhi-endowed self, it is real to yoga and unreal to Sāṁkhya. It is real conative appropriation to yoga, real perpetration of an illusion or contradiction, real willing of the contradiction of the object being the self. This willed contradiction is the real significance of the theory of Anyathā-khyāti, the theory of illusion accepted by yoga and Nyāya. The root of conative appropriation is called in yoga 'avidyā' which is defined as the viewing of the not-self as the self,......To Sāmkha, bhoga is the feeling of the self being the not-self, wearing the form of the Vṛtti, getting objectified or modified into the form of the affective object in the last resort. ......The root of the affective illusion ......as distinct from the willed contradiction in yoga......is aviveka which, too, like avidyā, is not merely privative, being the positive feeling (not presentation) of the self being impossibly affected or modified like the object......The non-distinction of the object from the self is an actual objective situation, factual

or sat though terminable, but the positively felt identity of the self from (Sic.) the object is unreal or asat. Hence, illusion is taken in Sāṁkhya as Sadasat-khyāti". (Pp. 229-30, Studies in Philosophy, Vol. I—Prof. K. C. Bhattacharya). It is now clear from the above that the Sāṁkhya and the yoga differ in their conception of Bhoga which is real conative appropriation to the latter and an affective objectification which is real-cum-unreal to the former, its root being Avidyā in one and Aviveka in the other. Hence, it stands to reason that, while Anyathā-khyāti is advocated by the yoga, the Sāṁkhya view of illusion is no other than Sadasat-khyāti.

This Sāṁkhya theory of Sadasat-khyāti bas been elucidated by Aniruddha in his Sāṁkhya-sūtra-vṛtti, by Vijñāna Bhikṣu in his Sāṁkhya-Pravacana-bhāṣya and by Nāges'a Bhaṭṭa in his Mañjūṣā. Let us now deal with their deliberations on it one after another.

In the 5th Adhyāya of the Sāṁkhya Sūtras, we get the following five consecutive Sūtras : 'Nāsataḥ Khyānaṁ nṛśṛṅgavat' (Sū. 52), 'Na Sato bādha-dars'anāt' (Sū. 53), 'Nānirvacanīyasya tadabhāvāt' (Sū. 54), 'Nānyathā-khyātiḥ sva-vaco-vyāghātāt' (Sū. 55) and 'Sadasat-khyātirbādhā-bādhāt' (Sū. 56). Aniruddha in his gloss on these Sūtras points out that the two theories of Anirvacanīya-khyāti and Anyathā-khyāti are not at all maintainable. He explodes the first theory by showing that a nacresilver is not at all indescribable ; for, it can certainly be described as 'this is silver' ; furthermore, though it be indescribable, being neither sat, nor asat, this its indescribability is verily its description. Hence, Anirvacanīya-khyāti has to give in[5]. The theory of Anyathā-khyāti does not fare any the better. For, how can a nacre appear as a silver ? Something appearing and being apprehended as a different thing is a position which contradicts experience and betrays self-contradictory cognition[6]. Nor may the illusion of a nacre-silver be explained as asat-khyāti. It may be argued that, in an illusion like 'this is silver', one apprehends between a nacre and a silver an identity which is non-existent. But, Aniruddha rules out such a possibility. He argues that what is non-existent is devoid of

5. "Tanna ; idaṁ rajatam ityanenaiva nirvacanīyatvāt, na sannāsan iti anirvacanīyatvena nirvacanācca" (SSV. P. 281).

6. "Anyat anyātmanā avabhāsate iti saṁvid-viruddham" (Ibid. P. 282).

causal efficiency and, as such, a non-existent, like the horn of a man, cannot reasonably generate any cognition[7]. Then is such a nacre-silver non-existent ? No, says Aniruddha. One might argue that, in 'this is silver', the 'this' refers to the thing in front and the 'silver' is memory, and, through non-apprehension of the distinction between these two discrete cognitions, we are prompted to get at the nacre-silver. Aniruddha refuses to accept such a thesis and says that inducement to activ ty comes through the apprehension of identity and not through any non-apprehension of distinction. Moreover, the cognition 'this is silver' is found to be contradicted and sublated by the cognition 'this is not silver'. But, a valid knowledge never suffers sublation. So, the nacre-silver cannot be taken to be real either[8]. Then, what is the ontological status of this cognition of nacre-silver ? Aniruddha assures us that it is real and unreal—real in so far as it refers to a thing in front, and, unreal in regard to its cognitum being a silver, in as much as the former is not contradicted, while the latter is contradicted. The silver appearing there is a super-imposed one[9]. It is not, however, clear what Aniruddha precisely means by the expression 'Āropita-rajatam' here. It may mean a mental projection on the 'this', in which case it tends towards Ātma-khyāti, except for the fact that here the projection and its locus, or, for the matter of that, the external world, are real. It may also signify an elsewhere reality brought to bear upon the 'this' ; but, such an alternative is ruled out by damning the cognition as false with reference to silver ('rajatavişayatayā tu asat').

It seems that Aniruddha's statements silently pave the way for saduparakta-asatkhyāti as advocated by the Mādhva philosophers. The thing to be particularly noted here is that the criteria of truth and fal-ity are, according to Aniruddha, Abādha (absence of contradiction) and bādha (contradiction) respectively, which are, as we know, the two corner-stones of the magnificent edifice of Advaita-vāda. Elsewhere, however, he has recourse to

7. "Idaṁ rajatam iti asadeva śukti-rajata-tādātmyaṁ pratibhāti/Tanna, asataḥ artha-kriyā-virahāt jñāna-janakatvānupapatteḥ, Yathā manuṣya-śṛṅgasya" (Ibid., P. 278).

8. "Idaṁ rajatam iti purovarti-viṣayatayā sat, abādhanāt/rajata-viṣayatayā tu asat, bādhāt/tasmāt sadasatī tattvam" (Ibid., P. 283).

9. "Āropita-rajatameva tatrāvabhāsate iti sva-matam āha" (Ibid.).

the pragmatic theory of causal efficiency as the criterion of truth ('Asataḥ artha-kriyā-virahāt', Ibid., p. 278). This mental imbalance is all the more betrayed when we careto go through the whole of his Vṛtti. Thus, in one place he says that the nacre-silver is sublated by the cognition 'this is not silver'. And this silver is adjudged to be false because of its origin from defective cause even like the cognition of a yellow conch-shell occasioned by jaundice[10]. In another place, on the contrary, he says that even a dream-cognition is not utterly false like a sky-flower ; for, in the ultimate analysis, a dream cannot be false with regard to itself, or, it will cease to be called a dream at all. Nor can a dream thrive on something utterly unforeseen. On the contrary, it has for its content the things of wakeful consciousness [11]. From this we can make several deductions as follow :—(1) that a dream-cognition, or, for the matter of that, any illusion, is not false, which fact flatly contradicts the postulation of its falsity referred to presently, (2) that the statement that a dream qua dream is a reality only takes after the view-point of kumārila when he says, "Tasmād bodhārthakatvena prāptā buddheḥ pramāṇatā" (S'v.). (3) that a sky-flower and the like are unreal which fact contradicts the statement that whatever is contradicted is unreal, (4) that the content of a dream is an elsewhere reality and not an utter naught, which fact also reminds one of Kumārila's pronouncement to the following effect, "Sarvatrālambanaṁ bāhyaṁ des'a-kālānyathātmakam" (Śv.) and smacks of Anyathā-khyāti. Thus, it transpires that Aniruddha gives expression to a congeries of ideas which he cannot weld together to form a rigid philosophical system. His approach is rather uncritical and it is futile to attempt any refutation of his exposition of the theory, as it stands almost self-condemned.

Vijñāna Bhikṣu, another interpreter of the Sāṁkhya Sūtras, does not fare better. The texture of his thought is extremely loose and hardly stands any serious scrutiny. While explaining

10. "S'uktau rajata-jñāne nedaṁ rajatamiti jñānāt rajata-bādhaḥ/......... duṣṭa-kāraṇa-janyatvācca mithyeti avagamyate, yathā kāmalādi-doṣāt pītaśaṁkha-jñānaṁ Kasyacit" (Ibid., P. 84).

11. "Svapna-pratyayasyāpi na ātyantikaṁ mithyātvaṁ kha-puṣpa-vat, na ca svātmani api mithyātvam, anyathā svapna ityeva na syāt/na ca atyantādṛṣṭe svapnaḥ, kintu jāgrad-dṛṣṭe' rthe" (Ibid., P. 198).

the Sūtra "Sadasat-khyātirbādhābadhāt", he first points out that all things in their self-subsistent, entitative aspect are real and uncontradicted ; but they are unreal in their relational character. Thus, redness and a piece of cloth are both equally real ; but when they are related to each other, the composite thing is unreal as also the relation itself. One should not demur that reality and unreality cannot co-exist ; for, the contradiction may be avoided by making room for different modes of approach. Thus, redness is certainly something real, but, lapses into unreality as a reflection on crystal. Again, a silver is real as existing in a merchant's shop, but is unreal as superimposed upon a shell. This manner of speech certainly tends to Asat-saṁsarga-khyāti or Anyathā-khyāti. He, then, unlike Aniruddha, does not explain the illusion 'this is a silver' as a composite experience of which 'this' is real and 'a silver' is unreal. He accords this reality-cum-unreality not only to errors and illusions, but also to the world at large. But, quite contrary to this, he elsewhere pleads that the fact that the Sūtrakāra himself would affirm reality-cum-unreality of the world does not involve contradiction, since reality and unreality there stand for manifestness and unmanifestness respectively[12]. In another place he says that their avowed object is to deny of the world a similarity to the nacre-silver [13]. The self-contradiction is too apparent to call for any elucidation. One might come to the rescue of the Bhikṣu and point out that while a real silver of our normal experience is unreal only when superimposed upon immaculate consciousness, a nacre-silver is unreal even as a super-imposition upon a nacre. But, that is nowhere stated by the Bhikṣu. He elsewhere states that the world is not sublated like a dream and what is sublated is unreal. Indeed, a dream-rope cannot bind any one. The world is neither created by a defective cause in the fashion of the yellowness of the conch-shell occasioned by the defective organ. Hence the world is real and not unreal like a dream, a sky-flower and the like. Here, again, he calls dreams and illusions 'avastu' i.e. unreal and equates them with

12. "Swayaṁ tu sadasattvaṁ prapañcasya yad Vakṣyati tatra sattvāsattve vyaktāvyakta-svarūpatvād viruddhe eva na bhavataḥ" (P. 257, SD., Beng. ed.).

13. "S'ukti-rajatādi-tulyatvasyaiva prapañce' smābhiḥ pratiṣedhāt" (P. 267, Ibid.).

sky-flower which is totally non-existent. On yet another occasion, he takes us by storm by affirming that dreams and illusions are not completely divested of reality inasmuch as they are but transformations of the mind[14]. It is certainly difficult to keep one's foothold upon such a drifting log. Again, while explaining the Sūtra "Nānyathā-khyātiḥ svavaco-vyāghātāt", he disposes of the theory of Anyathākhyāti and remarks : "An entity, absent in front of the percipient, cannot be apprehended simply by its existence elsewhere. It need not be argued that apprehension presupposes some existence somewhere, or else, in the absence of any sense-contact etc., it cannot be apprehended. For, we can safely refer te the time-less continuum of impressions as the cause of errors"[15]. This is sheer self-contradiction, and, in a sense, it clearly smacks of Ātma-khyāti of the yogācāra. He involves himself, perhaps unwittingly, in insurmountable difficulties by saying that Prakṛti, being super-imposed upon the rope-like Puruṣa. becomes like a serpent[16]. Thus it appears that his utterances are a medley of divergent thoughts which are neither here, nor there as a whole. His endeavour to read the thoughts of the Brahma-sūtras and the Geetā in the Sāṁkhya-sūtras is pathetic, indeed. But, in one point he certainly enlightens us when he says that the Sāṁkhya differs from the yoga only in respect of non-acceptance of the theory of Anyathā-khyāti[17]. This theory of the Bhikṣu, like most of the theories discussed before-hand, is fragmentary in its nature ; for, it has no explanation to offer in regard to the genesis of illusion, the overt action in its wake and its subsequent sublation—the three cornerstones of any full-blooded theory of illusion.

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14. "Svapna-padārthānāmapi manaḥ-pariṇāmatvena atyantāsattā-virahācca" (Ibid., P. 362). Aslo "S'ukti-rajata-svapna-manorathādau ca manaḥ-pariṇāma-rūpa evārthaḥ pratīyate nātyantāsanniti vakṣyati" (Ibid., P. 458).

15. "Purovartinyasattve 'nyatra tat-sattāyā bhānā-prayojakatvamiti bhāvaḥ/na ca sarvatrāsato bhāne sāmagrī na sambhavati sannikarṣādyabhāvāt ityata kvacit sattāmātram apekṣyata iti vācyam/anādi-vāsanādhārāyā eva bhrama-hetutva-sambhavāditi. (Ibid., P. 459).

16. "Uraga-tulyatvaṁ ca pradhānasya rajjutulye puruṣe samāropaṇāt" (Ibid., 415).

17. "Anyathā-khyātyanabhyupagama-mātra eva yogato' traviśeṣaucityāt" (Ibid., P. 274).

Mr. S. C. Bhāratī in his brochure called 'Khyātivādaḥ' represents Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa as a patron of the theory of Sadasat-Khyāti and quotes sparingly but two brief sentences from his Mañjūṣā by way of attempting an exposition of his theory. The Mañjūṣā under reference is evidently a gloss of Nāgeśa on the Sāṁkya Sūtras[17a]; but, unfortunately for me, I have not been able to procure a copy of it for my use. So, I have no other alternative but to closely follow the exposition of Mr. Bhāratī in presenting the view of Nāgeśa. According to Nāgeśa, the Vyāvahārika as also the prātibhāsika world has both the absence of the numerical difference of Sat (Sad-bhedātyantābhāva) and Asat (Asad-bhedātyantābhāva). Hence, the empiric world as also the subsistent world i.e. a phenomenon of the nacre-silver type is a negation of both what is different from the real and what is different from the unreal at the same time. The first negation pertains to its unreality and the second to its reality. Now, this negation of reality-cum-unreality being a simultaneous one, it is anirvācya i.e. indescribable. The nacre-silver, according to Nāgeśa, is a mental reality, and, has no existence in the outside world ; still, the reality of the substratum is super-imposed upon it whereby it appears to be real. Nāgeśa does not yield his palm to the advaitic view of a prātibhāsika silver being created in the locus in question. For, avidyā may very well generate an immediate cognition of a nacre-silver even without its external existence, and, in the circumstances, it will be sheer useless complexity of hypothesis (i.e. Kalpanā-gaurava) to assume the creation of silver. The cognition of such a nacre-silver remains uncontradicted so long as the particularity of the locus is not apprehended and it is contradicted thereafter[18]. The words of Nāgeśa may thus be explained. The nacre-silver is a mental reality ; but, it is not projected outwards and superimposed upon the datum of intuition. Rather, the reality of the datum is super-imposed upon it and that makes it appear as an external reality. So, his view

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17*a*. This is a wrong surmise corrected through a perusal of the Bhūmikā of the Pañca-pādikā (Madras ed., 1958). The Mañjūṣā is the vaiyākaraṇa-laghu-mañjūṣa of Nāgeśa. See Appendix.

18. "Yāvad-viśeṣādarśanam abādhaḥ, taduttarañca bādhaḥ, adhiṣṭhāna-gata-sattvāropeṇa tu yāvad-viśeṣa-darśanaṁ bahiḥ sattvena pratītirbuddhi-sad-rajatasya". (Mañ. quoted in Khyātivādaḥ, P. 27)

seems to be quite different from that of the Bhikṣu, though nearer to that of Aniruddha in a sense. In the absence of first-hand materials to draw upon, we excuse ourselves the task of attempting a criticism of this theory. We may only casually point out a few of our objections to his rather imperfectly known view.

(1) If avidyā is capable of generating cognition even without any cognitum, the causal theory of knowledge of the Sāṁkhya will be cast to the four winds and knowledge, being neither discovery nor creation, would be a chaotic incidence.

(2) That the expression 'bahiḥ Sattvena pratītiḥ' smacks of Ātma-khyāti and leads inevitably to Anyathā-khyāti ; for, what is not actually 'bahiḥ', appears as 'bahiḥ'.

(3) That avidyā of the advaitic brand is exploded in the Sāṁkhya Sūtras[19], and that the Sāṁkhya does not advocate any knowledge without sense-object-contact and the consequent mental modification. So, the proposition of knowledge only through Avidyā even without the existence of an object is definitely at variance with the Sāṁkhya theory of knowledge.

In fact, Nāgeśa betrays his subconscious affiliation to the vedantic anirvacanīya-khyāti, but forsakes its realistic epistemology and moves straightaway into the orbit of Ātma-khyāti of the yogācāra school.

19. cf. the Sāṁkhya-Sūtras 20.24, Adhyāya I.

CHAPTER IX

ĀTMA-KHYĀTI

The Ātma-khyāti theory of error and illusion is traditionally fathered upon the yogācāra buddhists who, though denying dualism, generally advocate monistic pluralism in which nothing but the incessant stream of momentary consciousness-units is real. The yogācāra buddhists, unlike the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, deny the reality of the external world which is at best a Prajñapti-sat to them and hence they reduce all existence to a monolith of fleeting cognitions, the only reality acceptable to them. So, it is only to be expected that they should put forward the Ātma-khyāti theory of error. The Mādhyamikas hold themselves studiously apart from such a view and are said to sponsor the view of Asat-khyāti in consonance with their metaphysical doctrine of Śūnyavāda which presumably cuts off even the inner world of ideas and reduces reality to an unqualified void. But, what about the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas? Dr. A. Roy Choudhuri in his book entitled 'The doctrine of Māyā' says, "The philosophers of the Sautrāntika, Vaibhāṣika and the yogācāra schools of Buddhism hold the doctrine of Ātma-khyāti" and refers to Bhāmatī of Vācaspati Miśra and Parimala of Appyaya Dīkṣita as his authorities in point. Dr. B. K. Sengupta also harps on the same string when he confidently remarks, "It is well-known that except the Mādhyamikas, all other schools of Buddhism subscribe to this Ātmakhyāti theory of error which explains it from the angle of an epistemological idealism" (P. 63, A Critique of the Vivaraṇa School). Mr. S. C. Bhāratī also appeals to the same authorities with a view to arriving at an identical conclusion. In the Bhāmatī of Vācaspati we come across the following sentence "Sautrāntika-naye tāvad bāhyam asti vastu-sat, tatra jñānākārasyāropaḥ" (Bhā., P. 26, A. Śāstri's ed.). This coupled with the gloss on it called Kalpataru[1] and the sub-gloss there-on named Parimala[2] has led the scholars referred

1. "Yadyapi Sautrāntikasya Vaibhāṣikavad artho na pratyakṣaḥ, tathāpi jñāna-gatārthasārūpyeṇānumī-yamānatvād asti tāvad adhiṣṭhānam, āropyaṁ tu jñānākāra eva, bhrānti-jñānākāra-sadṛśasya bāhyārthasyābhāvād ityarthaḥ". (Kalpataru, P. 26).

2. "Bāhyāstitva-vādinor-Vaibhāṣika-Sautrāntikayoḥ sat śuktikā-S'akalā-

to presently to the conclusion that the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas also upheld the theory of Ātma-khyāti. Mr. Bhāratī registers the approval of such a position by Nāgeśa also, at least with regard to the Sautrāntikas[3]. But, the situation grows intriguing when others view such an opinion with disapproval and present matters altogether differently. Thus, Mahādeva Punatāmakara in his 'Nyāyakaustubha', though confirming the view in regard to the Sautrāntikas, denies it of the Vaibhāṣikas of whom he says : 'Vaibhāṣikāstu bhrame' sadeva rajataṁ bhāsate ityasatkhyātireva bhramaḥ" (Pp. 77-78). His silence in regard to the yogācāras seems ominous, and it may be reasonably doubted if he had sufficient opportunity of getting acquainted with the metaphysical speculations of the Buddhists. But, Vācaspati's silence in regard to the Vaibhāṣika standpoint here seems to be highly significant. Amalānanda also in his Kalpataru does not clearly state that the Vaibhāṣikas also upheld Ātma-khyāti. Moreover, no less a person than Vedāntadeśika Veṅkaṭa-Nātha seems to hold a different view, as will appear from even a cursory perusal of the chapter named Buddhisara of his book entitled Tattva-muktā-kalāpa. This prolific writer deals with the different theories of error in verse in the chapter called Buddhisara and in his Sarvārtha-siddhi commentary on it introduces śloka No. 27 with the following remark : "Atha bāhyārtha-vādi-bauddha-kalpitāḥ pakṣāḥ pratikṣipyante. Tatra Sautrāntikāḥ Prāhuḥ". It is to be noted here that the Asat-khyāti theory of the Mādhyamikas has been already refuted in śl. 18 and the Ātma-khyāti theory of the yogācāras has been disposed of in the Śls. from No. 20 to No. 26. This definitely proves that the view of the Sautrāntikas was different from the Ātma-khyāti of the yogācāra school. We must note that Śl. 26 represents only one pakṣa among the 'Pakṣāḥ' referred to above. These other Pakṣas appear in Śls. 28 and 29, if not also in Śl. 30. In the Sarvārtha-siddhi on Śl. 28 Veṅkaṭa says : "Anye tvāhuḥ-buddhirarthaśca vastuto nirākārau ; tathāpi cūrṇa-haridrā-yogaja-rāganyāyena sita-raktā-dirākārastadotpanno gṛhyata iti".

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dikamadhiṣṭhānaṁ, tannāstitva-vādino yogācārasya tvavidyā-kalpitaṁ tadadhiṣṭhānam ityevaṁ matabhedenādhiṣṭhāna-bhedam āhetyarthaḥ" (Parimala, P. 26).

3. "Nāgeśenāpi Mañjūṣāyām Sautrāntika-naye jñāna-dharma eva bhāsata ityuktam". (KV., P. 21).

But, on close scrutiny it will appear here that the Śls. 27 and 28 do not deal with any theory of illusion, but only present the peculiar views of certain sections of Buddhists in regard to the nature of Buddhi. Incidentally it may be pointed out here that the yogācāras[4], the Sautrāntikas and the Vaibhāṣikas[5] are at one in denying fromlessness of cognitions and hence the Śl. 28 does not refer to any of them. Though it is extremely difficult to ascertain who amongst the buddhists are the target of attack in Śl. 28, particularly in view of the fact that there were as many as eighteen different schools of them maintaining widely divergent views starting from the doctrine of the soul to that of soullessness and the void, one might be tempted to find in it a reference to the Mādhyamikas who are represented in the Vivekavilāsa in the following hemistitch : "Kevalāṁ saṁvidaṁ svasthāṁ manyante madhyamāḥ punaḥ[6]". But, such a hypothesis is ruled out by the Sarvārtha-siddhi commentery which clearly states that the Śls. beginning from No. 27 bear upon the views of those buddhists who accept external reality. Be that as it may, the Sl. No. 29 is openly declared to be in refutation of of Niradhiṣṭhāna-khyāti and the SS. commentary introduces it with the following remark : "Atha Kaiścid bāhyārthavādibhiḥ saugatairuktāṁ niradhiṣṭhāna-khyātim anvākhyāti". (P. 454). Now, of the four traditional schools of the buddhists, it is only the Vaibhāṣikas, besides theSautrāntikas, who advocate the reality of the external world. So, it may be concluded, without any serious violence to discursive thought, that the Vaibhāṣikas are represented here as advocates of Niradhiṣṭhāna-khyāti. Veṅkaṭa in his Nyāya-Pariśuddhi also discusses this theory[7]. But, his scholiast Śrī Nivāsadāsa in his Nyāyasāra commentary affiliates this view to the Mādhyamika school, as appears from the preface to his exposition of this view, with the following remarks : "Idānīṁ sākṣān mādhyamika-parigṛhīte niradhiṣ-

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4. 'Ākāra-sahitā buddhiḥ yogācārasya sammatā' (Vivekavilāsa quoted in SDS., P. 29, Cal. ed.).

5. "Cittaṁ mano' rtha-vijñānam ekārthaṁ citta-caitasāḥ/Sāśrayālambanākārāḥ samprayuktāśca pañcadhā" (Kośasthāna 2, Kā. 34). Also, 'Artha-sārūpyamasya prāmāṇyam' (NB., Sū. 20).

6. Cf. SDS. P. 29, Cal. ed.

7. "Anyeṣāṁ tacca niradhiṣṭhāna-khyātau vicāryatām/Atrāsadeva bhavatām atreti jñāyate na vā etc." (NP., P. 47, Chowkhāmbā ed.)

ṭhāna-khyāti-pakṣe doṣaṁ vaktuṁ pratijānīte" (P. 47, NS). Śrī Nivāsa evidently had the word 'Atrāsadeva bhavatām' of Veṅkaṭa ringing into his ears, and he presumably pounced upon the word 'Asat' as the foundation of this theory, wherefore it was fathered upon the Mādhyamikas by him. This explains also why the author of Nyāya-Kaustubha represents the Vaibhāṣikas as subscribing to the view of Asat-Khyāti. But, from what has been presently discussed with quotations from TMK. and SS. it becomes perfectly clear that Veṅkaṭa had no such idea of facile equation at the back of his mind when he treated of the theory of Niradhiṣṭhāna-khyāti. On the contrary, we have it on the authority of his SS. that it was a theory of a section of the bāhyārtha-vādī buddhists whom we equate with the Vaibhāṣikas for reasons stated heretofore. Hence, it is difficult here for us to toe the line with other scholars and engraft the Ātma-khyāti theory of illusion upon the Vaibhāṣikas.

Here one might demur : If the adhiṣṭhāna or the substratum is once denied, the stage is once for all set for Ātma-khyāti irrevocably to the exclusion of all other khyātis. To this it may be replied that just as Ātma-khyāti has an element of Sat-khyāti from one view-point and also an element of asat-khyāti from another, so, Niradhiṣṭhāna-khyāti has certainly an element of Ātma-khyāti in it ; but that does not assuredly equate it with the latter. It is to be particularly noted here that the difference between the two theories does not lie in the assumption of different substrates of illusion as highlighted by Appyaya ; On the contrary, to Niradhiṣṭhāna-khyāti the substratum is in every sense a non-être. As explained by Veṅkaṭa, according to this theory, what happens in an illusory cognition is that a silver is presented through impressions along with its certain particularities lying submerged and it then appears, through some defect, as 'this'. What is studiously denied here is the super-imposition of a silver upon a thing-in-front[8]. Though admitting external reality, this theory allows no influx resulting in an illusory cognition ; but, on the contrary, an afflorescence of a latent impression into a cognition and its subsequent efflux into the outer world. The main point about this theory is its denial of

8. "Nātra purovartini rajatādhyāsaḥ, kintu saṁskāropanītaṁ pramuṣita-tattādyaṁśaṁ rajataṁ doṣa-vaśādidamiti bhāti" (SS., P. 454, Kāśi ed.)

all afferent stimuli and sense-activity as is quite apparent from its stock example of illusion which is 'an woollen mass of hair' experienced with closed eyes. The Vaibhāṣika standpoint may be better understood in reference to their postulation of mental cognition of the past and the future. They characterise the past cognition as 'Manas'[11]. They hold that this Manas as 'adhipati-pratyaya' along with the rūpa etc. of the past or future entities generates a kind of mental cognition which is not to be confused with the Mano-vijñāna variety of Pratyakṣa. An illusion is such a kind of mental cognition whose content is projected outwards through some defect. Hence, in deference to the silence of Vācaspati on the point and the view of Veṅkaṭa, we conclude that Ātma-khyāti was advocated by the Sautrāntikas and the yogācāras, and the view of the Vaibhāṣikas was different, though similar in certain respects, from it. It may, however, be pointed out here that in the Vaibhāṣika system 'Vijñāna' and 'citta' are identical[9], and that this citta or vijñāna is metaphorically called 'Ātman[10]' and as such the Vaibhāṣika theory of error may certainly be called 'Ātma-khyāti' from the terminological point of view.

Before embarking on a discusslon of the Ātma-khyāti theory of error, it is necessary to present here the fundamentals of the yogācāra philosophy and its raison d'être. The yogācāra idealists are un-compromising monists denying the incipient or convex dualism of the Sautrāntikas or the Vaibhāṣikas. While the new realists cut off ideas, the yogācāra cuts off the external world. To him consciousness is the only reality, and, since reality is momentary, abiding as it does only for a single moment, by its very nature and constitution, the ultimate reality is but the stream of momentary consciousness-series. The yogācāra idealist postulates two aspects of Knowledge : Samāropa or the phenomenal aspect from which the external world seems to exist, and apavāda i.e. the metaphysical aspect. From this latter aspect, vijñāna is the sole integral reality, the cognitum and the

9. "Cittaṁ mano' rtha-vijñānam ekārtham" (Kośa-sthāna 2, Kā. 34).

10. "Cittamahaṁkāra-niśraya ityātmetyupacaryate" (Kośasthāna 1, Kā. 39, Sphuṭārthā).

11. "Saṇṇāmanantarātītaṁ vijñānaṁ yaddhi tanmanaḥ" (Ibid, Ka. 17).

cogniser being only false appearances[12]. Consciousness is rigidly impartite and it has neither subject nor an object. As quoted by Mm. Phaṇibhūṣaṇ Tarka-vāgīśa in his Bengali edition of Nyāyadarśana, according to the Buddhists (excluding the Vaibhāṣikas) who advocate momentariness and universal flux, 'Bhūtiryeṣāṁ Kriyā saiva kārakaṁ saiva cocyate" (P. 162, Vol. 5). Indeed, consciousness is 'a mathematical point-instant', to use the expression of Prof. Stcherbatsky, and is self-luminous[13]. It has no other object of illumination. Consequently, the yogācāra advocates an epistemological monism and a presentative theory of knowledge as opposed to the representative theory as upheld by the Sautrāntikas[14]. The yogācāras, therefore, discard the causal theory of knowledge and as such knowledge to them is not discovery, but creation, This consciousness, however, is not formless like that of the Nyāya and the Sāṁkhya or of the Mādhyamika school[15], but is invested with a definite form. Vasubandhu recognises a three-fold transformation of this consciousness into Vipāka, Manana and Viṣaya-Vijñapti. The first transformation is called Ālaya-vijñana by him[16]. This Ālaya-vijñāna may be called the I-consciousness. The transformation called viṣaya-vijñapti is otherwise named as Pravṛtti-vijñāna which may be described as object-consciousness[17]. The pravṛtti-vijñāna owes its origin to the Ālaya-vijñāna[18]. The yogācāras postulate innumerable continua of beginningless subconscious impressions, which mature and flower forth into Pravṛtti-vijñānas in the form of diversified specific object-cognitions. This vāsanā is what taints and stagnates consciousness and liberation is

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12. 'Avibhāgo' pi buddhyātmā viparyāsita-darśanaiḥ/Grāhya-grāhaka-saṁvitti-bhedavān iva lakṣyate' (quoted in SDS., P. 20, Cal. ed).

13. "Nānyo' nubhāvyo buddhyā' sti tasyā nānubhavo' paraḥ/Grāhya-grāhaka-vaidhuryāt svayaṁ saiva prakāśate" (Ibid., P. 19).

14. -Apratyakṣopalambhasya nārtha-dṛṣṭiḥ prasidhyati' (Dharmakīrti quoted in SDS., P. 19, Cal. ed.).

15. 'Kevalāṁ saṁvidaṁ svasthāṁ manyante madhyamāḥ punaḥ' (Viveka-vilāsa quoted in SDS., P. 96).

16. 'Vipāko mananākhyaśca vijñaptir-viṣayasya ca/Tatrālayākhyaṁ vijñānaṁ vipākaḥ sarva-bījakam'. (Tri. Vī. Kā., Kā 2).

17. 'Tat syādālaya-vijñānaṁ yad bhavedahamāspadam/Tat syāt pravṛtti-vijñānaṁ yannīlādikam ullikhet" (quoted in SDS,, P. 23).

18. 'Oghāntara-jalasthānīyāt ālaya-vijñānāt pravṛtti-vijñāna-taraṅga utpadyate' (Laṅ. Sū.).

nothing but the emergence of pure consciousness freed from the shackles of object-cognitions arising out of the subconscious impressions[19].

We should mention here at least some of the arguments with which the yogācāras endeavour to prove their thesis. The first argument is an inference which may be syllogistically put thus : All cognitions are without any substrate (Ālambana), even like a dream-cognition ; for, as cognitions, they do not differ from dream-cognitions[20]. It is an agreed fact that dream-cognitions have no external cognita ; and they are as much cognitions as any others ; so, if they can thrive without any external cognita, other cognitions may as well do so. The second agrument is also based on inferenee. It may be stated thus : The cognitum does not differ from the cognition which cognises it even as in the case of self-cognising cognition. (And it is to be borne well in mind that, according to the yogācāra, consciousness is self-luminous.). And the blue etc. are cognised by the cognitions and, hence, they do not differ from the latter[21]. A third argument is based on what is known as the law of com-apprehension ('Sahopalambha-niyama'). A cognition always appears along with its cognitum and never in separation. A jar and its cognition are apprehended in one sweep and, as such, they are identical[22]. We may refer here to a fourth argument to the following effect :—The so-called objects vary in their affective tone in regard to different persons at the same time and in regard to the same person at different times. This fact proves the unreality of objects [23]. A slightly different argument from the second one is as follows ;—Objects are not anything extra-mental ; for, they are cognisable even like feelings etc. As feelings etc. are not distinct from consciousness,

19. "Tataśca prāg-ukta-bhāvanā-pracaya-balānnikhila-vāsanocchedaviga-lita-vividha-viṣayākāropaplava-viśuddha-vijñānodayo mahodaya iti" (quoted in SDS., P. 21).

20. "Pratyakṣādi-pratyayo nirālambanaḥ pratyayatvāt svapna-pratya-yavat" (P. 22n, NSj. of Veṅkaṭa).

21. "Yad vedyate yena vedanena tat-tato na bhidyate yathā jñānenātmā, vedyante taiśca nīlādayaḥ" (quoted in SDS., Pp. 19-20).

22. "Sahopalambha-niyamādabhedo nīla-taddhiyoḥ" (Ibid., P. 20). Also, "Yat.saṁvedanameva syād yasya saṁvedanaṁ dhruvam/Tasmādavyatiriktaṁ tat tato vā na vibhidyate//" (TS., P. 567).

23. "Paribrāt-kāmuka-śunāmekasyāṁ pramadā-tanau/kuṇapaḥ kāminī bhakṣya iti tisro vikalpanāḥ//" (SDS., P. 18).

though cognisable, so are objects. Hence, they are identical with consciousness[24].

Moreover, the yogācāras point out that, granting the existence of external objects, it is impossible to prove any relation between cognition and the object other than that of identity. The doctrine of momentariness precludes any causal relation between the two; for, if the object causes the cognition, the latter can no longer cognise the object inasmuch as it has by the time had passed into nothingness. If it is argued that the cause of a cognition is its object, it may be pointed out that the sense-organs like the eye should also, in that case, be taken as objects—a situation which is furthest from the truth. The yogācāra promptly dismisses the suggestion that the cognition 'I cognise silver' registers a subject-object relation by pointing out that the cognition in question is a composite one consisting of three separate cognitions. The verb 'cognise' here cannot serve as the relation between the two. For, as has already been said, a momentary entity can have no activity as apart from and supplementary to it. Hence, the only imaginable relation between the two is identity. If, however, it is argued that external entities may be objects of cognition even without any relation between the two, it will lead to the absurd contingency of all entities being revealed in a cognition without any exception. Furthermore, cognitions have specific forms and each cognition presents only one form and not two. Now, this form must belong to the cognition as is proved by the joint methods of Agreement and Difference and by an analogy with the dream-cognition. This also proves the external object to be a fiction. The cognitions and the subconscious impressions are the mutual causes of each other even like the seed and the sprout, and this explains the diversity of our experiences[25].

Now, we propose to present the Ātma-khyāti theory of illusion

24. "Na citta-vyatirekiṇo viṣayāḥ grāhyatvād vedanādivad iti. yathā vedanādi grāhyaṁ na citta-vyatiriktam, tathā viṣayā api" (NV. of Uddyotakara).

25. "Sambandhaṁ vinā viṣayatve sarva-visayāṇām ekasminneva jñāne' vabhāsa-prasaṅgāt,.........Tataścāṅgīkṛte jñānākāre ākāradvayānupalambhāt apāramārthikyeva bahiṣkāra-kalpanā.........Anādau saṁsāre vījāṅkura-vaj-jñānānāṁ vāsanānāñca anyonyanimittakatvena vaicitryāt". (NY. S. On NP., Pp. 43-44).

of the yogācāras. The yogācāras hold that in an invalid cognition like 'this is silver', the silver is but a cognitive construct and what is apprehended is nothing but cognition itself. They would arge thus : The silver in question cannot be nonexistent ; for, in that case, it could not be apprehended. Nor is it an external reality placed within the ken of our vision ; for, its erroneous character and subsequent recantation would then be unintelligible. Neither is it an elsewhere reality. Hence by the operation of the law of the residue, the silver is reduced to a cognitional reality. Moreover, tho point may be established by the following syllogistic reasoning : The silver under discussion is but cognition itself ; for, it is immediately perceived without the intercourse of sense-organs even like a cognition. It should not be argued that if the silver be a reality in its form as cognition, it would no longer be an error. For, as the yogācāras contend, the error consists in apprehending what is internal as something external. So, the sublating congnition 'this is not silver' contradicts only the externality of the silver[26]. It does not negate the reality of the silver also. For, the form of the sublating congnition is not 'Not this, not silver', but simply 'this is not silver'. When illusion and its rectification may well be explained by negating only the externality of the silver, it is improper to negate the silver also. For, the law of parsimony demands that we should assume the sublation of one factor only to the exclusion of two, when that much is enough for explaining an error and its final rejection. If the opponent argues that let the silver be taken as sublated instead of fts externality, the yogācāra would rejoin that the silver being the substantive, its sublation would spell disaster for the attribute of externality as well. Hence, it is judicious to sublate the latter[27].

26. "na tāvadasadeva rajataṁ pratītyanupapatteḥ. Nāpi purata eva sad bhrāntyanupapatteḥ. Bādha-virodhācca. na ca deśāntare sat pramāṇābhāvāt. Ataḥ pariśeṣāj-jñānākāramevāvatiṣṭhate. Kiṁ cedaṁ jñānarūpam indriya-samprayoge asatyaparokṣatvāt jñānavat. Na ca satyatve bhrāntyanupapattiḥ· Āntarasyaiva bāhyatayāvabhāso bhrama ityaṅgīkārāt. Tasya nedamiti bāhyatā-niṣedhenaiva bādhakasya bādhakatvopapatteriti". (NS. of Jaya-tīrtha).

27. "na hi nedam, na rajatam iti ca bādhaḥ. Ato rūpyasya sattvaṁ na virudhyate......na hyekasyaiva bādhena iṣṭe siddhe dvayor-bādha-kalpanā nyāyyā, kalpanā-gauravāt. Rūpyasyaiva badho' stviti cet, tanna ; dharmi-bādhe bāhyatvadharmasyāpi bādhāt dvayor-bādha-prasaṅgāt. Ato bāhyataiva bādhyate, na rūpyam". (IS., G. O. S., Pp. 40-41).

To explain the position more clearly, the yogācāras, though denying all manner of external reality, imagine unreal external entities as projected outwards by the potency of subconscious psychoses caused by timeless Avidyā. Upon such an unreal nacre is superimposed the silver, which is nothing but cognition. Now, since we must accept facts as they are intuited unless there is any strong contradictory intuition, we must accept the reality of the silver under review. But, the sublating cognition 'this is not silver' restricts the reality of the silver to the cognitive domain only, the silver being nothing but consciousness itself[28]. So, the erroneousness of the cognition consists in the external localisation of the silver, for example. This error of externality comes into being due to the impelling force of timeless vāsanās. These vāsanās, that give rise to errors, may arise both from logically valid and invalid intuitions. For, as the yogācāras contend, not only the valid cognition, but also the invalid ones may give rise to Vāsanās maturing forth into errors[29]. A particular cognition takes the from of a particular object due to its peculiar intrinsic nature or potency and this fact cannot be explained otherwise[30]. The different cognitions and vāsanās are mutually causally related from beginningless time even like the seed and the sprout, and so no objective entity is necesary to explain the manifold of cognitions or their veridical and non-veridical character[31]. In other words, there are mutually existing loci of vāsanā and Vijñāna, and so it is not necessary to assume any third locus of error and illusion.

Two points are to be noted here particularly. In analysing an erroneous judgment like 'Idaṁ rajatam', all the disputationists

28. "Vijñāna-vādināmapi yadyapi na bāhyaṁ vastusat, tathāpyanādya-vidyā-vāsanāropitam alīkaṁ bāhyam, tatra jñānākārasyāropaḥ. Upapattiśca yad yādṛśam anubhavasiddhaṁ rūpaṁ tattādṛsamevā-bhyupetavyam ityutsargaḥ etc." (Bhā., P. 26).

29. "Pramāṇa-saṁskāra eva na bhrama-hetuḥ, bhrama-saṁskārādapi bhrama-darśanāt" (Jñānottama's Vi. on IS., P. 497).

30. It is interesting to note in this connection the following two kārikās of Vasubandhu :—"Deśādi-niyamaḥ siddhaḥ svapnavat pretavat punaḥ/ Santānaniyamaḥ sarvaiḥ pūya-nadyādi-darśane//2// karmaṇo vāsanānyatra phalamanyatra kalpyate/Tatraiva neṣyate yatra vāsanā kiṁ nu kāraṇam//7// (Viṁśatikā-kārikā).

31. "Anādau saṁsāre vījāṅkuravaj-jñānānāṁ vāsanānāñca anyonya-nimittakatvena vaicitryāt" (NS, on N. P., P. 43).

are at one in taking the 'idam' as the substantive, 'rajatam' being only an adjunct to it. But, the yogācāra, in perfect accord with his metaphysical position, reverses the situation outright and hits upon'rajatam' as the substantive, 'idam' being merely an adventitious false adjunct attached to it. Still, this false adjunct simulates reality and it serves as the substratum of superimposition of the silver-cognition. So, according to Ātmakhyāti, an illusion is not the superimposition of one real cognition, say of the silver, upon another. Hence, when Prof. Hiriyanna states in this regard that "the stimulus to erroneous experience comes wholly from within and not in the least from without"[32], he states only a half-truth ; for the fancied, external entity, say a nacre, is present there to serve as the substratum of the superimposed silver. So, as Dr. J. N. Sinha says, an error is 'simply an eccentric projection of a subjective idea into the the external world".

So, this ls the attitude of the yogācāras, the subjective idealists of Indian philosophy, in regard to illusions. But, this position has been subjected to violent diatribes by all the rival schools of Indian philosophy. There is a legion of arguments that has been put forward to discountenance the general metaphysical position of Ātma-khyāti, but that need not detain us here for long. We need simply say that Ātma-khyāti leads invariably to solipsism[33], which is a serious charge against any speculative thought and need point further to the pithy observation of Madhusūdana Saraswatī to the following effect ; "Bādhena sopādhikatānumāne upāya-bhāvena sahopalambhaḥ/ Sārūpyato buddhi-tadartha-bhedaḥ sthūlārthabhaṅge bhavato'pi tulyaḥ//" (Gloss on the BS.' 'Vaidharmyācca na svapnādivat'). The doctrine of momentariness, which is the corner-stone of Buddhist metaphysics, has been refuted by all the rival schools of philosophy if at least for the necessity of postulating a trans-fluxional entity, an entity that outlives the point-instant, a percipient that experiences the manifold of momentariness. We may very briefly attempt here a general refutation of the yogācāra philosophy in the following manner : Is reality reduced to consciousness alone on the strength of any positive proof for the

32. Quoted by Dr, A. Roychoudhuri in his "The doctrine of Māyā".

33. cf. "Tarhi bahirarthavat sva-jñana-santānāt anyāni santānāntaraṇy-api viśīryeran". (Gloss on St. 56, ṣad. dar.śam of Guṇaratna).

impartite nature of consciousness or on the ground of an argument contradicting the reality of external objects ? Neither alternative is acceptable here. For, in the first alternative, neither perception, nor inference is competent to prove the position. For, neither of them can help ascertainment of absence of external entity without which the existence of mere consciousness can never be proved, An inference on the ground of Svabhāva or Kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva, or Anupalabdhi can not surely prove Arthābhāva. Thus, it appears that both the alternative proofs for the existence of mere consciousness are quite hollow. To assert the identity of consciousness and its object on the strength of the principle of Sahopalambha is equally fallacious ; for, it is clearly contradicted by perception and the example of the double-moon is certainly prejudicial to the probandum. Besides, the principle of Sahopalambha doos not stand to reason. For, the probans becomes Asiddha (or unproved) in cases of feeling-intuitions and is Anaikāntika(or bilateral) also as is proved by the simultaneous apprehension of colour and light. Moreover, what does Sahopalambha exactly mean ? It can neither mean 'simultaneous apprehension' nor absence of any sequence of apprehension, nor unitary apprehension ('ekopalambhaḥ'). For, all of them are fraught with inconsistencies and are unavailing. In the first and the second alternatives, the probans beeomes viruddha (contradictory) and Asiddha respectively, The third alternative may be interpreted as either an apprehension in the form of an identity, or by a single cognition, or of a single entity ; but neither can serve the purpose of the yogācāra since all of them are vitiated by the fallacies of either Sādhya-samatā or Asiddhi or Viruddhatā[34].

Let us now attempt a criticism of Ātma-khyāti as a theory of error of the yogācāra. The yogācāra holds that a nacre-silver is real, though internal. But, this supposition of reality is flatly contradicted by the subsequent retrospective cognition 'Asadeva rajataṁ pratyabhāt' (i.e, 'the silver, that appeared, was verily unreal')[35]. This proves that the reality of the nacre-silver is nothing but a mere fiction. Then, the cognition of externality

34. Cf. PKM, pp. 77-82. Also see SM. Ṭīkā, pp. 349-353, SVR., pp. 155-159, Vyoma. Vṛ. pp. 527.

35. Cf. "Sattve asadev rajatam ityasattvāvedaka-pratyaya-virodhasya uktatvāt". NS. of Jayatīrtha.

is an illusion, an unreality according to the yogācāra. Now, since they themselves hold that what is unreal cannot be apprehended, it follows that externality also, being unreal, should not be amenable to intuition. It cannot be argued that external reality is negated by the subsequent sublating cognition ; for, there is no strong proof for the subjectivity or internality of the nacre-silver. Moreover, the argument from inference, that a nacre-silver is of the form of consciousness since it is directly intuited even without sense-intercourse just like a cognition, is fallacious ; for, its probans is both Anekānta and Asiddha and the example is shorn of the probans[36]. Again, when one mistakes a bunch of guñjā fruits for fire, that fire, being internal, would certainly burn the body ; otherwise, it would be unreal even as an internal entity and that would lead to Asatkhyāti. The hypothesis of timeless subconscious impressions to account for externality is also untenable. For, this vāsanā must be either Avastu (a fiction), or Vastu (a real entity). If it is avastu, it, being as unreal as a sky-flower, cannot operate as a cause. If, however, it is a vastu, is it something different from the emerging consciousness or not ? If different, the cognitional monism (Vijñānādvaita) as accepted by yogācāra will suffer damnation. If, on the contrary, it be identical with that consciousness, the appearance of externality will be due to the cognitum being of the form of consciousness itself—a contingency that would lock into embrace the probans and the prabandum and turn them identical[37].

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36. Cf. "Asataḥ pratītyanupapattau ca bahiṣṭhatāyā api pratītyanupapattiprasaṅgāt......Bahiḥ-sattvameva asat-pratyayena niṣidhyate iti cenna. Āntara-tve pramāṇābhāvāt. Indriya-samprayogamantareṇa aparokṣatvasya hetor-bāhyatāyām anaikāntyāt. Śukti-samprayogeṇa aparokṣatāyāḥ svīkārāḥ asiddhaśca. Dṛṣṭāntaśca sādhana-vikalaḥ jñānasyāpi indriya-samprayogādeva aparokṣa-tāṅgīkārāt. Kiñca guñjā-puñjādau dahanādi-samārope tasya antaḥ-sattve deha-dāhādi-prasaṅgaḥ. Anyathā āntare'pi tadasat ityatyantāsadeva āpannam iti nātma-khyātipakṣo'pi upapattimān". (Ibid).

Also "Buddhi-rūpatvañca buddhau kalpitatvaṁ cet sādhya-vaikalyam etc..' (P. 7, Pra. Vi.).

37. Cf. "Iyaṁ vāsanā avastu-rūpā vā vastu-rūpā vā. Tatra yadyavastu-svarūpā, tadā nabha-stāmarasa-tulyāyāstasyāḥ kathaṁ kāñcana vyavasthāṁ prati hetu-bhāvaḥ sambhavati. Atha vastu-svarūpā, sāpi jñānākārāt pārthakyena svarūpam ābibharti anyathā vā. Prathamapakṣe jñānādvaita-kṣatiḥ... ...Atha na pārthakyena svarūpam ābibharti. Tarhi jñānākāra evāyamiti jñānākāra-māhātmyād bahiriva pratibhāsate iti tadeva sādhyaṁ tadeva ca sādhanam abhihitaṁ bhavet" (P. 128, SVR).

Vācaspati Miśra in his Bhāmatī as also in his Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-ṭīkā attacks the yogācāra position thus :—It may be asked whether the cognitive charater of the nacre-silver is established either by perception or by inference. If it is established by perceptual cognition, is it the cognition of nacre-silver or the subsequent sublating cognition ? The former only shows the silver as 'this', as something 'not I'. Had it not been so, the cognition would have been of fhe form 'I am silver', the percipient being non-different from the perception. If, then, tbe sublating cognition be called into request to account for the cognitive character of the nacre-silver, even that too becomes futile. For, the cognitive character does not follow from the negation of proximateness (Purovartitva) ; on the contrary, it ought to be distant from the perceiver instead of being the most proximate through its identity with the latter. So, the cognitive character of the nacre-silver cannot be proved[38].

Prabhācandra in his prameya-kamala-Mārtaṇḍa attempts a brief, but radical, refutation of the theory. He points out that the theory under review cannot satisfactorily explain either the genesis of error, or the conation prompted by the erroneous cognition, or the subsequent recantation of such a cognition. To begin with, if all cognitions are conversant only with their own forms and not with any corresponding 'ed' (as Lloyd Morgan puts it), then all distinction between truth and error will be buried and all talk of cross-cognitions and their sublation will be mere idle gossip ; for, there will remain absolutely no scope for any lapse of a cognition from registering its accredited form. Then, the percipient will not feel any urge for getting hold of the erroneous nacre-silver, for example. For, the supposed nacre-silver is neither an external entity, nor a permanent one —it being only a form of momentary cognition—and, as such, it will not be a fit object of conation. If, however, it is argued

38. "Vijñānākāratā rajatāderanubhavādvā vyavasthāpyeta anumānād vā......Anubhavo' pi rajata-pratyayo vā syāt, bādhaka-pratyayo vā, Na tāvad rajatānubhavaḥ, Sa hīdaṅkārāspadaṁ rajatam āvedayati, na tvāntaram ahamiti hi tadā syāt, pratipattuḥ pratyayād avyatirekāt,......Jñānākāratā punarasya bādhaka-pratyaya-pravedanīyeti cenna, asannidhānāgraha-niṣedhādasannihito bhavati pratipattuḥ, atyanta-sannidhānaṁ tvasya pratipatrātmakaṁ kutastyam." (p. 26, Bhāmatī, Ananta Kṛṣṇa's ed. See also, NVTT., Vizi. Skt. Series, P. 54).

that, under the spell of nescience, it appears as external and permanent, the theory clearly is reduced to Viparīta-khyāti[39].

And in the wake of such a concession to Viparīta-khyāti, Asatkhyati and Akhyāti will also have their sway over the theory under review. For, it will become Asat-khyāti in as much as externality, though non-existent, is said to be apprehended. And it will pave the way for Akhyāti since here the nacre-silver, which is internal, is not apprehended as such.

But, the deadliest and most consistent onslaughts upon Ātma-khyāti were hurled by Vimuktātman, the illustrious author of Iṣṭa-siddhi. Let us summarise his points of attack one by one :—

(1) Ātmakhyāti is untenable, because it contradicts the experience of externality. Moreover, by its admission of an internal entity being apprehended as external, it makes possible the reverse admission of apprehending non-cognition as cognition and thus shakes the very foundation of certitude in knowledge. Further-more, it involves the contingency of apprehending a non-existent in the form of externality[40].

(2) In Ātma-khyāti, there is no scope for 'bādhya-bādhaka-bhāva' in the domain of cognition and hence, there being no bādhya-jñāna, no error is possible ; or, on the contrary, all cognitions, being mutually contradictory, will be erroneous.

That the silver having the form and essence of cognition (or, 'cogniform' silver) appears as external cannot verily be apprehended by that particular cognition, since cognition is integral and impartite and can have no division into the cognitum and the cogniser. Nor can some other cognition apprehend it ; for, cognitions are momentary and in a particular series are identical[41]. Moreover, if it be assumed to be apprehended by

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39. "Sarva-jñānānāṁ svākāra-grāhitve ca bhrāntābhrānta-viveko bādhya-bādhaka-bhāvaśca na prāpnoti, tatra vyabhicārābhāvāviśeṣāt......Pratipattā ca tadupādānārthaṁ na pravarteta, abahiṣṭhāsthiratvena pravṛtyaviṣayatvāt. Athāvidyopaplava-vaśāt bahiṣṭha-sthiratvenādhyavasāyaḥ, kathamevaṁ viparīta-khyātireva neṣṭā" (PKM., Pp. 50-51).

40. "Nātma-khyātirapyata eva bāhya-saṁvid-virodhāt, abāhye bāhya-khyātivad abuddhau buddhi-khyāti-sambhavād anāśvāsāt, bāhyatvasya asataḥ khyāti-prasaṅgācca" (IS. Pp. 41-42 G. O. S.).

41. Cf. "Anirbhāsaṁ sanirbhāsamanya-nirbhāsameva ca Vijānāti na ca

someother cognition, then the postulation of auto-illumination of cognition will have to be abandoned with a view to making room for alter-illumination. If, however, it is assumed, for argument's sake, that it is apprehended by the self-same cognition instantly, then there will be no error. To be brief, no matter whatever assumptions the yogācāra might make to weather the storm, all cognitions will be proved to be either false or true, alter-illumined or auto-illumined, or, on the contrary, partly true and partly false, partly alter-illumined and partly auto-illumined. If self-luminosity is tenaciously adhererd to, cognition must be one, indivisible, external and immutable. If, on the contrary, cognition is assumed to be characterised by origin, decay, multiplicity, impurity and the like, it will necessarily be alter-illumined and, in that case, the yogācāra will be compelled to accept a permanent soul to avoid all-out blindness[42]. So, Ātma-khyāti, as it stands, cannot account for the genesis of error and its subsequent rejection.

(3) Moreover, the yogācāra can ill afford to argue that the nacre silver is an elsewhere reality,—a cognitive fact, a subjective existence. It cannot be said that since silver is apprehended and since its externality is contradicted, its existence elsewhere is assumed, though not apprehended. For, its appearance as non-existent here cannot suggest its existence elsewhere. If experience determines existence, it must locate it in the locus of appearance. For, an assumption of existence even without apprehension will lead to a lack of necessary concomitance between the two[43].

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jñānaṁ bāhyamrthaṁ kathañcana". Here 'bāhyamartham' implies other cognitions as well.

42. "Tathā ātma-khyāti-vādino'pi syātekārthayorbhinnārthayośca bādhya-bādhakatvāyogāt ; Buddhyākāro rūpyaṁ bahirvad bhātīti tayā buddhyā jñātum aśakyatvāt ekasyā buddherniraṁśatayā grāhya-grāhakatvāsambhavāt ; buddheśca buddhyantarāviṣayatvāt—samatvāt kṣaṇikatvācca ; etc. up to Tasmāt ātma-khyātivādino'pi na bhrama-bādhau sambhavata iti sthitam". (IS., Pp. 113-115).

43. "Nānyatra bhāti rūpyaṁ tadiha bādhāt tu kalpyate/Ihāsad bhāti ced rūpyaṁ khyātiḥ sattāṁ āa kalpayet//Sattāṁ cet kalpayet khyātirasatkhyāterayogataḥ/yatra yad bhāti tatraiva tasya tāṁkiṁ na kalpayet//

... ...

... ...

(4) Furthermore, Ātma-khyāti involves an element of Anyathā-khyāti without which no talk of error will be possible. But, Anyathā-khyāti is a concept which is inexplicable both psychologically and metaphysically. If the nacre-silver and the like are of the nature of cognition, error is ruled out ; if not of the nature of cognition, they themselves must be taken to appear as such and not cognition. Assuredly, it is silly to conceive that one thing will appear, though another will be the agent of appearence[44]. So, to quote Vimuktātman verbatim, "Yanna khyāti na tat khyāti yat khyāti na tad anyathā/Anyathā-khyāti-gīstasmānmātā bandhyā mametivat/" (Sl. 116. Ch. III).

(5) From the metaphysical standpoint, Vimuktātman refutes the Ātma-khyāti theory in the following manner :—The yogācāra does not provide for any witness-self that will illumine cognition and as such it remains unillumined ; An unillumined buddhi cannot illumine its cognitum and, in the absence of illumination of both, no Vāsanā is possible ; and without it the momentary cognition cannot take the from of silver. Hence, there is neither error, nor truth ; the world is but an impenetrable mass of mute darkness and scriptures are without any basis. Hence, to avoid such contingencies, we must hold that Ātma-khyāti is untenable[45].

Vidyāraṇya in his vivaraṇa-prameya-Saṁgraha endeavours to prove that in the Ātma-khyāti theory there is no possibility at all of the nacre-silver, for example, being apprehended. For, the nacre-silver must have either no origin, or regular origin like an ordinary silver. In the first alternative, it cannot be of the form of cognition which has distinct origin. In the second alternative, it must have its origin from cognition, external objects being rejected by the yogācāra. But, that cognition must be one occasioned by a defective cause. This cognition, however, cannot apprehend the silver because of the momentary and 'non-equitemporal' character of both of them. If some other cognition

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Tatra bādhānna kalpyā cennānyatra khyātyabhāvataḥ/khyātiṁ vināpi cet sattā kalpyate niyamaḥ kutaḥ" (IS. Pp. 129-130).

44. "Akhyātyātma-khyāti-pakṣau cokta-nyāyena pratyuktau. Tayorapi anyathā-khyānam eṣṭavyaṁ, anyathā bhrama-vyava-hārāyogāt......Ātma-khyātipakṣe'pi rūpyādiḥ dhiyaścet svarūpam etc": (Ibid. P, 291)

45 See Śls. 19-21, P. 293, IS.

effected by a non-defective cause is said to apprehend it, there will be the contingency of overlapping assumption. If, however, the cognition arises from a defective cause, say a nacre-silver, the nacre-silver must be existent and external reality will have to be accepted. If, on the contrary, it is not caused by the silver, the silver cannot serve as its cognitum. For, a cognitum is said to be what lends a particular form to a cognition[46]. So, the silver has no earthly chance of being intuited[47].

To my mind, the yogācāra seems to have been unreasonably disgraced by the opponents at least in certain respects. The argument, that since the yogācāra cognition of nacre-sllver fails to apprehend the falsity of externality, it is no longer self-luminous, or, on the contrary, since it, being self-luminous, apprehends the falsity, no error is possible, does not seem to carry much weight. For, if a cognition chooses to appear in the form 'this is silver', its self-luminosity fructifies itself if it reveals that form and can by no means extend beyond it to what is not in the form ; subsequently when the cognition appears ln the form 'not this is silver', the cognition reveals this form which denies externality. Then arises another cognition of the form 'the cognition of 'this is silver' is false' and the falsity is then revealed. So, the charge of cognition lapsing into the state of alter-illumination does net seem to stand to reason. However that may be, the theory is damned a thousand-fold and it is difficult to salvage it from the sea of damnation.

NOTE

It is a pity that many of the Buddhist philosophical texts are lost to us and the few we have seem to prove that the philosophers of the orthodox systems did not properly present the Buddhist doctrines, if not misrepresent them wilfully. Veṅkṭanātha and Vidyāraṇya, beside a few others, seem to give a purer account of these doctrines, but even in them are found wanting certain important aspects of those doctrines. Many

46. Cf. "Nākāraṇaṁ viṣayaḥ" quoted in PKM., p. 502 as the Buddhist definition of 'Viṣaya'.

47. "Atrocyate kiṁ tad rajatam alaukikatvāt jñānāropitam etc" (P. 218, VPS., Beng. Ed.).

critics have pointed out that since the Ātma-khyāti theory offers no principle of differentiation between the cognition of a nacre-silver and that of a silver of normal experience, all cognitions will be either true or false equally. It is on this very supposition that Vimuktātman has classed Ātma-khyāti under Sat-khyāti. But, such a conclusion seems to be unwarranted. The yogācāra advocates, as already stated, two grades of reality ; viz. Samāropa and Apavāda. The former has been classified into four kinds in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra of which Asat-trikṣaṇa-samāropa, which principally accounts for phenomenal reality, is the first one. These two grades are otherwise known as Saṁvṛti-satya and Pāramārthika Satya[48]. Now, this Saṁvṛti has again been divided into Loka-saṁvṛti-satya or Tathya-saṁvṛti and Mithyā-saṁvṛti[49]. Hence, ultimately three grades of reality are accepted by the yogācāra ; namely, Mithyā-saṁvṛti, Tathya-saṁvṛti & Pāramārthika Satya. These three grades are otherwise known as Parikalpita, Para-tantra and Pari-niṣpanna respectively[50]. This triple classification may easily be brought into line with the advaitic triple classification of reality into Prātibhāsika, Vyāvahārika and Pāramārthika. Hence, it is unfair to assert that the Buddhist subjective idealist can not consistently admit of any erroneous cognition in his system. A cognition is illusory when it does not withstand a pragmatic test or when it fails to be shared in common by others and to be coherent with other ideas[51]. In other words, the external world with its law of uniformity of nature is a pragmatic reality, though, ultimately a fiction ; but, when a phenomenon turns out to be a double fiction because of its failure to square itself up with the law of uniformity, it is damned as an error or illusion. Moreover, we should here profitably call to mind the distinction between Saṁvādī bhrama and Visaṁvādī bhrama as

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48. Cf. "Dve satye samupāśritya Buddhānāṁ dharmadeśanā Loka-saṁvṛti-satyañca satyañca paramārthataḥ" (Mād. Kā.)

Also "Saṁvṛtiḥ paramārthaśca satyadvayam idaṁ smṛtam/Buddhera-gocaraṁ tattvaṁ buddhiḥ saṁvṛtirucyate" (Bodhi-Caryāvatāra of Śāntideva).

49. See Bodhi-caryāvatāra-pañjikā, P, 353.

50. "Māyā-kṛtaṁ mantra-vaśāt khyāti hastyātmanāyathā/Ākāra-mātraṁ tatrāsti hastī nāsti tu sarvathā//Svabhāvo kalpito hastī paratantrastadākṛtiḥ/ yastatra hastyabhāvo'sau pari-niṣpanna iṣyate", (Tri-Svabhāva-nirdeśaḥ)

51. Vide Dr, J. N. Sinha's Indian Realism.

analysed by Dharmakīrti[52]. This distinction will help us a long way in understanding the yogācāra position in regard to error. A mithyā-saṁvṛti may be likened unto Visaṁvādī bhrama, while a tathya-saṁvṛti may represent saṁvādī bhrama.

We may hazard another interpretation of the situation, all our own, in keeping with the yogācāra doctrine. When a pravṛtti-vijñāna of silver is abosrved as such by the ālaya-vijñāna, the cognition and its cognitum are empirically real; but, when a pravṛtti-vijñāna of a nacre in its indeterminate state gives rise to that of a silver and the latter is accepted as such by the ālaya-vijñāna, this sliver and its cognition are both false. Be that as it may, the yogācāra is in perfect agreement with the Advaitin in his postulation of the three grades of reality. The only important point in which he differs from the latter is in his denial of a permanent self. Even in this regard he has recourse to an unceasing flow of consciousness, of Vijñāna-santāna, which has a sort of stream-like permanence. To be honest to oneself, it is really difficult to properly appraise the metaphysical position of the yogācāra vis-a-vis the Advaitin and this difficulty has grown into menacing magnitude due to the paucity of yogācāra texts. Indeed, one might wish it were not a far cry from Vijñānādvaita to Kevalādvaita, but that will remain a wishful thinking only until further materials on yogācāra metaphysics are easily available to us.

52. Cf. "Maṇi-pradīpa-prabhayormaṇibuddhyā' bhidhāvatoḥ/Mithyā-jñānāviśeṣe'pi viśeṣo' rtha-kriyaṁ prati".

CHAPTER X

ASAT-KHYĀTI

The theory of Asat-khyāti is generally fathered upon the Mādhyamika's or the nihilist buddhists. In the narrower sense of Asat-saṁsarga-khyāti, the theory worms its devious way into almost all other khyātivādas. Thus, the Bhāṭṭas, the Jainas and the Naiyāyikas, to mention only a few, have had to accept in some way or other the asat-saṁsarga-khyāti, though they never expressly confess it. Indeed, on acute analysis it will transpire that almost all the different theories of illusion implicitly involve an element of Asat-saṁsarga-khyāti which sits tight on them like a parasite and saps their foundation. But such a position is brought out by logical scrutiny and is never professed in the theories themselves. So, in all fairness to these theories, they should not be included in any dissertation on Asat-khyāti. But, the Anyathā-khyāti theory of the Mādhvas should certainly be accepted as a variant of Asat-khyāti inasmuch as their theory is otherwise known as "Sad-uparaktāsat-khyāti". This theory will, however, be taken up for discussion along with the general theory of Anyathā-khyāti. And the Sadasat-Khyāti of the Sāṁkhya, which is openly an asat-khyāti in one aspect, has already been disposed of. So, we are here concerned only with the general theory of Asat-khyāti which is advocated by the Mādhyamika's only. Some scholars, however, are of the opinion that the Cārvākas also upheld the theory of Asat-khyāti[1]. Udayana in his Nyāya-kusumāñjali is perfectly clear on this point and we may without any prejudice refer this theory to all the three classes of Cārvākas, namely, the Dhūrtas, the well-trained Cārvākas of the type of purandara and the Vaitaṇḍika or the Tattvopaplavavādins.

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1. Cf. "Asat-khyāti-vādinā ca cārvākeṇa tathā anabhyupagamāt" (VSM. of Prakāśānanda, P. 271).

Also, "Sarvathā śūnya-vādina-stattvopaplava-vadino brahma-vādino vā jāgradupalabdhārtha-kriyāyāṁ kiṁ na bādhaka-pratyayaḥ" (Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika of Vidyānandī).

Also, see Nyāyakusumāñjali.

But, except the Tattvopaplava-siṁha of Jaya-rāśi-bhaṭṭa[2], we have no other book on cārvāka materialism to draw upon, and in the circumstances, it is not possible to attempt an exposition of the theory as upheld by them. Moreover, the cārvākas in general, leaving aside the Vaitaṇḍikas, however, are not nihilists and they advocate Asat-khyāti only in the sense that the non-existent may be intuited and not also in the reverse sense that what-ever is intuited is non-existent. Thus, they admit the verbal cognition of God and the like that are non-existent to them. So, we confine ourselves here only to the consideration of the full-blooded theory as sponsored by the Mādhyamika's.

The Mādhyamika buddhists believe in no reality whatsoever, whether mental or extra-mental and as such they are known as Śūnya-vādins. They proceed a step further from the yogācāra and show that even cognition is not a reality. Reason lays bare the hollowness of all so-called entities which are bundles of inconsistencies and can in no wise pass the test of logical scrutiny. So, all experience is a delusion. There is no causation and hence nothing exists. There is no bondage or liberation. The whole panorama of existence is a mighty illusion ushered into existence through the impelling force of timeless Avidyā which has the peculiar potency of showing off the non-existent. The Mādhyamika points out that the yogācāra has lamentably failed in appraising the irresistible logical deductions of his own assumption of consciousness as the sole reality. For, if consciousness alone is real, the object-consciousness of the blue and that of the yellow will negate each other and both will be reduced to non-entity like a santānāntara[3]. So, everything of our experience is unreal ; everything is void. Reality and falsity are exclusive terms and they can never co-exist. If experience were conversant with reality, it would necessarily stamp with reality the experience, its object, its substrate and the necessary relations. But, no disputant accepts the reality of all of them. So, when one or more of them are proved to be unreal, logical consistency

2. Cf. "Tadevam upaplutesveva tattveṣu avicārita-ramaṇīyāḥ sarve vyavahārā ghaṭanta iti". (Tattopaplava-siṁha of Jayarāśi).

3. "Tathā hi nīle pravṛttaṁ jñānaṁ pītādau na pravartate iti pītādeḥ santānāntaravadabhāvaḥ etc."

demands that the whole scheme should be unreal[4]. Hence, the void is the only reality, though this void is not something positive. Nothing is not 'something' that is delivered to us by reason. On the contrary, it is a negation of all affirmation and at the same time the negation of affirmation of negation itself as something. Hence, the void is the negative truth about the universe of our experience. Still the inscrutable Avidyā spins out for us the empiric world of experience which is accorded a provisional reality called Saṁvṛti-satya as opposed to paramārtha-satya. The whole epistemology of the Mādhyamika is hinged upon the assumption that what is non-existent may be intuited, not only through verbal indirectness, but even directly through perception. The advaitin accepts the verbal apprehension of the non-existent, though denying its direct intuition. The Mādhvas, however, think that the non-existent may even be directly intuited when it is somehow affianced with an existent even as Rāhu, which is but the ascending node, becomes perceptible when it eclipses the sun. But, the Mādhyamika differs from both of them and asserts that an asat may be intuited in itself and no intermediary need be called into request for the purpose. So, it is the non-existent that is apprehended by us in our normal and illusory experiences alike. Hence, asatkhyāti is the general rule with all our empiric experience fraught both with error and provisional reality, with mithyā-saṁvṛti and satya-saṁvṛti. So, when our normal experience is grounded in Asat, it is only to be expected that an error, which cannot withstand the pragmatic test and which is not a socialised product 'to the widest commonalty spread', should be all the more bred in it. Hence, the theory of errors as advocated by the Mādhyamika is Asat-khyāti.

The Mādhyamika tries to prove his thesis in the following manner :—Apart from all metaphysical preoccupations, it may be easily proved that in an illusory experience like 'this is silver', the intuited silver turns out to be non-existent on scrutiny. For, one apprehends it upon a nacre where it is assuredly not. So, it is evidently asat. The typical example of an illusion with the Mādhyamika is, however, the intuition of a

4. "yadi dṛṣṭaṁ sat tadā tad-viśiṣṭasya darśanasya idantāyā adhiṣṭhānasya ca etc." (P. 17, SDS).

Keśoṇḍuka or a woollen mass of hair which is postulated to have no substratum at all. Thus, the locus being not, the thing located is also not. For, the world of our fancy being a relational one, if one relatum is negated and knocked off, the whole structure tumbles down in no time. The Mādhyamika points out that all the disputationists are to concede direct cognition of non-existence either in regard to relation or to relatum ; and once one accepts the contingency of direct intuition of the non-existent, one inevitably casts one's anchor at the shore of Asat-khyāti and cannot but accept the theory at least for self-consistency and also in deference to the law of parsimony, For, otherwise, one has to assume a lot of things like the recollection of the illusory silver, for example, its concealment (pramoṣa) and consequent absence of discrimination between perception and recollection and the like[5]. The Mādhyamika is no less devoted to the deliverance of perception than his rivals, but unlike them he lays emphasis on the negative intuition consequent upon an illusory cognition, i.e. upon the recanting intuition of the type 'Nedaṁ rajatam' (this is not silver) or 'Asadeva rajatam abhāt (The non-existent silver did verily appear) and purports to say that such negative intuition itself proves Asat-khyāti indisputably. Moreover, the law of presumption proves that the silver, for example, must be asat ; otherwise, its sublation does not stand to reason. So, to justify sublation, we must assume the silver to be illusory. And, this law of presumption is the strongest argument in settling a dispute[6].

To follow the summary of the contention of the Mādhyamika as presented by a scholar of a rival school : The silver presented in an illusory cognition cannot be real ; for, then, it cannot be contradicted. Nor can it be both real and unreal at the same time ; for, reality and unreality are mutually exclusive. If, however, the two are affirmed of the same silver in different spatio-temporal relations, they may equally be affirmed of a pitcher and the like, that are the cognita of our normal valid

5. "Śūnya-vādinastu......rūpyādeḥ viparīta-dharmatvasya avidyamānasya kalpanaṁ bhāsamānatām ācakṣate atyanta-lāghavāt. Itarathā rūpyasmaraṇaṁ tat-pramoṣaḥ tannimittāvivekaśceti garīyasī kalpanā syāt". (PV., P. 8, Madras Uni. Skt. Series)

6. Cf. "Anyathānupapattiśced asti Vastu-prasādhikā/pinaṣṭi dṛṣṭavaimatyaṁ saiva sarva-balādhikā" (KKK. of Śrīharṣa).

experience. Moreover, accepting, for argument's sake, the affirmation of both reality and unreality, one cannot damn as erroneous a cognition like 'this is real silver' ; for, its reality has already been affirmed. If, however, it is pointed out by the opponent that the cognition is erroneous only because the silver which is real-cum-unreal, has been taken as real only, the retort will be as follows :—It follows from the opponent's argument that a cognition, that is partial and imperfect, is erroneous. In that case, the subsequent sublating cognition will also be erroneous, because it is impressed only with the unreality-aspect of the real-unreal silver. If such a contingency be granted, all talk of one cognition being negated and falsified by another will turn out to be hollow. So, what appears in an illusory cognition is non-existent[7].

If one argues to the contrary that a non-existent cannot be an object of knowledge simply because it cannot be a cause, the Mādhyamika would point out that he does not advocate a causal theory of knowledge and hence there is no bar to a non-existent being a cognitum. In fact, cognition itself has a peculiar potency whereby the non-existent may be apprehended as existent. Indeed, this inexplicable potency of cognition calculated to manifest the non-existent is called Avidyā by them[8]. The traditional four causes of the Buddhists are not necessary here. Avidyā aided by the timeless divers impressions is potent enough to make a show of reality where there is no reality at all. Thus, in all cases of errors and illusions, (hallucinations and delusions are all the more welcome) it is only the non-existent that appear as

7. "Na tāvad idaṁ sadeva, bādha-bodha-virodhāt. Nāpi sadasat. Tatraiva tadaiva tasyaiva sad-asattva-virodhāt. Deśa-kāla-prakāra-Vyavasthayā sad-asattvā-ṅgīkāre ghaṭādi-tulyatā-pātāt. Kiṁ caivaṁ sati sad idaṁ rajatam iti jñānaṁ bhrāntirnaiva bhavet. Sattvasya vidyamānatvāt etc." (NS. of Jayatīrtha), (This shows how anticipatory arguments are cooked up by opponents to discredit their rivals without much ado. Indeed, it is too much to expect that a Mādhyamika would argue out his case in the above manner).

8. "Na cāsato viṣaya-bhāvo nopapadyate ; Na hi viṣayatvaṁ kāraṇatvaṁ yenāsati na syāt, kintu sva-kāraṇādhīnaḥ sāmarthyātiśayaḥ sa tādṛśo jñānasya yena santam ivāsantam api gocarayati......Ata eva asat-prakāśana-sāmarthyameva mithyā-jñānānām avidyātvam anirvacanīyatvaṁ kecid āsthiṣata'. (P. 54, NVTT., Vizianagram Skt. Series).

existent and hence asatkhyāti is the theory of errors and illusions that stands to reason. The speciality of the theory is that in it both the qualifier and the qualificand, the attribute and the substantive, the superimposed entity and the substratum are equally false. Hence, the general contention in regard to an invalid cognition that 'Dharmiṇi sarvam abhrāntaṁ prakāre to viparyayaḥ' does not hold good here. In point of fact, neologicians have demonstrated that there may be cognitions which are entirely false, the subject and the predicate of the judgment being equally non-existent[8a]. It seems to us that neo-logicians thus render incalculable service to the establishment of the theory of Asat-khyāti. For, once it is proved that an asat may be superimposed upon another asat, the situation may easily be universalised and extended to all the phenomena of our experience. Thus, asat-khyāti seems to thrive on the omissions and commissions of rival philosophers and strengthen its citadel against all inimical onslaughts.

But, the truth of the cartesian dictum 'Cogito ergo sum' is never unavailing and we may, following it, assert that I exist, because I deny ; not only that ; the fact of denial exists as also the fancied existence. From the last one it may be deduced that some existence must exist somewhere in whose likeness existence may be fancied at all. Hence, to deny all is to deny the denial itself and thus to revert to the affirmation of all. That is why Bādarāyaṇa has with much brevity refuted the position in the Sūtra "Nābhāva Upalabdheḥ". So, Asat-khyāti as a general metaphysical theory is self-condemned.

Let us now present its refutation by the rival philosophers. Vidyāraṇya in his Vivaraṇa-Prameyasaṁgraha combats the theory mainly from a metaphysical standpoint and lays bare its hollowness. He points out that there can neither be an error without a real substratum, nor a sublation (Bādha) divorced from a term of reference. The Keśoṇḍūka and Gandharva-nagara (Fata morgana) are not really without substratum. For, the

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8a. Suppose I mistake the surging billows of the sea for a hill and the water tinged with the crimson rays of the sun for fire and say 'the hill is fiery'. Such a judgment is entirely false. Here, however, some might disagree and point out that 'dharmin' is not the logical substratum, but the ontological base. But, that goes against the assumption of the neo-logician.

optical rays arched through the pressure of finger are the substratum of the former and 'Ākāśa' is that of the latter. If this be not accepted, even nihilistic cognition will become erroneous and that will invalidate nihilism itself. If, however, the Mādhyamika tries to wriggle out of the situation by assuming that jñānādhyāsa and Arthādhyāsa are the mutual substrata of each other, this will lead to the fallacy of interdependence. This interdependence is not of the order of the seed-and-the-sprout series ; for, fhe Mādhyamika cannot point out any permanent entity running through the series of jñānādhyāsa and Arthādhyāsa just like mud which is an invariable constant pervading the seed-and-the-sprout series. In the ultimate analysis, the witness-consciousness must be inalienably taken as the substratum of error and the term of reference of sublation. Indeed, the śūnya cannot be the substratum ; for, it never pervades the superimposed entity. Had it been otherwise, our cognition would have taken the form 'Śūnyaṁ rajatam' rather than the form 'idaṁ rajatam'. Similary, Śūnya cannot serve as the term of reference of bādha. It can neither be the superimposed entity ; for, then, it could not be directly apprehended. If the Mādhyamika welcomes the position, he cannot explain the apprehension of sublation either. So, the theory is fraught with inconsistencies and is untenable[9].

In fact, the 'idam' of the fallacious cognition 'idaṁ rajatam' must be taken to be real, because its existence is apprehended both before and after the illusory cognition. If the element referred to by 'idam' were otherwise, then it would not have been pointed out with the finger both in illusion and in recantation and seized in the former, while forsaken in the latter. Moreover, the Mādhyamika has to explain the genesis of such an invalid cognition. Defective organs cannot generate it. For, in the absence of any intercourse with the sensedata, the senses cannot be operative. And there cannot be any intercourse with the

9. "Naitat sāram......beṣṭitānāṁ netra-raśmīnāṁ keśoṇḍrakā-dhiṣṭhānatvāt Ākāśasya ca gandharvanagarā-dhiṣṭhānatvāt. Anyathā śūnya-jñānasyāpi bhramatva-prasaṅgāt. Tathātve ca Śūnyāsiddheḥ. Jñānajñeya-bhramayoranyonyādhiṣṭhānatve ca adhiṣṭhānasya pūrva-bhāvitvena anyonyāśrayatvāt. Bījāṅkura-nyāyena jñāna-jñeya-vyaktīnāṁ paramparābhyupagame'pi Bījāṅkurapravāhānugatamṛdvat jñāna-jñeya-pravāhānugatasya sthāyinaḥ kasyacit abhyupagantavyatvāt etc." (Pp. 16-17, VPS., Vol. 2, Beng. ed.).

unreal. If intercourse with the nacre and the like is affirmed, the intuition of the nacre cannot be denied at the same time. If it is argued that nescience is the cause of the apprehension of silver, then one cannot shut out the contingency of even a blind man apprehending it even in the absence of nacre. If to avert such a calamitous situation it is assumed that the sense-nacre-contact serves as the auxiliary cause, then the nacre ought to be apprehended as such even like the ground, the ultimate locus. If then the totality of cause is reinforced by the nonapprehension of nacreness due to defect, then since the Mādhyamika does not accept any substratum of illusion, it cannot be decided incontestably whether the non-apprehension of the ground or that of the nacre is the cause. Furthermore, the unreal silver of the Mādhyamika conception cannot appear as unreal. For, an unreal cannot prompt any conation. If then it is admitted that the unreal appears as real, the admission inevitably paves the way for Anyathākhyāti. In that case it is better to assume that what appears as silver is verily a nacre[10].

The Mādhyamika may further be pushed to a tight corner by asking him to explain the nature and function of Avidyā which is professedly a potency of Vijñāna. Indeed, what does the potentate Vijñāna achieve with its potency of Avidyā ? In other words, what is the exact function of Avidyā ? Does it create the unreal object, or simply reveal it ? The first alternative is not tenable ; for, an unreal cannot be created, and even though such creation be conceded, Avidyā will consequentially forfeit the alternative function of revealing the unreal which will then remain unapprehended. The second alternative also does not stand to reason. For, Avidyā cannot reveal the unreal object as the content of some other cognition, which is assuredly not, according to the Mādhyamika. Even if some other cognition be granted, that will have to be revealed by another cogni-

10. "Tad asat. Idaṁ-kārāspadasya śuktikā-śakalasya prāg ūrdhvaṁ sattvāvagamāt. Yadi ca na tad idaṁ-kārāspadaṁ tadā na bhrānti-bādhayor-aṅgulyagreṇa nir-diśet nopādadyāt na parityajet. Kiṁ cāsya jñānasya kāraṇaṁ vaktavyam. Duṣṭendriyādikam iti cenna. Tasya sannikarṣādyana-pekṣasya kāraṇatāyām atiprasaṅgāt. Asatā ca sanni-karṣāyogāt" etc. etc. up to "Sattayā pratibhāse tu anyathā-khyātiḥ aṅgīkṛteti śuktireva rūpyatayā avabhāsate iti kuto nāṅgīkaraṇīyam (NS. of Jayatīrtha).

tion, and that by another, and thus there will arise the fallacy of infinite regression. If to steer clear of this difficulty, it is argued that Avidyā reveals the unreal as a content of the self-same cognition, it does not improve the position. For, then cognition, which is the substratum of the potency called Avidyā, becomes at once the potentate and the potential ('Śakya') of the potency, Avidyā. In other words, the cognition itself becomes the very thing to be achieved by Avidyā. But, this is impossible. For, it is flagrant contradiction to hold that an entity is at once 'being' ('Siddha') and 'becoming' ('Sādhya')—'being' as the substrate of potency, and 'becoming' as the object of that potency. Indeed, the same cognition becoming the revealer and the revealed at the same time is impossible. If, now, the taciturn Mādyamika argues that the Vijñāna itself is the revelation of the unreal, the retort will be that there can be no relation between the real and the unreal. The relation of the determinate-and-the-determinant ('Nirūpya-Nirūpaka-sambandha') between the cognition and the unreal object is not maintainable. For, this determination dependent on the unreal is in its turn dependent upon some other relation and that upon some other, thus leading again to infinite regression. Moreover, the unreal can not be the substrate of a relation, nor of the atiśaya ('excess') generated by the cognition. Hence, the Mādhyamika contention is untenable[11].

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11. "......Vijñānam eva avidyayā asat-prakāśana-śaktimad iti cet tarhi vaktavyaṁ kim asyāḥ śakyam iti. yadi asadeva kim etasyāḥ kāryam uta etajjñāpyam. Nādyaḥ, asato 'kāryatvāt prakāśana-śaktitva-vyāghātācca. Na dvitīyaḥ, prakāśāntarābhāvāt anavasthānācca. Tadeva vijñānam asataḥ prakāśa iti cenna. Vijñānāśrayāṁ śaktiṁ prati vijñānasyaiva śakta-śakyatayā viṣayatvānupapatteḥ. Na hi ekasya ekadaiva siddhatayā śaktyāśrayatvam asiddhatayā ca tadviṣayatvaṁ sambhavati yugapadeva siddha-sādhyatvavirodhāt......Astu tarhi......vijñānam eva asataḥ prakāśa iti cenna. Tadadhīnanirūpaṇa-tvasyāpi sambandhāntarādhīnatvāt asataśca nirūpākhyatvāt sambandhādhāratā-nupapatteḥ, jñāna-janyātiśayānā-dhāratvācca". (Pp. 70-71, TP. of Citsukha).

Also "yato yeyam asat-prakāśana-śaktir-vijñānasya, kiṁpunar-asyāḥ śakyam, Asaditi cet, kim etat kāryam āhosvit asyā jñāpyam etc."

(P. 22, Bhā.)

Also "Śakyābhāve śaktereva asiddhatvāt. Na cāsadeva asya śakyam iti vācyam etc." (P. 195, SSD. of Puruṣottama-Prasāda). Also see Nyāyamakaranda.

Vimuktātman in his Iṣṭa-siddhi refutes Asat-khyāti on the following grounds :

(1) If in the illusory cognition "this is silver", the silver is taken to be unreal, it contradicts the intuition of silver as real. If the unreal may appear as real, it leads to universal lack of certitude in knowledge and, who knows, even what appears as real may be unreal. Besides, the unreal cannot be apprehended[12].

(2) If the Asat-khyāti theory be accepted, the apprehension and rejection of the silver, for example, cannot be explained. If the cognition apprehends an unreal silver, it should be apprehended as such ; but, in fact, it is apprehended as real ; so, it is not the unreal silver that appears. If it is argued that the subsequent recanting cognition brings home to our mind the unreality of the silver, the situation does not stand scrutiny. What, pray, is the unreality of the silver ? Is it the silver itself, or the silver in another form, or something else ? In the first alternative, the recanting cognition will contrari-wise strengthen the reality of the silver all the more. The other two alternatives are untenable, because they presuppose the reality of the silver, which, however, is denied in the theory. So, the silver must needs be real. Indeed, from the above it follows that to say that an unreal silver appears as real means practically that the real appears as real[13]. Moreover, if an unreal can serve as a cognitum, the means of cognition may as well be unreal ; and once it is accepted, there arises the ludicrous contingency of the unreal being apprehended all the while. If such means of cognition might dispel error, then, such means being omnipresent, an error will never occur. Moreover, if the means be admitted to be unreal, it will make room for the perpetual apprehension

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12. "Anye' sataḥ khyātyayogāt sat-saṁvitti-virodhataḥ/Nāsatkhyātir-anāśvāsāt......" (P. 41, IS,)

13. "Asaccet rūpyaṁ buddhyā jñāyate, asadātmanaiva jñāyeta ; sadātmanā tu jñāyate.........Tasyāsattvaṁ bādhaka-jñānaṁ bodhayatīticettasyāsattvaṁ nāma kiṁ tadeva, kiṁ vā tasyaiva rūpāntaram, utānyat.........Tadeva cet, bādhakam apitadeva sad-rūpaṁ dṛḍhīkuryāt. Rūpāntaram api hi tasya tasmin satyeva bhavet. Tathā tato'nyad api.........ataḥ sattvam eva rūpyasya nāsattvam.........Ato' sat sadātmanā khyāti ityukte sadeva sadātmanā khyātītyarthaḥ syāt". (pp. 116-118, Ibid).

of the real beside that of the unreal ; and the conflicting claims will invalidate and nullify both[14]. Vimuktātman asserts that a cognition can only inform, but cannot annul. So, the recanting cognition only informs by dispelling the ignorance, but does not negate the silver[15].

(3) If the void appears as the real silver, does it appear so of itself, or due to some extraneous cause ? In both the cases, the void will be not. Moreover, in the first alternative, the silver and the void being identical, the disappearance of the silver will mean the disappearance of the void too. So, Asatkyāti cannot be maintained at all—epistemologically, logically or metaphysically[16].

We may humbly point out further all on our own that the Mādhyamika hastily concludes the unreality of all from the unreality of some relata or ṛelations of a system of relations for which he has very little epistemological or logical sanction. For, while the negative cognition suggests unreality, the prior positive intuition suggests reality with equal vehemence, if not more. The argument based on the mutual exclusiveness of reality and unreality may cut both ways and if reality can catch contagion of unreality and become unreal, unreality in its turn may also be absorved by the real and become itself real. Moreover, the theory implicitly involves, besides Anyathā-khyāti, an element of Akhyāti also ; for, here the unreal silver is not apprehended as unreal. So, the theory is condemned to the core and illogical to the marrow and cannot be maintained by any one except a Vaitaṇḍika who revels only in destructive criticism and has no positive thesis to prove and hold fast to. It can neither explain the genesis of error, nor the conation following it, nor even the final rejection of error. The ultimate paradox

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14. "Yadi asadapi meyaṁ syāt, asadapi mānaṁ kiṁ na syāt, syāccet, sadaiva asataḥ khyātiḥ syāt. Sā ced bhrāntiṁ nudet, tasyāḥ sadā-bhāvāt na Kadācidapi bhrāntiḥ syāt. Asadapi cenmānaṁ syāt, sat-khyātirapi sadaiva syāt· Sad-asat-khyātyośca virodhe naikāpi syāt, aviśeṣāt". (P. 118, Ibid).

15. "Akārakatvāt jñānasya, anyathā ati-prasaṅgāt. Ato bodhakam eva jñānam, ajñanaṁ tu nivartayet...Jñānasya jñeyānāśakatvāt". (P. 117, Ibid.).

Also "Na hanti bādha-dhīrvastu sā hi tattva-prakāśikā" (P, 154, Ibid).

16. "Bhāti rūpyātmatā yāsya sā svataḥ kimutānyataḥ/Svataścenna tato'-peyāt tadrūpatvāt na śūnyatā etc." (P. 179, Ibid.)

of the situation is that the arguments of nihilists turn back upon them like a boomerang and their pet dogma of Asat-khyāti withers away before logical scrutiny like leaves of a tree in winter[17].

Note

The above dissertation is an exposition of the Mādhyamika standpoint and of its refutation on traditional lines. Beginning from the most ancient Vātsyāyana and Vyāsa, commentators of NS. and YS. respectively down to Viśvanātha of Bhāṣā-pariccheda fame and Vijñāna Bhikṣu, from the great Śaṁkara down to Vidyāraṇya and veṅkaṭa, Vyāsa-tīrtha and Mādhusūdana, all philosophers of note of India have described the Mādhyamika Buddhists as nihilists and have dubbed them Vaināśikas. But, it seems almost dead sure to us that the Mādhyamikas held an altogether different view which had no semblance of nihilism in it. This intriguing fact has been referred to as the decisive truth about the Mādhyamika metaphysics by Dr. S. N. Dasgupta in his 'A History of Indian philosophy'. Vol. I and by Mm. Phaṇibhūṣaṇ Tarkabāgīśa in his Bengali expository treatise on NS. together with Vā. Bhāṣya. They, however, did not try to demonstrate the truth from the Mādhyamika treatises in any systematic manner. Mm. Tarkavāgīśa, however, admits in the same breath that there was certainly a theory called Śūnyatāvāda or nihilism in ancient India as distinguished from the Mādhyamika Śūnya-vāda. He, however, is not sure as to which school advocated such a theory, though he studiously denied it of the Mādhyamikas. Here then we are confronted with an almost interminable puzzle of the history of Indian philosophy. It seems extremely odd to surmise that even Śaṅkara was ill-equipped to present a faithful exposition of the Mādhyamika doctrine and acutely disquieting, nay blasphemous, to choose to think that he wilfully distorted it with a view to achieving an easy victory over his opponent. Still, the fact seems undeniable that the Mādhyamika is not a nihilist. He is not an empiricist, to be sure. A rationalist he is undoubtedly and his rationalism leads him to agnosticism. If he is at all

17. Cf. "Yathā yathārthāścintyante Viśīryante tathā tathā" (SDS, P. 15).

an empiricist,—for, certain statements of his point to such a conclusion—his empiricism is of the type of thorough-going sensationism though unlike that of the western neo-realists. But, all these facts have never been thrashed out by any scholar as yet. It is a pity that even the term 'Mādhyamika' has not been properly explained as yet. Though I may possibly play the fool, while rushing in 'where angels fear to tread', I crave the never-failing indulgence of the masters and propose, with due deference to my predecessors, to try to establish on a solid basis the truth about the Mādhyamika doctrine as tacitly put forward by Dr. Dasgupta, and Mm. Tarkvāgīśa* (See also Rādhākrishnan's I. P. Vol. I, Pp. 662-666).

In this connection it is to be noted that Prof. Hiriyanna studiously subscribes to the traditional view, though, on the authority of Candra-kīrti, he distinguishes Mādhyamika nihilism from vulgar nihilism, the former being called critical and the latter dogmatic[18]. But, the learned professor seems to misrepresent the import of Candra-kīrti's remark. It is a pity that neither he. nor any other scholar has attempted any serious interpretation of even the term 'Mādhyamika'. The traditional interpretation as found in Vidyāraṇya's SDS and such other treatises seems to be based on folk-etymology. The learned professor glibly observes : "The term signifies an adherent of the 'middle path', which is a distinctive feature of Buddhism" (Footnote, P. 206). That the term does not owe its origin from 'the middle path'[19] is quite apparent and it will be all the more clear from the discussion that follows.

Let us then first try to understand the meaning of the term 'Mādhyamika'. Nāgārjuna in his Mādhyamika-kārikā asserts that "a wise man discards the two extremes of a situation, say,

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* How can I with my poor lights ignore or under-rate the deliberations of my predecessors, bearing in mind the admirable humility of no less a personage than Abhinava Gupta expressed in the following śloka :—

"Tasmāt Satāmatra na dūṣitāni matāni tānyeva tu śodhitāni/Pūrva-pratiṣṭhāpita-yojanāsu mūla-pratiṣṭhā-phalam āmananti" ? (P. 280, Abhinava-bhāratī).

18. See OIP. of Prof. Hiriyanna, p. 222.

19. "The middle path" is the golden mean of couduct as accepted by the Buddhists.

existence and non-existence, purity and impurity ; still he does not welcome the mean of the two"[20]. This assertion proves beyond any spectre of doubt that the Mādhyamika does not uphold the middle path ; in other words, he does not accept even sadasat as the reality, even after ruling out the two extremes of Sat and asat. This fact is readily corroborated by the following verse : "Catuṣkoṭi-vinirmuktaṁ tattvaṁ saugata-sammatam". But, then, this 'tattva' of the Mādhyamika is not an entity of the fifth category like the cessation of nescience of the Advaitins. (In fact, the Mādhyamika does not support the Advaitic phillosophy of universal negation in the locus of a positive Brahman, nor the Jaina philosophy of alternative standpoints). He characterises his intuition of things as 'madhyamā pratipat'. This word 'madhymā' has certainly given rise to the term 'mādhyamika'. Now, the word 'madhyamā' here cannot connote the middle path, the golden mean ; for, that has already been discarded as being not the reality. The word, then, may only mean 'indifferent', 'detached'. The 'madhyamā pratipat', therefore, means that the intuition is indifferent to and detached from the two extremes and their mean and does not submit to any concretisation or characterisation. Hence, such indifferent intuition reveals to us entities that are 'mādhyamika' of which nothing can be affirmed or denied in as much as they possess no definable character[21]. Thus, the theory has been very significantly named 'Mādhamika'. The crux of the theory is that it stands against all categorisation and concludes that entities are devoid of any definitive character[22].

Nāgārjuna and his scholiast candra-kīrti equate the 'madhyamā pratipat', which is uncharacterisable, with Śūnyatā and the latter again with Pratītya-samutpāda. Indeed, as Nāgārjuna says, "It is Pratītya-samutpāda that is christened Śūnyatā ; and the cognition of this Śūnyatā is called the

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20. "Astīti nāstīti ubhe'pi antā śuddhī aśuddhīti ime 'piantā/Tasmādubhe ante vivarjayitvā madhye'pi sthānaṁ na Karoti paṇḍitaḥ" (MK. P. 97, Budd. Text Soc. of India).

21. "Tasmāt mādhyamikānām eva bhāvānāṁ svabhāvānabhyupagamāt" (M. Vr. of Candra-kīrti, P. 119).

22. Cf. "Buddhyā vivicyamānānām etc." quoted before.

madhyamā Pratipat"[23]. To understand the Mādhyamika philosophy, then, is to understand in their fullest implications the terms Pratītya-samutpāda, Śūnyatā and Madhyamā Pratipat. So far as the last one, which has been presently discussed, is concerned, it should be noted that it does not make room for any analogue of the marxian theory of penetration of opposites as has been curiously assumed by some Bengali writers with communistic leanings. Śūnyatā is not a conception of nothingness, but of an analytical negativity of all positive categorisation. It steers clear of all idolatry of thought and, instead of denying an entity, it points out the failure of reason to characterise it ; as a result, the entity becomes indeterminable. The philosophy of Śūnyatā thus becomes equated with the philosophy of Tathatā as propounded by Aśva-ghoṣa.

From another standpoint Śūnyatā means the absence of origin of anything by its own nature and constitution[24]. Candra-Kīrti in his Prasanna-padā Vṛtti quotes Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra to the following effect : 'Oh you of great intellect ! I have shown all entities to be Śūnya with a view to implying the absence of origin of them all by their very nature"[25]. For, as Nāgārjuna asserts : "What is born through causes and conditions, is, in fact, unborn ; for, it is not born out of its own nature". In another place he says : "If existence were bred in the nature of a thing, that thing could not have lapsed into non-existence ; for, the proposition of the nature of a thing being altered does not stand to reason"[27]. Nāgārjuna is categorical on the point that nothing can originate without the dependence of causes

23. "yaḥ pratītya-samutpādaḥ śūnyatāṁ tāṁ pracakṣmahe/Sā prajñaptirupādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā" (MK., P. 184).

Also "Sarvasvabhāvānutpatti-lakṣaṇā śūnyatā madhyamā pratipat madhyamā marga ityucyate. Tadevaṁ pratītya-samutpādasyaive ete viśeṣa-saṁjñāḥ śūnyatām upādāya prajñaptiḥ madhyamā pratipat" (M. Vr., P. 185).

24. "Sarva-svabhāvānutpatti-lakṣaṇā Śūnyatā......" (Ibid, P. 185).

25. "Svabhāvā-nutpattiṁ Sandhāya mahāmate sarvadharmāḥ Śūnyā iti mayā darśitaḥ" (Ibid.)

26. "Yaḥ paratyayai-rjāyati sa hyajātaḥ na tasya utpādaḥ svabhāvato' sti" (M. K, P. 185).

27. "Yadastitvaṁ prakṛtya syānna bhavedasya nāstitā/Prakṛteranyathā-bhāvo na hi jātūpapadyate (MK., P. 97)

and conditions ; origin implies dependent origin. And whatever has dependent origin, is, on that very account, born not of itself, not through its own nature, but through the operation of extraneous agents. So, it is a Śūnya and it follows that there is no object that is not Śūnya[28].

Nāgārjuna employs his implacable dialectics to prove that the whole scheme of worldly relations has no demonstrable character, positive or negative. As he argues ; "Since there may be no Karma having dependent origination, or bereft of it, there may be no kartā either. If, then, kartā and karma are knocked out of existence, there can be no fruit of actions ; and, in the absence of it, there can be no enjoyer"[29]. So, the outer world and the inner mental world are both Śūnya and the experient of Śūnya is also naught[30]. Following the same kind of reasoning, Nāgārjuna asserts that neither existence nor non-existence can be affirmed of the so-called soul[31]. The conception of causality and the like are mere figments of imagination. As one perceives the reflection of one's face in a mirror and the reflection is, to be sure, no reality, so does egoity appear in the wake of the assumption of Skandhas. Does then Nāgārjuna advocate some sort of nihilism ? The answer is an emphatic 'no'. Nāgārjuna says that our afflictions, actions, fruits of actions and our bodies and the like are like Fata morgana, the mirage and the dream[32]. Commenting on this, Candra-kīrti says : "All these are to be conceived as being devoid of any character like Fata morgana etc"[33]. Candra-kīrti thrashes out the point in

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28. "Apratītya samutpanno dharmaḥ Kaścinna vidyate/Pratītyasamutpannaśca śūnyastasmād aśūnyodharmo nāsti". (MK., P. 186).

29. "Na pratyaya-samutpannaṁ na pratyaya-samujjhitam/Asti yasmādidaṁ karma tasmāt kartāpi nāstyataḥ//Karma cennāsti kartāca kutaḥ syāt karmajaṁ phalam/Asatye' tha phalebhoktā kuto eva bhaviṣyati (MK., P. 117).

30. "Tatnoktaṁ bhagavatā : "Śūnyam ādhyātmikaṁ paśya paśya śūnyaṁ bahirgatam/Na vidyate sopi kaścid yo bhāvayati Śūnyatām (Mk., P. 124).

31. Ātmanostitva-nāstitve na kathañcana sidhyataḥ (MK., P. 163). Also "Buddhairātmā na vā nātmā kaścid ityapidarśitam (Mk,, P. 127)

32. "Kleśaḥ karmāṇi dehaśca phalāni ca/Gandharva-nagarākārā marīci-swapna-sannibhāḥ (Mk., P. 119).

33. "Gandharva-nagarākārādivat niḥsvabhāvā veditavyāḥ (M. Vr., P, 119).

another place and openly denies any semblance of nihilism in their theory in the following manner : "We are not nihilists, to be sure. Neither do we deny the existence of karma, kartā, phala and the like ; we merely ordain that they are devoid of any character"[34]. So, Dr. S. N. Dasgupta is perfectly right when he observes : "It is this interdependence and relativity of all appearance that was called......Śūnyatā by Nāgārjuna"[35].

From our foregoing discussion it transpires that Śūnya means what is indeterminable, what is devoid of origin by itself and what has dependent origination. If now this dependent origination is Śūnyatā, then there being no origination of anything by itself, Śūnya must be unreal. Hence, Nāgarjuna clearly says : "Whatever is born through the operation of causes and conditions, is unborn" (See FN. 26 ante). To him truth is what knows no lapse from its identity[36]. Transmutation and the transmuted entity are not realities. The real must be inmutable and above all modalities. All heterisation is false and whatever is inalienably self-poised, self-sufficient and self-identical, is real. It is easy to find in this theory an analogue of the Advaitic theory of truth based on non-contradiction. But, it is easier to understand that, according to Nāgārjuna and his scholiast, heterisation is but a nursling of relations. So, reality must be absolutely non-relational—a proposition which is readily accepted by the Sankarites for their absolute Brahman. The non-relational character of all reality is further emphasised by Nāgārjuna when he says : "Everything is, therefore, neither Śūnya, nor non-Śūnya[37]. Then, what is truth and reality ? Śūnya is merely a negative characterisation of the positive reality as 'neti' is of Brahman. What is 'apoha' as a logical category, is 'Śūnyatā' as a metaphysical concept. But, the reality is a supralogical or infra-conceptual entity. It is, to express it straightaway, a "svalakṣaṇa' which is a metaphysical untouchable fighting shy of all categories of logical thought. It is a simple intuitive integer that does not submit itself to any judgment. This

34. "Na vayaṁ nāstikāḥ......Na ca vayaṁ karma-kartṛphalādikaṁ nāst iti brūmaḥ niḥsvabhāvam eveti vyavasthāpayāmaḥ (M. Vṛ., P. 118).

35. Vide A Hist. of Indian Philosophy., Vol. I.—Dr. S. N. Das Gupta.

36. "Tatra tathyaṁ nāma yasya anyathātvaṁ nāsti (M. Vr., P. 132).

37. "Na śūnyaṁ nāpi vā śūnyaṁ tasmātsarvaṁ vidhīyate (Mk., P. 360).

'svalakṣaṇa', however, is not the one accepted in common in all the four Buddhistic schools. It differs from the other in that it is a 'svalakṣaṇa' not only logically, but ontologically too and that the 'sva' in this case means consciousness pure and simple. It is for this reason that Viveka-vilāsa records that the Mādhyamikas accept only self-poised consciousness as the sole reality[38].

What, then, is the nature of the external world ? Is it real, or unreal ? Nāgārjuna assures us that it is unreal ; for, all the world is a super-structure on the corner-stone of egoity which is a false entity. And how can an entity, whose root-cause is false, be real[39] ? But, then the world is real as an appearance, i.e. a 'saṁvṛti-satya' from the empiric standpoint, a Śūnya from the rationalistic standpoint and pure consciousness, a svalakṣaṇa from the ultimate intuitive standpoint. It is interesting to note here that to an Advaitin also the world is real from the empiric standpoint, indescribable from the rationalistic standpoint and mere Brahman from the ultimate intuitive standpoint[40].

Then, what is the difference between the Mādhyamika and the Advaitin in matters of ontology ? It cannot be broached that while the Advaitin accepts an eternal consciousness, the Mādhyamika accepts a consciousness that is fluxional and momentary. For, had the Mādhyamika accepted such a fluxional consciousness as the ultimate reality, it would have been a case of Pratītya-samutpāda which would have profaned the reality into a Śūnya. That is why consciousness has been qualified by the word 'Svasthām' in Viveka-vilāsa. So, the consciousness of the Mādhyamika also is eternal and permanent. If such an exposition of the Mādhyamika theory is at all maintainable, then the Advaitin and the Mādhyamika seem to merge their differences and advocate the same metaphysical theory with difference in name only[41].

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38. "Kevalāṁ saṁvidaṁ svasthāṁ manyante madhymāḥ punaḥ (See Dr. A, Śastri's vedāntadarśan—Advaitavāda, Vol. 3)

39. "Bījam yasyānṛtaṁ tasya prarohaḥ satyataḥ kutaḥ".

40. See Fn. 5 on Satkhyāti.

41. Cf. "Yat Śūnya-vādinaḥ Śūnyaṁ tadeva Brahma māyinaḥ (Madhva's Aṇubhāṣya on BS. II. ii. 29).

Once such a position is acceded to, the theory of error and illusion is bound to be one and the same in both the systems. So, it ought to be anirvacanīya-khyāti or Śūnya-khyāti according as one or the other christens it. That it is just the fact has been incidentally shown previously. We can further demonstrate the truth of our supposition by a reference to the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, which is curiously a medley of yogācāra and Mādhyamika metaphysics. The Laṅkāvatāra incidentally brings into the forum the problem of error and illusion and assesses their reality in the following manner : "Oh intelligent one ! As, for example, fools label the term 'city' to a Fata morgana ; yet that city is neither a non-city, nor a city......that woollen mass of hair is neither existent, nor non-existent......Those bubbles of water, oh intelligent one ! are neither gems, nor non-gems"[42]. This shows that illusion has no definable character and as such it is Śūnya. Nāgārjuna seems to hint at this Śūnyatā when he remarks : "If the mirage were water, why is it not perceived as such by the neighbouring people ?"[43]. But, from another standpoint, since an illusion is not a case of Pratītya-samutpāda, —for, it does not depend upon the 'rūpa' of the presented datum —but, rather of Adhītya-samutpāda, it is not a Śūnya. Neither it is a non-Śūnya ; for, in that case, it would be real. So, it is neither Śūnya, nor non-Śūnya. Thus, again it is uncharacterisable and hence Śūnya. Candrakīrti points out that in Vijñānavāda an illusion like the perception of the double moon, which is a tissue of fancied attributes, is Śūnya inasmuch as it is not pratītyasamutpanna. But, 'Śūnya' there means purely 'false'. Be that as it may, we feel compelled here to conclude from the fore-going discussion that the real Mādhyamika theory of illusion is Śūnya-khyāti, which is but another name for anirvacanīya-khyāti.

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42. "Tad yathā mahāmate gandharva-nagare' viduṣām anagaraṁ nagara-saṁjñā bhavati......Tacca nagaraṁ nānagaraṁ na nagaram...Tacca keśoṇḍū-kam......na bhāvo nābhāvo......Te ca mahāmate udaka-budbudakā na maṇayo nāmaṇayo...... (Lam. Sū., P. 90).

43. "Marīciryadi vāri syād āsannaiḥ kiṁ na gṛhyate (Mk., P. 123).

CHAPTER XI

SAT-KHYĀTI

Vimuktātman in his Iṣṭa-siddhi broadly classifies theories of Khyāti-vāda in the following manner: Satkhyāti, Asat-Khyāti and Anirvacanīya-khyāti. He further subdivides the theory of Sat-khyāti into Ātma-Khyāti, Akhyāti and Anyathā-khyāti[1]. While Akhyāti and Anyathākhyāti will be dealt wtth subsequently, Ātmakhyāti has already been disposed of by us, though it is difficult to designate it, as has already been shown, as a type of Sat-khyāti. The point to be specially emphasised here is that these theories are called Sat-khyāti because they accept the reality of the appearance as an elsewhere and/or elsewhen entity. It is easy to understand that such a sat-khyāti implies and thrives on a kind of asat-khyāti; for, the moment one asserts that the nacre-silver, for example, is an elsewhere and elsewhen reality, one denies its reality now here i.e. in the locus of the nacre at the time of the intuition of the silver. Hence, such a sat-khyāti presupposes asat-khyāti and, on that very account, it negates itself. It fights shy of the living present and facetiously takes refuge in the disinterred past—a past whose reality blurs the vision and the unreality of the experienced present is not taken any note of. But, such an exotic reality cannot satisfy the demands of a thorough-going realist who abhors a reality in retreat, a reality that fails to move abreast of our work-a-day life. He contends that a dark-chamber theory of reality only shelves the problem of epistemology without squarely answering it till at long last unreality saps its foundation outright. Indeed, once unreality is harboured and given quarter to in any sector of our experience, it would beseige and beleaguer the whole field and reality would be reduced to a non-entity. Whatever appears in perception must be existent and true; to speak of an error is a psychological or logical absurdity. So, any intuition, any experience is invariably conversant with reality. This uncompromising and radical Sat-khyāti is advocated by the great Rāmānuja, the founder of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school of Vedānta.

1. "Tatra sat-pakṣaḥ tridhā bhinnaḥ—Ātma-khyātiḥ Akhyātiḥ Anyathā-khyātiriti (I. S., P. 40).

Rāmānuja, the protagonist of qualified monism, is necessarily a dualist in epistemology. To him a cognition is recognition and to know is to discriminate. The so-called nirvikalpa is but a kind of cognition devoid of recognition. A nirvikalpa of the unqualified type is a psychological and logical fiction[2]. Knowledge is not an identity, but a synthetic unity, a judgment. It always implies a subject and an object. The dharma-bhūtajñāna or the attributive jñāna of Rāmānuja is neither jaḍa (i.e. matter), nor cetana (i.e. spirit), but is ajaḍa. Hence 'it can only show but cannot know''[3]. The knower is the spirit itself, the dharmi-bhūta-jñāna and, it being unchangeable, must know only what is real. Moreover, Rāmānuja's description of the process of knowing implies that objects are independent of our knowledge and are therefore absolutely real. He holds that this inexorable realism is preached by the vedicists[4]. The spiritual forbears of Rāmānuja—Bodhāyana, Nāthamuni, and yāmunācārya—tacitly put forward this theory of Satkhyāti and Rāmānuja and his followers tried to give the fillip to it. Rāmānuja evinced abundant catholicity of thought in his treatment of illusory phenomena and could easily tether his philosophical conscience equally well to either Sat-khyāti or Anyathā-khyāti or Akhyāti. Still, this catholicity is not symptomatic of indecision through disorganised thinking ; for, while subscribing to the view of Sat-khyāti ontologically, he lends his warmest support to Anyathā-khyāti from the psychological and logical standpoint. But, then again, the law of parsimony inclines him towards the theory of Akhyāti An interesting point to be noted here is that a cognition of error, according to Rāmānuja, is a case of Sat-khyāti from the vedic (Śrauta) standpoint, an anyathā-khyāti from the psychological (laukika) standpoint and an akhyāti from the logical standpoint. This reminds one of Vidyāraṇya's assertion that the cognition of an illusion is real from the empiric standpoint, indescribable from the logical standpoint and 'tuccha' from the scriptural stand-point[5]. Does then Ramanuja make room for grades

2. "Sapratyavamarśa-pratyakṣaṁ savikalpam. Tadrahitaṁ pratyakṣaṁ nirvikalpam (NP. of Veṅkaṭa).

3. Vide OIP., P. 337.

4. Cf. "Yathārthaṁ sarva-vijñānam iti veda-vidāṁ mataṁ (Pp., p. 32).

5. "Tucchānirvacanīyā ca vāstavī cetyasau tridhā/jñeyā māyā tribhirbodhaiḥ śrauto-yauktika-laukikaiḥ (Pañcadaśī, VI, 130)

of reality in his system much in the manner of his sworn adversaries, the Sankarites ? Certainly he does ; but the grade he approves of, though not consciously, is one of reality, which, unlike that of the Sankarites, never at any stage lapses into complete unreality. For, to him it is a simple reality in one case, a displaced reality in the other and a condensation of two realities in the third case. So, these three theories, even though taken together to form a composite theory, does in no way bring Rāmānuja into line with the Sankarites[6]. But, Rāmānuja's first preference for the theory of Sat-khyāti is unmistakable in his dissertations. Anyathākhyāti is agreeable to him only as a second preference and that also only when Sat-khyāti is kept aside (cf. "Yathārtha-khyāti-vyatirikta-pakṣeṣu anyathā-khyātipakṣaḥ prabalaḥ"—Śruta-prakāśikā of Sudarśana). But the followers of Rāmānuja show an increasing apathy for Sat-khyāti which hardly satisfies the demands of logic[7]. This explains why some of them at least hold fast to one of the theories of Anyathā-khyāti and Akhyāti to which they easily resolve even the Sat-khyāti of Rāmānuja and his hallowed predecessors[8]. Veṅkaṭanātha, however, holds the balance between Rāmānuja and his aforesaid followers and re-asserts the position of Śruta-prakāśikā[9]. He seems to give his seal of approval on all the three theories, though personally prefering the theory of Anyathā-khyāti, and he defines valid

6. Prof. Hiriyanna observes : "But it must be distinctly understood that such a classification does not mean that he admits different types of reality—an admission which would place his doctrine epistemologically on the same footing as Śamkara's Advaita" (P. 393, OIP). But, such a supposition is unwarranted ; for, every philosopher must necessarily admit at least two types of reality ; still, such an admission need not make him a Samkarite. Rāmānuja, however, does never consciously accept two types of reality.

7. Cf. "Yan Nātha-muni-miśrādyaiḥ yathārtha-khyāti-sādhanam/Tallokabuddhyanārohād vaibhavaṁ kecid ūcire. (NP. of Veṅkaṭa)

8. Cf. "Anye tu yathārtha-khyāti-pakṣe anyathā-khyātau akhyātau vā viśrāntiḥ eṣṭavyeti tadanyatara-khyātiparigraha eva yuktaḥ (P. 37, NS. on NP. of Veṅkaṭa).

9. Cf. "Ātma-khyātyādi-vādeṣu anyathātvam avāritam.

... ...

Sarvairapyanyathā-khyātiḥ dustyajatvāl laghīyasī/Tadvādināpyavarjyatvāt tatopyakhyāti-lāghavam//Svārasyam anyathā-khyātau akhyātau lāghavaṁ sthitam/Iti darśayituṁ bhāṣye dvitayaṁ tad anuśritam//(P. 40, NP. of Veṅkaṭa)

knowledge as "yathāvasthita-vyavahārānuguṇaṁ pramā" (P. 36, NP. of Veṅkaṭa), keeping in view the demands of all the three theories[10]. But, elsewhere he evinces his partiality for Akhyāti which he combines with Sat-khyāti on which is based the view of Mm. Kuppu Swāmī Śāstrī when he says ; "The vedantins of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school adopt the Prābhākara theory of Akhyāti with certain modifications and their version of Akhyāti is known as 'non-apprehension-cum-apprehension of reality' (Akhyāti-saṁvalita-sat-khyāti)" (Br. Si. of Maṇḍana, Introduction by Mm. Kuppu Swāmī Śāstrī, P. LXV)[11].

Let us now see how Rāmānuja and his followers endeavour to establish the Sat-khyāti theory of error and illusion. Rāmānuja calls into request the upanisadic principle of quintuplication (pañcī-karaṇa) or triplication (Trivṛtkaraṇa) to account for the genesis of error. According to the theory of Pañcīkaraṇa, the things of the world are composed of all the five primal elements, though in varying proportions. Thus, the physical Ap (i. e. water) is a compound of primal water and the four other primal elements. Still, it goes by the name of Ap only because of the preponderance of that element in it. The scheme of creation is thus not only unity in diversity, but something more. Every diversity is itself a unity. Evolution atany stage, according to Rāmānuja, proceeds not through elimination and natural selection, but through the aggregation and absorption of all the principles of the preceding stage. So, looked at from a certain stage, creation is a movement from the simple to the complex, from the disparate to the integrated, from the chaos to the cosmos. This seems to be the real implication of Rāmānuja's espousing the principle of quintuplication to explain error, though such an interpretation has not been offered by any scholar as yet. Every stage is a rehearsal of the preceding stage and this history of the

10. Cf. "Sva-saiddhāntikābhimata-khyāti-traya-pakṣa-sādhāraṇam idaṁ lakṣaṇam etc." (P. 36, NS. of Srinivāsa)

11. Cf. "Śuktau rūpyaṁ prabhāmbhaḥ śruti-naya-vaśataḥ svāpnam apyastu satyaṁ yogyāyogyādi-bhedāgraha iha caramāṁ gāhate sampratiṣṭhām" (Sl. 10, Buddhisara, TMK of Veṅkaṭa)

Also cf. SAS of Veṅkaṭa, pp. 403/7. Also cf."...Rāmānujācāryāstu...... rajatādeḥ sattvāt tatrāpi jñānaṁ yathārtham eva ityakhyātirevocitā" (Khyātivāda of Puruṣottama, pp. 123-129).

process of evolution repeats itself even beyond the stage of elements. To put the matter direct, the principle of quintuplition holds good even in the case of the evolution of Bhautikas and their species. That is why Rāmānuja concludes that everything is every other thing (c.f. "Evaṁ sarvasya sarvatve etc." Śrī-Bhā.) The metaphysical background being thus prepared, Rāmānuja proceeds to enquire into the physics of similarity. For, though everyting is every other thing, it is common knowledge that nobody takes a nacre for a piece of gold or a rope for a tiger. The mutual physical identity of all things is only metaphysically evident, but the similarity between two particular things is also physically cognisable and demonstrable,—a fact which explains the speciality of the content of an erroneous cognition. So, Rāmānuja takes up the conception of Sādṛśya whose physical basis he tries to investigate and concludes that a thing is similar to another thing when it has partial identity of material with the other one. The Śruti enjoins the substitution of Soma and Vrīhi by Pūtikā and Nīvāra respectively in case the former are not available. This implies that Pūtikā and Nīvāra comprise some material part or parts of Soma and Vrīhi respectively[12]. So, what occurs in a so-called erroneous cognition, according to Rāmānuja, is that due to defective organ like the eye, one perceives the silver-part uncontaminated by the nacre-part of a nacre and proceeds to possess it. But, the defect being gone, one apprehends the nacre-part only and the silver is no longer intuited. Contradiction in such cases is conceivable on the ground of the predominance of the nacre-part. So, what is contradicted in such erroneous cognitions is the volition consequent upon it and not the content of the cognition.

Thus, in the cognition of a nacre-silver, the silver-element is in fact persent in the nacre and so far the cognitum is real. But, since the silver-element is meagre, the cognition is erroneous only from a pragmatic stand-point. The correction of error occurs when one apprehends the predominance of the nacre-element. In

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12. "Somābhāve ca pūtikā-grahaṇaṁ śruti-coditam/Somāvayava-sadbhāvādi ti nyāya-vido viduḥ//vrīhyabhāve ca nīvāra—grahaṇaṁ śruti-coditam/ tadeva sadṛśaṁ tasya yattad-dravyaika-deśabhāk// (Śri Bhā., P. 184).

an erroneous cognition like 'the yellow conch-shell' the visual rays, being mixed up with the yellow bile of the jaundiced eyes, are focussed upon the white conch-shell and thus the yellowness is actually transmitted to it whose whiteness is screened thereby. Thus, even in this case knowledge registers only what is actually objectively given, not only in respect of the relata, but also of the relation itself. The yellowness under discussion is too subtle to be perceived by any one other than the person from whose eyes it has been secreted. Similar is the case with the cognition of a red crystal when a red flower is placed beside it. The cognition of water in a mirage admits of the simplest explanation according to the principle of quintuplication. Confusion of direction may also be accounted for by asserting that any particular direction includes other directions also. Similarly the phenomenon of a whirling circle of fire is also real. Here the rapidity of whirling causes non-apprehension of the intervening points of space that are bereft of fire and there arises the apprehension of a real circular ball of fire. The reverted reflection of one's person in a mirror is likewise due to the refraction of the visual rays after their contact with the mirror. The phenomenon of the double moon may also be explained by holding that the eye being pressed by the finger, the darkness in the eye bifurcates the visual rays which are thus severally focussed upon the moon. Since there are two separate streams of visual rays directed separately towards the moon, the apprehension of the double moon is a real experience[14]. Prof. Hiriyanna and Prof. Dr. Āśutoṣh Śāstrī attach too much importance on the principle of quintuplication and the concept of Sādṛśya as pressed into service by Rāmānuja and assert that, according to Rāmānuja, there may be an error of omission only, but not of commission[15]. But, this assertion holds good only in a limited sphere. For, in all cases of errors caused by adventitious adjuncts (Sopādhika bhrama) like the yellow conch-shell and the red crystal, there is an error of commission as well. Still, it is a commission only from the standpoint of the bare objective reality stripped of all its adjuncts. Dr. A.

14. "Pañcīkaraṇa-prakriyayā pṛthīvyādiṣu sarvatra sarvabhūtānāṁ vidyamānatvāt. Ata eva śuktikādau rajatāṁśasya vidyamānatvāt jñāna-viṣayasya satyatvam. etc. etc. (YMD. of Sriīnivāsadāsā, Pp. 12-14).

15. Cf. Hiriyanna, OIP. Pp. 391-394.

See also Dr. A. Śāstrī, SPSD., P. 270.

Śāstrī seems to strike a deeper note in regard to viśiṣṭādvaita epistemology when he says ; "In this he (i.e. Rāmānuja) seems to have drawn a distinction between reality and actuality and he thinks that all things are real which are objects of knowledge, though all things are not actual. The falsity lies in actuality, not in reality[16]". This is quite in consonance with Rāmānuja's assertion as also with that of his scholiast[17] and is referred to by Prof. Hiriyanna also. But, they never try to show why according to Rāmānuja "all things are real which are objects of knowledge".

A dream-phenomenon, again, is neither an error of omission, nor that of commission. Though on one occasion Rāmānuja contends that the content of a dream-cognition is unreal[18], he elsewhere asserts that the dream-objects are created by the Almighty according to the desert of the individual dreamer and as such they are real[19]. This shows that, according to Rāmānuja, the privacy of an experience does not take away its reality. But, we are still to answer why these queer intuitions are at all real. They are certainly not real only as cognitions qua cognitions, as is sometimes held by kumārila[20]. For, such a reality does not go beyond the cognition itself. Rāmānuja in one place attempts to explain why these cognitions are real[21]. He bases his argument on the simple logic that an unreal can never come into being through the operation of any cause, nor can it impinge its unreal existence upon any other thing. What Rāmānuja seems to suggest is that a cognition, that comes into being at a point of time, must have some cause, some real objective basis, the theory of vivarta being studiously discarded by him. So, there must always be a real datum of cognition, a cognitum having independent objective reality. No object, no cognition. But,

16. Vide SPSD., P. 26.

17. Cf. "Jñāna-phala-bhūta-pravṛtti-bādhyatvam (Śr. Pra. of Sudarśana, P. 185).

18. "Svapna-jñānasya asatyatvābhāvāt. Tatra hi viṣayānāmeva mithyātvam, teṣāmeva hi bādho dṛśyate, na jñānasya. (SB., P. 121, Sāhitya Pariṣat ed.).

19. Vide SB. III. ii. 3 & 5.

20. Cf. "Tasmāt bodhārthakatvena prāptā buddheḥ pramāṇata (SV)

21. "Eteṣāṁ saṁvedanānāṁ utpattimattvāt artha-kriyā-kāritvācca satyatvam avasīyate (SB., P. 121, Sā. Pa. ed.).

why does the object appear differently in certain cognitions? Taking the cue from Rāmānuja, we may say that his principle of Pañcī-karaṇa leads him to the assumption of reality with many facets as is advocated in the Anekānta theory of the jainas. Every object is a complex entity comprising different facts which are related to the substratum by Apṛthak-sidhi ('inseparability'). So, when one perceives a nacre-silver, one really perceives what is silver from one standpoint. The implication of Rāmānuja's contention seems to be that if the whole psychosis be repeated with all its accessories, an identical cognition will result. Whosoever looks at the moon with his eye pressed with the finger-tip must see the moon double. So, the truth of the cognition may be experimented upon and verified as often as one wishes to. If you approach an object in a particular manner, you will have a particular cognition which is real in the circumstances and the reality extends from the cognition to the cognitum also. But, Rāmānuja warns us that these realities have no pragmatic value. Indeed, this betrays Rāmānuja's disquieting disapproval of the falsity-fetish of the Māyā-vādins and shows why he strenuously endeavours to prove that knowledge is always a discovery and never a creation. Thus, while Śaṁkara establishes the unity of the whole existence from the absolute standpoint, Rāmānuja advocates the unity of the physical world from the metaphysical standpoint and bases thereon his theory of Sat-khyāti.

A variant of this satkhyāti may be discovered in the writings of Vaiṣṇava scholars of the Dvaitā-dvaita school. Rāmānuja's Sat-khyāti is verily yathārtha-khyāti in both the senses of the cognition being "Arthasya yogyam" and "artham anatikramya[22]". But, the variant under reference cannot be called 'Yathārtha-khyāti' in any sense of the term. The protagonists of such a Sat-khyāti explain their position by pointing out that the so-called illusory cognitions like the rope-serpent, the nacre-silver etc. are real in the sense that they are based on real causes and conditions. A cognition, they say, would be valid if it has behind it a real entity as its cause or condition[23]. Thus Anantarāma

22. Vide the different meanings of 'yathā' as given by Bhaṭṭoji in his Siddhānta-kaumudī : "Yogyatā-vīpsāpadārthānati-vṛtti-sādṛśyāni yathārthāḥ (P. 162, NS. ed.)

23. "Sad-dhetukā khyātiḥ sat-khyātiḥ ityarthābhyupagamāt (P, 16, VTB of Anantarāma).

observes : "All Vedicists, who are advocates of Sat-khyāti, accept every cognition as valid. If it is asked how then a cognition is contradicted and how a contradicted cognition may still be valid, the answer is that even a real entity may be sublated on the strength of pramāṇa. But the pramāṇa cannot affirm its universal negation. Verily, it has been observed and heard also that a sin is removed by piety, a disease remedied by wholesome drugs and an anterior cognition disposed of by a posterior one"[24]. Anantarāma illustrates his above thesis by pointing out that the cognition of silver in the so-called illusory perception of the form 'this is silver' has defect and simiiarity, which are real, for its cause and as such it is real. Still this valid cognition is quite legitimately removed through the contact of the eye with the nacre. Anantarāma does not feel any urge or necessity to enquire if the object exists or not ; for, the Satkhyāti of his conception becomes established beyond dispute if the cognition is demonstrated to be based on some real cause[25]. Puruṣottamaprasāda also in his Vedānta-kārikāvalī says that all cognition is invariably real and it is nowhere falsified[26]. Both Anantarāma and Puruṣottama Prasāda raise the question how the cognition of fear consequent upon the cognition of rope-serpent may be called valid ; for, here the fear-cognition is generated by the serpent superimposed upon the nacre and this superimposed serpent is not real. But, it's no puzzle with them. Though realists to the very core, they now embark on a cognitive rock-and-roll and point out confidently that the fear-cognition is occasioned by the serpent-cognition, not by the superimposed serpent[27], and hence their thesis is inviolable. Thus, while it is generally held that the truth of a cognition is verified by the fruition of the resulting

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24. "Sat-khyāti-vādinām vaidikānām sarveṣām jñānānām satyatvābhyupagamāt. Katham tarhi tasya bādho, bādhe ca katham sattvam iti cet ucyate. Satopi pramāṇabalena nivṛttiḥ jāyate, na tu atyantābhāvaḥ. Punyena pāpasya, sadauṣadhibhī rogasya uttara-jñānena pūrva-jñānasya ca nivṛtteḥ dṛṣṭaśrutatvāt (Ibid).

25. "Tāsmat jñānasyaiva sattvād viṣayasya sattvāniyamāt satkhyātivādasiddhiḥ (Ibid).

26. "Jñānantu satyamevāsti tadbādho na hi Kutracit". (P. 190).

27. "Sarpa-bhrama-sthale'pi sarpa-viṣayaka-jñānasyaiva bhayādi-hetutvam, nāropita-sarpasya". (VTB., P. 17).

See also "Rajjvādyāropitāhyādeḥ etc.", (VKa., P. 190).

purposive action that follows[28], they seem to opine that the validity of a cognition is ensured by the reality of its cause or conditions. The process of verification is, then, with them a backward movement, a study in retrospect ; the means justifies the end and not vice versa. This validating cause or condition may be another cognition as in the case of the cognition of fear dealt with heretofore. But, this should not encourage one to affiliate the theory with vijñāna-vāda ; for, the cause or condition under reference may as well be an objective fact. Organic defect is certainly an objective fact and the idea of Sādṛśya has verily an objective basis. The 'hetu' here, however, does hardly mean the cause ; rather it signifies the special conditions which are responsible for the erratic cognition of the nacre-silver etc. Thus these scholars endeavour to construct a cognitive world of inner consistency which may here and there break away with the external world of reality, without any prejudice to the reality of the corresponding cognition. The peculiarity of this theory is that though there may be cognition without any corresponding external object, the cognition is not self-poised, self-subsistent on that account, but is occasioned by some real 'hetu'. This unmistakable reference to hard objectivity as its basis is what distinguishes it from Asat-khyāti.

It is interesting to note here that this theory is almost diametrically opposed to the view of certain scholars of the Śuddhādvaita school. Thus, Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa in his gloss called 'Prakāśa' on Śuddhādvaitamārtaṇḍa of Giridhārijiī Mahāraj observes : 'The cognition of numerical difference between Nāma (i.e. Name) and Rūpa (i.e. Form) is illusory ; but, Nāma and Rūpa are not illusory. Similarly, the cognition of numerical difference between Īśa (God) and Jīva, and between cause and effect are illusory[29]'. Thus, while Rāmakṛṣṇa nestles illusoriness in the world of cognition, granting immaculate reality to the external world, the scholars of Dvaitādvaita assert the

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28. Even Vanamālī Miśra, a scholar of the Nimbārka school under reference observes : "Phala-saṁvādinām satyatvaniyamāt".

(P. 59, Vedanta-siddhānta-saṁgraha),

29. "Nāma-rūpa-bheda-jñānameva āvidyakam, na tu te. Evaṁ Īśa-jīva-bheda-jñānam, tathā kārya-kāraṇa-bheda-jñānam iti".

(P. 2, Prakāśa on Śuddhādvaita-mārtaṇḍa).

impregnable rectitude of all cognition and, snapping the time-honoured relation of accord between cognition and the external object, hold that wherever a cognition brings in its wake abortive activity, the content of that cognition is unreal as an external entity. So, the nacre-silver, the rope-serpent etc. are non-existent, though their cognition is unimpeachable.

Is then the nacre-silver etc. and, for the matter of that, the world unreal ? Realists as they are, they vigourously affirm the reality of the world ; but, so far as the phenomena like the nacre-silver etc. are concerned, they damn them as being unreal. For, what is contradicted in its own locus is considered unreal by them, though not illusory[30]. Moreover, no entity can come into being without any cause ; but, in the case of the nacre-silver etc., no proof can be demonstrated in support of its origin. Hence, in the absence of any proof in point, the nacre-silver has no origin, and, as such, it has no real being. Our subsequent intuition also proves the unreality of the nacre-silver. This intuition is to the following effect : "This was so long known as silver, but no silver was here[31]". But, then, all such unusual phenomena are not unreal. Dream-objects are not all unreal as a class. Only those that are contradicted within the period of dream-experience or are incongruous with it are unreal[32]. The Veda itself declares the creation of dream-chariots etc. The creator here is God himself and the material cause is Vāsanā of the experient Jīva. Such entities are certainly not negated at the time of their experience, and, as such, there being absence of tri-temporal negation in their regard, they are real[33]. It may

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30. "Yasya tatraiva bādhaḥ syāt tanmithyātvam urīkṛtam". (P. 187, Ve. Kār.).

31. "Vinākāraṇam utpattirvastuno naiva yujyate/. Utpattau śukti-rūpyāder-mānaṁkiñcinna vidyate//......Śuktirūpyaṁ na vastu na vā tasyot-pattir-mānābhāvāt. Idam etāvat rūpyatayā jñātaṁ rūpyamatra nāsīt ityanubhavācca". (Pp. 207-208, Vedānta-Siddhānta-Saṁgraha).

32. "Svāpnikānāṁ na vastūnāṁ sarveṣāṁ hi mṛṣātmatā/Keṣāñcit syāt tadānīṁ ced yeṣām artha-viparyayaḥ//". (P. 89, Ibid.).

33. Evidently 'Trikālābādha' is here taken in the sense of 'Atrikālabādha'. "Svāpnikānāṁ rathādīnāṁ sṛṣṭiṁ prāha śrutiḥ sphuṭam/Bhavet sattvam atasteṣāṁ trikālābādha-lakṣaṇam//......Yadā yasya pratītiḥ syāt tadā 'bādhya-tvamātrataḥ/Traikālikasya Bādhasyābhāvaḥ sattvaṁ bhaved dṛḍham//........ Kartā tatra pareśaḥ syād upādānaṁ hi vāsanā//. (P. 207, Ibid.)

now be argued that the nacre-silver etc. also has origin ; for, it may be due to the efficient cause, God and the material cause, Vāsanā even like dream-objects. But, such a position is emphatically denied as shown above because there is no vedic text in support of its creation.

Puruṣottamaprasād also says that in a phenomen like the rope-serpent, the serpent is superimposed upon the rope[34]. So, such entities are unreal. Puruṣottama Prasād here initiates a discussion in the following manner : If dream-objects are created by God, they ought not to be contradicted at that time, nor should they remain unperceived by others. So, they are created by individual jīvas and as such they are all the more unreal. He, however, discredits such objections by observing that the creation of God is in accordance with His will and it need not necessarily be always durable in nature. The span of existence of the creation depends entirely upon the will of God. As Devadatta's mental agony, which is imperceptible to others, is still real, so these dream-objects may also be real, though unnoticed by others. The fact is that the dream-objects are created by God in accordance with the merit or demerit of individual souls and, as such, are experienced by them alone for a stipulated period of time. So, their reality is unquestioned. Hence from the above discussion it transpires that the rope-serpent etc. are unreal, though their cognition is real and that the dream-objects, which are created by God, are also real[35].

But, it is a pity that Puruṣottama Prasād fails to maintain this position every-where and perhaps unwittingly contradicts himself in his Vedānta-Kārikāvalī as also in his Śrutyanta-sura-druma. In the former treatise he asserts that the whole world is real, or else there would be insuperable incongruity. For, the omniscient God would not certainly nurse the cognition of silver, knowing all the same that the silver is in reality a nacre[36]. In Śrutyanta-sura-druma he asserts the proposition that all cogni-

34. "Rajjvādyāropitāhyādeḥ etc" (P. 190, Ve. Kār.)

35. "Nanu yadi pārameśvarī svapna-sṛṣṭiḥ tarhi etc.". (P. 200, Śr. Su. Dru.)

36. "Prapañco vāstavaḥ sarvo' nyathā syād vyāhatiḥ sphuṭam/na śuktiṁ tattvato jānan sarvavid rūpya-pālakaḥ//". (P. 187, Ve. Kār.).

tion is 'yarthārtha'. Why then are not the nacre-silver etc. perceptible? He answers that the imperceptibility is due to its presence in a subtle form which precludes pragmatic activity[37]. Hence, as a matter of fact, the nacre-silver is real[38]. Such a position, however, is in no way different from the yathārtha-khyāti of Rāmānuja. It may also be pointed out here that the variant discussed presently might have been also suggested by the writings of Rāmānuja[39].

The theory of Sat-khyāti has been severely criticised by the exponents of the rival theories, although sometimes with great impatience. Let us now present here the arguments advanced by these rival scholars to refute the theory of Sat-khyāti. Nṛsiṁhāśrama, a Samkarite philosopher observes that Sat-khyāti thrives on a misinterpretation of the principle of quintuplication. The misinterpretation lies in the undue extension of quintuplication beyond the domain of the five elements to that of their evolutes or derivatives ('bhautikas'). Nṛsiṁhāśrama argues that quintuplication holds good in respect of the five primal elements only and not with regard to their derivatives. Otherwise, one is confronted with the contingency of apprehending silver even in a pillar and the like[40]. This argument, however, does not seem to be a sound one. For, even granting that quintuplication applies only with regard to the five primal elements, the thesis of Rāmānuja that everything is everyother thing suffers no damnation and is by no means disproved. It is so for the simple reason that all objects of this world are composed of these five quintuplicated elements. And then to argue that if the plea of quintuplication had any force in it, one would be constrained to accept the contingency of intuiting even a pillar as silver is, to say the least, hasty and ill-conceived. For, such

37. "Sarva-jñānānāṁ yathārthatvasya śāstra-dṛṣṭyā satkhyātivādinām. iṣṭatvāt......Tarhi Katham anupalabdhiriti cet, sūkṣmātmanā sattve'pi artha-kāritvānarhatvād iti brūmaḥ". (P. 21, Śr. Su. Dru.).

38. "Vastutastu sadrūpameva rajatam". (P. 199, Ibid.)

39. cf. "Eteṣāṁ saṁvedanānām utpatti-mattvāt artha-kriyā-kāritvācca satyatvam avasīyate". (Śrī. Bhā., P. 121).

40. "Bhūtānāmeva pañcīkṛtatvāt bhautikānāṁ tad-abhāvāt, anyathā stambhādāvapi rajata-pratītiprasaṅgāt".

(Nṛsiṁhāśrama's Com, on Sam. Sā., Ch. I, Verse 20.)

an argument takes no note of Rāmānuja's other principle of Sādṛśya, which coupled with the metaphysical priniciale of 'Sarvasya Sarvātmakatvam', sets the stage for Sat-khyāti. So, it is perfectly clear that the objection of Nṛsiṁhāśrama is completely wide of the mark and pathetically unavailing.

But, the Samkarites are not to be cowed so easily. They now resume their attack from a different standpoint and assert that Rāmānuja and his followers unwittingly accept grades of being whereby they are inevitably pushed into the fold of the Samkarites. For, they have to accept two classes of erroneous perception—individualistic like the dream-chariot and general like the mirage or the Oyster-silver.Moreover, the Samkarites argue, the will of the Almighty that is supposed to create dream-chariots and the like is to be equated with the Māyā of their (samkarite) school. So, Satkhyāti becomes ultimately moulded into Anirvacanīya-khyāti[41].

To my mind, these two arguments also are completely effete against the Rāmānuja theory of Satkhyāti. For, individualistic phenomena like the dream-chariot etc. are real in every sense according to Rāmānuja and the fact of a phenomenon being private does not take away its reality. In point of fact, such phenomena do not call for acceptance of different grades of reality at all[42]. Even if it is proved that Rāmānuja accepts grades of reality, he cannot be brought into line with the Samkarites for reasons already stated[43]. As regards the second argument, it may be pointed out here that a Ramanujist may pay back a Samkarite in his own coin by asserting that the Māyā of the Samkarites is an illogical and unwarrantable supposition and is to be resolved into the will or Energy in general of the Almighty. So, in such an eventuality, it is not possible to take any side decisively because of 'Vinigamanāviraha' (i.e. 'absence of conclusive proof in favour of any one of the two conflicting issues.).

Nor does the polymath Appyaya Dīkṣita succeed in dealing the death-blow, or even any meaningful blow, on Sat-khyāti

41. Vide Post-Śaṁkara Advaita Dialectics. (Pp. 271-72).

42. Vide footnote no. 6 in P. 4.

43. See Ante. P. 4 and the f. n. 6.

with his armoury of transparent sophistry. It is really odd to discover him say in his sub-gloss Parimala that the absence of silver in a shell is proved beyond any spectre of doubt by the fact that the latter is turned into ashes by fire and is not liquefied as it ought to be if it were silver[44]. The hollowness of this finding of the Advaitic Inquisition becomes at once apparent when we call to mind the fact that Rāmānuja's Sat-khyāti is avowedly allergic to all manner of pragmatic behaviour. Moreover, methinks a Ramanujist might say by pursuing the logic of Dīkṣita that the advaitic thesis of non-difference of cause and effect is disproved by the fact that the effect jar can contain water, while the cause, a lump of clay, cannot. This proves how much useless these arguments are in appraising a situation.

But, the indictment of Advaitānanda in his Brahma-vidyābharaṇa seems to carry much weight with it. He takes exception to the Ramanujist assertion that in the cognition of a nacre-silver, silverness really inheres in 'Idam' (i.e. 'This'), the locus of nacreness. He argues out his point thus: If this silverness comes into being at the time of the particular cognition, then the Ramanujist accepts the Advaitic view of the creation of silver. If, however, it is maintained that this silver-ness is tritemporal, how is the contradiction with nacreness set aside[45]? To this it may be rejoined from Rāmānuja's standpoint that the opponent has misrepresented the position of Sat-khyāti. For, a Ramanujist does not experience any 'silver-ness' as apart from 'Idam'; rather a denier of in determinate cognition that he is, he expereinces 'this is silver' as a complex whole. His experience is certainly not of the form 'silverness inheres in this' and, hence, to father such verbal transcription of his experience on him is a sheer travesty of truth which will never be accepted by a thorough-going Ramanujist. To raise the charge of impossibility of 'Virodhaparihāra' against him is again a clear mincing of matter. For, Rāmānuja himself points out

44. Vide Parimala of Appyaya Dīkṣita, P. 690, Mm. Ananta Śāstrī's ed.

45. Vide "Etena yat sat-khyāti-vādinoktam—Śuktitvādhikaraṇe idami rajatatvaṁ vartate iti, tat pratyuktam. Yadi tat pratibhāsakāla utpadyate, tadā asmanmatapraveśaḥ. yadi tu traikālikaḥ, kathaṁ virodha-parihāraḥ". (Br. Vi., P. 20).

that truth has many facets and it is for all practical purposes selective and incomplete. So, the contradiction in question is resolved by the failure of purposive action. Advaitānanda perhaps himself realises the weakness of this charge raised by him and reluctantly accepts the thesis of Rāmānuja when he says : "Let there be somehow the assemblage of the parts of silver in a nacre and let it be conceded on such a slender ground that the experience 'this is silver' is valid[46]. He then raises another objection which is very significant in its implication. He takes peculiar cases of invalid cognition in which the superimposed entity is a composite whole. As Dr. Roy Choudhury explains the position : "Jarness inheres in the jar alone. It does not exist in the component parts of a jar. Therefore we can never correctly perceive an anthill as a jar or as an object characterised by jarness. Such is also the case with rope-snake. Snakehood inheres only in the snake and never in its formative elements[47]". So in such cases a Ramanujist must take refuge in Akhyāti with a view to maintaining his theory of Sat-khyāti. In that case, it is better to explain all invalid cognition as Akhyāti[48]. Evidently this objection is directed against cases where the jāti is 'avayava-saṁsthāna-vyaṅgya' i.e. manifested by the particular structural adjustment of parts. But, a Ramanujist may meet this objection by holding that the word 'ekadeśa' in the proposition 'Tadeva sadṛśaṁ tasya yat tad-dravyaikadeśa-bhāk' does not merely mean a physical part, but even an isolated aspect, a partial facet of an entity which is a complex of multifarious aspects. To Rāmānuja an entity is a bundle of divers ideas transformed into materiality. The particular idea that is 'to the widest commonalty spread' is the bed-rook of all purposive action in community life. The other ideas, though equally real, are ostracised and cannot generally keep going on any socialised commerce of life. Social boycotts, they are still metaphysical or even factual compatriots. Moreover, a Ramanujist will say

46. "Astu vā yathā-kathañcit tatra rajatāvayava-samāveśaḥ, tāvanmātreṇa ca rajatam iti pratīteḥ pramātvam. (P. 21, Ibid.)

47. See The Doctrine of Māyā by A. Roy Choudhury.

48. "Valmīka-nīvārādiṣu ghaṭatva-vrīhitvādyavagāhiṣu bhrameṣu kā gatiḥ. Ghaṭatva-vrīhitvādi-jāter-avayavi-viśeṣa-mātroparaktatvāt. Tatra Akhyāti-svīkāre ca saiva sarvatra astu (Ibid).

that he experiences no error characterised by class-character separately. So, the last argument also does not seem to have much force against Sat-khyāti.

Advaitānanda then reverts to the former argument of 'silverness in Idam', and observes that if the Ramanujist answers the charge by maintaining that in the cognition of the form 'this is silver', silver, divested of all characteristics, is intuited in the 'Idam' as locus, this explanation will be quite contrary to all experience and will be disregarded by all[49]. But, this cannot be the position taken by a Ramanujist inasmuch as, not to speak of the nacre-silver cognition, no cognition is accepted to be indeterminate in nature by him. So, this is nothing but a fantastic effort at marooning an adversary in a place where he is not.

Mahādevānanda Saraswatī, an Advaita scholar, impugns in his gloss named Tattvānusandhānam on his Advaitacintā-kaustubha the Ramanujist assertion that in a so-called invalid cognition purposive action is only thwarted. He observes that it cannot be maintained that in such cognitions, the cognition or its cognitum is not contradicted, but only the social behaviour based on it is negated. For, the sublation of the cognitum is established by experience. Otherwise, the form of the sublating cognition would have been 'this is not activity pertaining to silver[50]'. A Ramanujist will, however, assert in reply to this thatwhen the particular volition will be thwarted, he will realise that the cognised silver, though real, has no pragmatic value even like the 'saṁvṛta' vowel 'a' of pāṇini[51] and the sublating cognition will take the form 'nedaṁ rajatam' from the pragmatic standpoint. Or, he will try to vindicate his position better by asserting that the form of sublation will be 'nātra rajata-vyavahāraḥ' as opposed to the form 'nātra rajatam' as is advocated as an alternative by the Advaitins.

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49. "Rajatam idam ityatra aparokṣatayā idaṁ-padārthe adhiṣṭhāne nissvarūpam eva rajataṁ pratīyata iti mataṁ tu anubhava-virodhād eva anādaraṇīyam (Ibid).

50. "Na ca vyavahāra eva bādhyate na jñānaṁ viṣayo veti vācyam. Viṣaya-niṣedhasya anubhava-siddhatvāt. Anyathā nedaṁ rajatavyavahāra ityeva ullekhaḥ syāt (P. 21, Tattvānusandhānam on Ad. Ci. Kau).

51. Pāṇini's sūtra 'a aḥ' (Aṣṭādhyāyī, VIII. 4, 68).

Cit-sukha in his Tattva-pradīpikā vehemently criticises this plea of thwarted pragmatic activity in regard to the nacre-silver as advanced by the Ramanujist.

He argues the point out in the following manner :—

Negation of pragmatic activity cannot be accepted as the import of sublation. For, people who have no hankering after silver and the like will not be prompted into any possessive activity and, in the absence of any such activity, the cognition 'this is silver' will have nothing to dispute its authority. On the other hand, if whatever thwarts consequent activity be accepted as the sublator, even the cognition of the presence of thieves and the like that can thwart the activity of a lustful man may also serve as sublator[52]. Nor can it be argued that sublation means the negation of pragmatic potentiality. For, then will arise the contigency of actual pragmatic activity being thwarted on some other occasion. Neither can sublation be taken to mean atrophy of potentiality inasmuch as there is no valid ground for such supposition of atrophy. Hence, sublation cannot be meaningful simply by shutting out 'vyavahāra'[53].

But the bitterest criticism of Sat-khyāti came from one who was a sturdy fighter of a rival vaiṣṇava school. Indeed, it was jayatīrtha, the great successor of Madhva, who dealt a severe blow on Sat-khyāti and served as an eye-opener to many a Ramanujist who eventually discovered 'vaibhavam' in the advocacy for Sat-khyāti. Jayatīrtha puts the sponsors of the theory to utmost ridicule and shame in his Nyāya-sudhā in course of a long-drawn discussion on different theories of Illusion. It is better here to hear him in his own words transcribed in English. After presenting the theory in some detail, he observes[54] : "This

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52. "Na vyavahāra-vyavacchedo bādhaḥ. Atad-arthināṁ tatra vyavahārānudayena idaṁ rajatam ityādi-jñānasya abādhakatva-prasaṅgāt. Tad-arthināṁ ca vyavahāra-vicchedakasya bādhakatve corādi-jñāna-syāpi tad-vicchedakasya bādhakatāpatteḥ (P. 66, Tat. Pra.).

53. "Na ca tad-yogyatā-vicchedo bādhaḥ, tad-vicchede samayāntare punastatra vyavahārābhāva-prasaṅgāt. Yogyatāpratibandho bādha ityapi na,......pratibandha-kalpanānavakāśāt......Ato na vyavahāra-nirūpaṇena bādhakasya bādhakatopapattiḥ (Ibid).

54. "Tadidam ayuktam. Tathāhi yāni tāvat śuktikādiṣu rajatādi-sadbhāve śruti-purāṇa-sūtrāṇi paṭhitāni tāni tejo'bannādīnāṁ miśratām abhidadhati. Na punārajatādīnāṁ śuktikādau sadbhāvam. Na hi kāraṇa-

is unreasonable. For, the vedic, puranic and Brahmasūtra texts quoted in support of the presence of silver etc. in nacre etc. do only speak of the fusion of Fire, Water and Earth. They do in no wise affirm the presence of silver etc. in nacre etc. We could possibly accept this thesis if we could argue with conviction that the presence of the cause (not however as cause) invariably vouches for the presence of the effect. But, this we cannot do. For, if it were so, one could cognise everything in nacre even like silver. It cannot be maintained that this is not so because of Adṛṣṭa and the like. For, the supposition of Adṛṣṭa finds scope only after the ascertainment of the presence of the effect. The argument from verbal presumption is extremely unreasonable here. For, do you assume the presence of the parts of Soma etc. in Pūtikā etc. in abundance, or in equal proportions, or in deficit ? In the first alternative, it is but soma and as such no question of substitution arises. Verily, even Soma is not (according to this theory) Soma exclusively, but an entity possessing the parts of Soma in super-abundance. Nor is the second alternative maintainable ; for, then one should cognise both. In the third alternative, how can it (i. e. pūtikā) do the work of Soma ? If it does, why should not the nacre also discharge the purposive action of silver ? If it is pleaded that we have it on the authority of the vedas that pūtikā serves the purpose of Soma, we are constrained to beg of you not to take the trouble of assuming parts of Soma in Pūtikā ; for, you can readily accept the identity of purposive action being done by utterly distinct objects. Moreover, ghee and oil, being similar to each other, must possess each other's parts and should, on

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sadbhāve kāryasya sadbhāvo niyataḥ yena upapattyā api imam arthaṁ pratīmaḥ. Tathātve śuktau rajatavat sarvasyāpi pratītiḥ prasajyeta. Adṛṣṭādi-vaśāt naivam iti cenna. Kārya-niścayottarakālīnatvāt asyāḥ kalpanāyāḥ. Śrutārthāpattiḥ tu atyantāyuktā. Tathāpi pūtikādau somādyavayavāḥ bhūyāṁsaḥ kalpyante uta samāḥ atha alpīyāṁsaḥ etc......Śrutiprāmāṇyāt tadartha.kriyā-kāritā avagamyate iti cet. Kiṁ tarhi somāvayava-kalpanayā, śruti-prāmāṇyāt atyantaviviktānām eva vastūnām artha-kriyā-sāmyam upagamyatām......Kiṁ ca ghṛta-tailayoḥ etc......Na bhāvyam ca visadṛśayoḥ. Kiṁ ca mātṛ-mataṅga etc.....aparāvayava-saṁyoga eva sādṛśyaṁ cet, kathaṁ kakāra-khakārayoḥ sādṛśyam iti cintyam. Rajatārthinaḥ śuktikāyāṁ pravartakaṁ ca kiṁ bhūyasāṁ śuktyavayavānām adarśanam uta alpīyasāṁ rajatāvayavānāṁ darśanam utobhayam etc......kathaṁ cāsya jñānasa bhrāntitvam. Alpāṁśa-grahaṇāt iti cet. Nūnaṁ Brahma-jñānamapi mahā-

that account, do each other's function, while dissimilar objects should have no such reciprocation. Furthermore, since the wife and the like have great similarity with the mother and the like, the enjoyment of the former should be a sin. If the situation be sought to be bypassed on the plea of the presence of fewer parts of mother in wife, it will be asked how 'nīvāra' can serve as a substitute for 'Vrīhi'. The dogma of vedic authority has already been disposed of. Similarity, again, is not the presence in one of the parts of the others. For, then the similarity between the two alphabets 'ka' and 'Kha' would be difficult to explain. What, again, does prompt the silver-seeker towards the nacre? Is it the non-perception of many parts of the nacre, or the perception of the fewer parts of silver, or again both? It is not the first one; for, otherwise even a sleeping man should have such inducement to action. In the case of the second alternative, it may further be asked whether the cognition of fewer parts of silver, or of many parts, or again a mere cognition gives inducement to action. In the first case, one apprehends non-silverness and this apprehension cannot generate the necessary purposive action. The second case makes room for Anyathā-khyāti. In the third case, the inducement is apt to be for anything similar. The third alternative also is not reasonable. For, otherwise it may as well be contended that inducement comes from the indefinite cognition that something is there. How, again, is this cognition invalid? If it be due to the apprehension of the fewer parts only, well, then, even Brahman-cognition lapses into irrevocable invalidity. Hence contradiction also cannot serve as sublator. If, for example, the conch-shell be dyed with the yellowness of the yellow bile, why does it not lend itself to the vision of the bystander? That is because it is subtle, you may growl out.

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bhrāntirāpannā. Ata eva na bādhasya bādhakatvam api. Pitta-gatapītimānuliptaḥ cet śaṁkhaḥ kathaṁ tarhi na tathā pārśvasthena dṛśyate. Sukṣmatvāt iti cet. Kimidaṁ sūkṣma-tvam atīndriyatvaṁ cet. Na tarhi bhrāntenāpi dṛśyeta, Anyat cet kim anena. Pittopa-hatena tu sāmīpyāt dṛśyata iti cet. Kimidaṁ sāmīpyaṁ nāma. Indriya-sannikarṣaḥ cet, sa tarhi ubhayoḥ samānaḥ; Śarīra-sāmipyaṁ cet tat anupayuktam. Anyathā para-śarira-samīpa-sthānāṁ daṇḍa-kuṇḍalādināṁ adarśana-prasaṅgāt. Pītaḥ śaṁkhaḥ pratīyate iti Ko'rthaḥ. Kiṁ pīta-rūpa-vattayā iti uta pīta-rūpa-dravya-saṁyuktatayā iti. Nādyaḥ anyathākhyāti-prasaṅgāt. Dvitīye'nubhava-virodhaḥ. Evam udāharaṇāntarāni vi-pratipannāni nirasanīyāni ityalam upahasanīyaprakriyā-nirākriyā-vistareṇa'' (NS. of Jayatīrtha).

Well, then, is this subtleness supra-sensuous ? In that case, it would elude the vision of the deluded experient also. If it be something else, it's no use fastening one's reason on it. You might reopen the issue by asserting that a jaundiced man can only see it because of proximity. Teach us, then, what is proximity. If it be sense-intercourse, it holds good for both. It cannot, however, be proximity of the body : for, otherwise, the staff, the ear-trinket etc., which lie proximate to some other's body, would remain unperceived. Then, again, what do you mean by saying that a yellow conch-shell is being apprehended ? Does the conch-shell appear to possess yellow colour, or does it have conjunction with yellow substance ? The first alternative welcomes Anyathā-Khyāti and is, hence, unacceptable. The second alternative rides roughshod over experience. Thus may be set aside other illustrations of Invalid cognition. But, no need of prolixity in refuting such ridiculous propositions".

This long-drawn, threadbare and pungent criticism, though not beyond reproach, has certainly much force in it. But, the most effective criticism of the theory comes unfortunately from veṅkaṭa-nātha, the most illustrious scholar in the line of Rāmānuja. He observes in a cryptic śloka that he, who accepts everything as valid, suffers his own theory being disproved by an opponent ("Na sarvasya pramāṇatvaṁ sva-pakṣasyānyataḥ kṣateḥ".). Though he does not direct it against Sat-khyāti, it can be thus utilised easily. For, Rāmānuja must have to accept that his opponents' cognitions are also real and this admission will signal the doom of Sat-khyāti. Cit-sukha also makes use of this argument, though against the Prābhākara theory, and observes that if all cognitions were valid, the cognition of the form 'there is invalid cognition' will also be valid, thus making room for the acceptance of invalid cognitions. Indeed, the advocate of Sat-khyāti has got to keep mum in all philosophical disputations ; for, by criticising others he disproves his own thesis that all cognition is valid.

We may push the argument further forward. All of us now and then experience that we misunderstood a certain matter, that we had a wrong notion of something. Now, if this cognition of wrong notion be a reality, there is certainly wrong notion i.e. invalid cognition. If, again, the cognition is unreal, it itself is a wrong i.e. invalid cognition.

What has Rāmānuja got to say in regard to our cognitions of the type 'I am fat', 'I am Brahmin' and the like ? These cognitions are certainly erroneous ; still they, far from impeding purposive action, are the very foundation of it. One might plead that Rāmānuja's Sat-khyāti pertains only to the epistemological sphere and not also beyond it to the metaphysical domain. Though many dualistic philosophers estrange epistemology from ontology, the fact is not true in regard to Rāmānuja. He, on the contrary, brings in a kind of physics-laden metaphysics that abhors pragmatic activity. Herein lies the fatal weakness of his theory.

Indeed, Rāmānuja, though a realist, looks askance at a certain kind of 'Vyavahāra', though not at the whole lot of them in the Advaitic manner. But, once an erroneous type of 'Vyavahāra' is harboured, the reality of 'Vyavahāra' in general becomes problematic and fraught with misgivings, leading inevitably to the Advaitic 'mithyātva' of all 'vyavahāra'. It might be contended that the things left to themselves are quite all right, but it is the relations that bring in falsity. Though this cannot be the position taken by Rāmānuja unless we accept Akhyāti-saṁvalitā satkhyāti as his theory, still we may observe against it that the relations are imposed by the intellect which conceives them and hence this conception must be erroneous. The ultimate fact of the matter is that Rāmānuja cannot rule out Error. He only shifts it from one place to another, from cognition to 'Vyavahāra'. And causality demands, not to speak of Rāmānuja's application of the principle of quintuplication, that cognition and Vyavahāra should both be either real or unreal.

The oddity of Rāmānuja's argument comes out in bold relief when we consider that he postulates valid cognition as sandwiched between invalidity on both the ends, defect of organs on the one side and invalid 'vyavahāra' on the other. If, then, truth can come out of falsity and good out of evil, let the merciful God of Rāmānuja abdicate in favour of Satan. If, again, a valid cognition can bring in its wake an invalid 'vyavahāra', why should not the God of Rāmānuja create an unreal, or even 'mithyā' world even with His real Śakti ? Then again, if Doṣa or defect can reveal truth without shrouding and perverting it, why should the Doṣa of Māyā be the cause of our bondage by shutting out

from us the true nature of the self and God and sundering us from the servitude of the latter ? These arguments as they have appeared to me seem to shake to its very foundation the metaphysical edifice of Rāmānuja.

Furthermore, it appears to me that the theory has its weakness in another regard also. Rāmānuja, as has already been said, holds that Nirvikalpaka is not indeterminate, but non-recognitive, non-discriminatory cognition. And Savikalpaka is recognitive and discriminatory cognition. Now, the cognition of nacre-silver taking the form 'this is silver' must be called Savikalpaka by Rāmānuja. But, is there any nirvikalpaka cognition of the same preceding it ? For, in order to be recognitive, it must necessarily be preceded by a Nirvikalpaka cognition of the same. But, can Rāmānuja prove that he had at any point of time a nirvikalpaka cognition of silver in a nacre ? Certainly he cannot ; for, if he could, the Savikalpaka in question becomes well-grounded and conventionalised and in that case he cannot find fault with vyavahāra even. So, he is constrained to deny any such nirvikalpaka. And the moment he does so, he denies to the cognition in question the character of Savikalpaka also. Thus, both nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka being ruled out of court, it loses all claim to cognition at all.

These are some of the more important arguments against Sat-khyāti that have appeared to me on a close scrutiny of the system.

The variant of Sat-khyāti as advocated by the scholars of the Dvaitādvaita school does not require being separately scrutinized ; for, it almost stands refuted by the arguments given against the Sat-khyāti of Rāmānuja. Still, we may draw attention to one or two positive defects of this variant. In the first instance, it disregards the time-honoured coherence or correspondence between cognition and its datum—a fact which is apt to let loose the forces of riotous indiscipline in the domain of epistemology. It would be really difficult for us to ascertain if there is a particular thing before us and all our behaviour will be at a standstill. Secondly, the theory postulates that a cognition is real if it arises from a real cause ('Saddhetu'). But, how to know that the cause is real ? The theory brings in complete rupture between

cognition and its external cognitum and we cannot pass confidently from the former to the latter. For, we are not sure of the existence of the external object outside the cognition as in the case of the nacre-silver. So, the reality of the cause must be tentatively known by some other prior cognition whose reality again depends upon another prior cognition and so an ad infinitum, leading to infinite regression. To avoid this, it may be said that the cause must be cognised by the cognition taking the form 'this is real'. But, then, the cause like 'doṣa-saṁskāra' etc. being cognised, the cognition of the nacre-silver and the like will not occur at all, or else all illusions will be of the abiding type like the bent stick. Moreover, the infinite regression of the chain of cognitions will reduce the world to a cognitive one and the objective world will be practically done away with.

Hence, sat-khyāti in either form does not stand to reason and cannot be accepted by a logical mind, far less by one who is moreover a realist to the core.

CHAPTER XII

VIVEKĀKHYĀTI

Vivekākhyāti, or Smṛti-pramoṣa, or Akhyāti, as it is generally termed, (the Akhyāti of the Cārvāka being an altogether different theory as discussed previously) is the theory of Error advocated by Prabhākara and his followers. Prabhākara, or Prabhākara-guru, or simply Guru, as he is sometimes called, was a great Mimamsist who probably flourished earlier than Kumārila-Bhaṭṭa round about 650 A. D. He was the illustrious founder of a separate school of Mīmāṁsā which differed from the school of Kumārila in many respects. Though it is generally held that "the Prābhākara school seems to be the older and to preserve better the distinctive lineaments of the original Mīmāṁsā"[1], it is difficult to decide the chronological issue as between Prabhākara and Kumārila. The former is said to be senior to the latter by some fifty years. But, the hypothesis becomes shaky when we consider that Śālika-nātha, said to be a direct disciple of Prabhākara, quotes in his Ṛju-vimalā, a sub-commentary on Prabhākara's Bṛhatī, verses from Pramāṇa-vārttika of Dharma-kīrti, a nephew of Kumārila (?)[2]. Kumārila's school, however, attained greater celebrity in course of time and the school of Prabhākara suffered a great set-back, its adherents being mainly located in South India among the dualists like the Ramanujists. Even in South India it had to contend with the rival school of Kumārila that enlisted the sympathy of the great Śaṅkara and his followers (cf. "Vyavahāre Bhāṭṭa-nayaḥ"). That does not, however, prove that the school was weak in its philosophical texture, or that it was saturated with heretical ideas as is sometimes alleged (cf. 'Prasiddham eva loke' smin Buddha-bandhuḥ Prabhākaraḥ'—Śrī Harṣa). Prabhākara, Śālikanātha and Bhavanātha were great thinkers, but the fact that they fell foul of the major

1. Hiriyanna's O. I. P., P. 302.

2. The fact that Śālika-nātha refers to Dharma-kīrti as simply 'kīrti' is highly significant. For, a long period of time must have elapsed before this abbreviation could occur as a memento of his far-flung fame.

philosophical movement of the time—I mean the Adviata movement of Śaṅkara—signalled their discomfiture and premature doom. As a matter of fact, Prabhākara's system, whose essentials I am presenting presently, has many attractions for us even to this day.

Prabhākara, like Kumārila, took the Vedas as revealed knowledge and, therefore, infallible. Hence, he upheld the theory of self-validity of knowledge, both in ratio essendi and ratio cognoscendi. All cognition is axiomatically valid to him. Even Smṛti is not invalid, nor is it valid. The fact is that it has no occasion to face the question of validity[3]. All cognition is, according to Prabhākara, self-luminous. It is, therefore, cognised not as an object, but as cognition itself[4]. A cognition is not invested with the form of its object ; in this regard, it is formless. Prabhākara maintains that every cognition reveals not only itself, but also its cogniser and cognitum. Hence, a cognition (say) of a jar arises not in the form 'this is a jar', but in the form 'I know a jar'. In other words, according to Prabhākara, every cognition is self-cognition and there is no self-appropriating perception beyond perception itself. It follows as a corollary of this postulate of triple cognition (Tripuṭī-Saṁvid) that the object and the cogniser are illumined ab extra by the cognition. The cogniser, which is the self, is the 'I-notion' itself and becomes manifest in all cognitions. It is intrinsically wholly non-sentient, but is never the object of any cognition, though revealed by it. Furthermore, Prabhākara does not admit that the self suffers any change—either change of place, or change of form. The souls are many in number and they are all ubiquitous. Every cognition points to a cognitum as an external object and this object is the cause of the cognition. Tbis causal theory of cognition makes Prabhākara a realist and as a through-going realist he refuses to admit any cognition as invalid. Another special feature of the school

3. "......Smaraṇam, tasya ananubhava-rūpatvāt na prāmāṇya-prasaṅgaḥ". (PP. of Śālikanātha, P. 43)

"Na pramāṇaṁ smṛtiḥ pūrva-pratipatti-vyape-kṣaṇāt" (Ibid). This statement does not mean that Smṛti is invalid, but simply says that it is not valid.

4. "Saṁvit-tayaiva hi saṁvid saṁvedyā na saṁvedyatayā".
(Bṛ, P. 64).

is that in it 'Nirvikalpaka' is not a mere logical necessity as in Nyāya, nor an apprehension of the pure Esse only as in Advaitism, nor even an 'Ālocana-jñāna' as in the Bhāṭṭa school. The Nirvikalpaka here apprehends both Sāmānya and Viśeṣa only as entities, while Savikalpaka relates them and apprehends their specific characters[5]. Prabhākara further asserts that though cognition is self-luminous, it is never a knowable (Saṁvedya); the presence of a cognition, however, may be apprehended through inference, but never its cognitional character as such (cf. "Na hi anumānād rūpa-grahaṇam, Sanmātra-grāhi anumānaṁ bhavati" Bṛhatī). That is to say, a cognition is not 'Saṁvedya', but 'Prameya', and that also through inference. Furthermore, "the proof for the existence of anything", according to Prabhākara, as Dr. G. N. Jhā says in his Prabhākara School of Pūrva-mīmāṁsā, "must ultimately rest in our own consciousness". (P. 98). Consciousness is infallible and whatever appears in it is invariably real. Another special feature of this school is that it makes knowledge a means to an end. All knowledge, according to this theory, prompts activity.

Let us now see how Prabhākara and his followers explain the phenomena of errors and illusion with the theory of Vivekākhyāti. Prabhākara explodes the five-fold kalpanā of the Buddhists[6], but he himself enunciates another five-fold kalpanā, which is at the root of superimposition, which latter is responsible for the so-called erroneousness of cognitions. He holds that five kinds of imagination bring in their wake Adhyāsa which gives rise to the so-called invalid cognition. He puts to himself the question what Adhyāsa is and answers readily: "It is non-apprehension of discrimination; it is the superimposition of common attributes due to absence of enquiry for difference because of the apprehension of the individuality only of an entity; it is the similarity with some other entity of one that is non-different; it is the super-imposition of difference due to absence of enquiry for the similar; and it is the non-ascertainment of the

5. Vide "Tasmāt sāmānya-viśeṣau etc.". (PP., p. 54).

6. "Bhavati kalpanā-jñānam, yadi pratyakṣa-samadhi-gamyatā jñānasya syāt. Ānumānikatvaṁ tu jñānasya vakṣyati". (Bṛhatī, P. 44, Chowkhāmbā). Also "tathā ca vidya-mānārtha-grahaṇāt na kalpanā-rūpateti". (Ṛju, P. 44).

similar because of absence of enquiry for difference"[7]. This adhyāsa is the matrix of all so-called erroneousness as he himself explains : "How, then, are we to account for such contrary apprehensions as those of the self in the non-self and the like ? The answer is as follows :—The cognition that arises propping upon a different, though similar, object, but does not provide for apprehension of discrimination, becomes the cause of recollection in regard to some other similar object—a recollection which does not appear in the from "I recollect"[8]. (Incidentally, I want to point out that this portion of Prabhākara's Bṛhatī is highly valuable as supplying a hitherto undiscovered historical perspective for a study of the evolution of a particular philosophical concept in India—I mean the concept of Adhyāsa. How abundantly clear is the fact that the great Śaṅkara was much influenced by this portion of Bṛhatī in preparing his brilliant Adhyāsa-bhāṣya, and how lamentably pathetic is the tonguetied silence of scholars in this regard ! It is certainly exhilarating to find that Śaṅkara imbibes the ideas of Prabhākara in writing his Adhyāsa-bhāṣya ; in the ultimate analysis, it may transpire that Prabhākara also imported the concept of Adhyāsa from the Buddhist schools[9]. It is highly exhilaraing to get to discover that Adhyāsa forms the bed-rock of the Akhyāti theory of Prabhākara—a fact, which I think, has occurred to no scholar as yet). Basing then his thesis on Adhyāsa, Prabhākara asserts that a cognition, whose cognitum is different from what the sense

7. "Ko'yam adhyāso nāma ? Vivekāgrahaṇam ; svarūpa-mātra-grahaṇāt bhedānanu-sandhānāt sāmānyādhyāsaḥ. Abhinnasya ca arthāntareṇa sādṛśyam ; sadṛśānanu-sandhānāt bhedādhyāsaḥ. Sadṛśānava-grahaṇaṁ tu bhedānanu-sandhānāt. Seyaṁ pañca-vidhā kalpanā". (Bṛhatī., P. 61).

8. "Kathaṁ tarhi viparīta-graha anātmani ātmādayaḥ ? Ucyate—Viṣayāntaraṁ sadṛśam ava-lambya agṛhīta-vivekaṁ yat jñānam utpannaṁ tat sadṛśa-viṣayāntare smṛti-jñāna-hetutāṁ pratipadyate smarāmīti jñāna-śūnyasya. (Ibid., P. 65).

9. Śalika-nātha in his Ṛju says the following : "Taduktam kīrtinaiva 'Śāstra-cintakāḥ khalu evaṁ vivecayanti, na tu partipattāraḥ. Te tu dṛśya-vikalpau ekīkṛtya bāhyameva anumanyamānāḥ pravartante' iti". (P. 41, Chow.).

A casual perusal of the words 'Satyānṛte mithunīkṛtya" of Śaṁkara side by side with the above underlined words of Dharmakīrti clearly establishes borrowing on the part of Śaṅkara. The word 'Adhyāsa', however, first occurs in the following yoga-sūtra : "Śabdārtha-pratyayānām itaretarādhyāsāt etc". (Ys. III. 17).

contacts, is not perception. On the contrary, such an erroneous cognition occurs as a result of non-apprehension[10]. Prabhākara assails here the popular contention that invalid cognitions are due to defectiveness of organs. He asserts that defectiveness can only reasonably do away with the causal potency of an entity ; it can, on no account, generate a different causal potency. Hence, all errors and illusions are occasioned by Adhyāsa based on non-apprehension of difference[11].

Śālika-nātha in his Prakaraṇa-Pañcikā and Bhavanātha in Naya-viveka have elaborated the thesis of Prabhākara and have tried to place it on a firm footing. Śālika-nātha starts with the assertion that what appears in a cognition is verily the object of that cognition. And since silver appears in the cognition of the form 'this is silver', silver surely is the object of that cognition, not the nacre. So, the proposition of something appearing as some other thing contradicts cognition itself[12]. In point of fact, the nacre is intuited in its general aspects, its differentia from silver remaining unknown. Then occurs recollection of silver in which the characteristic of 'thatness' is left out due to mental defect. Finally, this recollected silver is not differentiated from nacre[13]. That such so-called invalid cognitions are due to recollection is proved by the Law of Residue ('pāriśeṣya-pramāṇa'). For, in the case cited above, the silver cannot be perceived, being absent there ; nor can it be known by other means of proof like Inference inasmuch as there is absence of grounds of inference and the like. Hence, in the last resort, it must be ascertained to have been supplied by recolle-

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10. "Anya-samprayukte cakṣuṣi anya-viṣayaṁ jñānaṁ na pratyakṣam iti. Kathaṁ tarhi viparyayaḥ ? Agrahaṇād eveti vadāmaḥ".

(P. 66, Bṛhatī)

11. "Yuktaṁ ca duṣṭatāyāḥ kāryākṣama-tvam, na punaḥ kāryāntara-sāmarthyam. Tasmāt agrahaṇa-nibandhana eva viparyayaḥ".

(Ibid., P. 67).

12. "Atra brūmo ya evārtho yasyāṁ saṁvidi bhāsate/Vedyaḥ sa eva...../ Idaṁ rajatam ityatra rajatañcāvabhāsate/Tadeva tena vedyaṁ syānna tu śuktiravedanāt//Tenānyasyānyathā bhānaṁ pratītyaiva parāhatam//".

(Pp. 33-34, Pp., Chowkhāmbā).

13. "Śuktikāyā viśeṣā ye rajatād bheda-hetavaḥ/Te na jñātā abhibhavād jñātā sāmānya-rūpatā//Anantarañca rajate smṛtirjātā tayāpi ca/Mano-doṣāt tad ityaṁśa-parāmarśa-vivarjitam//Rajataṁ viṣayīkṛtya naiva śuktervivecitam/".

(Ibid., P. 34).

ction[14]. The fact of the matter is that we have two distinct cognitions here : 'this' is perception and silver is recollection, the latter immediately succeeding the former. But, these two are unwittingly identified due to non-apprehension of difference with the result that they do not appear distinct. Hence, this apprehension, what with its seeming directness of cognition and what with its seeming possession of the same cognitum, does not appear a whit different from the valid cognition of sllver. As a result, a similar volition occurs ; but this volition is thwarted, giving rise to the sublating cognition. So, the sublating cognition justifies itself by negating the volition in regard to the silver under reference ('Prasajyamāna-rajatam')[15].

Śālika-nātha then applies this theory to explain different cases of illusion. He now points out that all illusions do not as a rule arise out of partly eclipsed memory (Smṛti-pramoṣa)[16]. Thus, in the case of the cognition of a yellow conch-shell, we do not discriminate between two perceptions—one of the conch-shell and the other of the yellowness of the bile. Similar is the case with the cognitions of 'the bitter molasses', 'the double moon', 'the circular fire-brand' and the like. Similarly, there may be non-discrimination between two recollections as in the case of doubt. Śālika-nātha incidentally observes that we do not damn a cognition as invalid when our purposive action in regard to it is not hindered as in the case of the cognition of 'hot water'[17].

Bhavanātha in his Naya-viveka tries to discredit Anyathākhyāti from the causal standpoint, He develops the arguments of Prabhākara and Śālikanāth to the effect that an invalid

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14. "Na hyasannihitaṁ tāvat pratyakṣaṁ rajataṁ bhavet/Liṅgādyabhāvāc—Cānyasya pramāṇasya na gocaraḥ//Pariśeṣāt smṛtiriti niścayo jāyate punaḥ". (Ibid.).

15. "Grahaṇa-smaraṇe ceme vivekānavabhāsinī/.........bhinne nābhāto bhedāgraha-samatvataḥ//.........Aparokṣārtha-bodhena samānārtha-graheṇa ca/ Availakṣaṇya-saṁvittiriti tāvat samarthitam/etc.". (Ibid., P. 34-35)

16. "Na hi smṛti-pramoṣeṇa sarvatraiva bhramo mataḥ" (Ibid., P. 36). Also "Tadevaṁ vivekāgrahāt kvacit smṛtyoḥ kvacid gṛhītyoḥ kvacid gṛhītismṛtyoḥ svapna-pītaśaṅkha-śuktirajatādibhrānti-siddhiriti diṅmātram" (Na. Vi., P. 94).

17. "Yatra tu vyavahāra-visaṁvādo nāsti tatra bhrāntirapi na vyapadiśyate, yathā uṣṇa-jala-jñāne". (Ibid., Pp. 43-44).

cognition can not be causally explained. He argues that those who arrive at Anyathā-khyāti from the causality of intellect impaired by defect, assume some potency of defects which is contrary to their nature. A defect arrests the creative potency and does not infuse different potency. A burnt cane-seed is the cause of a plantain-tree ; in this regard, burning is no defect, though it is in regard to the growth of cane-plant. So, a cause that gives rise to a certain effect, cannot generate a defective species of the same effect when it is marred by defect. Hence, a defective cognition i.e. an invalid cognition cannot arise from defective intellect[18].

Now, Bhavanātha raises an interesting point. How, he asks, can we deny invalidity of the nacre-silver cognition when in it, contrary to actuality, 'silver' is apprehended as being in apposition with 'this' ? He meets this charge in the following manner : In the case of an invalid cognition of the type 'this is silver', one apprehends in 'this' an entity similar in properties to a piece of silver and this brings the recollection of the silver-species ; this recollection, however, is absorved into the cognition of 'this' which is the substantive. As no cognition of discrimination arises, the two are related in apposition even as in a valid cognition and appear as though integrated in a single cognition. The two cognitions, though occurring successively, appear as substantive and its adjunct. And since the substantive and the adjunct are apprehended in one cognition, here also direct apprehension and recollection, or for the matter of that, their objects, are cognised in one sweep by a single cognition, though seemingly[19].

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18. "Ye tu doṣopahata-dhī-sāmagrīto' nyathākhyātim āhuḥ, teṣāṁ doṣa-svabhāva-viparīta-śakti-kalpanā syāt.........Dagdhaṁ tu vetra-bījaṁ kadalī-kārye sāmagrī, na tu dāho' smin kārye doṣaḥ, vetrājananāt tu doṣatā......... Evaṁ ca yajjātīya-kāryajanikā yā sāmagrī, na sā doṣāt tajjātīyaṁ kāryaṁ karotīti na dhi-jātīyaṁ doṣād vikṛtaṁ yuktam". (Na. Vi., P. 92).

19. "Nanu idam ityetat-samānādhikaraṇatayā rajata-bhānam ; Na tu vastu tathā ityayathārtham eva. Maivam ; idam iti rajatavyakti-tulya-dharmaka-vastubhāne rajatajāti-smṛtau ca satyāṁ rūpyantar-bhāvācca rūpa-buddheḥ idamantarbhāvo jātaḥ, tatra tu viveko na bhātaḥ......Ato bhānastha-mātrāpekṣayā satyadhītulyatā iti yuktā samānādhikaraṇatā......Nirantara-bhānaṁ hi rūpa-rūpinoḥ eka-dhī-vedyatayā svato yuktam iti eka-dhivedyatā' ṅgīkṛtā" (Ibid., Pp, 90-91).

Jayatīrtha, the great Mādhva logician, presents this Prābhākara theory in a highly systematic manner. Let us refer here to some of the points discussed by him. The so-called invalid cognition consists of two cognitions : direct apprehension and recollcection. Recollection, which is apprehension of the apprehended, sheds off its characteristic of thatness-cum-apprehendedness due to defect and is reduced to mere apprehension. So, the recollection of 'silver' and the apprchension of 'this' are not mutully discriminated either entitatively or in respect of cognitum and, as such, due to the similarity with the cognition of a presented silver, these two appear non-different and form appositional relation with each other[20]. That the cognition of silver is recollection transpires from the fact that a nacresilver is not cognised by one who has never before cognised a silver. It cannot be contended that the cognition of silver, shorn, as it is of thatness, cannot be called recollection ; for, 'thatness' is not invariable as is evident in the recollection of meaning from a word and in that of Hari, Hara and the like. Moreover, recollection need not necessarily report the whole of what is apprehended[21]. Again, even those who affirm invalid cognition must accept non-apprehension of difference. For, when difference is apprehended, there remains no scope for invalid cognition ; otherwise, an invalid cognition would never have been contradicted. So, when non-apprehension of difference can explain everything, why do you assume an invalid cognition[22] ? More-

Also "Vijñāna-dvayañcaitat eka-sādhāraṇa-rūpam. Tatra ekavijñānasādhāraṇa-rūpāvamarśād ekamiva jñānam etc." (Pp., p. 43).

20. "Tathā ca rajata-smṛteḥ purovarti-grahaṇasya ca mithaḥ svarūpato viṣayataśca bhedāgrahaṇāt sannihita-rajata-jñāna-sārūpyeṇa idaṁ rajatam iti bhinne api grahaṇa-smaraṇe abheda-vyavahāraṁ sāmānādhikaraṇya-vyapadeśaṁ ca pravartayataḥ" (NS). See also Bhāmatī, P. 28 (Mm. A. K. Śāstri's ed.).

21. "Kiñcedaṁ smaraṇam anākalita-rajatasya anutpadyamānatvāt sampratipanna-smaraṇavat. Na cedam asmaraṇam ; Tattāṁśa-vikalatvāt sampratipannavat iti yuktam. Padāt Padārthasmṛtau Hari-Harādi-smṛtau ca vyabhicārāt (Ibid.).

Also Cf. "Iha bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti ityanullikhita-tadaṁśasyāpi smaraṇasya svīkaraṇāt" (SVR., P. 105)

22. "Kiñca viparyayam aṅgīkurvāṇena api Vivekāgraho grāhya eva. Na hi viveka-grahe viparyayāvakāśo'sti, Virodhāt. Anyathā vīparyaya-nivṛtty-anupapatteḥ. Tathā ca tata eva sarvasya upapattau kiṁ viparyaya-kalpanayā". (Ibid.)

over, the following inference proves that all cognition is valid: "Jñānatvaṁ yathārtha-mātra-vṛtti, jñāna-mātra-vṛttitvāt pramātvavat" (NS).

This then is the Vivekākhyāti of the Prābhākaras. But, in order to understand the special traits of this theory, we are to distinguish it from the Akhyāti or Vivekāhyāti theory as is said to be upheld by Rāmānuja, the Sāṁkhya and the Bhāṭṭas. The Rāmānuja brand of Akhyāti hinges upon the law of Parsimony and is arrived at only as a consequence of Sat-khyāti or Anyathākhyāti. In it there is no postulation of two distinct cognitions whose Vivekāgraha gives rise to the so-called invalid cognition in the Prābhākara system. On the contrary, here the vivekāgraha takes the shape of 'asaṁsargāgraha' which is in regard to plentitude of the particles of silver in nacre in the case of Satkhyāti ('bahutvā-saṁsargāgraheṇa eva bodhopapateriti'. N. Sā. On Np., p. 37) and in regard to the superimposed characteristic of (say) silverness in the case of Anyathākhyāti ('Āropyadharmāsaṁsargāgraha-rūpāyā Akhyāteḥ avarjanīyatvāt.........". N. Sā. on NP., p. 43). In the case of Anyathākhyāti, it may also be said that there is non-apprehension of Anyathātva and this fact constitutes Akhyāti.

The Sāṁkhya Akhyāti, however, is more radical and does not depend simply upon any slender non-apprehension at any stage of the invalid experience. The Akhyāti it makes room for in its system is arrived at from two different standpoints. From the psychological standpoint, it advocates the view of selective apprehension and asserts that all our cognitions are partial and incomplete. All knowledge is fragmentary. Hence, as Prof. Hiriyanna says, 'It may not indeed amount to an error of commission ; but it is partial and so far as it not recognised to be partial, it becomes an error, though only an error of omission'. (The cultural Heritage of India, Vol. II, p. 47). The activity which the Buddhi exercises in apprehending an object is selective and only that much of the nature of an object is apprehended as is in accord with the percipient's attitude at the time. So, there is non-apprehension of the complete nature of an object. From the metaphysical standpoint, again, knowledge is marked by another deficiency. Every experience presupposes the invariable identity of the Buddhi and the self, that are in reality different.

This failure of discrimination or Vivekākhyāti leads to Avivekakhyāti which is at the root of all our empiric experience wherefrom we can free ourselves through Viveka-khyāti (cf, 'Vivekakhyātiraviplavā hānopāyah'. Ys. II. 26). Both these types of Akhyāti are, however, metaphysical errors from which we can rid ourselves only through Liberation.

Puruṣottamaji Mahārāja states that the Bhāṭṭas advocate the theory of Akhyāti because they hold that an invalid cognition is due to recollection whose character of thatness hasbeen engulfed because of defects of the agent. ('Bhāṭṭāstu kartṛgatairdoṣaiḥ pramuṣṭa-tattākā smṛtirevātra ityakhyātivādamāhuḥ' (PR., p. 17). Dr. S. N. Dasgupta also says : 'Kumārila agrees with this view as expounded by Prabhākara' (A Hist. of Ind. Phil., Vol. I, p. 386). This, however, sounds queer as the Bhāṭṭas are said to advocate Anyathākhyāti. But, the fact of the matter is that Kumārila in his Nirālambana-vāda in SV. seeks refuge in Smṛti to explain invalid cognitions and also hints at Saṁsargagraha in the hemistitch 'Vastvantaraika-saṁsṛṣṭaḥ padārthaḥ Śūnyatā-dhiyaḥ'. These two features of the theory of Kumārila, namely Smṛti and Saṁsarga-graha, are emphasised by some of his followers. Thus, Gāgā Bhaṭṭa in his Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi says : 'Thus arises the apprehension of objects, that are known as related to one thing, as related to some different thing as in the case of nacre-silver. This (explanation) is not faulty because we assume recollection divested of thatness"[23]. Pārtha-sārathi Miśra also says as follows while explaining an illusion : 'The piece of nacre, through contact with the (visual) organ, is apprehended in its aspect of luminosity shared in common with the silver ; and the specific characteristic of nacreness is not cognised due to organic weakness. Then, the impression being revived, the silver is recollected and the nacre is apprehended as the silver in recollection due to defect'[24]. This Pramuṣṭatattāka-smṛti coupled with Saṁsarga-graha affiliated

23. "Evaṁ ca anya-sambandhitvena avagatānām anya-sambandhitvena bhānaṁ śukti-rajata-jñānavat...Pramuṣṭa-tattāka-smaraṇāṅgīkārād vā na doṣaḥ" (Bh. Ci., p. 26).

24. "Indriya-samprayogāt śuktī-śakalaṁ rajata-sādhāraṇena bhāsvaratvādi-rūpeṇa gṛhītam asādhāraṇaṁ tu śuktikātvam indriyadaurbalyādagṛhītam, anantarañca saṁskārodbodhād rajataṁ smṛtam, tataḥ smṛta-rajatātmanā śuktirdoṣād gṛhyate" (Sd., P. 30).

the theory to Akhyāti from the strictly logical standpoint, though from the psychological standpoint the two theories are widely apart. The fact of the matter is that, though both the schools emphasise the role of Smṛti in explaining illusions, the Prābhākara school makes illusion logically a complex cognition composed of presentative and representative elements whose asaṁsargāgraha is responsible for illusion, while the Bhaṭṭa school pounces upon the positive aspect of Saṁsarga-graha which suggests to them the theory of Anyathākhyāti. Logically speaking, there is little difference between Asaṁsargāgraha and Saṁsarga-graha. But, psychologically, the two are worlds apart and. as such, it is not proper to let the same name of Akhyāti be shared by both the schools.

But another matter of great import must detain us here for some time before we can proceed with the criticism of Vivekākhyāti. Vimuktātman in his Iṣṭa-siddhi points out that no volition can result from two discrete cognitions that are not in apposition and so he suggests in favour of the Prābhākara the following : 'Tṛtīyaṁ vā sāmānādhikaraṇyajñānaṁ mānasamasti, tato vā pravṛttiriti' (p. 44). Jñānottama, the scholiast, introduces this view with the following observation : 'Cirantanākhyāti-matam upanyasyati —tṛtīyaṁveti'. Prof. Hiriyanna waxes eloquent on this observation of Jñānottama and says the following in his article entitled 'Prābhākaras : Old and New' in the JOOR, Madras (1930) : 'From this it is clear that the older Prābhākaras admit over and above the two jñānas referred to above, unitary jñāna which the manas of the percipient constructs out of the material furnished by the senses and memory. It is this additional jñāna that is bhrama. ......It is this saṁsargagraha where there is no saṁsarga that constitutes error" (p. 106). So, Prof. Hiriyanna thinks that the older Prābhākaras assumed a third unitary cognition, as a result of purely mental operation, which prompted consequent acitivity and which was damned as invalid by them. That this third cognition is held invalid instead of the first two is accounted for by pointing out that the validity of the Vedic knowledge can be assured of only if sense-perceptions and the like are held to be veridical in nature. This explanation offered by Vimuktātman in favour of the acceptance of a third cognition, which is invalid, seems to support apparently the supposition of Prof. Hiriyanna. For, the unimpeach-ability of

vedic knowledge is advocated most of all by the Prābhākaras and the Bhāṭṭas of whom the latter are represented by Vimuktātman as sponsoring Anyathā-khyāti.

But, unfortunately for me, I have not discovered any data that may lend support to such a thesis and wonder how the learned professor could jump to such a conclusion. It is to be noted here before anything else that this suggestion of a third unitary mental cognition takes away the essential character of the theory of Akhyāti from it. For, the principal psychological fact about Vivekākhyāti or Asaṁsargāgraha is that the mind remains in a partial stupor wherefore it admits of only negative characterisation much in the lines of the Citra-turaganyāya of Śaṅkuka in matters of Rasa-exegesis. Prof. Hiriyanna also states in the foot-note, "This may appear to be the same as the Viparīta-khyāti of Kumārila as expounded by Pārtha-sārathi Miśra". In point of fact, irrespective of the old and new Prābhākaras, neither Prabhākara himself, nor Śālikanātha. nor Bhavanātha, nor Rāmānujācārya alias Vādihaṁsāmbuvāhācārya is found to make any statement which can bear out the above supposition. And it is the furthest from truth that any Prābhākara would concede invalidity to mental cognitions (of. "Yathārthaṁ sarva-vijñānam iti Veda-vidāṁ matam" PP). None of the above-mentioned writers is found to assume any third unitary mental cognition. That the invalid cognition is as though an integral one, at least psychologically, is vouched for by Prabhākara and the whole band of his followers ; but, that it is a third unitary cognition, and a mental one at that, is not accepted by any of them. He asserts, as already pointed out, that perception of an object in its general character brings about the recollection of a similar object in a manner that completely engulfs its character as recollection. Upon this Śālikanātha comments : "Hence the difference between what is perceived and what is recollected is not apprehended" ("Tena gṛhyamāṇa-smaryamāṇayoḥ bhedo nāvasīyate" RV., P. 65). In fact, Prabhākara's partiality for the term 'Adhyāsa', with which he explains away invalid cognition, proves that he takes all invalid cognition to be apparently integral in nature. Śālikanātha also refers to it as though it were a single cognition ("ekam iva jñānam" PP., p. 43). Bhavanātha is perfectly clear and emphatic on this point. He contends that, though in fact, we have two

discrete cognitions, their presentation in apposition with each other as an integrated whole stands to reason ("yuktā samānādhikaraṇatā" NV., p. 90). It is clear that none of these three scholars call into request a third unitary mental cognition to explain illusion. On the contrary, Śālikanātha and Bhavanātha emphasise the fact that an invalid experience appears as not a whit different from a valid experience ("Aparokṣārtha-bodhena samānārtha-graheṇa ca/Availakṣaṇya-Saṁvittiriti tāvat samarthitam" PP., p. 34); Also 'Ato bhānastha-mātrāpekṣayā satyadhī-tulyatā iti yuktā samānādhikaraṇatā' NV., pp. 89-90). Incidentally, it may be pointed out here that the great Rāmānuja also thinks that the Prābhākaras take illusion as a single cognition. He gives vent to such a conviction in regard to Vivekākhyāti when he says that the theory is ultimately reducible to Anyathākhyāti inasmuch as it conceives two cognitions as one. ("Khyātyantara-vādināṁ tu sudūram api gatvā anyathāvabhāso' vaśyāśryaṇīyaḥ......Akhyāti-pakṣe'pi......Jñāna-dvayam ekatvena ca". Śrī Bhā., P. 89, Kan. ed.).

Vādihaṁsāmbu-vāhācārya, however, seems to strike out a new path for himself in his Tantra-rahasyam. He asserts that an appositional volition results from the non-apprehension of difference between perception and recollection, and not from a single qualified cognition. ("Tatra......grahaṇa-smaraṇayorvā bhedāgrahāt......Viśiṣṭa-vyavahāraḥ, na tu viśeṣa-dhītaḥ" P. 2). Proceeding further with his discussion, he springs us a surprise when he compares his pet theory of Vivekākhyāti with Anyathākhyāti. He now points out that the advocate of Anyathākhyāti also explains illusion on the basis of perception and recollection at the first instance and then brings in the superimposition of the recollected object upon the perceived one. But, in his own theory, an illusion may be explained by those very two cognitions in their mutually undifferentiated nature and subsequent volition made possible. So, in deference to the Law of Parsimony, no third cognition is assumed in his theory. ("Kiṁ cānyathākhyātivādināpi bhavatā prathamaṁ grahaṇa-smaraṇe aṅgīkṛtyaiva tābhyāṁ viparyayo jāyata ityuktam. Ata evātra smaryamāṇāropa iti bhavato vyavahāraḥ. Asmākaṁ tu tābhyām eva agṛhīta-bhedābhyāṁ bhrānti-vyapadeśopapatteḥ pravṛttisambhavācca na tṛtīya-jñānāṅgīkāraḥ, lāghavāt". P. 3).

This seems to suggest that the assumption of a third unitary cognition was never pressed into request (though this writer was a later Prāhhākara) by any Prābhākara, old or new. On the contrary, it was perhaps accepted by a certain section of the Anyathā-khyāti-vādins who may very reasonably be identified with the Bhāṭṭas, the sworn enemies of the Prābhākaras. It may be argued here to the contrary that if 'smaryamāṇāropaḥ' implies unitary cognition in respect of Anythā-khyātivādins, why should the same be not implied in respect of Prabhākara also who assumes 'adhyāsa'. This objection, however, is beside the point ; for, as I have shown on many previous occasions, psychology and not logic should generally guide us in determining the true nature of a theory unless otherwise directed in the theory itself. Moreover, the Prābhākara's insistence on the absolute non-difference of an invalid cognition from a valid one from the stand-point of mere apprehension must not be lost sight of.

The real fact of the matter is that Vivekākhyāti is principally a psychological theory with explicit ontological implications and not a logical or metaphysical theory at bottom like Sat-khyāti, Ātma-khyāti or Anirvacanīya-khyāti. But, scholars of rival schools have either wilfully misrepresented it or illegitimately brought in logical scrutiny to bear upon it. Logic will surely enter the scene when the theory will come up for criticism, but before that stage it ought to be kept cautiously apart in consideration of the psychological nature of the theory. In fact, what Prabhākara and his followers mean to say is that an invalid cognition invariably appears as a single cognition ; their affirmation of non-difference of dream-illusions from illusions in general proves this fact beyond any spectre of doubt. But, subsequent scrutiny reveals to them that it is in reality composed of two distinct cognitions, perception and memory, which appear undifferentiated in the invalid cognition. So, what is a single cognition—and a perception at that—in presentation gives way before logical analysis and is bifurcated into perception and memory. But, this bifurcation does in no way represent the psychosis of the moment of presentation. This bifurcation again may be subsequently integrated into a third unitary mental cognition. But, this mental cognition is wholly exotic in regard to the presentative cognition which takes after any valid cognition.

So, a Prābhākara can never assume such a third unitary mental cognition simply because his experience at the moment registers no such thing ; and, as such, it flatly contradicts his fundamental postulate that a cognition is what it appears like at the moment of its experience.

It may now be safely concluded that this theory of a third unitary mental cognition cannot be fathered upon the older Prābhākaras. Indeed, Jñānottama himself never does it, but simply introduces it as the older Akhyāti theory. So, it is not unlikely that it might have been upheld by some other school older than the school of Prabhākara. And, to our great delight, we find such a theory being referred to by citsukha in his Tattva-pradīpikā. After fighting out the Prābhākara prejudice against invalid cognition, Citsukha discusses and disposes of Asat-khyāti and then scrutinises Satkhyāti in the aspect of Anyathākhyāti. It is here that he states the following: "Athādhunikasya kasyacit matānusāreṇa idaṁ rajatam iti jñānam idamākāra-rajatākārayoḥ na saṁsarga-grāhakam api tu tayoḥ eka-jñāna-saṁsargiṇoḥ bhedāgrahād ayathārtha-vyavahāro(?) gṛhyamāṇayoḥ bhedāgrāhi savikalpakam ekaṁ vijñānaṁ vibhrama iti bhrama-lakṣaṇābhyupagamāt. Tathā ca nāsataḥ Kasyacit Khyātiriti kaścit brūyāt taṁ prati brūyāt" (P. 71). Upon this the scholiast Pratyag-rūpa-bhagavān says in his Nayana-Prasādinī, "Nyāya-kalpatarau udīritam āśaṅkate". A little later he again says, "Eka-jñānopāroha-svīkāre'pi saṁsarga-jñānāpalāpa-sāmyāt Akhyā-ti-vādini saṁsarga-jñānāpalāpini uktaṁ śabdānumāna-pratya-kṣāprāmāṇya-prasaṅgaṁ doṣam atrāpyāha". From the above it follows that the theory of a third unitary cognition was advanced in a book called Nyāya-kalpataru and that it was a kind of Anyathā-khyāti and different from Akhyātivāda, perhaps of Prabhākara, which did not accept "eka-jñānopāroha" as the scholiast says. Nyāya-kalpataru is an undiscovered book on Nyāya and it may very well be that the old Nyāya school had germs of such a view which was developed and systematised by the author of Nyāya-kalpataru. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his Nyāya-mañjarī evinces his partiality for Akhyāti when he says that the other three khyāti-vādins cannot rule out Akhyāti ("Khyāti-traya-vādi-bhirapi ceyam apratyākhyeyā nūnam Akhyātiḥ". (P. 164, Beng. Ed., pt. II). In this regard he further says, "Vipa-

rīta-khyātāvapi...rajata-smṛtiḥ aparihāryā, sā ca rajata-smṛtirna tadā svena rūpeṇa prakāśate smarāmīti pratyayābhāvāt" (P. 165, Ibid.). Then, while refuting Akhyāti, he says : "Yaduktam...... dve ete jñāne iti tad asāmpratam, pratyabhijñāvad ekatvenaiva saṁvedyamānatvād" (P. 166, Ibid.). This shows that he accepts the recollection of silver, but still affirms one single cognition even as in Recognition. Does it not answer to the requirements of the theory of a third unitary cognition ? In this connection, it is further to be noted how Jayanta explains acquired perception of the type 'Sugandhi puṣpam'. He holds that a fragrant flower is perceived not by the visual organ, but by the mind ("Locanagocare'pi kunda-kusume tadaviṣaya-gandha-viśeṣite bāhyendriya-dvāraka-grahaṇam aghaṭamānam iti mānasam eva surabhi kusumam it jñānam" (NM). So, according to him, it is a new type of a synthetic unity of apperception, though the neo-logicians donot accept any mixed mode of consciousness even like William James. So, we may conclude that the theory in question was upheld by a certain section of Anyathākhyātivādins, whether a group of old logicians like Jayanta or a group of Bhāṭṭa scholars as suggested in Tantra-rahasyam.

But, even this conclusion fails to carry conviction with it when set off against a subsequent statement of Vimuktātman to the effect that there are four variants of the Akhyāti theory whereupon Jñānottama comments that the first three belong to the older school and the fourth to the newer one ("Akhyātivādino'pi śukti-rūpyayoḥ pṛthak satoḥ apṛthagavabhāsābhimāna iti kecit. Anutpanna eva ekatva-jñāna utpannabhrama iti cānye. Apare tu tṛtīyaṁ mānasam aikya-jñānam āhuḥ. Yadā tu avivekagraha eva bhramo viveka-grahaśca tadbādha iti......etc." (Is., P. 291). Also "Cirantanākhyāti-mata-paryālocanayā anyathākhyānam āpādya ādhunikākhyātimate doṣāntaram atidiśati yadā tu avivekagraha eva iti" (Viv. of Jñānottama, p. 583). So, at the present state of our knowledge, which is very limited, due to the paucity of materials at our hands, it is better not to risk any conclusion, but leave the issue an open question. Still, it is to be noted here that jñānottama here calls all the first three variants the older views, whereas on the previous occasion, he only hits upon the third one as the older view. Does it not suggest some amount of vacillation on the part of jñānottama ?

Furthermore, it is worthy of note here that the great Śaṅkara and Vācaspati Miśra both characterise the theory as 'Vivekāgrahaṇam' or 'Agrahaṇam'. So, the supposed older view of a third unitary mental cognition must, however curious it may seem, come after them if it needs be fathered upon the Prābhākaras. But, the plain fact is that we cannot trace it to its source and hence can make no categorical statement in support of or against this view, though our present findings seem to almost falsify the predication of jñānottama in this regard. The fourth view, which is styled the new theory of Akhyāti by jñānottama, brings in a radical change in the theory by characterising illusion in positive terms as Aviveka-graha instead of in negative terms as Vivekāgraha and this theory also cannot be surely traced to its source. It appears, therefore, that all these different views are only logical constructions without any factual basis.

A legion of scholars of diverse philosophical affiliations has dealt sledge-hammer blows on Vivekākhyāti which has been almost proved to be a leaky boat incapable of salvaging the Prābhākaras from the deluge of attacks. Indeed, the attacks were vitriolic to the utmost and the war was waged on different fronts, though foul play was much in evidence in some of the sectors of the battle-field. We shall now present the different spear-heads of attack one after another and assess their value wherever necessary.

The first general objection is that Akhyāti, by which name Vivekākhyāti is generally known, is not at all a logical concept. For, its connotation cannot be logically determined. It may be asked if Akhyāti means a kind of Khyāti i.e. presentation, or an absence of Khyāti. Now, for fear of unwelcome issues and as a matter of fact, the Prābhākaras cannot and do not explain Akhyāti as absence of Khyāti. Nor can it mean a kind of presentation. For, then will arise the contingency of all cognitions being invalid. Moreover, if such presentation be deemed erroneous, what will contradict it ? If it is answered that another presentation will contradict it, that will lead to undue extension of the province of contradiction which will then find scope anywhere. So, it follows that a supporter of Akhyāti cannot speak of any error ; or, if he does, he must affirm it as a possibility

in case of all presentations[25]. Furtheremore, if Akhyāti means absence of Khyāti as said before, we should have error in slumber, not in wakeful state and dream[26]. Nor can it either mean a cognition that prompts one to something different from what one seeks, or an undifferentiated cognition of many objects. For, in the first case, it will not be erroneous where there is no consequent volition due to instantaneous contradition or sluggishness. In the second case, what is exactly meant by Viviktatva (i.e. differentiatedness), which is the counterentity of 'Aviviktatva'? It cannot mean cognition of difference; for, that would logically rule out any kind of non-cognition of difference which the Prābhākara postulates. Nor can it mean non-cognition of non-difference since the aforesaid argument shuts out any cognition of non-difference and thereby logically hinders any cognition of Aviviktatva which is but negation of the absence of cognition of non-difference. Neither can it mean a composite cognition formed of difference and duality etc. For, in that case, either non-differentiation will overlap its supposed province or else will be too narrow to include cases which are styled errors. Hence it follows that Akhyāti is not a logically analysable concept[27]. But, a Prābhākara might demur here and say that logical inderterminism can in no way corrupt the reality of anything. Moreover, if the Sankarites can speak of 'Akhaṇḍārthabodha' and the logicians of 'Akhaṇḍopādhi', both of which defy analysis, what's the harm if tbe Akhyāti of Prabhākara turns out perchance to be unanalysable? In point of fact, however, Vimuktātman betrays his perfect understanding of the concept of Akhyāti when he says that if Akhyāti be denied, Omniscience would stalk the world and all the Pramāṇas would

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25. "Kā ceyam akhyātiḥ. Kiṁ khyātireva, uta khyātyabhāvaḥ. Na tāvat khyātyabhāvaḥ, abhāvasya aniṣṭatvāt. Nāpi khyātireva, sarva-khyātīnāṁ bhrāntitva-prasaṅgāt......Khyātiścet bhrāntiḥ, sā kena bādhyeta. Na hi khyātiḥ khyātiṁ bādhate, atiprasaṅgāt......Tasmāt nākhyāti-vādinaḥ kācid bhrāntiḥ, sarvā vā khyātiḥ bhrāntiḥ syāt". (IS., P. 116, G. O. S.)

26. "Ādye suṣuptau bhramaḥ syāt na jāgrat-svapnayoḥ (Vi. Pra. Sa., P. 190, Beng. Ed.).

27. "Dvitīye jhaṭiti bādhāt ālasyād vā yatra na pravṛttiḥ tatra bhrāntiḥ na syāt. Tṛtīye'pi aviviktatva-pratiyogi viviktatvaṁ nāma kiṁ bheda-graha uta abhedāgrahaḥ āho svid itaretarābhāva-bheda-dvitvādi-saṅkhyā-viśiṣṭa-jñānam etc." (Ibid.).

be useless, there being nothing unknown[28]. This shows that the charge lacks sincerity and is framed as a device for out-manoeuvring the Prābhākara. The second objection against the theory is that the Law of Residue, which is called into request to prove that in an invalid cognition like 'this is silver', silver is supplied by memory, has no scope here. For, the experience may very well be generated through defective organs and the like. The argument that one, who has perceived silver before, can have no such experience, lacks certainty ('anaikāntika') in cases like the void. If, then, it is argued that one, having previous experience of silver, can have such a cognition, the answer is that in that case the cognition would not have been conspicuous by its absence in behaviour prompted by silver-impression. If the Prābhākara qualifies the inference by 'there being cognitionhood'[29], even then the position does not improve. For, if the experience occurs only to one who has previous indeterminate cognition of silver, then it will not answer squarely to the determinate cognition of silver ; if, again, the experience is vouched unto one who has a previous determinate cognition of silver, it would not have any impress of certitude in regard to the conative corollaries like rejection or acceptance. Moreover, the inference is vitiated by the upādhi in the form 'Origination from mind assisted by impressions only'[30]. So, the silver cannot be proved to be recollection through the operation of the Law of Residue, or by any independent inference. Inference is unavailing here also because the major term of the inference would be 'Smaraṇatva', which is a genus, but the Prābhākaras do not accept any genus in regard to a guṇa which 'smaraṇa'

28. "Akhyātyabhāve ca sarvo janaḥ sarvadā sarvajñaḥ syāt, sarva--pramāṇānāṁ cānarthakyam, ajñātārthābhāvāt" (NS., p. 116, G. O. S.).

29. The inference is as follows ; "Idaṁ smaraṇaṁ jñānatve sati rajata-jñānavata utpadya-mānatvāt sampratipanna-smaraṇavat" See NS.

30. "Anākalita-rajatasya anutpadyamānatvaṁ gaganādau anaikāntikam. Rajata-jñānavata eva utpadyamānatvaṁ vivakṣitam iti cenna. Tathāpi rajata-saṁskāra-vyavahārādau vyabhicārāt. Jñānatve satīti viśeṣaṇād adoṣa iti cenna. Rajata-nirvikalpaka-jñānavata eva utpadyamāne rajata-savi-kalpakā-nubhave vyabhi-cāra-tādavasthyāt. Rajata-savikalpaka-jñānavata eva utpadyamānatvaṁ vivakṣitam iti cenna. Hānādi-buddhiṣu anaikāntikatā-nistārāt. Saṁskāra-mātra-sahakṛta-manojanyatvo-pādhi-grastaṁ cānu-mānam" (NS).

is ('Kiñcedaṁ smaraṇatvaṁ sādhyam, na tāvat sāmānyaṁ guṇeṣu prābhākaraiḥ abhyupagatam" NS.).

Indeed, it cannot be proved that the cognition of silver is through recollection ('Yadapi kaiścid ucyate doṣavaśāt pramuṣṭa-tattāṁśa-smaraṇaṁ bhavatīti, tadapi nopapannaṁ tadīya-smaraṇatve pramāṇābhāvāt'. Kha. Kha. Khā.). If a Prābhākara tries to push forward his assumption of recollection of silver by defining 'smṛtitva' as that which has its origin from impression unaided by any other means of proof or as a genre implied by such impressions, he cannot remain unscathed. For, why should not the visual organ be taken as its cause? The Prābhākara might say that the visual organ has at the moment no intercourse with the object in question and, since the assumption of a contact-less organ producing cognition would lead to undue over-extension, it stands to reason that the cognition of silver is not sensuous. But, this charge of undue over-extension may be made also against the Prābhākara assumption of mere impression producing the cognition of silver. For, if mere impressions could produce cognitions, anything previously experienced might suggest itself to the mind at any moment and there will be syncretism and consequently a babel of cognitions. If it is argued that impressions aided by auxiliaries may very well produce the said cognition, it may be redargued that the visual organ may equally well produce it, aided by the same auxiliary[31]. So, however one might define smṛti, an invalid cognition cannot be brought within its fold by any means.

Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa in his Tattvopaplava-siṁha disproves completely the claim of an invalid cognition like the mirage being called a smṛti in the following manner :—How is it smṛti? Is it so as a perception of water? In that case, all cognitions of water would become smṛti. If it be so as a perception of the perceived water, then the original perception would also become smṛti. Not only this : Continuous cognitions of an object, recog-

31. "Pramāṇāntarāsaha-kṛta-saṁskārajatvaṁ tad-vyaṅgyo vā jātiviśeṣa eva smṛtitvam iti cet. Maivam ; tatra kāraṇatvaṁ kimiti nākṣasyaiva, yena saṁskāra-jatvaṁ vyavasthāpyate. Tenārthena saha tadākṣasya sannikarṣābhāvāt asannikṛṣṭasya ca tasya jñāna-janakatve'tiprasaṅgāt nendriyajatvaṁ tasyeti cenna. Saṁskārasyāpi kevalasya tajjanane'tiprasaṅga-tādavasthyāt etc." (Kha. Kha. Khā.).

nition and inference would also be turned into smṛti. Similarly, it can be proved that it is not smṛti as one occurring in the moment following the moment of water-perception, or as one having no object, or as one occurring in the form 'what I perceived'[32].

Even if smṛtitva be conceded, it is difficult to explain what is meant by Smṛtipramoṣa. It cannot mean absence of smṛti. For, then it is not possible to apprehend the previously perceived silver. Moreover, even a state of swoon would have then to be called a state of smṛti-pramoṣa. If now it is argued that a state of swoon is not a state of smṛti-pramoṣa 'since in it there is no presentation of 'this', then the Prābhākara is to be asked what appears in 'this'. If he answers that a piece of nacre lying in front appears in 'this', he would be asked whether this piece of nacre appears there as qualified by its own attributes or as related to silver. The acceptance of the first alternative amounts to the denial of smṛti and hence of smṛti-pramoṣa. For, when the nacre appears as characterised by its specific properties, there is no scope for recollection of a similar object. The second alternative also is untenable simply because the nacre cannot be related to silver which is absent there ; Moreover, there would arise the positive contingency of the apprehension of atoms etc. lying there and having contact with the visual organ. Nor can smṛti-pramoṣa signify the presentation of something different (from the recollected silver). For, if it were so, it would either be synchronous with the silver-recollection or would be posterior to it. If the first alternative be welcomed, even a pitcher-cognition synchronous with the silver-recollection would effect smṛti-pramoṣa. The other alternative also is unacceptable for fear of undue extension. For, then, the succeeding cognition would become the smṛti-pramoṣa of the preceding one and as such the former should not be acceptable to a Prābhākara. Moreover, this would lead to the acceptance of all different presentations ('anyāvabhāsa') as smṛti-pramoṣa i.e. as negative in implication. If again smṛti-pramoṣa means apprehension of a contrary form, then it leads to Viparīta-khyāti. And what is this contrary

32. "Tasya kathaṁ smṛtitvam—kiṁ udaka-gṛhītitvena, gṛhītodaka-gṛhītitvena vā, udaka-grahaṇānantara-kāla-bhāvitvena vā, nirviṣayatvena vā, yam aham adrākṣam ityanena ākāreṇa upajāyamānatvena vā ? etc." (TPS., P. 17, G. O S.).

form ? If it means distinct apprehension of something, then it is of the form of perception and cannot be related to smṛti. Nor again can smṛti-pramoṣa mean the remembrance of something past as present ; for, then, the silver-cognition would not have been a distinct apprehension. If, ultimately, it is argued that smṛti-pramoṣa means apprehension of recollection as undifferentiated from perception even like the apprehension of a mixture of milk and water, the Prābhākara must explain what he means by 'aviveka' here. Does it mean a non-differenced apprehension of two different things, or admixture of the two, or consecutive apprehension of the two ? The first alternative leads to Viparīta-khyāti. The second alternative of admixture, which is possible only in cases of objects having perceptible forms, does not hold good in respect of two formless cognitions. The last alternative, again, would reduce inference to smṛti-pramoṣa. Hence, smṛti-pramoṣa is unexplainable[33].

Even conceding smṛti-pramoṣa, it may be asked why the part of 'thatness' of smṛti is eclipsed. For, the impression generated by the previous cognition of silver as a particular spatio-temporal complex must register this spatio-temporal characteristic. Recognition also proves this fact. If it is argued that, due to some 'defect' in recollection, 'thatness' is not apprehended, it will be asked what 'defect' is. The Prābhākara might now answer that 'defect' is that from which the opponents postulate the origin of error. Śrīharṣa is severely critical of this attitude and would not give quater to the Prābhākara. To quote him in the original : "Tarhi tad-rajata-viśiṣṭam idaṁ rajatam ityatra, saiva rajata-vyaktiriyam ityatra vā, punaḥ tadeva rajatam upasthitam itīha vā, sāmānyata eva rajatasya tadāpi parāmṛṣṭasya bhrāntau tattāṁśa-moṣaḥ syāt doṣasya vidyamānatvāt.

33. "Kaścāyaṁ smṛteḥ pramoṣaḥ—kiṁ smṛterabhāvaḥ, anyāvabhāso vā syāt, viparītākāra-veditvaṁ vā, atīta-kālasya vartamānatayā grahaṇaṁ vā, anubhavena saha kṣirodakavat avivekena utpādo vā, prakārāntarāsambhavāt etc." (PKM., P. 56, Mahendra Śāstrin's ed.).

Also "Ko'yaṁ vipramoṣo nāma—kim anubhavākāra—svīkaraṇam, smaraṇākāra-pradhvaṁso vā, pūrvārtha-gṛhītitvaṁ vā, indriyārtha-sannikarṣajatvaṁ vā. (TPS,, P. 18).

Also "Kiṁ smṛterabhāvaḥ, uta anyāvabhāsaḥ, āhosvit anyākāraveditvam iti vikalpāḥ" (Sanmati Ṭī., P, 28).

Anyathā idaṁ rajatam ityaṁśe'pi tasmin jñāne tattāṁśa-moṣo na syād ityāstāṁ iyaṁ prasaktānuprasaktiḥ" (Kha. Kha. Khā.).

Prakāśātman in his Vivaraṇam states that memory is never with regard to the auxiliary aspects of the object, but always in regard to the pure object. But, Vidyāraṇya in his Vivaraṇaprameya-saṁgraha points out that, though memory due to mere perception is with regard to the pure object, that due to apperception certainly refers to the auxiliary aspects whose eclipsing cannot be explained[34].

We, however, beg to submit in favour of the Prābhākara that partially eclipsed memory is quite a psychological phenomenon and is within the experience of normal life. How often do we hear people exclaim at the sight of an old acquaintance, "Yes, I remember your face, but cannot identify you ; nor can I recall to my mind the environs of our first meeting". So, smṛti-pramoṣa as a psychological fact cannot be questioned, though its role in explaining error may be disputed.

The third objection against Vivekākhyāti may be presented in a composite manner. It may be urged that the theory cannot satisfactorily explain the origin of error, its subsequent annulment as also the volitional activity prompted by the invalid cognition. While discussing the illogicality of the concept of Vivekākhyāti, it has been shown following Vimuktātman that if Akhyāti is error, there is either no error at all or else all cognitions are erroneous—a fact which demonstrates that the Prābhākara cannot explain error. Indeed, 'Viveka' means 'bheda' and, as the Advaitins aver, it is not amenable to sense-perception ("Bhedo na pratyakṣeṇa gṛhyate"—Brahmasiddhi of Maṇḍana) and consequently to inference also. In the circumstances, 'Viveka-graha' being an impossibility, 'vivekāgraha' would be universal and hence every cognition would be erroneous ; in other words, the world will be relieved of the gnawing tentacles of error which will be a non-être. Indeed, from logical analysis it appears that Vivekāgraha cannot be called 'bhrama'[35]. For, Vivekāgraha itself is impossible

34. "Anuvyavasāyena jñānagocarānumānena vā janyeyaṁ smṛtiḥ vyavasāya-janyāyā ghaṭa-mātra-gocarāyāḥ smṛteranyā etc." (P. 195, Beng. ed.).

35. "Itaśca nākhyāti-pakṣo yuktaḥ ; yataḥ—Na graha-smṛtitanmeyaviveko'pi grahāntarāt / Aśakteranavasthānānnāto' khyātirbhramo mataḥ" (IS., P. 292).

when one postulates the theory of triple consciousness. If it is argued that there is Vivekāgraha not between perception and recollection, but between what is perceived and what is recollected, then such Vivekāgraha is apt to occur anywhere. Then the question arises how these two are differentiated. Certainly not through some other perception ; for, that other perception has no scope here and there will arise the eventuality of infinite regression. Since two cognitions are to be differentiated, they must be taken to be thus differentiated not by one, but by two other cognitions ; but, these two subsequent cognitions may again remain undifferentiated, thus leading to infinite regress. Moreover, we never have any experience of two sublating cognitions. Furthermore, perception and recollection being imperceptible, their non-discrimination and discrimination would lead, if at all, for argument's sake, to 'bhrama' and 'bādha' respectively which are suprasensuous—a contingency which flatly contradicts experience. Again, what is perceived and what is recollected, being respectively immediately and mediately apprehended, the 'bhrama' and the 'bādha' under reference should neither be immediate nor mediate knowledge. So, the Prābhākara cannot prove the fact of 'bhrama' itself[36].

The Prābhākara would certainly repatriate his brand of 'bhrama' by asserting that the undifferentiated cognition is an error in that it leads to erroneous behaviour. But, it's a poor defence. For, when the cognitions are themselves quite valid, how can they prompt invalid behaviour ? If they can, other valid cognitions would also have the possibility of initiating such invalid behaviour[37]. In the circumstances, the Prābhākara postulation of the invariable validity of all knowledge adhered to with a view to ruling out chaos and confusion from the domain of consciousness and installing impeccable certitude in their place defeats its very purpose. For, now it transpires that wc cannot assure ourselves of the validity of one behaviour as

36. "Na gṛhyamāṇa-smaryamāṇāviveko yuktaḥ......Anyathā sadāviveka-prasaṅgāt. Na hi tayoḥ viveko grahāntarāt, aśakteranavasthānācca......Dve ca jñāne tad-viṣaye, tābhyām api pūrvābhyām iva na syād vivekaḥ,......na cātra dve bādhaka-jñāne......grahaṇa-smaraṇayoḥ....apratyakṣatvāt tadvivekāvivekau na pratykṣa-bhrama-bādhau syātām etc." (Ibid).

37. "Na hyayathārthavyavahāra-hetutvam etc." (IS., p. 43).

against the invalidity of another inasmuch as both are equally prompted by valid cognitions. So, the chaos and uncertainty that was externed from the domain of cognition becomes ultimately rehabilitated in the sphere of behaviour. So, overt behaviour being once called into question, not only the whole of practical life is thrown out of gear, but training in the grasping of syntactically related meaning through the observation of behaviour of experts—a postulate of the Prābhākara—becomes impossible[38]. In this connection it may be further stated that there is no knowing where 'Vivekāgraha' or 'Asaṁsargāgraha' will occur, granting its presence in certain cases, and, as a result, all our behaviour will be shrouded by the lengthening shadows of doubt. Indeed, absence of recantation, which follows behaviour, cannot assuredly prompt indubious behaviour. Even if it does, it becomes instrumental in validating the validity of cognition and thereby cuts at the root of the theory of self-validity of knowledge of the Prābhākara[39]. It may further be argued that if valid cognition may induce invalid behaviour, as the Prābhākara urges, then it follows that defects have the potency of generating effects that are contrary to the usual ones—a conclusion which has been vigourously opposed by the Prābhākara who thinks that defects straightaway arrest the emergence of the normal effect[40]. So, the Prābhākara cannot make out a case for the occurrence of error in his theory of Vivekākhyāti.

Nor can Vivekākhyāti explain Pravṛtti or the motor activity

38. "Ataeva anāśvāsa-nirasanopāyo na jñāneṣu kaścid viśeṣo'stīti nirastam. Anyathā parasyāpi kathaṁ viṣaya-vyabhicāre vyavahṛter-vyavahārāntare samāśvāsaḥ syāt. Tadabhāve ca kathaṁ vyavahāra-darśanena anvitārthe vyutpattiḥ' (NS.).

39. "Kvacid vivekāgrahe ca katham anyatra viśiṣṭa-pratyaye viśvāso bhavet. Tadabhāve ca kathaṁ niḥśaṅkā pravṛttiḥ......kiñca pravṛttyuttarakālīno bādhakābhāvaḥ kathaṁ niḥśaṅka-pravṛttau upayujyate. Bādhakābhāvādinā viśiṣṭa-jñāna-svarūpa-niścayam aṅgīkurvāṇaḥ kathaṁ svaprakāśa-vijñāna-vādaṁ na jahyāt" (Ibid).

Also "yaccoktaṁ kvacit jñānasya aprāmāṇye sarvatrāpi prāmāṇya-saṁśayāpattyā niṣkampa-pravṛttirna syād iti, tanna. Parasyāpi kvacid vidyamānāsaṁsargāgrahāṅgīkāre sarvatrāpi tat-saṁśayāpattyā niṣkampa-pravṛttirna syātityalam" (Br. vi. Bha., p. 27).

40. "Tathā sati samīcīna-vyavahāra-hetor-vijñānād ayathārthavyavahāra-janmānupapatti-prasaṅgāt (NS).

following the cognition of (say) nacre-silver etc. In a general way it may be pointed out first that perception and recollection, the two discrete cognitions accepted by the Prābhākara in cases of illusion, being momentary, cannot combine to prompt activity. It cannot be argued that the two cognitions occurring consecutively will induce activity ; for, perception is sundered from the activity by an intervening memory and, as such, it cannot be an unconditional antecedent of the activity[41]. The Prābhākara may argue that the dichotomisation into two cognitions is but the produce of post-cognitional analysis and, since from the cognitional standpoint, the so-called invalid cognition is similar in all respects to its valid type, it would prompt activity even like the valid cognition. But, this advocacy also cuts no ice. Against this it may be asked whether this similarity with valid knowledge prompts activity through its conscious apprehension or merely through its subconscious facthood (or existence). The first alternative is not acceptable. The cognition of a cognition, though similar to a valid cognition, cannot induce activity. For, one seeking a cow cannot be prompted towards a 'gavaya' through the cognition of similarity between a cow and a gavaya. The second alternative stands to reason only when similarity leads to the superimposition of one of the undifferentiated cognitions or its objects upon another. For, conscious activity cannot be preceded by any absence of knowledge. Certainly the recollection of the meaning of the word 'silver' cannot justify activity. How can one move towards the 'this', when what one wants is something else ? So, one must know 'this' to be silver before one can proceed to have it. Hence, without accepting superimposition, the Prābhākara cannot explain 'Pravṛtti'[42]. Vādideva sūrī points out that the Prābhākara

41. Vide Tattva-dīpanam.

42. "Atha samīcīna-jñāna-sārūpyam anayoḥ gṛhyamāṇaṁ vā vyavahāra-pravṛtti-hetuḥ, agṛhyamāṇaṁ vā sattā-mātreṇa...,. Tatra na tāvat samīcīna-jñāna-sadṛśī iti jñānaṁ samīcīnajñānavat vyavahāra-pravartakam ; na hi go-sadṛśo gavaya iti jñānam gavarthinaṁ gavaye pravartayati......Tasmāt sattāmātreṇa bhedāgraho' gṛhīta eva vyavahāra-heturiti vaktavyam. Tatra kimayam āropotpāda-krameṇa vyavahāra-hetuḥ, āho'nutpāditāropa eva svata iti. Vayaṁ tu paśyāmaḥ—cetana-vyavahārasya ajñānapūrvakatvānupapatteḥ, āropotpāda-krameṇaiveti......Na ced idaṁ-kāraspadaṁ rajatam iti jānīyāt kathaṁ rajatārthī tadicchet. (Bhāmatī, P. 28, Mm. A. Śāstri's ed.).

flatly contradicts himself by supposing that the recollection of silver prompts activity in regard to nacre. For, recollection will generate undisputed activity in the locus of the previous apprehension whose recollection it is. So, by assuming that recollection generates an unconventional effect, he does away with his pet thesis that defects cannot generate a different effect[43].

Jayatīrtha thrashes out the case against Pravṛtti as prompted by Vivekāgraha. He points out that 'Viveka' or 'Bheda' here cannot signify either of the collateral entities ('Svarūpam') inasmuch as that cannot remain unapprehended in the theory of triple consciousness. It can neither mean separateness. For, separateness, being a quality, cannot inhere in cognition which is itself a quality. Moreover, it will lead to the universal possibility of motor activity in something different from what is desired, because non-cognition of difference might occur anywhere in the circumstances. Nor can it mean reciprocal negation. Nor again can it mean possession of different attributes. The Prābhākara may argue that the non-apprehension of the attribute of nacreness of the 'this' that bars out silver on the one hand, and that of the attribute of distantness inhering in silver that bars out the 'this' on the other, will together prompt activity. But, that is not reasonable. For, if the nacreness is not apprehended in 'this', one seeking nacre would not move towards it. And, one seeking silver would not be drawn towards it, if the attribute of distantness remains unapprehended. So, the Prābhākara cannot explain Pravṛtti. Moreover, he must either hold that such invalid behaviour is prompted by non-cognition of difference, while valid behaviour springs forth from cognition of non-difference or that all behaviour is equally prompted by non-cognition of difference. The first alternative invites chaos in the realm of causality. If it is argued that though cognition of non-difference is generally the propelling force, still non-cognition

43. "Tasmāt autsargika-kārya-karaṇe pratihata-sāmarthyānāṁ kāraṇānāṁ viparīta-kāryotpādakatvam upalabhyamānaṁ bhavatā abhyupagantavyam. Anyathā svamata-vyāghātaḥ. Tathāpi rajatam iti smaraṇasya pūrvānubhava-deśābādhita-pravṛtti-rūpautsargika-kāryātikrameṇa śuktikā-deśe pravṛtti-janakatvaṁ bhavataiva aṅgīkṛtam. Tacca evam ucyamāne kathaṁ saṁgaccheta" (SVR., p. 108).

of difference may prompt activity through its similarity with the former, even then the charge of chaos in causality is not obviated. Moreover, it may be asked if this prompting through likeness with the legitimate prompter is assumed only here, or it holds good universally. The first alternative is vitiated by the assumption of the unforeseen. And if the second were true, a cluster of 'Gunjā' fruits simulating fire would have warded off cold. If two discrete cognitions could prompt activity simply because they simulated a legitimate prompter, why should they not also arrest activity because of the presence there of non-cognition of non-difference which simulates cognition of difference[44] ? Now, the Prābhākara might desparately plead that just as, according to the opponent, 'bhedāgraha' gives rise to 'abheda-graha', similarly it would prompt activity also. But, this is far from the truth. For, cognition is entirely dependent upon its causes, while prompting to activity is entirely at the mercy of the agent. Moreover, a cognition cannot directly prompt activity ; nor can two discrete cognitions generate activity through the evoking of desire and effort. Furthermore, the apprehension of a mere thing-in-itself (not Kantian) and the non-apprehension of non-relation brings the cognition in question into line with indeterminate cognition and all talk of determinate cognition becomes unreal gibberish. And an indeterminate cognition can never prompt any activity. Moreover, if activity is supposed to start invariably from 'asaṁsargāgraha', then a child, who learns from the activities of an expert, can never have any scope for knowing the mutual relation of things. Thus, the theory of the syntactical import of words falls to the ground and the verbal testimony follows suit. So, the Prābhākaras cannot explain Pravṛtti through their theory of error[45].

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44. Comp. "Atha nāvagacchet na pravartate, tat-kāryāvagamādhīnatvāt pravṛtteḥ. Atha akāryatvānavagame'pi kāryāvagatisādṛśyāt pravṛttiḥ. Tatastat-kāryatvānavagamena akāryāvagati-sādṛśyam api astīti nivṛttirapi syāt sādṛśyayoḥ aviśeṣāt" (Sd. of Pārthasārathi, p. 40).

45. "Nanviyaṁ pravṛttiḥ svarūpato viṣayataśca agṛhītabhedāt vedana-dvayāt upapadyate iti cet. Ko'yaṁ bhedo nāma. Kiṁ svarūpam uta pṛthaktvam uta anyonyābhāvaḥ athavā vaidharmyam etc......Kiñca bhedā-grahāt anyārthino'nyatra pravṛttim ācakṣāṇaḥ praṣṭavyaḥ. Kim ayam eva vyavahāro bhedāgrahāt anyastu abheda-grahāt. Uta sarvo'pi bhedāgrahāditi. Nādyaḥ, aniyata-kāraṇatāpātāt......Kiñca pravartaka-sādṛśyāt pravṛttiḥ

Nor can the Prābhākara explain bādha. The Prābhākara holds that the cognition 'this is silver' becomes a sublation by the annulment of 'abheda-vyavahāra', which is brought in by 'bhedāgraha'[46]. But, this ill affords to explain bādha. For, a cognition need not necessarily induce motor activity. So, where there is no such activity, no bādha will at all occur. Even if such activity be conceded, the sublating cognition 'this is not silver' does hardly recant the abheda-vyavahāra simply because it is not consciously present in the previous positive cognition[47]. Similarly, from the stand-point of smṛti-pramoṣa it may be said that the sublating cognition, if there be any, ought to appear in the form 'rajata-pratibhāsaḥ smṛtiḥ' and not in the form 'nedaṁ rajatam'. So, the Prābhākara can hardly find out a 'bādhaka pratyaya'[48]. That recantation is impossible in Vivekākhyāti is vigourously demonstrated by Jayatīrtha. For, it cannot come into being as sublating non-apprehension since all cognitions, which by their very nature partake of such a function, will effect some sort of recantation. Nor, can recantation mean arrest of activity. For, those who do not seek it (say, a silver) will have no activity which might subsequently be recanted by the cognition 'nedaṁ rajatam'. On the other hand, the cognition of the presence of tiger, thief and the like, which are apt to arrest activity, would turn out to be sublators. Neither is recantation possible by way of arresting the implicit workability of an entity ; for, such atrophy may occur in other occasions also. Neither again can it occur as simply hindering activity. For, in that case activity might well cease with the cessation of Aviveka and as such no hindrance need be assumed at all. Besides, here too the cognition of tiger, thief and the like would also serve as sublators[49].

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ityatraiva kalpyate, uta yad yat sadṛśam tat tat-kāryakārīti sarvatra niyamaḥ etc. etc." (NS).

46. "Bhedāgraha-prasañjitābheda-vyavahāra-bādhanācca nedam iti vibhedaka-pratyayasya bādhakatāpi upapannā" (NM., p. 64).

47. See NM., p. 65 et seq.

48. "Kiñca smṛti-pramoṣa-pakṣe bādhaka-pratyayo na syāt, sa hi purovartini arthe tat-pratibhāsasya asad-viṣayatām ādarśayan 'nedaṁ rajatam' ityullekhena pravartate, na tu rajata-pratibhāsaḥ smṛtiḥ ityullekhena" (PKM., p. 58).

49. "Na tāvad agrahaṇa-nivartakatayā bādhakatvam. Sarva-pratyayānāṁ tathātvāpātāt. Nāpi vyavahāra-vicchedakatvena ; atadarthināṁ

In short, the Advaitins point out that unless nescience is assumed, error, its sublation and the motor activity consequent upon error cannot be explained[50]. Others, again, aver that unless error is accepted as a cognitional fact, all these cannot be established. Anyway, the upshot of this long discussion is that the Prābhākara can by no means prove bhrama, pravṛtti and bādha—the three pillars of any theory of error.

To my mind, the above criticism of Vivekākhyāti is to a great extent based on wilful misrepresentation of facts. The postulation of two discrete cognitions, which has been fully exploited by the opponents, is but an outcome of post-cognitional analysis which is resorted to with a view to demonstrating that there is nothing erroneous in so-called invalid cognitions. It has, however, nothing to do with the genesis of error and the consequent motor activity which are all explained by the peculiar psychosis embodying the cognition which is later damned as invalid. Indeed, what the Prābhākara means by 'bhedāgraha' is not negativity as a positive factor or as a conscious factor, but mere existential negativity of a positive attribute. What seems to be at the back of the mind of the Prābhākara is that an invalid cognition is the operation of a twilight consciousness which may best be, though imperfectly, described negatively. So, it is easy to see that many of the aforesaid charges against him are mockeries with his logically defective expression of his essentially psychological theory. But, many other charges against him are quite apt and fully justified.

The next objection raised against the theory of the Prābhākara is with regard to his assertion that the origin of

vyavahārānutpattau nedaṁ rajatam iti jñānasya abādhakatva-prasaṅgāt. Vyāghra-corādijñānasyāpi pravṛtti-vicchedakatvena bādhakatva-prasakteśca. Na cārthasya vyavahāra-yogyatā-vicchedakatvena. Samayāntare'pi tatra vibhramāt pravṛttyabhāvāpatteḥ. Na ca vyavahāra-pratibandhakatvena. Avivekanivṛttau kāraṇābhāvādeva vyavahārānutpatteḥ pratibandhakalpanāyogāt. Vyāghra-corādi-jñānasya bādhakatāpatteśca'' (NS).

50. ''Na hyavidyā-siddhatvaṁ vinā tasya nirākāryasya nirākaraṇaṁ yuktam, asiddhasya pramāṇataḥ siddhasya ca nirākaraṇasya naiṣphalyād aśakyatvācca'' (IS., p. 143). Also ''Māyām anicchatastuccha-khyātiḥ prāpnotyanīpsayā/'' (Ibid., p. 154). Also ''Anyathākhyātirakhyātirātmakhyātiriti trayaḥ/ Sat-khyātipakṣā naite'pi vinā sidhyanti māyayā//'' (Ibid., p. 218).

an invalid cognition is causally impossible. The Prābhākara says that defective causes lose their causal potency outright and cannot bring into being effects different from the scheduled ones. But, Ānandabodha, Vācaspati Miśra, Jayatīrtha, Vādideva Sūri, to name only a few, cry a halt at this point and try to prove the hollowness of this assertion. It is sheer suppression of facts or lamentable lack of observation to assert that defects cannot infuse a new kind of causality. It is common knowledge that a burnt cane-seed produces the embryo of a plantain-plant[51]. But, the Prābhākara would not yield here so easily. He would naturally ridicule the idea of 'a defective cause' which is silly talk with him. Suppose 'a' is the cause of 'b' ; now, 'a', being tainted by some defect, can no longer effect 'b', but may effect 'c' which is something different from 'b'. Here 'a' appears not in its former causal character, but merely in its entitative character and, being characterised by a defect, becomes a new cause effecting 'c'. So, the former cause 'a' does in no way effect 'c'[52]. From this it follows that the burnt cane-seed is the cause of plantain-plant ; so far as this effect is concerned, burning is no defect ; it is verily a defect in regard to the cane-plant as effect whose generation is prevented by it ; but, it does not give rise to a depraved kind of cane-plant. So, the opponent is open to the charge of shifting of position. Burning is considered by them a defect in regard to one thing, while it is considered a cause of a different thing in which case it is not a defect at all. If the opponents could demonstrate that a burnt cane-seed produces a perverted cane-plant, they might have silenced the Prābhākara. Here Jayatīrtha tries to rout the zealous Prābhākara with his sharp dialectics. He asks whether any auxiliary of the cause bars out its contrary potency or only defects as auxiliaries do it. The first alternative, if accepted, will raise a fresh round of questions. It would be asked if animal-slaughter has natural potency to generate merit or demerit. If it generates merit, why should it not do so even

51. See Bhamatī, p. 30, Mm, A. Śastri's ed.

52. "Dagdhaṁ tu vetra-bījaṁ kadalī-karye samagrī, na tu dāho'smin kārye doṣaḥ, vetrajananāt tu doṣatā, na tu vikṛta-vetrajananāt. Evaṁ ca yajjātīya-kārya-janikā yā sāmagrī, na sā doṣāt tajjātīyaṁ kāryaṁ vikṛtaṁ karotīti na dhī-jātīyaṁ doṣad vikṛtaṁyuktam". (NV., p. 93).

when it is not a part of a sacrifice ? If, however, it generates demerit, why should it not do so even as a part of sacrifice ? If the Prābhākara argues that all this is due to some auxiliary, he unwittingly accepts that auxiliaries may generate contrary potency. The original second alternative also does not stand to reason because of absence of any regulative principle. Moreover, disease of the eye etc. also are considered auxiliaries in generating contrary cognition. And what arrests the desired effect is called a defect. If it is asked why fried kutaja seeds do not generate banyan-sprouts, the answer is that it is not so because of the multiform potency of things. Thus, frying etc. arrest the potency of producing a different thing. Others prevent the natural potency, but generate a contrary potency ; thus, there are things that arrest the death-dealing potency of poison, and produce instead a healing potency[53]. Hence the Prābhākara thesis that a defect cannot produce a contrary effect is unjustifiable.

But, it seems to my humble self that Jayatīrtha or any other scholar has not been able to rebut the arguments of Bhavanātha discussed above and to disprove the Prābhākara thesis under discussion. The only potent refutation of this thesis is possible by showing its contradiction with some other assumption of the Prābhākara as has been already referred to by us[54].

The next objection which the oppenents most confidently raise against the Prābhākara is as follows :—The Prābhākara assumes auto-illumination of all cognition. How can he then

53. "Kiñca sahakāri-mātrasya viparīta-śaktyanādhāyakatvam aṅgīkartavyaṁ doṣāṇāmeva vā. Ādye paśu-hiṁsā kiṁ dharmajanane svārasika-śaktimatī utādharma-janane iti vācyam. Ādye kathaṁ kratu-bāhyāpi dharmaṁ na janayet. Dvitīye kathaṁ kratvantargatāpi dharmaṁ janayet. Sahakārivaśāt iti cet ; aṅgīkṛtaṁ tarhi sahakāriṇāṁ svārasika-śakti-pratibandhena viparīta-śaktyādhāyakatvam. Na dvitīyaḥ. Niyāmakābhāvāt. Kiñca kācādayo'pi viparīta-jñāna-janane sahakāriṇa evāṅgīkriyante. Doṣatvaṁ tu iṣṭa-kārya-vīghātitāmātreṇa ucyate......Na caivaṁ bharjitāḥ kuṭaja-dhānā vaṭāṅkuraṁ kuto na janayantīti vācyam. Padārtha-śakti-vaicitryāt ; kecid vastvantara-śaktim eva pratibadhnanti yathā bharjanādayaḥ. Kecit sahaja-śakti-pratibandhena viparitām api śaktim ādadhati, yathā viṣasya mārakatva-śaktiṁ pratibadhya ārogyādiśaktim ādadhānāḥ padārthāḥ" (NS.).

54. See foot-notes Nos. 40 and 43 supra.

consistently speak of 'smṛti-pramoṣa' or of 'bhedāgraha'? If the cognition arises with its self-luminosity, in other words, its self-appropriation, how can its proper nature remain still masked[55]? It must either appear as recollection or as perception. In the first alternative there is no 'pramoṣa' and the second alternative paves inevitably the way for Viparīta-khyāti[56].

But, this argument also does not seem cogent to me. The opponents only resort to misinterpretation of the supposed self-luminosity of cognition and intend thus to discredit the Prābhākara. The real import of the assertion of self-luminosity of cognition is that a cognition cognises itself by itself without the help of some other cognition; in other words, every cognition is self-cognition and appears in the form 'I know'. Furthermore, the cognition is cognised not in its logically demonstrated character, but in its cognitional character in a double sense. To explain, it appears as cognition and in its psychological peculiarity of the moment of cognition. So, there is no scope for discovering any self-contradiction here.

The next objection raised against the Prābhākara is that Vivekākhyāti leads to Anyathākhyāti. For, the two discrete cognitions are not known as such; it further assumes Vivekāgraha and Asaṁsargāgraha where there ought to be Vivekagraha and Asaṁsarga-graha respectively[57].

Pārthasārathi Miśra further points out that Vivekākhyāti cannot explain cases like the double moon, confusion of direction etc.[58]. The illusion of the bent stick, the continuous illusion, the illusion of the form 'Ime raṅga-rajate' cannot be explained in this theory.

Vādideva Sūri raises another objection against the theory.

55. "Sarva-bhāvānāṁ svayaṁ-prabhatvena sphuṭatarāva-bhāsayoḥ saṁvidoḥ tadadhīna-prakāśayośca arthayoḥ kathaṁ vivekāgraha-vācoyuktiḥ yuktimatī, na khalu avabhāsamānasvabhāvasya eva anavabhāso bhedasyeti sāmpratam, avabhāsānavabhāsa-viruddha-dharmasya ekasmin asambhavāt. (NMAK., p. 65, Chowkhāmbā ed.).

56. Vide NM., pp. 166-197.

57. Vide PKM. p. 57; SD., p. 40. Also see NS.

58. Vide ŚD., p. 39.

He asks whether the two cognitions arise simultaneously, or in succession. Not simultaneously ; for, that goes against the Prābhākara assumption. They cannot arise in succession either. For, in that case, the recollection of silver must occur either earlier or later than the cognition of 'this'. The first alternative is unwarranted ; for, before the perception of 'this' there is nothing to evoke the latent impression which is the cause of recollection. The second alternative also is not sound. For, in that case the recollection may occur even after the cessation of the operation of the eyes even unto one with eyes closed. Moreover, this succession of occurrence is not apprehended and is, therefore, contrary to experience[59].

Another objection generally raised against this theory is that it disregards the Law of Parsimony or simplicity of Hypothesis, as Russell puts it, and suffers from prolixity. The Prābhākaras themselves hold that to accept Viparyaya is to invite prolixity. They point out that their theory, which can explain the motor attitude and the overt behaviour with the help of a cognition that is characterised by (say) silverness and by non-apprehension of unrelatedness, is, on that very account, conspicuous by its simplicity. But, this simplicity turns out to be over-burdened with varied hypotheses when examined by the opponents. Thus, Gāgā Bhaṭṭa points out that in the above hypothesis of the Prābhākara, cognition has two adjuncts whose mutual relation as substantive and attribute being undecided on both the sides, both may be affirmed of the two adjuncts in turn and that makes the Prābhākara assume in fact two sets of causes. Again, if the sense of duty-hood serves as the cause of volition in general, then where volition starts from a wrong sense of

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59. "Api cedaṁ rajatamiti yadidaṁ saṁvedana-dvayam abhyupagamyate, tasya kiṁ yaugapadyena paryāyeṇa vā prādurbhāvaḥ syāt. Na tāvad yaugapadyena, sva-kṛtānta-prakopa-prasaṅgāt. Paryāyeṇāpi prādurbhūtau idam iti pratyakṣāt pūrvam uttaratra vā rajata-smaraṇam udbhavet. Tatrādyaḥ pakṣaḥ prekṣā-cakṣuṣāṁ na lakṣayitum ucitaḥ. Idam iti pratyakṣāt pūrvaṁ smṛti-bījasya saṁskārasya prabodhakatvānibandhanāt......... Athedam iti pratyakṣād uttaratra rajata-smṛtiḥ prādurbhavati ityabhimanyate. Tanna śobhanam. Yasmāt idamiti pratyakṣāt paścāt prādurbhavantī rajata-smṛtiḥ virata-vyāpāre'pi cakṣuṣi prādurbhavet. Evaṁ ca sati nimīlita-locanasyāpi rajata-smṛtyanubhavaḥ syāt. Paryāyeṇa ca bhavad-abhimata-jñānadvayasya prādurbhāvaḥ pratīti-viruddhaḥ" (SVD., pp. 119-120).

duty-hood, there would arise a confusion between non-apprehension of unrelatedness and the attributiveness of duty as to which of them should be substantive and which attribute. As a result, here too the Prābhākara would have to assume two sets of causes. In this manner other such cases of multiplicity of hypothesis would occur and weaken the position of the Prābhākara[60].

Advaitānanda also in his Brahma-vidyā-bharaṇam brings the charge of prolixity against the Prābhākara. He points out that those, who accept a single qualified cognition as the cause of an invalid experience, can have their theory or theories of error propped upon a single cause ; but, the Prābhākara has to assume 'asaṁsargāgraha' as an additional cause in order that he may eliminate the possible hindrance in the way. Moreover, what should he say about a cognition like 'these are two pieces of silver' in regard to a piece of zinc and that of silver ? He must resort to 'asaṁsargāgraha' in regard to the piece of zinc, but to 'saṁsarga-graha' in respect of the piece of silver. This is sheer contradiction of experience. He had better give up 'ardha-jaratīya (i.e. affirming two contradictory qualities at the same time in an identical locus) and accept 'asaṁsargāgraha' even in regard to the silver-part of the cognition. If now the Prābhākara argues that his acceptance of the recommendations of the opponent would merge all differences between the volition from a so-called invalid cognition and a fruitful volition, he betrays a fresh multiplicity of hypothesis. For, while in the view of the opponent mere 'pravṛttitva' may well serve as the co-extensive adjunct ('avacchedaka'), the Prābhākara would have to assume instead 'saṁvādiviṣaya-pravṛttitva' as the adjunct— a much more sumptuous assumption. Besides, he would be guilty of assuming two alternative causes of volition— asaṁsargāgraha in cases of volition in general, but a qualified cognition in cases of fruitful volition. Hence, it is quite clear that the Prābhākara is open to the charge of 'Kalpanā-gaurava' on various grounds[61]. [The worth and ontological importance

60. "Tanna. Asaṁsargāviṣayatva-rajatatva-prakārakatvayoḥ jñāna-viśeṣaṇayoḥ viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāve vinigamanābhāvena kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvad-vaya-kalpanā-gauravāt" et. seq. (Bhā. ci., p. 29).

61. "Apica yena viśiṣṭa-jñānasya kāraṇatvam ucyate, tanmate ekameva

of arguments based on 'Lāghava' and 'gaurava' will be discussed in the concluding chapter. Suffice it to say here that, one's acquaintance with the late mediaeval philosophical literature of India shows that it is a weapon which, like Occam's rajor, cuts both ways, though not in one sweep. This argumentative device has been resorted to by both the contending parties so indiscriminately that its practical utility has been, to say the least, reduced to the minimum. So, a sincere seeker after truth should attach little importance on the charge of 'gaurava' against the Prābhākara.]

The naive realism with which the Prābhākara explains the genesis of invalid cognition is fascinating. But, he imperils his position by engrafting on it logical cannibalism that, in many cases, tears asunder the psychological realism into smithereens. He starts with passive photometry, but ends in aggressive ionometry (if the expressions are permissible). The dichotomisation and logical analysis adhered to by him with a view to demonstrating the validity of all cognitions spells disaster for him. Even his logical thought is expressed with a psychological yeast which saps the very foundation of his logic. His 'bhedāgraha' and 'asaṁsargāgraha' and the consequent 'pravṛtti' seem to me te be psychological facts. But, he cannot explain away invalidity thereby. Indeed, the most potent argument is that the theory cannot rule out invalidity ; it only shifts it from the realm of cognition to that of behaviour[62] and entails interminable trouble. The Prābhākara thus cuts off the world of behaviour, in fact, the external world itself, while affirming the world of cognition. He thus starts with naive realism and ends in idealism of the yogācāra brand.

The Prābhākara, however, can silence, as I see, the Advaitin easily. I have previously referred to the fetish of 'akhaṇḍārthabodha' of the Advaitin which may be utilised by the Prābhākara with advantage. He may further point out that as the Advaitin

kāraṇam......Pareṇa tu pratibandhakābhāvatayā asaṁsargāgrahaḥ kāraṇāntaraṁ kalpanīyam iti mahad gauravam. Apica raṅga-rajatayoḥ 'ime rajate' ityatra aṁśadvaye tulyatayā ullekhe'pi raṅgāṁśe asaṁsargāgraho, rajatāṁśe saṁsarga-graha iti vadatā anubhavānusāraḥ parityaktaḥ'' et. seq, (Br. Vi., P. 25).

62. See ch. X, Pp. 33-34.

accepts identity and, therefore, 'bhedāgraha' between 'Tat' and 'Tvam' in the upanisadic sentence 'Tat tvam asi' through the application of 'jahadajahat-svārthā vṛtti', similarly he postulates 'bhedāgraha' between perception and recollection. But, all these contrivances can not rescue him from his inevitable doom. By asserting 'asaṁsargāgraha', he accepts a relation between the two cognitions that is in fact a non-être. So. he unwittingly moves into the groove of 'asat-saṁsarga-khyāti', besides harbouring 'anyathākhyāti'. Moreover, he cannot successfully explain the illusion of the bent stick, the parallax, the illusion of a fish in the aquarium looking double and such other cases. Furthermore, he cannot explain why, even after the demonstration of difference between the two cognitions, the invalid experience should still persist. He might here take the plea that this proves that error is not a logical fact. But, then, he has to forsake outright the logical interpretation of the experience whereby he endeavours to prove its validity. And, if he does so, he straightaway moves into the orbit of Asat-khyāti pure and simple. If again, he takes both the invalid cognition and its sublator as alogical experiences, he is face to face with the inexplicable Māyā and pays homage to the Anirvacanīya-khyāti of the Advaitin. So, this theory also goes the gloomy way of its fore-runners and is condemned to perdition.

POST-SCRIPT

This post-script becomes necessary, because certain facts, which give the lie direct to the assumption of Prof. Hiriyanna of a different Akhyāti view of the older Prābhākaras, escaped my notice at the time of preparing this chapter. I am now presenting them in original in order to shed straightaway all misgivings about the matter. Prskāśātmayati in his Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇam, while discussing the Akhyāti-theory of the Prābhākaras, makes the following statement : "Pramāṇa-smṛti-dvairāśyameva vijñānasya na tṛtīyaṁ mithyā-jñānaṁ nāmāstīti akhyātivādī pratyavatiṣṭhate" (P. 22, Vizianagram Skt. Series). This positively states that the Prābhākara, who advocates dichotomy of cognitions in invalid experiences, does not accept a third unitary mithyā-jñāna. But, some might still entertain doubt in regard to it ; for, the above statement of Prakāśātman

may very well represent only the generally current variant of the Akhyāti view, without implying that there is no other variant of the view. So, I beg to draw the kind attention of my learned readers to a passage from Nyāyasudhā of Jayatīrtha whose vast erudition and dialectical skill are undoubted. This passage occurs just after where the Rāmānuja theory of Sat-khyāti is discussed and disposed of. The Prābhākara theory of Akhyāti is discussed just before the presentation of Sat-khyāti of Rāmānuja and hence there is no scope for reading Prābhākara thoughts in this passage. The passage itself, however, clearly dispels all doubt about it. Let me quote the passage here in original so that it may speak for itself independent of my poor advocacy. The passage is as follows :—"Anyastu manyate. Gṛhyamāṇayoḥ bhedāgrāhi savikalpakam ekameva vijñānaṁ vibhramaḥ. Tathāpi rajata-saṁskāradoṣa-sacivam indriyam śuktikā-śakala-sannikṛṣṭaṁ rajata-śuktīdam-aṁśaviṣayaṁ tatsaṁsargāsaṁsargau anavagāhamānam ekam eva savikalpaka-jñānam utpādayati. Tathā ca tayoreka-vijñānopārohiṇoḥ bhedāgrahāt ayathārtha-vyavahāraḥ. Tannirāsādeva viveka-jñānaṁ bādhakam ityucyate. Na punaḥ anyad anyātmanā pratīyate iti. Tadidam anupapannam. Vivekāgrahaḥ Kiṁ sarvatra pravṛtti-hetuḥ utātraiveti prāgukta-doṣāṇām aśeṣāṇām aviśeṣāt. Kiñca Prābhākarāṇāṁ veda-prāmāṇya-siddhyaṅgatayā astyakhyāti-svīkāre prayojanam iti vidyate bhramaḥ. Kaṇabhakṣākṣa-caraṇa-pakśa-pātinā tu atasmiṁstad iti pratyayo viparyaya iti pūrvācāryavacanam anādṛtya paramata-pramoṣaḥ kasmād iṣyate etc.". A cursory perusal of this passage will reveal to any one that this is the theory which has been fathered upon the author of Nyāyakalpataru by Pratyagrūpa-bhagavān in his gloss on Citsukha's Tattva-pradīpikā. Jayatīrtha here explicitly states that this view was advocated by a scholar or a handful of scholars belonging to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. The fact that Jayatīrtha refers to the upholders of different theories of error always in the plural except in the case of Satkhyāti of Rāmānuja and this theory (cf. "Anyastu manyate'), coupled with the use of singular in 'Kaṇa-bhakṣākṣa-caraṇa-pakṣa-pātinā' seems to suggest that this view was upheld by a single scholar with few followers behind him. And since this view clearly postulates a third unitary cognition, this must be the view

referred to by Vimuktātman and his scholiast. So, Prof. Hiriyanna's view seems to be unfounded. But, a die-hard wrangler might still raise his voice of disapproval against this conclusion and point out that the word 'gṛhyamāṇayoḥ' in the above passage disaffiliates this view from the view of a third unitary cognition referred to by Vimuktātman and his scholiast. But, one who reads between the lines of the above passage will surely conclude that one of the two 'gṛhyamāṇa's' here is an exact replicum of 'smaryamāṇa', with difference in nomenclature only. So, we feel sure that we can safely reiterate our present conclusion without any fear of well-meaning contradiction.

I confess I cannot resist here the temptation of presenting the refutation of this theory by Jayatīrtha, though it mostly shares the defects of Vlvekākhyāti and is already refuted by the arguments levelled against that theory. For, Jayatīrtha has lent much zest in the additional argument of refutation he advances against it. The protagonist of this theory might declare that he rules out Viparyaya from all cognitions lest it defiles the vedic knowledge. To this Jayatīrtha says that this theorist cannot then accept even vivekāgraha ("Tathā sati Vivekāgrah-asyāpi anaṅgīkāryatvāpātāt"). For, the vedic sentences are no authority either in matters of semantics or in the syntactical relation of words inasmuch as they are derived from other sources. So, a neophyte who learns from the behaviour prompted by Asaṁsargāgraha and apprehends it also through that non-cognition of difference will nurse misgivings even in regard to the knowledge imparted by the Vedas. If the opponent redargues that this doubt would be dispelled by the fact of the Vedas being 'apauruṣeya', then this fact may serve as well to dispel doubts in regard to vedic knowledge despite Viprayaya be accepted. So, there is no reason why Viprayaya should not be given the seal of reality that it naturally claims from all disputationists. ("Tathāhi, Na tāvat veda-vākyaṁ padārtheṣu pramāṇam etc.").

CHAPTER XIII

ANYATHĀ-KHYĀTI

Now, it is time for us to switch over from the twilight of psychological realism to the noontide of logical realism, from the somnolence of feeling to the self-conscious rumination of thought, from Vivekākhyāti to Anyathā-khyāti. This Anyathā-khyāti is a theory which has drawn the sympathies of the major bulk of the philosophers of India from the ancient times down through the middle ages to the present days. Indeed, Vācaspati Miśra, that colossal scholar, though personally championing the cause of Anirvacanīya-khyāti, had to admit the antiquity of the theory by making the significant statement 'anyathā-khyātiriti bṛd-dhāḥ' (NVTT., P. 54, Vizi. Skt. Series). This theory was advocated by the Bhāṭṭas, the Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas, the Pātañjalas (the yoga-philosophers), the Mādhvas, the Jainas and even by the latter Ramanujists and by a certain section of the Advaitins in a limited sphere. It seems not very unlikely that even some Buddhists of the Sarvāsti-vādin school might have advocated this theory. The Bhāvānyathātva theory of Dharmatrāta[1], the Lakṣaṇānyathātva theory of Buddhadeva and the Avasthānya-thātva theory of Vasumitra though concerned with a different problem, seem to suggest such a hypothesis, though one cannot be sure of it until further materials on this point are available. The theory is sometimes called Viparītakhyāti by its adherents[2]. The great Śaṅkara also seems to suggest this name of Viparīta-khyāti when he records one of the definitions of adhyāsa as 'viparīta-dharma-tva-kalpanā'[3], though his scholiasts interpret it otherwise. Veṅkaṭanātha, however, draws a line of distinction between the two terms and points out that a viparyaya is called anyathākhyāti or Viparīta-khyāti according as it is characterised by 'dharmāntara' or 'dharmyantara'. The former has scope in

1. Cf. "Avasthā-phalaṁ sāmagryam, na dravyaphalam iti siddhāntaḥ" (Kośasthāna v, kā. 24, Sphuṭārthā).

2. Vide. NM, of Jayanta, SVR. of Vādideva, PKM of Prabhācandra, SD. of Pārthasārathi etc. etc.

3. "Anye tu yatra yad-adhyāsaḥ tasyaiva viparīta-dharmatva-kalpanām ācakṣate". (SB., P. 2, Vāṇī Vilās Ed.)

cases like 'a yellow conch-shell' where there is 'saṁsargāropa', while the latter occurs in experiences like the rope-snake which depends upon 'tādātmyāropa'. Veṅkaṭa further observes that rajas is at the root of anyathā-khyāti, while Tamas brings about Viparīta-Khyāti[4]. But, no such distinction is found to be adhered to in practice and the terms are used as being readily interchangeable. Without disputing the analysis of Veṅkaṭa, it may be pointed out that to a modern mind the former term may seem to emphasise the psychological aspect, while the latter brings into bold relief the ontological aspect.

Though scholars of different schools advocate this theory of Anyathā-khyāti, they are widely at variance with one another in enunciating and proving their theory, not only in matters of detail, but also sometimes in essentials. So, there are practically as many variants of the theory as there are schools sponsoring it. Not only that ; one is apt to come across an older version of the theory as opposed to the latter one as is clearly evident in the Nyāya school.

In the circumstances, it grows difficult even to hit upon the G.C.M. of the different variants unerringly. For, to call it even Sat-khyāti, which is perhaps common to almost all the variants, will be flatly contradicting the essentials of the Mādhva variant. So, it will be but a truism if we call these variants different theories appearing under the same name. We shall, therefore, do well to present the variants separately generally in an ascending order of complexity in the following pages.

The yoga theory of Anyathā-khyāti is propounded in the ys. "Viparyayo mithyā-jñānam atadrūpa-pratiṣṭham" (Ys. I. 8). Error, according to the yoga, is a kind of vṛtti called viparyaya. It is false knowledge which has its basis not on the presented datum. The Vyāsa-bhāṣya cites as an example the cognition of the double moon which is corrected by the subsequent cognition of a single moon. The latter recanting cognition, the bhāṣya points out, is a Pramāṇa, since it has something existent as its cognitum. The clear implication seems to be that the content

4. "Viparyayam eva dharmāntara-dharmyantara-bhedāt anyathākhyāti-viparītakhyāti-bhedena kvacid vyavaharanti. Yathā pīta-śaṅka-rajju-sarpa-bhrame. Tayośca rajastamasī mūlam iti gīyate". (NP., P. 55, Chowkhāmbā).

of an invalid cognition is a nonêtre i.e. an asat. The negative particle in 'atad-rūpa-pratiṣṭham' seems also to suggest such a hypothesis, thus flinging open the gate for Asat-khyāti. But, such an interpretation has not been put forward by any of the noted mediaeval scholars. Indeed, Vijñānabhikṣu asserts that the yoga view of error is Anyathā-khyāti as against the Aviveka of the Sāṁkhya. He argues that this anyathā-khyāti is clearly implied in the sūtra "Anityāśuci-duḥkhānātmasu nitya-śuci-sukhātmakhyātiravidyā" (Ys. II. 5). The Bhikṣu further points out that unlike the Vaiśeṣikas who advocate that an external object like the silver is superimposed upon the presented external object, the yoga holds that an internal cognition is grafted on the presented datum. For, to assume the distant silver etc. as the cognitum instead of the contiguous nacre etc. is to court prolixity of assumption. The vaiśeṣika view cannot further explain the substantive sublation in cases like 'It was seen in a dream ; now it is not'[5]. The point of the matter is that the yoga is essentially realistic in its epistemology and is tethered to the doctrine of Sat-kāryavāda wherefore Asat-khyāti is anathema to its system.

To elucidate the standpoint of the yoga further : Viparyaya is not Pramāṇa, because it does not take the form of the presented datum ; it is not Vikalpa, since it does not arise merely from verbal cognition. Neither can it be equated with Nidrā which has negation as its content. Nor is it of the nature of Smṛti which has a pre-cognised entity as its content. But, at this point we should take a pause and probe into the Vyāsa-Bhāṣya on Ys. I. 11. Therein it is stated that Smṛti is of two kinds according as it occurs in dream or in wakeful consciousness ; in the former case, it is 'bhāvita-smartavyā' i.e. its memory-content is such as may be in conformity with some fancied cognition, and in the latter, it is 'abhāvita-smartavyā'[6]. In both the cases, however, it is different from Viparyaya. Is then

5. Vide yoga-vārttika of Vijñānabhikṣu, p, 27, Jīvānanda's ed.

6. "Sā ca dvayī bhāvita-smartavyā cābhāvita-smartavyā ca, svapne bhāvita-smartavyā, jāgrat-samaye tu abhāvita-smartavyeti" (Vyā. Bhā. on Ys. I. 11). According to vācaspati the former is productive, while the latter is reproductive. But, Bhikṣu differs and takes the former to mean 'prognosticative of the future' ('bhāvyartha-sūcaka').

dream something different from invalid cognition? In other words, is it then neither valid nor invalid simply because it does not add to our stock of knowledge? But, we know that a dream-cognition is almost universally condemned as erroneous and the yoga also cannot do otherwise. Why, then, is a dream erroneous according to the yoga? Though the point does not seem to have been raised and discussed by any of my fore-runners in the field, I venture to submit that error pertains to the 'bhāvita' element in dream; this element is responsible for construction and/or spatio-temporal relation between fact and fiction, or simply super-imposition. If this explanation be at all acceptable, then the question arises how viparyaya differs from a dream-cognition; for, it can be easily shown that Viparyaya thrives on 'bhāvita-smartavyā' smṛti. It will not do to point out that Viparyaya is 'atad-rūpa-pratiṣṭha', while dream is not; for, that is merely a negative qualification which cannot positively account for the genesis of error. Moreover, there are erroneous or self-discrepant dream-cognitions even like erroneous wakeful cognitions. If it still be maintained that Viparyaya has nothing in common with dream, it boils down to this that Viparyaya does not necessitate an element of Smṛti for its occurrence. In that case, the yoga assumption of vāsanā or saṁskāra being at the root of all metaphysical illusion becomes indefensible[7]. Anyway, it is well nigh impossible to settle this issue for want of sufficient materials in this regard. One thing, however, that may be asserted with emphasis in regard to the yoga Viparyaya is that the form of the correction will be 'nedaṁ jñānaṁ tadrūpa-pratiṣṭham' as against 'nātra rajatam' as advocated in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. So, according to the yoga, the reality of (say) the silver, which is presented as unpresented in correction, is out of the question. The yoga-sūtras, including the Vyāsabhāṣya, nowhere indicate the exact role of the presented datum, say, a piece of nacre, in the genesis of an erroneous cognition, say, of the silver. The only thing that can be made out and safely affirmed is that it occasions the subsequent recanting cognition. And, in this

7. Cf. "Tathājātīyakāḥ saṁskārā vṛttibhireva Kriyante Saṁskāraiśca vṛttaya' iti, evaṁ vṛtti-saṁskāra-cakram aniśam āvartate" (Vyā. Bhā. on Ys. I. 5.)

regard at least, the theory alienates itself from the Buddhist theory of Ātma-khyāti.

But, one thing must be submitted here. The yoga definition of Viparyaya as discussed above cannot possibly bring within its fold cases of 'Sopādhika bhrama' like the red crystal and seems to be too narrow in this regard. For, a red crystal is certainly 'Tadrūpa-pratiṣṭha'; and all the metaphysical errors on different levels of the yoga are of this 'sopādhika' type. Hence, 'tad-rūpa' has to be explained differently. It is to be taken to mean the real nature of form or appearance of an entity. And 'anyatākhyāti'[7a] is to be taken as the recanting cognition that fights out anyathā-khyāti. In that case, 'ekātma-tā-khyāti'[7b] should be the positive description of the nature of an illusion and this also may very well be termed anyatākhyāti as opposed to the Anyakhyāti of the vallabhaites from the standpoint of 'tadrūpa'.

Now, let us present the Anayathākhyāti theory of the Ramanujist school. It has already been noted that Rāmānuja in his Śrī-bhāṣya yields his palm to all the three theories of Sat-khyāti, Anyathākhyātl and Akhyāti. It has also been noted that a majority of the followers of Rāmānuja has rallied round the theory of Anyathākhyāti. Indeed, Rāmānuja defines an illusion as 'anyasya anyathāva-bhāsaḥ' and points out that all the theories of illusion must ultimately call into request an otherwise apprehension to explain the phenomenon ("Khyātyantarāṇāṁ tu sudūram api gatvā anyathāvabhāsa āśrayaṇīyaḥ". (P. 135, Sāhitya Pariṣat ed.). The point of the matter is that every theory of illusion presents a contradiction between the initial psychological presentation and the subsequent logical assertion, thus admitting the unwitting cognition of something as some other thing. Thus, something is taken as real which is, in fact, unreal in the Asat-khyāti theory; similarly, in Ātma-khyāti, a cognition is taken as an external object; in Akhyāti, the adjunct of one is taken to be another's adjunct and two cognitions are taken as one[8]. Similarly in Anirvacanīya-khyāti, a prātibhāsika entity is taken as vyāvahārika.

7a. Cf. "Sattva-puruṣānyatā-khyātimātrasya etc." Ys. III. 49.

7b. Cf. "Dṛg-darśana-śaktyorekātmatevāsmitā" Ys. II. 6.

8. "Asat-khyāti-pakṣe sadātmanā, Ātma-khyātipakṣe ca arthātmanā,

Veṅkaṭanātha asserts that Anyathākhyāti is the irreducible minimum which must be accepted ungrudgingly by all the disputationists in order that a sensible explanation may be offered of the facts of illusion, its conative corollary and the final recantation etc.[9]. The scholiast Śrīnivāsa-dāsa says that bhrama, pravṛtti and bādha do not stand to reason unless one assumes that the nacre-silver cognition is different from the normal cognition of silver. So, the otherwiseness of an illusory cognition from its valid counterpart is undeniable and the connotation of the word 'bhrama' is apprehension of a characteristic different from what is presented[10]. Thus it transpires that the Ramanujist Anyathākhyāti has two different strands : first, it points out that no theory of error can rule out the logical anyathātva of a psychological presentation ; and, secondly, it affirms the factual anyathātva of an invalid cognition from its valid counter-part, which fact only can successfully explain the occurrence of illusion, the consequent volition and the subsequent recantation as a continuous process. But, Veṅkaṭa himself refutes this Anyathākhyāti in his TMK. in the following manner : In cases of saṁvādī bhrama, the cognition of a gem in its rays prompts one to the gem itself which one seizes, though the cognition does not refer to the gem at all. Here, then, Anyathākhyāti has no scope at all. Because nacreness is different from silverness, a piece of nacre can by no means appear as a piece of silver ; moreover, an invalid cognition qua cognition is certainly valid and there can be no talk of any cognition being contradicted. Furthermore, the champion of Anyathā-khyāti cannot let himself off from the clutches of full-blooded Asat-khyāti ; for, he asserts the apprehension of the identity of silver in or of the silverness being related to a piece of nacre which is a reality neither there, nor anywhere else. If it be argued that this much of Asat-khyāti may well be harboured, then it leads to prolixity of assumption. So, the armsman for

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akhyāti-pakṣe'pi anya-viśeṣaṇam anya-viśeṣaṇatvena jñāna-dvayam ekatvena ca" (Śrī-Bhā., pp. 195-196, Sāhitya Pariṣat ed.)

9. "Ātma-khyātyādi-vādeṣu anyathātvam avāritam/Bhrama-pravṛtti-bādhāderanyathā na hi sambhavaḥ" (NP., P, 39).

10. "Tadetat sarvaṁ yathārtha-rajata-jñānāpekṣayā śuktau rajata-jñānasya vailakṣaṇyābhāve na saṁgacchate.....bhrama-pada-pravṛttinimittatvena cāvidyamāna-prakārāvagāhitvam avarjanīyam" (NS., p. 39).

Anyathākhyāti should advisedly remain tongue-tied against Asat-khyāti, or should not brandish his weapons to safeguard the position of Anyathākhyāti[11]. Some Advaitins like Dharmarājādhvarīndra accept Anyathākhyāti in cases where the superimposed entity is contiguous to the locus of superimposition and their view may be taken to be analogous to the Ramanujist theory in the sense of 'avidyamāna-prakārāvagāhitvam'.

Now, let us present the Anyathākhyāti of the Jainas. The Jainas generally call it Viparīta-khyāti. By way of explaining the term, they point out that the theory does not mean an apprehension to the effect 'this is a different entity'. On the contrary, it means the apprehension of something in some different thing. The Jainas assert that in erroneous cognitions like the nacre-silver, the silver presented through recollection or even the nacre, with its own characteristics screened and those of the silver assumed, becomes the cognitum. The latter alternative, however, is more to their liking[12]. By 'ālambana' the jainas mean what is pointed at with the finger etc. and which is the generator of cognition. This holds good in the case of nacre. Otherwise, the said erroneous cognition might arise even in the absence of nacre. Furthermore. if the nacre be not the cognitum, then the subsequent recognition in regard to it and the contradiction would become unreasonable[13]. The jainas hold that every entity is real in its own intrinsic aspect and unreal in some other aspect[14]. So, the nacre here is real in its own aspect, though unreal in some other aspect, and it appears as silver through some defect[15].

Prabhācandra in his NKC. refuses to accept such erroneous cognitions as mere perception. He holds that such cogntion

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11. See TMK , Ch. IV, śls. 12 and 13 and the gloss on the latter.

12. "Sthagita-nija-vapurupagṛhīta-rajatarūpā śuktikaiva hyatra prakāśate iti syādvādināṁ mudrā. (Syād. Vā. R., P. 108).

Also "Tataḥ sthitaṁ smṛtyupasthāpitaṁ rajatam asyāḥ pratīterālambanam iti, nigūhita-nijākarā parigṛhīta-rajatākārā śuktikaiva vā." (NKC., P. 65, M. Śāstrī's ed).

13. "Angulyādinā hi nirdiśyamānam etc" (Syād. Vā. R., pp. 138-139).

14. Perhaps this view which ultimately matured into the sevenfold predication is but an adaptation of the Bhāṭṭa view-point as elucidated in ŚV.

15. "Taddhi svarūpeṇa sat para-rūpeṇa cāsat doṣavaśāt kala-dhautatayā pratibhātīti" (Ibid., pp. 131-132).

presents a conglomeration of the previously perceived entity and the entity that is being perceived at present and, as such, it is of the nature of recognition even like the cognition 'this is that Devadatta'. He further assures us that such a position is not incongruous with the basic principles of the Jaina system in as much as cognitions like 'this is a tree' are classed under recognition in it[16]. Prabhācandra suggests such a position also in his PKM., while refuting the theory of Vivekākhyāti. He asserts there that defects do not destroy the potency of an entity. On the contrary, the potency of defects is such that eyes etc. can generate cognition of things that are not. This should not, however, be construed as paving the way for Asat-khyāti ; for, as Prabhācandra assures us, similarity also is a causal condition of invalid cognition. The form of the silver that is presented in an invalid cognition is not of the cognition itself ; for, it is supplied by impressions (of past experience). The fact is that defects assisted by impressions make the form of the previously cognised silver appear on the presented datum. But, that does not make the cognition appear as 'this is that silver' ; for, through defects the form of the silver in absentia appears on the presented datum in complete identity with it[17].

It is easy to discover here the affinity of this Jaina theory with the Smṛti-pramoṣa or vivekākhyāti of the Prābhākaras. The difference between the two theories in this regard is that the former assumes that the erroneous cognition appears as one knowledge of the type of pratyabhijñā, while the latter holds that it appears as though it were one knowledge. Be that as it may, the Jainas further point out that after recantation arises another recognition to the effect 'This is that piece of nacre which I previously apprehended as silver'[18]. But what is

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16. "Pratyakṣa-rūpatvābhāvāt tasya, pratyabhijñāna-svarūpaṁ hi tat dṛṣṭa-dṛśyamānārtha-saṁkalanātmakatvāt 'sa evāyaṁ devadattaḥ' ityādijñānavat......na cāsya pratyabhijñānatvābhyupagame apasiddhānta-prasaṅgaḥ, 'vṛkṣo'yam' ityādijñānānāṁ pratyabhijñānatvena vakṣyamāṇatvāt". (NKC., p. 65).

Prabhācandra does not, however, call viparyaya a case of recognition in his PKM.

17. "Doṣāṇāṁ cedam eva sāmarthyaṁ yat tat-sannidhāne'vidyamāne'pyarthe jñānam utpādayanti cakṣurādīni etc." (PKM., p. 56, NS. ed)

18. "Bādhaka-pratyaya-samanantaraṁ yadeva śuktiśakalaṁ Kala-

recantation and what is recanted and who is the recantor? Vādideva Sūrī and Prabhācandra are very clear in their decision on this point. They hold that only what has scope and provenance may be negated ('Kiñca prasaktaṁ pratiṣidhyate. Syā. Vā R., p, 135). So, it is not sane to argue, as a Sankarite does, that an ordinary or empiric silver is negated, though what is apprehended be a supranormal or a prātibhāsika silver. But, then, the question arises whether the subsequent cognition or the entity pressented in it as content is the sublator. Furthermore, it is to be decided whether this sublator negates the former cognition, or its content or its consequence. To this their general reply is that the cognition which reveals a content contrary to that of the previous cognition, which is demonstrated to have revealed something non-existent, is what is sublated[19]. Prabhācandra points out that the subsequent sublation of a previous cognition only purports to damn it, though bygone, as false. In some cases, however, the sublation serves an additional purpose of thwarting the activity consequent upon the valid cognition[20]. Prabhācandra, however, does not subscribe to the view that the sublator negates the content of the previous cognition; for, he remarks sarcastically that it is the nature of kings, not of cognitions, to take away a 'Viṣaya' ('Property' and 'Content')[21].

But, Vādideva Sūrī differs and holds that the sublator may be said to negate the content also; but, that does not mean that the content did not appear in cognition at all; On the contrary, it demonstrates that the content that was intuited was non-existent. He, however, is at one with prabhācandra in accepting 'phalāpahāra' as an additional import of 'bādha'[22]. Still, he

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dhauta-rūpeṇa mayā prāk pratyākalitaṁ tadevedam iti pratyabhijñānam ātmānam anubhavad anubhūyate." (Syā. Vā. Ra., p. 110).

Also "Bādhottara-Kālaṁ hi pratisandhatte sthāṇurayaṁ me puruṣa ityevaṁ Pratibhāta iti". (PKM., P. 52).

19. "Jñānam eva hi viparītārtha-khyāpakaṁ bādhakam abhidhīyate, pratipāditāsadartha-khyāpanaṁ tu bādhyam". (PKM. P, 76).

20. "Etadeva hi mithyājñānasya atītasyāpi bādhyatvaṁ yad asmin mithyātvāpādanam ; Kvacit punaḥ pravṛtti-prati-ṣedho' pi phalam". (PKM., P. 76).

21. "Viṣayāpahāraśca rājñāṁ dharmo na jñānānām" (P. 75, Ibid).

22. "Viṣayāpahārastu bādhaḥ svīkriyate. Viṣayasya ca na pratipannat-

does not accept the sublation of the previous cognition by the latter one. But, the difference between the two scholars is more apparent than real; for, Prabhācandra indirectly accepts 'viṣayāpahāra' by maintaining that the sublated cognition is 'pratipāditāsadartha-khyāpanam'. Vādideva also, in his turn, implies by his acceptance of false content that the cognition apprehending it is false. Anyway, the Jaina theory is a medley of Smṛti-pramoṣa and Asat-khyāti and it is certainly more akin to Asat-khyāti than to the generally current Anyathākhyāti. But, strangely enough, the Jainas seem to concede even to the Nyāya type of Anyathā-khyāti in which an elsewhere entity is assumed to be the cognitum which is intuited by the senses not, however, through 'jñāna-lakṣaṇā' contact, but through the contact of defects ('doṣa-pratyāsatti')[23]. Thus, it appears that the Jainas evince great eclectic zeal in formulating a theory of error. But, it's a pity that their theory turns out to be a medley of diversified thoughts not integrated by any necessary apperception.

Maṇḍana Miśra, the great Mimamsist of the Bhāṭṭa school, is an advocate of Anyathā-khyāti; but, his position in this regard seems to be much at variance with that of the Bhāṭṭas. His general philosophic position makes him a bold champion of the pre-śaṁkara advita doctrine which differed but little from the full-fledged Advaita of Śaṁkarā. The doctrine of Māyā upon which hinges the Śaṁkarite theory was already recognised by Maṇḍana as some irrational entity which served to explain all inexplicabilities[24]. He too like Śaṁkara characterises it as 'anirvacanīya', it being neither real, nor unreal[25]. He further holds that duality cannot be proved by perception. He asserts that the fact of experience, which rests on the duality of the subject and the object, can be explained only on the assumption

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vam apahriyate Kintu pratipannasya asattvaṁ khyāpyata ityapahārārthaḥ. Asattvam api nedānīm upanatam asya khyāpyate api tu tadaiva tadasat iti prakāśyate...Phalāpaharo'pi bādhaḥ sambhāvyate eva" (Syā. Vā. Ra., P. 140),

23. Cf. "Atad-deśa-kālasyāpi kaladhautasya doṣa-mahimnā sannihitatvena pratibhāsa-viṣayatopapatteḥ". (Syā. Vā. Ra., P. 138).

24. Cf. "Na hi māyāyāṁ kācid anupapattiḥ. Anupapadya-mānārthaiva hi mayā" (Br. Si.)

25. "Tasmāt nāvidyā sati nāpyasatī" (Br. Si., P. 9, Kuppuswāmī's ed.)

that there is no real duality, that there is, in fact, only the subject which transforms itself into the sundry objects of experience[26]. Basing his arguments on such a theoretic position, Maṇḍana in his Brahma-siddhi condemns an illusory presentation as neither real nor unreal[27]. That is why Mm. Kuppu Swāmī remarks : "......when the nature of the object of erroneous cognition is examined, this theory has to be reduced inevitably to a form in which it becomes hardly distinguishable from the anirvacanīya-khyāti of the Advaitins" (P. XXVII, Kuppu Swāmī's Introduction to his ed. of Br. Si.). It is quite understandable that Maṇḍana might hold the one view ontologically and the other view (i.e. anyathākhyāti) psychologically, even like the great Rāmānuja. But, we hardly find any corroboration of this statement in the writings of Maṇḍana, particularly in his brochure entitled 'Vibhrama-vivekaḥ'[28]. The most interesting fact in this regard is that Maṇḍana discusses in his said brochure the theory of Anirvacanīya-khyāti of the Vedāntists (Brahma-vidaḥ')[29] and rejects it not, however, with much show of reason[30].

Though betraying his partiality for the Advaita in the metaphysical sphere, he nevertheless champions the cause of Anyathākhyāti or Viparīta-khyāti as it is more often called by the Bhāṭṭas. He points out that if the object of illusory cognition be existent, there is no scope for error ; on the contrary, if it be non-existent, it cannot be presented in cognition. Since these two alternatives fit in well with Anyathākhyāti only, the ancient thinkers had approved of this theory only[31]. He then refutes in detail the prābhākara theory and points out, inter alia, that not all cases of invalid cognition are occasioned by mental

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26. "Ekatva evāyaṁ draṣṭṛ-dṛśyabhāvo'vakalpate, draṣṭureva cidātmanaḥ tathā tathā vipariṇāmād vivartanād vā". (Ibid.)

27. "Avabhāsamāne'sati tad-avabhāso'pi satyato durnirūpaḥ" (Ibid.).

28. Maṇḍana discusses the problem of illusory cognition in the Niyoga-kāṇḍa of his Brahma-siddhi also, the metrical kārikās whereof are mostly identical with those of the Vibhrama-viveka.

29. Cf. "Ato'nirvacanīyatvaṁ varaṁ brahmavido viduḥ" (Sl. 28). Also "Vibhrameṣu vivartatvamato brahmavidāṁ matam". (Sl. 36).

30. Cf. "evaṁ nirvacanīyā ca nāvidyā parihāsyate/Avidyātvaṁ yato' nyasya sānyarūpa-prakāśikā. Also "Nānirvācyatayā matiḥ" (Sl. 154).

31. Cf. "Ekānta-sattve kā bhrāntirasattve kiṁ prakāśatām/Dvayānuguṇyād Vṛddhānāṁ sammatā khyātiranyathā". (Sl. 46)

defect necessarily ; there are cases like the optical illusion where the organs only are at fault. These are certain kinds of abiding illusion[32]. He then refutes Asatkhyāti and argues that if the Mādhyamika pleads that the non-existent appears as existent, it clearly leads to Anyathākhyāti psychologically. If the Mādhyamika still argues that even then that apparent existence is nothing but 'Śūnya', then it need not have any occasion to be recanted subsequently. So, argues Maṇḍana, 'Śūnya' here does not mean void, but any whatsoever divorced from its real spatio-temporal context[33]. Now Maṇḍana anticipates an objection from the opponents. It may very well be argued against Anyathākhyāti that if it pleads for apprehension in an entity of a mode which does not characterise its existence, then the theory gets into the tight grip of Śūnya-khyāti. For, even if that mode be somehow real, its relation with the cognitum in question is certainly a non-être[34]. But, Maṇḍana here, following kumārila[35], asserts that, rather than with any modal difference, we are here concerned with two distinct entities, one of which by its negation implies the other ; and there is no question of any relation between the two in as much as no relation appears in our experience. In fact, negation rests upon positivity and is not wholly non-existent and inexpressible. Avidyā serves its purpose by revealing something as some different thing. When a cognition is contradicted, its cognitum is rightly said to be false. The recanting does not, however, discard the externality of the cognitum, nor does it establish its indescribability. But, it simply indicates that the external object so perceived does not belong to that particular spatio-temporal context[36]. Maṇḍana

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32. Cf. "Buddhyamāno vivekañca paśyāmīndriya-doṣataḥ/
Dvitrādirūpān dīpādīn iti lokaḥ prabhāṣate/
Indriyāṇāṁ doṣa-bhedānniyata-bhrānti-darśanam/ (Śls. 73-74).

33. Cf. "Ato'tad-deśakālaṁ yanmātra-vādyeva Śūnyatā". (Sl. 123).
The text is highly cryptic and hopelessly corrupt in many places and it's a job to make out the intended meaning in many places.

34. "Prakārāntara-saṁsargo nanvasanneva bhāsate" (Sl. 130).

35. "Bhāvāntaram abhāvo hi etc." (Sl. 129).

36. Cf. "Tena yāvadbādhanīyaṁ tāvanmithyeti yujyate//
Bhrānti-jñeye ca bāhyatvaṁ bādhakairna nirasyate/
Na gamyate' ntarvartitvaṁ nānirvācyatayā matiḥ//
Kintvatad-deśakālatvaṁ gamyate bāhyavastunaḥ" (Sls. 153-155).

concludes by remarking that the recanting cognition leads to the conclusion that though the object is otherwise, it appears in the form of our consciousness[37]. Hence, from the above, it follows that, according to Maṇḍana, the object of invalid cognition, though false in that particular context, is not an utter naught and is far less an indescribable entity. So, it seems to us that Maṇḍana's view does in no way smack of Anirvacanīya-khyāti. On the contrary, it is more akin to the view of Vācaspati Miśra[38].

Another variant of Anyathākhyāti in which is postulated the real transformation, say, of a piece of nacre into a piece of silver is generally fathered upon Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara, a dualist Vedantist. Thus, Dr. Bratīn Sen Gupta confidently says : "This alternative of real transformation ('anyathā pariṇate vastuni jñānam') of the substratum into the illusory object is the very old view of Anyathākhyāti as advocated by Bhagavad Bhāskara, who admits both difference and non-difference ('bhedābhedau') in every relational knowledge". (P. 63, A critique on the vivaraṇa School). Even the great Bengali Pundit Mm. Jogendranāth in his Bengali exposition of Advaitasiddhi asserts that Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara advocated such real transformation of the substratum, and held that the so-called illusory object of an invalid cognition was real[39]. But it's a pity that we do not find any corroboration of such an assertion in the Bhāskara-bhāṣya on the Brahmasūtras. It is easy to discover statements scattered throughout his bhāṣya to the effect that objects of illusory cognition are false[40] and are in certain cases recollective recreation of what was cognised in some other time and place[41]. So, it seems that this view is the result of pure subjective abstraction on the basis of the general

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37. "Taduktaṁ bādhaka-jñānād vācoyuktiriyaṁ bhavet/
Arthe' nyathāpi satyeṣa dhiyākāraḥ pratīyate//" (Sl. 161).

38. Cf. "Svarūpeṇa marīcyambho mṛṣā Vācaspatermatam/
Anyathākhyātiriṣṭāsyetyanyathā jagṛhurjanāḥ"//
(Kalpataru, P. 24, NSP)

Amalānanda, however, means to imply that vācaspati holds Anirvacanīya-khyāti.

39. Vide p. 122, Advaitasiddhi, Vol. I ed. by Mm. Jogendranāth.

40. Cf. "......Śukti-rajatavad āgamāpāya-dharmitvācca anṛtam......" (P. 93) ; "Nanu sarvatra svapnādāvapi parata eva mithyātvaṁ gamyate na svato na hi rajata-jñāne tad-gata-mithyātvaṁ gṛhyate". (P. 124, chow.)

41. Cf. "Deśāntara-Kālāntarānubhūta-smaraṇāt" (P. 161, Chow.)

metaphysical position of Bhāskara which need not necessarily and does not in fact always square up with his epistemological position. It is highly significant that Jayatīrtha in his Nyāyasudhā refers to such a view, while explaining the different possible meanings of Anyathākhyāti, but does not father it upon anybody ('Yadi tāvad anyathā pariṇate vastuni Khyātiranyathā-khyātiḥ'). Vidyāraṇya also refers to such an alternative interpretation[42], but is silent about its champion and rather alienates it from Bhedābheda-vāda. Pratyag-rūpa-bhagavān in his Nayana-prasādinī on Citsukha's Tattva-pradīpikā refers to the theory of illusion of the Bhedābheda-vādin in the following manner: "Ubhayātmakam iti tu bhedābheda-vādino' nyathākhyāti-viśeṣasya" (P. 70). Prakāśātman also refers to the Anyathākhyāti view of the Bhedābheda-vādin[43], but this has nothing to do with 'pariṇāma'. To my mind, this bhedābhedavāda refers to the Bhāṭṭa view which we shall discuss presently.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the founder of the Bhāṭṭa School of Mīmāṁsā clearly speaks of Anyathā-khyāti in the following Śloka :—

"Tasmād yadanyathā santam anyathā pratipadyate/

Tannirālambanam jñānam abhāvālambanañca tat"//

(Nirā. V.ā, Sl. 117, S. V.)

Here 'nirālambanam' does not signify absolute absence of an 'ālambana' ; for, kumārila himself says elsewhere that everywhere cognition has some manner of external object as its 'ālambana', though divorced from its proper time and place[44]. 'Abhāva' also does not here mean absolute negation, but some other positive entity ('bhāvāntaram'). Kumārila is a pluralist and an advocate of the self-validity of knowledge. Cognition qua cognition and left to itself is valid, according to Kumārila, and it is negated only by the tainting cognition of the otherwiseness of the object under reference. To him negativity is a fact of

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42. "Vastunyapi Katham anyathātvaṁ Kiṁ śuktikāyā rajata-tādātmyaṁ Kiṁvā rajatākāreṇa pariṇāmaḥ" (P. 207, VPS., Beng. ed.).

43. Cf. "Atha bhedābheda-vādī saṁsarga-satyatāṁ brūyat etc." (P. 28, Vivaraṇam, Vizianagram Skt. Series).

44. "Sarvatrālambanaṁ bāhyaṁ deśa-kālānyathātmakam" (SV., Nirā. Vā.)

positivity ; negation is simply the position of something else[45] ; Indeed, an entity, according to him, is not a fixed concept, a self-identical entity, but a changing constant, a multiform entity that has the ynamicity of appearing now in one form and then in an altogether different form[46]. It is a one-many, an identity-in-difference. It is and also is not at the same time. It is as itself, but it is not as something else ; and cognition may present to us either of these two aspects at any time[47]. So, what appears in an invalid cognition is that a nacre, for example, appears in the form of a silver which is its negation. The fact of the matter in that here silver is taken as the negation of nacre ; for, as already stated, Kumārila thinks that negation is but position of some other entity[48]. So, the nacre is not here in the form of silver. But, the silver is not non-existent on that account. It is assuredly a fact that the silver is not present here in the form of nacre ; but, then, it is present in its own form elsewhere even like the pitcher that is here negated. Hence, it is that Kumārila asserts that even in dream-cognitions, some kind of external object is not completely denied. On the contrary, in every case of invalid cognition there must be an external cognitum of which the spatio-temporal relations are perverted[49]. Thus in the cognition of fata morgana, precognised house etc. and clouds serve as the objective basis of the cognition. Similarly, the water previously apprehended and the desert heated by the solar rays give rise to the experience of a mirage.

But, then, Kumārila makes a statement which, as I read it, is highly significant and reveals his mind to us with perfect clarity. It is here that he seems to be faithfully followed up by Maṇḍana and Vācaspati, though scholars might refuse to accept it with a severe nod of their heads. He now says that the

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45. Cf. "Bhāvāntaram abhāvo'nyo na kaścid anirūpaṇād' and "Bhavāntaram abhāvohi kayācit tu vyapekṣayā" (Both SV.)

46. "Ihānaikāntikaṁ vastu ityevaṁ jñānaṁ suniścitam" (Va. Vā., ŚV)

47. Cf. "Svarūpa-pararūpābhyāṁ nityaṁ sadasadātmake/
Vastuni jñāyate Kiñcid rūpaṁ Kaiścid kadācana//" (ŚV.)

48. Cf. "Rūpyasya śuktyabhāvatvāt. Rūpyaṁ hī Śukterabhavaḥ, bhavāntarasyaiva abhāvatvāt etc." (IS, P. 46).

49. "Svapnādi-pratyaye bāhyaṁ sarvathā na hi neṣyate/
Sarvatrālambanaṁ bāhyaṁ deśa-kālānyathātmakam//" (Ś. V.)

conception of a hare's horn is based on the conceptions of the hare and of the horn of some other animal being dovetailed together[50]. A hare's horn is almost universally condemned by philosophers and laymen alike as an utter naught like the son of a barren woman, the sky-flower etc. He thus seems to draw no line of demarcation between a hare's horn etc. and a nacre-silver and the like and this supposition is clearly borne out by him in the concluding line of this discourse which runs as follows ; "Vastvantaraika-saṁsṛṣṭaḥ padārthaḥ śūnyatā-dhiyaḥ" (S. V.). Are not then cognitions of the nacre-silver type false according to him ? Certainly they are ; for, he himself asserts that in the erroneous cognition of a red crystal, the attribute of redness is certainly false[51]. Earlier he makes a statement from the Buddhist standpoint which implies that water experienced in a mirage is unreal, ("......Bhavatyadhyasya dhīstasmāt mṛga-tṛṣṇādibhiḥ samā"). The falsity is due to adhyāsa"[52]. In the case of adhyāsa based on similarity, an element of smṛti is involved and the recollected entity is superimposed upon the presented datum. But, that does not bring the erroneous cognition into line with determinate cognition which is woven partly of the fabric of recollection. For, as Kumārila points out, genus, qualities etc. which go to make a cognition determinate, are never found in exclusion as apart from the particular entity, which is their substratum ; but the 'this' representing nacre etc. in an invalid cognition, is generally experienced as divested of the 'what' representing silver etc. Hence, a determinate cognition is valid, while a cognition of the nacre-silver type is invalid and its content is false[53]. So, Kumārila certainly acquiesces in the fact that the silver is non-existent in the nacre. But, he does not press this fact so much as to bring it to the fore, and, guided by his irrepressible realistic bias, he asserts that this falsity is not the whole truth, nor the major truth of the

50. "Dravyāntare viṣāṇañca śaśasyātmā ca Kāraṇam/
Saśa-śṛṅga-dhiyaḥ......"(Ibid).

51. "Sphaṭikādau tu lākṣādisvarūpā ya matirbhavet/
Avyutpannasya sā mithyā....../" (ŚV.)

52. "Ātmādhyāsastu sādṛśyād uparāgācca dṛśyate/" (Ibid).

53. "Na tu jātyādi-nirmuktaṁ vastu dṛṣṭaṁ kadācana/
Tad-vimokena Vā tāni lākṣādi-sphaṭikādivat//" (ŚV.)

situation. For, the reality of this falsity can only be vouched for when its correlate, the truth, is within our experience. Hence he pleads that the silver, though non-existent and false here in the nacre, is certainly an elsewhere and elsewhen reality which only can impart the reality and cognisability of falsity. To Kumārila, then, an invalid cognition is a unitary cognition, perceptual in character[54], composed of presentative and representative elements fused together into one integral whole (Cf. "Vastvantaraika-saṁsṛṣṭaḥ").

But, the followers of Kumārila,—Maṇḍana and Vācaspati excepted,—could not present this theory in its pristine purity. They mixed it up more and more with other theories. Thus, Pārthasārathi Miśra in his Śāstra-dīpikā avers that the nacre-silver cognition is not perception. In such cognitions, he says, the eye apprehends those properties of the nacre which are shared also by the silver and fails to grasp due to sensory weakness the specific properties of the nacre. Then through the waking of impressions, the silver is recollected and now the nacre is apprehended through defect in the form of the recollected silver[55]. He further points out that in an invalid judgment the subject and the predicate are both equally real ; only the relation between them is non-existent[56], though apprehended due to defect. This is the situation everywhere whether it is a cognition of a barren woman's son, or of the double moon, or of the yellow conch-shell[57].

Gāgā Bhāṭṭa in his Bhāṭṭa-cintāmaṇi asserts that in the cognition of nacre-silver something that is related to one thing is apprehended as related to some other thing. He explains the perception of silver in nacre by assuming 'jñāna-lakṣaṇā pratyāsatti' of the Nyāyā. As an alternative to this supranormal intercourse, he assumes 'pramuṣṭa-tattāka-smṛti' of the

54. Cf. "Tenendriyārtha-sambandhe vidyamāne smarannapi/
Vikalpayan Svadharmeṇa vastu pratyakṣavān naraḥ//" (Ibid)

55. "Na hi Śuktikāyāṁ rajata-jñānam indriya-sampra-yogajam etc." (P. 30, SD).

56. "Sarvatra saṁsarga-mātram asadeva avabhāsate. Saṁsargiṇastu santa eva". (P. 39, SD.)

57. "Tathā bandhyā-sutādiṣvapi etc." (Ibid).

Prābhākaras[58]. So the existence of the external object, say a silver, being undeniable, the cognition also is not false, but is only contradicted being occasioned by a defective cause. Much of this is not in accord with the theory of Kumārila. Be that as it may, Gāgā Bhaṭṭa then points out that the Prābhākara view of 'asaṁsargāgraha' can by no means explain 'pravṛtti', which can be satisfactorily explained only by assuming 'saṁsarga-graha' or a wrong synthesis of the presentative and the representative elements (Cf. "Vastvantaraika-saṁsṛṣṭaḥ padārthaḥ Śūnyatādhiyaḥ" SV.). Hence, in the invalid cognition of the nacre-silver, one apprehends 'this' as characterised by silver-ness. Now Gāgā Bhaṭṭa raises an interesting point. Suppose Maitra infers that Caitra has the cognition of silver (in a nacre), on ground of the latter's cognition of 'Kāryatā' or serviceability in it and this inference may lead him to action in regard to the silver. In that case there would arise the unwelcome contigency of cross-activity or parallel activity between Caitra and Maitra. Though such a situation is certainly very common in our experience, Gāgā disapproves it and says that Maitra's volition will have no scope because of contradiction ; for, he argues that Maitra will take a little bit of time before he himself can really have the cognition of 'this' as characterised by 'silver-ness' and this short span of time would reveal to him the invalidity of the cognition. Then he offers another explanation. He gives the ruling that activity will result only from a wrong synthetic cognition and not from the cognition of such wrong synthetic cognition. As a third alternative, he asserts that when the erroneous judgment has its subject characterised and determined by the determinant of the predicate, then only can follow any activity[59]. This explanation is hollow and the whole discussion is a fantastic nonsense, particularly because it has avowedly no direct bearing upon the point at issue.

From the above discussion it follows that, according to the Bhāṭṭa theory, defects are not privative in nature ; they do not waylay and atrophy ; they rather propel and can give rise to a

58. "Jñāna-lakṣaṇāyāḥ pratyāsatteraṅgīkārāt. Pramuṣṭa-tattāka-smaraṇāṅgīkarād vā na doṣaḥ" (P. 26, Bhā. ci., Choukhāmbā).

59. "Na caivaṁ Caitro rajata-jñānavān kāryatā-jñānavattvāt etc." (P. 27, Bhā. Ci., Choukhāmbā).

positive effect. Another point that emerges here is that though the 'that' and the 'what' of an illusory judgment are both equally real, the relation of 'tādātmya' (identity-in-difference) or 'saṁsarga', as some later Bhāṭṭas prefer to put it, subsisting between them is unreal. Kumārila, however, puts it differently by saying that though the 'what' is real in itself as an elsewhere and elsewhen entity, it is unreal in the sphere of the 'that' under reference. Another feature of this theory is that it makes room for a subjective element in it. As Prof. Hiriyanna remarks: "It overflows the given so to speak, and the overflowing element points to nothing". (P. XIX, Introduction to Is.). But, is the 'what', say, a silver, a subjective element to Kumārila? Probably it is not. The two ślokas "Tenendriyārtha-sambandhe etc" (Foot note$_{54}$) and 'yadi tvālocya sammīlya netre Kaścid vikalpayet /Na syāt pratyakṣatā tasya sambandhānanusārataḥ//' of kumārila do not seem to warrant any such idea of subjectivity. Apart from the fact that there is no overflowing, but only scraping across the given, Kumārila might assert that the object is as the subject does it, that the 'what' of an invalid cognition is a subjective object (as opposed to a trans-subjective object) which is a nonêtre for all practical purposes. He might hold that an object undergoes change (not merely the change of Jñāta-tā being born to it) through perception and that the so-called illusory object is but an objective joint property of the mind and the physical object as in the views of Broad, whitehead and other modern realists. Yet another point to be noted in this view is that the Bhāṭṭas speak of saṁsarga-graha as opposed to the asaṁsargāgraha of the Prābhākaras. But, the latter is nothing but the former according to the 'bhāvāntaram abhāvaḥ' dictum of the Bhāṭṭas. Still, they adhere to the former because it embodies a psychological truth which is of greater importance than the truth arrived at through logical equation. That is why though the silver is present there in its 'asad-rūpa' as nacre, yet it is said to be false in that context.

Let us now attempt a refutation of this Bhāṭṭa theory, particularly in those aspects in which it differs from its analogues. Vinuktātman in his Is. waxes eloquent in refuting this Bhāṭṭa theory. Besides refuting the theory in common with other theories in the first and second chapters, he devotes three successive Chapters from III to V almost exclusively to the

refutation of this Anyathākhyāti theory. In chapter III he refutes the dogma that a cognition may be 'anyathā-Khyāpaka'. In the Chapter IV he refutes the 'anyathātva' of 'Khyāti and in the 5th Chapter he refutes the Bhāṭṭa anyathā-khyāti.

Vimuktātman points out that in any form of Satkhyāti, the content of the illusory cognition, say, a silver, cannot be taken to be sublated by any means. The Bhāṭṭa cannot argue to the contrary as follows :—Since the silver is false, its cognition is invalid ; hence, the negating cognition is valid and this valid cognition sublates the silver. For, why is the silver false ? The Bhāṭṭa must answer that it is sublated. This train of reasoning, then, is fallacious on grounds of interdependence. So, the Bhāṭṭa must concede the reality of the nacre-silver even like the ordinary silver, because it is supposed to exist and has probative cognition. Otherwise, even the ordinary silver might turn out to be false. So, when tho Bhāṭṭa assumes that both the nacre and the silver are real, the silver cannot be proved to be false, invalid and recantable, even though the identity of the two be held to be false, invalid and recantable. For, otherwise, the nacre might also be equally damned as false etc. So, the silver cannot be sublated. Nor is the identity of the nacre and the silver apt to be recanted. For, the recanting cognition does not arise in the form 'there is no identity'. The mutual identification of neither the nacre and the silver, nor the 'this' and the silver may be said to be recanted. For, mutual identification depends upon the cognition of difference which cannot exist at the time of the erroneous cognition. In fact, vimuktātman argues, the cognition of difference or negation has no scope to sublate the fallacious identity. If the Bhāṭṭa points out that here 'identity' means only 'negation', the question will naturally arise as to whose negation it is. If it be the negation of the nacre and the silver both, then the negation, whether prior or posterior, will not be cognised at the time of the cognition of identity. If, however, the negation is of the type of numerical difference, then the erroneous cognition would take the form 'this is not silver' and the recanting cognition would be 'this is silver' and the whole scheme would be turned upside down. The whole argument boils down to this that an 'abhāvajñāna' may inform, but cannot annul ; it may be 'bodhaka', but can never be 'bādhaka'. So, the Bhāṭṭa cannot prove that the cognition 'this is silver' is invalid. Hence, he must

either hold that there is no error, or that all cognition is erroneous[61].

Now, Vimuktātman tries to prick the bubble of the elsewhere existent silver as assumed by the Bhāṭṭa. If the Bhāṭṭa argues that, though the silver does not appear in cognition as being elsewhere, still it is so assumed because of its contradiction in the 'this', he treads a wrong track undoubtedly. For, if the silver appears in the 'this' as non-existent, the appearance cannot warrant the assumption of its existence. If the appearance brings in the assumption of existence, then it is in the fitness of things that the existence should be assumed in the locus of appearance in as much as the appearance of the non-existent does not stand to reason. If the Bhāṭṭa now redargues that the existence is not assumed in the locus of the appearance for fear of contradiction, then he cannot assume it even elsewhere in the absence of its apprehension there ; if, then, the existence is assumed even without apprehension, then all regulative principles of cognition will be cast to the four winds. For, why should not one assume the existence of a hare's horn etc. instead of, say, a silver, non-apprehension being common to both ? If the Bhāṭṭa pleads in favour of the silver to the effect that it is apprehended somewhere, while the other is not, then why not assume the existence of a horn in a hare, since it is apprehended in a cow ? The Bhāṭṭa may now try to save his skin by arguing that he assumes the existence of the silver elsewhere only because it is contradicted here, while the situation is different in the case of the horn. But, then, the question will arise as to where the silver is negated—whether in the locus of its existence or elsewhere. The first alternative will lead to the negation of the horn even in the cow and to the consequent assumption of its existence elsewhere—an absurd proposition. The second alternative, again, will negate the silver elsewhere and encourage the assumption of its existence here. If, now, the taciturn Bhāṭṭa argues that, though the silver is existent else-

61. "Athocyeta rūpyasya mithyātvāt tajjñānasya apramāṇatvāt etc." (Is., P. 103). Also "Tasmāt Śukti-rūpyayoḥ, dvayorāpi sattve etc." (P. 107, Is.). Also "Api cedaṁ bhavān prasṭavyaḥ—Kiṁ śukti-rūpyayoḥ itaretarābhāvo bādhyaḥ etc." (P. 109, Is.). Also "Nāpi aikyam abhāva eva. Yadyabhāvaḥ, Kasyāsau etc." (Pp. 112-113).

where, it appears as being existent here, he has to explain how such appearance is at all possible. He cannot assuredly explain it with the help of the recanting experience. For, recantation cannot repudiate a thing in its locus. Hence, the silver cannot be assumed to be existing elsewhere[62].

Then, again, the Bhāṭṭa assumes a relation of 'tādātmya' between, say, the nacre and the silver. But, in that case, the cognition of the nacre-silver ought to be valid even like the cognitions 'khaṇḍo gauḥ', 'muṇḍo gauḥ' etc. or all such cognitions should be damned as invalid[63].

An invalid judgment has three constituents. viz. the subject and the predicate i.e. the two relata and the relation between them. To the Bhāṭṭa these three do not enjoy the same ontological status ; for, according to him, the relata are real, while the relation is false. It is really difficult to understand why the falsity of the relation should not overflow and deluge the relata outright. Apart from this illogicality, there is another lapse of thought in the fact that the falsity of the relation affects the two relata differently. The recanting cognition reaffirms the existence of the subject in its apprehended locus, but not that of the predicate which is supposed to be existing elsewhere. It follows from this that the relata are not real in the same sense. Does not then the Bhāṭṭa feel constrained to close up ranks with the Advaitin who also thinks that the relata cannot be unreal ?

Now, we shall present the fiercest diatribe of Vimuktātman against the Bhāṭṭa. The Bhāṭṭa practically assumes two different counter-parts of the same predicate in explaining error – One that is immediately intuited in the locus of the subject and the other that is remembered. But, neither of the two may be taken as the negatum of the negative judgment 'this is not silver'. If the remembered silver, for example, be the negatum, the silver apprehended here will outlive the negation ; if, however, the former be the negatum, the negation will not help establish the

62. "Sattāṁ cet kalpayet khyātiḥ etc." (Pp. 130-132, Is.)

63. Cf. "Khaṇḍo gaurityādivat sarvasya bhedābhedāt na kvacidapi bhrānti-bādhau sarvatra vā tau syātām ityarthaḥ" (P. 28, PPV., Vizianagram Skt. series),

Also "Bhedābheda-pakṣe tu khaṇḍo gauritivad abhrāntiḥ syāt" (P. 207, VPS., Vasumatī ed.)

existence of the silver elsewhere. For a 'nacreine' (Śuktyātmā) silver cannot surely exist elsewhere. So, the silver will ultimately turn out to be false. Thus, the Bhāṭṭa is thrust into the two horns of a dilemma : If the silver be real, it cannot be negated and the knowledge is not invalid. If, again, it be negated, the knowledge will be invalid, and it will not be real. The Bhāṭṭa might say that the apprehended silver is the negatum in the form of the nacre ; but, then, it can be negated not in the nacre, but elsewhere and it would be non-existent there. But, in the nacre it would be existent ; for, it is not negated, not being contradicted[64]. So, it transpires that reality and negation cannot go hand in hand.

Prof. Hiriyanna attaches great historical importance on this lastmentioned argument of Vimuktātman. As he himself says, "It is obviously to avoid this difficulty that the Naiyāyika holds that the āpaṇastha rajata is itself presented, though through alaukika sannikarṣa" (P. XiX, Footnote, Intro. to Is.). Though the argument might have but faintly suggested an orientation of the Anyathākhyāti theory to the Naiyāyika, the explanation hardly seems to discover the real psychosis of the neo-logician. For, the logical necessity for a novel theory is to be sought elsewhere. The logician does not accept any mixed mode of mentation ; he does not even like William James admit of any intermixture of mental modes. So, he cannot consistently mix up perception with recollection, presentation with representation. Moreover, he thinks that, owing to the atomic nature of the mind, there cannot be any simultaneity of psychoses. That is why he has to press forward the immediate intuition of, say, the 'āpaṇasthaṁ rajatam' through supra-sensuous contact called 'jñāna-lakṣaṇā pratyāsatti', which latter is postulated by him with a view to explaining cases of acquired perception. But, this matter will come up for discussion at a later stage. For, there are a 'before' and 'an after' in the Nyāya theory of Anyathākhyāti. The old logicians and the neo-logicians are at variance in expounding this theory. And we shall first present the old logicians' view of Anyathākhyāti.

This variant of Anyathākhyāti of the old logicians is to be found in the writings of Udayana, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Śrīdhara and

64. Vide IS., P. 95.

such other scholars, including, of course, Vācaspati Miśra in his Nyāya treatises. We shall here give a brief summary of what Vācaspati and Jayanta have to say on this theory. Vācaspati in his Nyāya-Vārttika-tātparya-ṭīkā asserts with much conviction that similarity ('sārūpyam') is at the root of all kinds of erroneous cognitions. Nobody, indeed, superimposes 'rūpa' etc. or an elephant upon a fly. Even in erroneous cognitions like 'the yellow conch-shell', 'the bitter mollasses' etc., this similarity is certainly in operation. Though 'Asaṁsargāgraha' or 'asambandhāgraha', as he himself puts it, is incipiently present in the process of erroneous mentation, there is also present an element of sambandhagraha along with it and these two together prepare the stage for 'similarity' to play its role in bringing about superimposition which brings in its wake an invalid judgment[65]. The point of the argument is that if once it can be proved that similarity is at the root of all error, the stage will be decidedly set for Anyathā-khyāti. For, similarity is 'tad-bhinnatve sati tad-gata-bhūyodharma-vattvam' and hence an error will be nothing but taking something for something else which is the import of Anyathākhyāti. That is why the advaitins like Prakāśātmayati have studiously endeavoured to discard this hypothesis of similarity and install in its place Ajñāna, which is an eveready 'open sesame' for their metaphysical edifice.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa opens his discussion on the subject by repudiating the Buddhist theory that the indeterminate cognition of the presented datum gives rise to the determinate cognition unaided by sense-contact. He asserts that an erroneous cognition is assuredly sensuous ; for, one cannot apprehend a mirage without opening one's eyes. There is also an entity as its cause ; for, the non-existent cannot be apprehended. As regards, however, the 'ālambana' of such invalid cognition, the masters have recourse to three different courses. Some hold that in the invalid cognition 'this is water' the solar rays, with their own characteristics shrouded and taking on the form of water, are the 'ālambana'. Others hold that the 'ālambana' here is water presented through recollection occasioned by the preception of

65. "Sarvatra hi rajatodakādibhrame śukti-rajatayorvā maru-marīcikā-salilayorvā sārūpyameva nimittaṁ paśyāmaḥ etc." (P. 52, NVTT., Vizi. Skt. Series.)

its similarity with the presented datum in front. In this view an 'ālambana' is what appears in a cognition—not the one that is present in front. Since the sky-flower and such other totally non-existent entities cannot be apprehended, the water present elsewhere becomes the 'ālambana' by its presentation through recollection. Others, again, hold that an 'ālambana' is different from what appears in a cognition. In this view an 'ālambana' is what generates knowledge though not as its Kartā or Karaṇa. In cases of 'nirālambana' error, the form presented by recollection is the 'ālambana'. Thus, whatever the circumstances, what is totally non-existent cannot generate cognition[66].

Jayanta then points out that an invalid cognition is a single unitary cognition even like recognition and, though there is assuredly an element of akhyāti in the form that recollection does not appear as such during the invalid cognition, still the Prābhākara view cannot be accepted. On the contray, Viparīta-khyāti based on any of the three alternative ālambanas referred to above is the only logical theory that can satisfactorily explain the phenomenon of error. Jayanta further points out that, in conformity with the view of Viparīta-khyāti, 'bādha' may be taken to mean only 'viṣayāpahāra' to the exclusion of other alternative imports of 'sahānavasthāna', 'saṁskāroccheda', 'phalāpahāra' etc. 'Bādha' does not repudiate the cognisedness of the 'viṣaya' ; it merely proclaims the non-existence of the apprehended object[67].

The position of Jayanta may best be explained by a reference to his and śrīdhara's analysis of the phenomenon of acquired perception. Śrīdhara holds that the visual perception of 'the fragrant sandal' is generated by the visual organ, which apprehends the substantive sandal only, in collaboration with the previous olfactory perception of fragrance[68]. Jayanta is more

66. "Tasyendriyārtha-janyatvaṁ siddhaṁ tadbhāva-bhāvataḥ, Na hyanunmīlitākṣasya marau salila-vedanam//etc." (P. 95-101, NM., Pt. II, Beng. ed.)

67. "Viṣayāpahāraḥ tāvadastu bādhaḥ, viṣayasya ca na pratibhātatvam apahriyate, Kintu pratibhātasya asattvaṁ khyāpyate ityapahārārthaḥ" (P. 171, Ibid).

68. "Ghrāṇena gandhe gṛhīte paścāt tad-grahaṇa-sahakāriṇā cakṣuṣā kevala-viśeṣyālambanam evedaṁ viśeṣya-jñānaṁ janyate ityakāmenāpi abhyupagantavyam" (N.M.).

clear on the point. He maintains that the fragrant sandal is not perceived by the visual organ, but by the mind[69]. This is, according to him, a new type of a synthetic unity of apperception. With this we may further line up what he says about recognition. He contends that recognition is a single psychosis of the type of a qualified perception. The content of recognition is an entity that is existing at present and is still qualified by the past time (Cf. "Atītakālaviśiṣṭo vartamāna-kālāvacchinnaścārtha etasyām ava-bhāsate" NM). So, it seems that, according to Jayanta, an error is the result of a synthetic unity of apperception of the presentative and representative elements.

It is generally maintained by scholars that, according to Vācaspati and other old Naiyāikas, the relation between the subject and the predicate of an invalid jndgment is false and to that extent they acquiesce in Asatkhyāti[70].

Gaṅgeśa also thinks that the older Naiyāyikas held asat-saṁsarga-Khyāti[71]. But, here the neo-logicians part company and they are not ready to harbour any kind of asat-khyāti even as verbal knowledge. Thus Jagadīśa in his ṭīkā on Vyāpti-pañcaka-dīdhiti says : "Saduparāgeṇāpyasataḥ saṁsarga-mary-ādayā bhānānaṅgīkārāt". This marks the dividing line between the old logicians and the neo-logicians beginning from Gaṅgeśa.

The neo-logician is a die-hard realist and his sense of realism, that fights shy of Asat-Khyāti, impels him to find out for him-self a novel explanation of the phenomenon of error. He takes his stand on the perceptual character of the erroneous cognition and maintains that this psychological phenomenon of percep-tuality cannot be explained unless one can establish the occur-rence of intercourse with the object, say, a silver. He brings in,

69. "Locana-gocare' pi kunda-kusume tadaviṣaya-gandha-viśeṣite bāhyen-driya-dvāraka-grahaṇam aghaṭamānam iti mānasam eva surabhi kusumam tit jñānam" (N.M.).

70. Cf. "Vācaspati-miśrāstu śuktau idaṁ rajatam iti jñāne prasiddha-śuktī-rajatatvayoralīka eva samavāyo bhāsate ityasatkhyātim aṅgīcakruḥ" (S. C., P. 19)

See also Mm, Jogendranāth's Beng. exposition of AS., Vol. I, P. 294.

71. "Prāñcastu—Tādātmya-saṁsargayoḥ asatoreva manyante viṣayatām (Pp. 546-537, Tc.)

therefore, a supra-sensuous intercourse to bear upon the problem and holds that, though there is no silver normally present in the locus of the nacre, yet the percipient has intercourse with an elsewhere silver, say, an 'āpaṇastha rajata' which is real in every sense. So, what occurs in an invalid cognition, say, of a nacre-silver is that the perception of the nacre brings forth through similarity the recollection of a pre-cognised silver and this recollection itself serves as the cognitional contact with an elsewhere and elsewhen silver. Hence, the neo-logician argues that both the subject and the predicate of the invalid judgment 'this is silver' are equally existent and real and are equally well perceived by the percipient. But, the cognition is called anyathā-khyāti simply because the nacre appears invested with a different characteristic. 'Anyathā-tva' simply means apprehension of something as characterised or delimited by a 'hetero-locative' adjunct' ("Anyathā prakārāntareṇa vyadhikaraṇa-dharmeṇa khyātiḥ anyathā-khyātiriti tad-vivaraṇāt" N. Kau. of Mahādeva, P. 79). The neo-logician avers that pravṛtti cannot be explained unless a qualified unitary cognition is assumed as the propelling force as is in evidence in all valid cognitions. This qualified cognition must needs be accepted as a hard psychological fact, and, in deference to this fact, he assumes the supranormal cognitional contact. But, that does not lay the theory open to the charge of prolixity of hypothesis ; for, the prolixity here bears the desired fruit and is as such not prejudicial to the rationale of the theory[72]. He further points out that the Prābhākara cannot discard qualified cognition and yet explain an invalid cognition like 'these are two pieces of silver', or 'these are two pieces of zinc', where the eye has contact with a piece of zinc and a piece of silver, only with the help of 'bhedāgraha'. Moreover, when a piece of zinc and a piece of silver in juxtaposition give rise to an invalid cognition of the form "these are a piece of silver and a piece of zinc" through reversal of the order of juxtaposition, the Prābhākara cannot do without admitting simultaneous volitional activity and its arrest. For, if he accepts the apprehension of difference from

72. "Itthañca raṅge rajatatva-viśiṣṭa-buddhyanurodhena jñāna-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti-kalpane' pi na Kṣatiḥ. Phalamukha.gauravasya adoṣatvāt" (P. 238, Si. Mu. of Viśvanātha.)

zinc in zinc itself and the apprehension of difference of silver in silver itself, that will lead him inevitably into the groove of Anyathākhyāti[73]. Moreover, the Prābhākara may easily be thrust into the horns of a dilemma. If 'bhedāgraha' be the cause of inference, then, on grounds of non-cognition of difference from what has smoke pervaded by fire, there will be inference of fire in a lake and this inference will be nothing but anyathākhyāti. If, however, to avoid thls contingency, he assumes qualified cognition as the cause, then he is compelled through the exigencies of inference to assume the inferential cognition of smoke as pervaded by fire in a red-hot iron-ball, thus leading again to anyathākhyāti. So, the neo-logician concludes that the Prābhākara position is unsound and that anyathākhyāti is proved by perception itself. For, the invalid cognition of the zinc-silver after recantation gives rise to the after-cognition "I took the piece of zinc as characterised by silver-ness"[74].

A certain section of neo-logicians finds fault with 'jñāna-lakṣaṇā pratyāsatti' in this context and holds instead that defect (doṣa) itself may serve as the requisite contact between the sense and the object[75]. These scholars thus endeavour to rule out the supranormal cognitional contact which involves prolixity of hypothesis and is too unrealistic to be grafted on the realistic system of Nyāya. But, this hypothesis of supposedly omnipotent doṣa, which evinces the growing influence of the Advaita doctrine of Ajñāna to which it may favourably be likened, again makes the neo-logician weigh anchor from the realistic moorings of their system and yields the palm to the queer suspension of

73. "Kiñca yatra raṅga-rajatayorime rajate raṅge vā iti jñānaṁ jātam, tatra na Kāraṇa-bādho'pi. Apica yatra raṅga-rajatayoḥ ime rajata-raṅge iti jñānaṁ tatra ubhayatra pravṛtti-nivṛttī syātām. Raṅge raṅga-bheda-grahe rajate rajata-bhedagrahe' nyathā-khyāti-bhayāt" (Pp. 238-239, Ibid).

74. "Kiñcānumitiṁ parti bhedāgrahasya hetutve jala-hrade vahni-vyāpya-dhūmavad-bhedāgrahāt auumitiḥ nirābadhā. Yadi ca viśiṣṭa-jñānaṁ kāraṇaṁ tadā ayogolake Vahni-vyāpya-dhūmajñānam anumityanurodhāt āpatitam. Seyam ubhayataḥpāśā rajjuḥ. Itthañca anyathākhyātau pratyakṣam eva pramāṇam. Raṅgaṁ rajatatayā avediṣam ityanubhavāt iti saṁkṣepaḥ". (pp. 239-240, Ibid.)

75. Cf. "Na ca doṣa eva pratyāsattirastu iti vācyam". (P. 219, Tattvānu. On Ad. Cin. Kau of Mahādevānanda Sarasvatī).

Also "Na ca doṣa eva pratyāsattiḥ" (p. 17, Ad. Cin. of Raṅgojī Bhaṭṭa).

reason in explaining experience. Be that as it may, the neo-logicians make the most of the argument of simplicity of hypothesis and take infinite pains to prove that the theories of the Prābhākaras and the Advaitins are fraught with the incorrigible defect of prolixity of hypothesis and are therefore doomed to damnation[76]. In brief, the neo-logician thinks that the nacre-silver is an 'upanīta-bhāna' object cognised through the normal and the supra-normal contacts operating simultaneously. The supra-normal contact, however, has to function in co-operatian with the organ of sense in action[77]. Hence, there is no question really of simultaneity at all since the two functions are integrated into a complex whole.

Now, let us present the arguments that have been put forward by the scholars of the rival schools against this theory. At the outset it may be pointed out that even in this theory recollection has an important and decisive role to play. Indeed, when the Prābhākara points out that the Nyāya theory also makes room for two distinct cognitions whose unrelatedness remains uncognised and that it makes room for 'pramuṣṭa-tattākasmṛti' also, the neo-logician cannot justfiably say anything to the contrary. For, his 'jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa' presupposes recollection and that, again, the perception of, say, the nacre as 'this'. Hence, he practically assumes a third unitary cognition as discussed in the previous chapter and as upheld also by Jayanta, though he, unlike Jayanta, studiously avoids calling it a mental cognition.

Many scholars of the Advaita and other schools object to the postulation of Jñāna-Lakṣaṇā pratyāsatti by the neo-logician. They, to start with, point out that such a postulation dislodges Inference from its position and confiscates its pasture outright. For, every case of inference may be explained by perception with

76. Vide Nyāya-Kaustubha of Mahādeva, Pp. 89-94.

77. "Ayaṁ ca jñāna.lakṣaṇaḥ sannikarṣaḥ, ṣaḍindriya-sahakārī iti sampradāya-vida āhuḥ, Manasa eva sahakārī iti śūla-pāṇi-miśrāḥ amanyanta". (p. 9, Tarka-kaumudī of laugākṣi Bhāskara.) So, Sūlapāṇi differs and affiliates it to the mind.

78. Cf. "Tvanmate' pi viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭya-gocara-janya-pratakṣasya viśeṣaṇatāvacchedaka-prakāraka-jñānādi-janyatvena anuvyavasāyasya ca vyavasāya-rūpa-viṣaya-janyatvena tṛtiya-kṣaṇādāveva tādṛśānubhavasya sambhavāt" (Pp. 3-4, Ad. Si. Vid.)

the aid of this supra-normal contact[79]. The neo-logician might argue that he does in no way rule out the scope of inference. For, he does not hold that every cognition necessarily serves as a supra-normal contact to yield supra-normal perception ; on the contrary, he maintains that when a cognition brings in its wake a perception devoid of any normal sense-object contact, that cognition itself is taken by him to be a supra-normal kind of contact giving rise to perception. But, this subterfuge does not help the neo-logician very much. For, if he, as a realist, lays particular emphasis on and holds fast to the psychological peculiarity of the invalid experience, he must consistently do it as a whole. That is to say, he must not only aver that the experience is a perception, but also that it is a normal kind of perception arrived through normal sense-object contact. But, he neglects these two aspects of the psychological fact about invalid cognition and his tenacity to stick to the aspect of perceptuality seems, therefore, unreasonable. Hence his assumption of supra-normal contact is unfounded and all the more unreasonable. Moreover, the neologician cannot establish any causal relation between this supra-normal contact and perception. For, if there be any, this contact would generate perception everywhere, leaving no room for inference to operate. And in the absence of any causal relation, the supra-normal contact will be an unjustified assumption. Hence, this contact, which has been assumed on seeming grounds of anyathānupatti, turns out to be a hollow platitude.

Granting, however, for argument's sake, this kind of supra-normal contact, the Advaitins argue that a cognition may serve, if at all, as a contact only when it is presented in its original characterisation. But, a silver has never been experienced before as characterised by a nacre. Henee its cognition cannot serve as a supra-normal contact to generate the cognition of a

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79. "Evaṁ tarhi jñānam eva sannikarṣo' stu iti cenna : ati-prasaṅgāt". (P. 218, Tattvānu. on Ad. Cin. Kau).

Also "Na ca rajatānubhava-janyaḥ saṁskāraḥ smṛtīrvā pratyāsattiḥ, Tathā sati vahnyanubhava-janya-saṁskāra-smṛtyoḥ parāmarśasya vā sattvena parvato vahnimān iti pratyakṣa-prasaṅgāt. Na cānu-miti-sāmagryā tat-pratibandhaḥ-......Samāne viṣaye pratyakṣa-sāmagryāḥ prabalatvāt". (Pp. 21-22, Bra. Vi. Bha.).

nacre-silver[80]. Moreover, Mahādevānanda points out that the cognition arrived at through such supra-normal contact cannot be called perception. For, if contact between the sense and the substantive (i.e. the 'this' in 'this is siver') be assumed te be the cause of perception, that will lead to prolixity of assumption. So, the contact between the sense and the object as a whole must be assumed to be the cause, which would then include contact with the 'viśeṣaṇa' also. But, since the object of error is an elsewhere entity, it can have no contact with the sense and, as a result, the cognition cannot be yielded by perception[81]. If, however, 'doṣa' is taken to be the requisite contact, the invalid inference will have no scope anywhere ("Doṣasya Pratyāsattitve bhramānumityuccheda-prasaṅgāt"—P. 47, Ad. Cin.). Besides, such an assumption would be prejudicial to the theory of alter-invalidity of knowledge as accepted by the Naiyāyikas ; for, doṣa becomes included, then, in the aggregate of causes of cognition and its invalidity will nolonger depend upon anything outside the aggregate of causes[82].

Then, again, this neo-logician's theory suffers damnably from the double psychological inconsistency in assuming the silver being perceived elsewhere through the supra-normal contact and yet being present here. Moreover, his theory suffers from the logical inconsistency of not affirming any relation between, say, the silver and the 'this' in the absence of which the two relata can never be related to form a unitary whole. He must assume that there is 'tādātmya' between the silver and the 'this'.

80. "Apica yatra yadanubhavaḥ tatra vā yad-avacchedena yasyānubhavaḥ, tadavacchedakavattayā upasthite vā saṁskārā-derupanayatvam. Śuktau tu rajatatvaṁ prāū nānubhūtam. Nāpi śukti-gatedantvāvacchedena iti Kathaṁ tatropanīyeta". (P. 22, Bra. Vi. Bha).

Also "Kiñca yadavacchedena etc." (P. 219, Tattvānu.).

Also "Saṁskāra-Lakṣaṇā pratyāsattiḥ rajatatve' pi astītī cenna.

Pūrvānubhūta-rajata-tādātmyasya saṁskārābhāvāt Ukta-doṣa-tādavasthyāt" (P. 559, Kha. Kha. Khā.),

81. "Kiñca viśeṣyendriya-sannikarṣatvena Kāraṇatve gauravāt viṣayendriya-sannikarṣatvena tad vācyam etc." (Ibid.)

82. "......aprāmāṇyasya paratastvam api lupyeta, doṣasya pratyāsattitayā jñāna-sāmānya-sāmagrī-praviṣṭatvena apramāyāḥ tadatirikta-kāraṇajanyatvābhāvāt". (P. 47, Ad. Cin).

And this 'tādātmya' must either come into being here[83], or else must somehow appear though non-existent. In the first alternative, he should rather assume the origin of the silver also in the 'this'; in the second alternative, however, he has to accept the relation as 'asat' and thus swallow the humble pie. But, a few neo-logicians assert that even this relation is an elsewhere existent which is uprooted and transplanted wholesale along with the elsewhere silver upon the 'this'[84], According to Gaṅgeśa, the adjectival part of the invalid cognition is certainly existent, but its relation with the substantive (i.e. the relation of, say, rajatatva with the 'this' of nacre) is, though non-existent, not apprehended as such at all[84a]. On this Vyāsatīrtha argues that this position of the neo-logician implies that the invalidity and its correction have nothing to do with this 'Vaiśiṣṭya' (i.e. relation), but only with the Viśeṣaṇa, which is 'sat' to them—an absurd position (Kiñca yadvai-śiṣṭyamasat na tadaṁśe tvanmate bādhaḥ tat-prayukta-bhramatvaṁ vā sambhavati etc." (P. 171, Ta. Tā. of Vyāsatīrtha).

Here, then, arises the question how the neo-logician arrives at the assumption of an elsewhere existent silver. This matter has been impugned already while refuting the Bhāṭṭa theory. In brief, it may be stated that neither the invalid cognition nor the recanting cognition warrants such an assumption. Moreover, a nacre-silver may be existent, if at all, in the locus of the nacre and nowhere else. But, if it be existent in the locus of the nacre, it cannot then be repudiated. So, the nacre-silver is not 'sat', but, since it appears, it cannot be even 'asat'. Hence, it is anirvacanīya—thus the Advaitin would argue.

Vimuktātman then asserts that 'anyathātva' of cognition is not at all a psychological concept. A cognition can by no means appear as an otherwise cognition. So, anyathākhyāti,

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83. "Yenāpi hi deśāntara-sthaṁ rajataṁ bhāsata ityucyate, tenāpi śukti-rajatobhaya-nirūpitaṁ tādātmyam atraiva utpadyate ityavaśyam abhypeyam". (P. 22, Bra. Vi. Bha).

84. Vide, Gādādharī on Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa of Tc.

84a. Also Cf. "Api ca tvanmate bhrame' pi yasminnaṁśe bhramatvaṁ tad rajatatvādikaṁ viśeṣaṇaṁ sadeva. Vaiśiṣṭyaṁ tu asadapi asat-Khyāti-bhītasya tava mate na bhāti". (P. 170. Ta. Tā. of Vyāsatīrtha. Here 'tvat' refere to Gaṅgeśa.

to say the least, is as untenable as the statement 'my mother is barren'[85].

Neither is 'anyathātva' logically ascertainable. For, the neo-logician cannot assuredly define what he factually means by 'anyathātva'. Thus, is it a new emergence (ārambhaḥ), or transformation, or a special kind of identity-in-difference ? And, again, in regard to these alternatives, it may be asked whether they pertain to a qualified substantive i.e. a qualificand, or a mere adjunct, or a mere substantive[86]. Now, if they be affirmed of the qualificand, then from the nacre in contact would emerge the silver even like the emergence of a jar from clay, or the nacre would be transformed into silver in the manner of milk being transformed into curd ; or again, it would comprise silverness even as a bar of iron assumes the nature of gold through its contact with the philosopher's stone. And then the silver would persist as such and its cognition would also be valid. If the adjunct gives rise to a new emergence or transforms itself, then, nacreness, for example, would turn out to be a substantive and would be relieved of its genus-ness. Again, if the adjunct lends itself to 'tādātmya', the supposition suffers from the additional defect of the cause of 'tādātmya' being indescribable. The other alternative of a mere substantive giving rise to a new emergence etc. does not hold good ; for, in that case also the cognition of the nacre-silver type would be valid and even after the perception of the specific properties of, say, a nacre, the silver would continue to be apprehended[87].

That the concept of anyathātva is utterly illogical may be demonstrated in a slightly different manner also. For, does this anyathātva appertain to cognition or to its effect, or to the cognitum ? The first alternative is extremely hollow. For, it means that a cognition having the form of silver depends upon

85. "Yanna khyāti natat khyāti yat khyāti na tadanyathā/ Anyathā-khyāti-gīstasmān mātā bandhyā mametivat//" (Sl. 116, Ch. III, IS.)

86. "Kimidam anyathātvaṁ nāma ārambho vipariṇāmaḥ tādātmya-viśeṣo vā ? So'pi viśiṣṭasya vā viśeṣyasya veti ?" (P. 122, Khyātivādaḥ of Puruṣottama).

87. "Samprayuktasya śuktyādeḥ mṛdo ghaṭasyeva rajatasya ārambhe dugdhasya dadhirūpeṇeva rajatākāreṇa pariṇāme vā lohādīnāṁ sparśamaṇi-sparśe etc." (Ibid).

a nacre as the external object occasioning it. But, the nacre cannot serve as an 'ālambana' either by investing the cognition with its form or by becoming the object of conation prompted by cognition. The first alternative is absurd. The second alternative will lead to the assumption of scimitar, javelin, bow etc. as 'ālambana' of tiger-cognition, since these weapons are objects of conation prompted by the sight of a tiger[88].

Anyathātva can neither appertain to the effect of cognition. For, the effect of cognition is revelation which is the same in all cognitions, valid or invalid[89]. The other alternative has already been disposed of. So, anyathākhyāti is not easily ascertainable[90].

Furthermore, the neo-logician can hardly account for the mutual confusion of synchronous objects like 'raṅga' and 'rajata'[91].

Brahmānanda in his Advaita-siddhānta-vidyotanam takes great pains to show that the nyāya theory hopelessly suffers from the charge of gaurava and that the advaita theory has the additional merit of lāghava[92]. [Incidentally, I beg to submit that the argument based on Lāghava ('Simplicity of hypothesis') and Gaurava ('Prolixity of hypothesis') has only a tentative probative value and that also only when it is kept within certain limits. Beyond that limit it becomes a fantastic nonsense which weakens the fibre of philosophical thought and ushers in an age of decadence. The hey-day of scholastic Navya Nyāya was also an age of despair in this sense. This age gave progressive prominence to this argument of Lāghava and Gaurava and reduced philosophic disquisitions to a vagrant series of Lāghava Tarkas. The preceding age was refreshingly an age of 'anyathānupapatti' which may be said to have roughly begun from the time of Śrīharṣa. It is with this caustic attitude towards such casuistry of Lāghava Tarka which opened up wild carnivals of fantastic hypotheses

88. "Kiṁ jñāne' nyathātvam, Kiṁvā phale, uta vastuni. Nādyaḥ. Rajatākāra-jñānaṁ śuktim ālambate iti hi jñāne' nyathātvaṁ vācyam. Tatra śukterālam-banatvaṁ nāma etc." (VPS., P. 206, Vasumatī ed.).

89. "Nāpi phale' nyathātvam. Phalasya sphuraṇasya bhrāntau samyag-jñāne vā svarūpato vaiṣamyādarśanāt". (Pp. 206-207, Ibid).

90. "Tasmān nānyathākhyātiḥ sunirūpā" (P. 207 Ibid).

91. Vide As., P. 647, NSP.

92. Vide P. 7 et seq.

that I disengage myself from the task of presenting here such arguments of Brahmananda against Anyathakhyati[93].

Finally, it may be pointed out that the neo-logician defines 'aprama' as 'tad-abhavavati tat-prakara-kam jñanam bhrama ityarthah' (P. 299, Sid. Mu. Kuñjabihari's ed.), but, actuated by sectarian zeal, shuts out the inevitable logical deduction from it, For, 'tad-abhava-vati' as opposed to 'tadvati' occurring in the definition of Prama, definitely affirms the absence or non-existence of, say, a silver in a nacre (or more properly in a 'this'); but, this logical fact of non-existence is dishonestly smuggled off from the field of discourse. And this non-existence is made into existence through the wanton assumption of the 'jñāna-lakṣaṇā pratyāsatti'. Even here the logician takes no note of the logical predicament of affirming non-existence and existence at the same time in an identical locus. Moreover, if 'tad-abhāva-vān' becomes 'tadvān' through the supra-normal contact, why should the invalid experience be at all damned as such? For, in the ultimate analysis, it also turns out to be 'tadvati tat-prakārakaṁ jñānam'. Evidently, the blame must be laid at the door of the supra-normal contact which would thus appear to be suspect to the extent of being completely abandoned. Thus, it becomes crystal-clear that the neo-logician intends to deliver us goods of realism aboard a chariot whose wheels are unrealistic with the result that his realism has to face the grim realism of wallowing in the azure dust of fantasy. His inordinate realism paradoxically leads him to unrealistic pastures. His theory is at best a logical appraisal of a psychological fact sprayed with an ontological effervescence from a safe distance.

The Mādhva dualists, however, are fully alive to these charges made out against such types of Anyathākhyāti and refuse to accept any of the variants discussed above. They, on their part, offer a new kind of Anyathākhyāti which generally goes by the name of 'sad-uparaktāsat-khyāti'. Finding fault with all other kinds of Anyathākhyāti except their own, they point out that all those kinds are fraught with logical inconsistencies on divers counts. For, Anyathākhyāti cannot mean the apprehension

93. The refrain of Brahmānanda's arguments in the presently referred book is 'mama tu lāghavam, tava tu gauravam' which makes one wonder if 'lāghava' is the index of truth and reality.

of a transmuted entity. Because, that would render the cognition of all evolved entities like a pitcher invalid. Moreover, if this transformation be without a cause, it would not be occasional. If it has a cause in the shape of defective organ or organic defect, then the silver, for example, should be apprehended by all and sundry even after the removal of the defect ; for, the destruction or absence of an efficient cause does in no way spell disaster for the effect. Nor is it reasonable to explain Anyathākhyāti as signifying the apprehension of an entity in terms of another entity. For, is this entitative otherness real or unreal ? The first alternative rules out both illusion and its recantation and leads to the unwelcome contingency of everything being apprehended by anyone as every other thing. If, however, it be unreal, it cannot be apprehended and if it be said to be apprehensible, it's no use taking the silver of the nacre-silver judgment as real. Nor, again, can it mean a cognition invested with a different form. For, even a valid cognition has a form different from that of the object in this that the former is internal, while the latter is external. Neither can it mean a cognition exhibiting one form, while depending upon a different one as the external cognitum ; for, it is plainly self-contradictory[93].

What, then, is an illusion according to the Mādhvas ? It is avowedly anyathākhyāti ("Anyathā-vijñānam eva bhrāntiḥ"—Pramāṇa-paddhati of Jaya-tīrtha) ; but it has a new ring all about it. This anyathākhyāti is to be defined as a cognition that makes into its object something in terms of some other thing ("Anyad anyātmanā viṣayīkurvad jñānam anyathākhyātirityaṅgīkārāt" NS.). In an illusion the non-existent appears as existent and the existent as non-existent. It may be asked here whether the 'anyasya anyātmatā' is real or unreal. Jayatīrtha promptly replies that it is unreal and hence the predicate of an invalid judgment, say, a silver, is unreal. That the silver is unreal is clearly demonstrated by the recanting cognition to the effect "asadeva rajataṁ pratyabhāt" and no one has any right to minimise the importance of this recanting cognition. So, what occurs in an invalid cognition of the type of nacre-silver is that the defective organ, aided by the manifest impression of silver, gives rise to a

93. "Yadi tāvad anyathā pariṇate vastuni khyātiḥ anyathā-khyātiḥ etc." NS

cognition which apprehends in terms of the totally non-existent silver the 'this' of the nacre with which it is in contact[94]. The Mādhva does not accept the external object as the immediate cause of a cognition; instead he avers that the sense-object intercourse is the immediate cause of it ("Na sākṣāt sākṣātkāraṁ prati kāraṇatvam arthasya, kintu indriya-sanni-karṣasyaiva" NS.). So, according to the Mādhva, there being no sense-contact with the non-existent silver, the nacre is the external object ('viṣaya) of the invalid nacre-silver cognition and this nacre itself appears as the silver which is an utter naught. The Mādhva does not accept that an object of knowledge is that which somehow affects its production ("Nanu janakasyaiva sākṣāt-kāri-pratyaya-viṣayatvaṁ dṛṣṭm......Maivam" NS.). On the contrary, he holds that a cognition has for its object ('viṣaya') that in contact with which the organ produces it ("yad-vijñānaṁ yat-sannikṛṣṭa-karaṇena janyate sa tasya viṣaya ityaṅgīkārāt" NS). If it is urged that it is flagrant contradiction to hold that the silver-cognition has the nacre as its viṣaya, the Mādhva would burst forth into a derisive chuckle. For, to him the 'silver-cognition' means 'the cognition exhibiting silverness' and, as such, the cognition apprehends the very nacre in a different form. If it still be urged that the silver must have some kind of objectivity ('dṛśyatā'), the Mādhva would argue that it has only a semblance of objectivity, which has no relation with the subject ('pakṣa') of the judgment. In fact, it has a semblance of objectivity only by way of its superimposition and not as 'phala-vyāpya', or 'Vṛttivyāpya'[95]. In reality, as Jayatīrtha emphatically says, the nacre-silver cognition and the like are apprehended either as auto-illuminative presentations or as being intuited by the Sākṣin even like a normal, valid cognition ("Puro-vartini rajate idam iti Viśiṣṭa-viṣayam ekam eva vijñānaṁ Sva-prakāśatayaiva vā

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94. "......udbuddha-rūpya-saṁskāra-sacivaṁ duṣṭendriyaṁ sannikṛṣṭaṁ śuktīdamaṁśam atyantāsad-rūpyātmanā gṛhṇāti ityanyathākhyātireva yuktā" (P. 423, NM., Vol. II).

95. "Nanu tarhyapi rajate' sti Kathañcid dṛśyateti· cenna. Tasya dṛśyatvābhāsatvāt. Tādṛśasya pakṣe' nanvayāt; Kiñca rajatasya phala-vyāpyatayā vṛtti-vyāpyatayā vā dṛśyatvam? Nobhayam api, adhyastatayaiva tat-siddhyabhyupagamāt". (Vādāvalī of Jayatīrtha) p. 42.

mānasa-pratyakṣatayā vā sākṣiṇā vā avabhāsate. Tathedamapi" NS.)[96].

Is then the predicate of an invalid judgment always unreal? It is not, says Jayatīrtha. Where the illusion is 'sopādhika' *i.e.* where the superimposed entity is contiguous to the locus of superimposition, only the identity between the two is unreal. But, in cases of 'nirupādhika bhrama' like the nacre-silver, the rope-serpent etc. (which are much unlike the yellow conchshell, the red crystal etc.), both the identity and the superimposed entity are equally unreal[97].

But, the Mādhva logician has to prove that a non-existent may be apprehended. Not only that; he must prove that it may be apprehended immediately. Jayatīrtha instantly rises equal to the occasion and says that the fact that we have knowledge of past events and refer things to past persons (as for example, 'Kurūṇāṁ Kṣetram', 'Gurūṇāṁ ṭīkā' etc.) proves indubitably that an 'asat' is amenable to mediate apprehension. But, that it is capable of immediate apprehension also may be proved by the following reasoning :—Is the apprehension of 'asat' as 'sat' denied by the opponent? It cannot be; for, then one has to give up all talk of error and illusion. If, however, the apprehension of 'asat' as 'asat' is denied, all usage of 'asat' will have to be given up[98].

To put the arguments of Jayatīrtha in a nutshell :—The Advaitist, whatever course he might adopt, cannot avoid accepting immediate apprehension of 'asat'. The illusory cognition itself proves it. For, at the time of an illusory cognition, the Advaitist certainly does not apprehend the indescribable silver as such, but as an empiric silver. But, this empiric silver is assuredly denied in the nacre by him. So, he has immediate apprehension of an empiric silver which is non-existent in the nacre. Hence, immediate awareness of 'asat' is sanctioned by logic and by

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96. The Mādhva does not subscribe to the Advaitic scheme of 'phala-vyāpyatva' and 'vṛtti-vyāpyatva'. As Madhva himself says; "Sudṛdo niścayo yatra jñeyaṁ tat sākṣi-darśanam" and "yat kvacid vyabhicāri syād darśanaṁ mānasaṁ hi tat" (quoted in TT., P. 120).

97. "Tat kiṁ sarvatrāropyam atyantāsadeva etc." (NS).

98. "Asatcenna pratīyeta ityatra asato'sattvena pratītiḥ niṣidhyate sattvena vā. Ādye' sad-vyavahāra-prasaṅgaḥ; Dvitīye bhrānti-vyavahāra-lopa-prasaṅgaḥ (Vādāvalī, P. 10).

experience. So, our experience itself proves that illusion is anyathākhyāti in which the predicate of the illusory judgment is 'asat'.

The word 'anyathā' in the Mādhva Anyathākhyāti means 'improper', 'inapposite' ("Vijñātasya anyathā asamyag vijñānam ......'NS). To explain, the relation between the 'this' of nacre and the silverness, or that between the silver and 'thisness' is 'anyathātva' ("Tatra yad anyathātvaṁ śuktikedamaṁśasya rajatatva-saṁsargo rajatasya idantāsaṁsargaḥ......"NS). This anyathātva is due to the defective organ, its defects being of various types like jaundice, cataract, distance etc. Similarity also serves as a defect even like cataract etc. ("sādṛśyaṁ tu kācādivad doṣatayā upayujyate" "NS). Hence, R. Nāgarāja Śarmā is definitely wrong when he says that in an illusion there is nothing wrong with the sensory stimuli, the sensory mechanism and the afferent and the efferent nervous tracts, but 'the incoming stimuli are wrongly interpreted' (Reign of Realism). Nor does Dr. M. N. Sircar fare any the better when he says that, according to Madhva, "falsity consists in wrong localisation, and the localisation is due to defective vision". (P. 81, Comparative Studies in Vedantism). For, it clearly smacks of the Nyāya theory which assumes the superimposed entity to be an elsewhere entity and in which the recantation ought to be logically of the form 'The silver is there, not here'. Madhva certainly declares in quite unambiguous terms that there can be no error or illusion ('nirupādhika' of course) without two real and similar objects ("Ato na kutrāpi sadṛśa-satya-vastu-dvayaṁ vinā bhramaḥ" Tattva-nirṇayaḥ). A hare's horn, as Jayatīrtha says, is nowhere superimposed. But, this reality serves merely as a background of superimposition and can in no way influence the ontological status of the nacre-silver. For, an elsewhere existence of silver does in no way help its apprehension in the nacre ("Na hi anyatra sattvam atra pratīteḥ upakāri". NS.). Nor does this elsewhere existence follow from the illusory cognition or the subsequent recanting cognition. Hence, though the silver be existent elsewhere, this fact is out of bounds for the invalid cognition, and the nacre-silver must be taken as unreal and imaginary, while recantation as absolute negation should mean the rejection of this absolute unreality. In other words, absolute negation here would be the negation of a sheer nothing.

Thus, while the nacre-silver has psychological reality (for, it is apprehended as real), its ontological reality is denied outright by the Mādhva. It thus appears—and this matter has been emphasised by Jayatīrtha time and again—that the Mādhva makes room also for Anyathā-khyāti as a psychological phenomenon. This theory is called 'sad-uparaktāsatkhyāti' to demarcate it from the Buddhist Asat-khyāti which denies both the subject and the predicate of the invalid judgment. This denomination is explained as the apprehension of the non-existent in the locus of the existent (or as supported by the existent). But, it seems better to explain it as the apprehension of the non-existent as determined (or literally 'tinged') by the existent. For, the word 'upa-rañjaka' means in philosophy an adjunct which need not have any excluding implication ('vyāvṛtti') to both the contending parties at the same time. The 'uparañjaka' 'sat' here is the silver itself, for example, as an elsewhere existent or as a psychological existent within the domain of the invalid experience itself.

But with regard to dream-cognitions the Mādhvas entertain an altogether different notion. To them, dreams, which are as a rule substrate-less, are real. Dreams *i.e.* dream-objects are created and are destroyed afterwards. They enjoy a very short span of life even like the lightning and so have no chance of being cognised before and after the actual occurrence of dreams. The material cause of these dream-objects is 'vāsanā' (*i.e.* appetencies and aversions) which is supra-sensuous and as such it cannot be perceived after the end of dream. The efficient causes of dreams are adṛṣṭa (unseen desert), God and the like[99].

So, according to the Madhvaites, dreams are real and are created by God from the materials of 'Vāsanā' in accordance with the merit or demerit of the individual experient.

The Mādhva theory makes an improvement upon the other theories at least in two respects ; first, it has the candour to accept an element of Asat-khyāti as a fundamental basis of invalidity. Secondly, it tries to ascertain the exact 'viṣaya' of an invalid cognition. But, it has its drawbacks too. It puts greater emphasis upon the recanting cognition of the form

99. "Teṣāṁ satyatvāt......utpatti-vināśāṅgīkārāt etc." (Vādāvali, P. 76)

'asadeva rajatam atrābhāt' (which form may perchance be a subject for controversy) than upon the form of the original invalid cognition. But, as cognitions, both of them should logically enjoy an equal status. If it is argued that logic itself dictates that the contradicting cognition should naturally hold sway over the previous cognition, how will one decide the issue when there is recrudescence of the previous cognition by way of recantation of the recanting cognition ? Hence, if he chooses to be guided by experience, the silver, for example, should have to be taken by him to be both 'sat' and 'Asat' at the first instance which may subsequently be given a coherent shape through reason.

Moreover, we are to scrutinise why the Mādhva calls the silver of the nacre-silver cognition an 'asat'. Certainly, a silver is not on a par with a hare's horn etc., according to the Mādhva, in matters of reality or unreality ; nor does he accept any degree of reality or unreality. Still, he calls this silver an 'atyantāsat', thus relegating it to the realm of the non-existent hare's horn etc. The fact of the matter is that the Mādhva does not take the silver here as divorced from the complex situation of the nacre-silver, but as an integral part of the situation. In other words, the silver here means the silver in the locus of the nacre and such a silver is certainly nowhere existent. But, in deference to the same course of reasoning, it may be said that the nacre also as the locus of silver or silverness is nowhere existent and as such 'asat' ; for, it also is an equally integral part of the complex experience. Hence, if the silver be 'asat', the nacre also (or the 'this') is 'asat'. For, the nacre-silver is but the silver-nacre turned upside down.

Then, if the silver be 'asat', does not this unreality prejudice the reality of the world and make it suspect ? For, the world-experience may very well be explained as a complex cognition in which the world appears in the locus of God or Brahman, that is 'Sat', and is an utter naught as a superimposed entity even like the nacre-silver. As the background of this superimposition, in conformity with the Mādhva postulate "Ato na Kutrāpi sadṛśa-satya-vastu-dvayaṁ vinā bhramaḥ" (tattvanirṇayaḥ), the world may be taken as real, not in its superimposed character, but as a potency of Brahman, whether it be called Māyā or something else. So the Mādhva theory

ultimately seems to lead to the abandonment of the dualistic philosophy and of the inviolable reality of the world to which the Mādhvas are inalienably wedded.

But, the Mādhva exposition of dreams itself is an open challenge to his theory of illusion which, in all logical fairness, is thrown overboard by it. For, if God can create momentary dream-objects out of 'vāsanā' of individuals in accordance with their desert, there is no reason why he should fail in creating a nacre-silver etc. in the same manner. So, if dream-objects are real, a nacre-silver also must be real. The Mādhva cannot take the plea that he calls dream-objects real only on the authority of scriptures. For, he explains the scriptural position with arguments which are equally applicable to the nacre-silver etc. The 'dream-cosmology' may very well be brought to bear upon the nacre-silver experience. To argue still that dream-objects are real, while the nacre-sllver is not is to fancy contradictory effects from the same cause and thus to cast causality asunder.

So, the Mādhva brand of Anyathā-khyāti too has to give way before logical scrutiny and the holocaust of reason spares it not a life of security and integrity.

CHAPTER XIV

ANIRVACANIYA-KHYĀTI

Now, we shall deal with the theory that steers a middle course between satkhyāti and Asat-khyāti,—or better a dialectical synthesis of the two extremes with a negative predication—, that discards the psychological being with the help of logical being and finally casts the latter aside with the logic of illogicality (Cf. the Concept of Māyā)—the theory of Anirvacanīya-khyāti. The theory is fathered upon the great Śaṁkara, the illustrious protagonist of the Advaita school of vedānta. In his brilliant Adhyāsa-bhāṣya Śaṁkara offers his own definition of adhyāsa, or, in other words, of Error, besides recording other definitions given by his predecessors belonging to different schools of thought. And his scholiasts come forward with their never-failing, illuminative exegesis to demonstrate that Śaṁkara upholds the theory of Anirvacanīya-khyāti. If Śaṁkara ever held such a view, particularly in the full-blooded form in which it has been passing current since a century or so after him, is extremely doubtful. But, his followers nevertheless try to logically deduce the theory from his writings. This endeavour of theirs gives rise to different sub-schools within the Advaita discipline itself, more important of these being the Vārttika sub-school, the Vivaraṇa sub-school and the Bhāmatī sub-school.

The essential features of the Advaita doctrine are too well-known to be recounted here. The prima donna of the Miracle play of the Advaita is Māyā or Avidyā, the primal and persistent nescience, the elusive nuances of whose inscrutable dance brings forth the world of phenomena on the ground of Brahman, an integer of existence-intelligence-bliss continuum. The nature of Māyā is a profound puzzle which defies all logical see-saw. It is neither sat, nor Asat, neither empiric, nor metempiric and is still something positive which is the matrix and the crematorium of the world of multiplicity. This Māyā or Ajñāna is not the antipodes of pure consciousness or Brahman-consciousness and may and, in fact, does co-exist with it without any prejudice to either. Indeed, its very existence is intuited by the Witness-consciousness. But, it is contradicted by Vṛtti-jñāna which it fights shy of. The conception of Māyā as co-existing peacefully

with pure consciousness and without violence to the basal Advaita doctrine and to the essential nature of either may seem queer. The confusion is worse confounded when one hears that both the subject and the object of Ajñāna is Brahman (as Padmapāda and Prakāśātman hold), or the subject is the Jīva, while the object is Brahman (Vācaspati). And the confusion reaches its zenith when it is said that Māyā or Ajñāna, a complex of two different potencies, screens Brahman with its first potency called 'Āvaraṇa' and, then* with its second potency called 'Vikṣepa', it generates the world of phenomena in the locus of Brahman. Padmapāda, author of Pañcapādikā, makes no distinction between Māyā and Avidyā ; but, Prakāśātman points out in his Vivaraṇam that Māyā has predominantly the potency of Vikṣepa, while Avidyā has that of Āvaraṇa. Some hold that this Māyā, which has an abundance of rajas, pertains to Īśvara, while Avidyā pertains to Jīva. Vidyāraṇya, however, asserts that Māyā has an abundance of pure sattva, while the Sattva of Avidyā is defiled by rajas and tamas ("Sattva-śuddhyaviśuddhibhyāṁ māyāvidye ca te mate" p. 9, PD). The relation between Māyā and Brahman is conceived in three different ways. Some hold that Māyā and Brahman entwine each other like two pieces of rope. In this view Māyā is taken as the 'Upādhi' of Brahman. Others hold that Māyā is the potency of Brahman. Some others hold that Brahman is the ground and support of Māyā, which is the material cause of the world. The material cause is of two kinds according to the Saṁkarites. It may be mutative or non-mutative. The latter is called vivarta. Brahman is the non-mutative material cause of the world, while Māyā is the mutative cause. Brahman as the non-mutative material cause is unqualified ('nirguṇa'), while the qualified Brahman is its efficient cause. But, Vidyāraṇya, who holds a slightly different view, asserts that the qualified Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe being related to the 'tāmasī Māyā' and 'Śuddhasattvā Māyā' respectively[1].

The Jīva-phenomenon is also explained differently by different scholars. According to the 'avaccheda' doctrine of Vācaspati,

* There is really no 'then' in the process. The two functions operate simultaneously according to the Advaitins.

1. "Jagato yad upādānaṁ māyām ādāya tāmasīm/Nimittaṁ Śuddhasattvāṁ tām ucyate Brahma tad-girā//" (P. 21, PD).

the consciousness that is the seat and subject of nescience, being delimited by it ('ajñānāvacchinna') is the Jīva, while the consciousness, that is object of nescience, is Īśvara. Sureśvara, the champion of 'ābhāsa-vāda,' holds that the consciousness qualified by the adventitious adjunct ('upādhi') of nescience is Īśvara, while the consciousness qualified by the Upādhi of buddhi is Jīva. Some, following ābhāsa-vāda, hold that the sum-totality of nescience is the upādhi of Īśvara, while the individual nescience is the 'upādhi' of Jīva. Sarvajñātman holds that consciousness reflected in nescience is Īśvara, while that in Buddhi is Jīva. Prakāśātman, however, thinks that Īśvara is the consciousness qualified by the 'upādhi' of nescience, while Jīva is the consciousness reflected in nescience as delimited by the mind and its impressions.

In Advaita metaphysics caitanya all-pervasive is the sole reality. Every other entity is but the fancied delimiting adjunct of caitanya. In Advaita epistemology we come across three kinds of caitanya : Viṣaya-caitanya, antaḥ-karaṇa-caitanya, and vṛtti-caitanya. These are otherwise known as Prameya-caitanya, Pramātṛ-caitanya and Pramāṇa-caitanya. The bare perception or sensation of an object involves the identification of the viṣaya-caitanya with the pramāṇa-caitanya. But, the perception of the object as object involves further the identification of the latter with the Pramātṛ-caitanya. An apperception or anu-vyavasāya of Nyāya further involves the identification of the pramātṛ-caitanya with the Śākṣi-caitanya, which is the caitanya having ajñāna or (according to some) antaḥ-karaṇa as the 'upādhi' (as distinguished from 'viśeṣaṇa') (Cf. "Ghaṭo'yam ityasāvukti-rābhāsasya prasādataḥ/Vijñāto ghaṭa ityuktirbrahmā-nugrahato bhavet//P. 278, PD). The perceptual character of a cognition does not depend on its sensuousness, but on its immediacy which is achieved by the identification of the viṣaya-caitanya with the Pramāṇa-caitanya[2]. Every perception is ontologically the perception of caitanya. (Cf. "Sarva-pratyaya-vedye'smin Brahmarūpe vyavasthite" quoted in khyātivāda of S.C. Bhāratī).

The Samkarites advocate that the criterion of truth is

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2. "Nahīndriya-janyatvena jñānasya sākṣāttvam, anu-mityāderapi mano-janyatayā sākṣāttvāpatteḥ......kiṁ jñāna-gatasya pratyakṣatvasya prayojakaṁ pṛcchasi, kiṁ vā viṣaya-gatasya ? Ādye pramāṇa-caitanyasya viṣaya-caitanyābheda iti brūmaḥ". (Ve. Pa., Pp. 41 & 44, Cal. Uni. ed.).

non-contradiction (Cf. "Satyatvaṁ bādha-rāhityam" PD. P. 78). What is contradicted cannot be 'sat', and whatever is 'sat' can never be contradicted whether in the past, the present or in the future. Brahman, which knows no lapse or contradiction, is the only 'sat'. The sky-flower, a barren woman's son and the like are never immediately apprehended (though apprehended mediately through words) and as such may be said to be eternally contradicated and so 'asat'. But, these two together do not exhaust the province of discourse ; albeit, they are not contradictory, but only contrary. For, there are entities that are cognised, but subsequently contradicted. That they are cognised is undeniable and so the Advaitins bank upon this epistemological realism, though upholding thorough-going idealism in metaphysics. Indeed, contradiction presupposes apprehension ; and a sky-flower is contradicted only in the sense that it contradicts all thought-activity ; it is apsychological and alogical. Hence the Advaitins maintain that there are grades of reality and that there are relative truths. Brahman is 'pāramārthika sat', the world of our experience is empirically or pragmatically real ("vyāvahārika sat'), and the nacre-silver is 'prātibhāsika sat'. Thus, we arrive at as many as four ontological categories :—Asat, pāramārthika sat, vyāvahārika sat and prātibhāsika sat of which the fourth one is generally called 'anirvacanīya' from which the third one is distinguished on pragmatic grounds. But, they seem to accept another category which would be characterised as 'sadasat'. Even beyond this they accept a sixth category—they call it the fifth—while explaining the nature of the cessation of nescience ("Na sat nāsat na sadasat nānirvācyo' pi tat—kṣayaḥ" NMak.). Be that as it may, the 'anirvacanīya' is otherwise called 'mithyā' by these philosophers. They further maintain that there are three different standpoints of assessing the reality of this panorama of existence. From the 'laukika' or common-sense standpoint, everything is real ('vāstavī'), from the 'yauktika' or logical standpoint, everything (not excluding the entities having pragmatic reality) is 'anirvacanīyā', and finally, from the view-point of the scriptures, everything of this multiplicity is an utter naught ('tucchā')[3].

3. "Tucchānirvacanīyā ca vāstavī cetyasau tridhā/Jñeyā māyā tribhir-bodhaiḥ Srauta-yauktika-laukikaiḥ//" (PD., P. 146, Vasumatī ed) Here the word 'māyā' implies its evolutes also.

The Advaita philosophers, armed with the above doctrines, put forward their theory of error called Anirvacanīya-khyāti. The one point that they fight studiously against is the general assumption of similarity being the principal cause of superimposition and error. This serves as the negative background of their theory of error ; for, if they can dislodge similarity from its proud position of glory, where it has been installed by many of the rival philosophers, they can, on that very account, discredit ontological Anyathākhyāti almost to its perdition. So, they take courage in both hands to assert that similarity, or objectivity ('viṣayatvam'), or psycho-physical defects cannot explain unaided any illusory phenomenon. They are only ancillary factors, or, at best, efficient causes, adventitious and variable. For, it is quite clear that a 'sopādhika bhrama' like the red crystal does not necessitate the assumption of any factor of similarty for its explanation. In 'nirupādhika bhrama' also, the Advaitins point out, similarity cannot be proved as the one indispensable, invariable antecedent. For. the cognition of similarity is a common experience which helps extension of our knowledge to unknown fields. The joint Method of Agreement and Difference, on the contrary, prove that nescience is the one indispensable material cause of any manner of error[4]. Hence, one is constrained to call into request Māyā with a view to accounting for error. So, the beginning-less nescience pertaining to (say) a nacre is the material cause of the nacre-silver and its cognition ("Ata anādikasyaiva śuktyajñānasya śukti-rūpyatajjñānopādānatā nyāyyā, na tvanyasya Kasyacit". P. 56, IS. Also 'Mithyājñānameva adhyāsopādānaṁ nātmāntaḥ-karaṇakācādidoṣā iti sūktam". Viv., P. 12, Vizi. Skt. Se.).

Thus the Advaitin sets the stage for his Anirvacanīya-khyāti and then proceeds to explain the psycho-physical process which leads to an illusory cognition. The defective organ, say, the eye, has intercourse with the object, say, the nacre in front and this gives rise to a psychosis of the form of 'this' and of glitter'. Then the consciousness delimited by 'idam' ('this') is reflected in the psychosis and there occurs the immediate identity of the three grades of consciousness, namely that delimited

4. "Na viṣayatvaṁ sādṛśyaṁ vā adhyāsa-hetuḥ ; Kintu anvaya-vyatirekavad ajñānam etc." (P. 6., Pra. Vi., Vol. I, Cintāmaṇi's ed.)

by 'idam', that by 'vṛtti' and that by the 'antaḥkaraṇa'. Now, the nescience in tho ground of consciousness delimited by 'idam' is perturbed through defect and, then, through the co-operation of the impression of silver awakened through the cognition of similarity, is transformed into the form of an objective silver. Simultaneously with this operation, the nescience in the ground of consciousness delimited by Vṛtti becomes transformed into the Vṛtti taking the form of silver[5]. This vṛtti is not of antaḥkaraṇa, but of nescience ('āvidyaka-vṛtti) and no intorcourse with an object is necessary for its generation. The above two transformations are revealed by the witness-consciousness and thus they are apprehended. The apprehension of the silver is called perception because the origin of the silver is assumed to be in the locus of the Pramāṇa-caitanya as identified with viṣaya-caitaya and as delimited by 'idam'. This prātibhāsika silver is the transformation ('pariṇāma') of Avidyā, though 'vivarta' of caitanya. It is to be noted here that this illusory silver is not made of the stuff of ordinary silver, but of the stuff of Avidyā herself. The avidyā in the ground of consciousness delimited by 'idam' envelopes the nacre with its potency called vikṣepa'. Some Advaitins, however, do not postulate any āvaraṇa-śakti' of Avidyā, particularly with reference to the not-self ('Jaḍa') group of objects and explain 'adhyāsa' with the help of 'vikṣepa' only (cf. "Sācana jaḍeṣu vastuṣu tat-svarūpāvabhāsaṁ pratibadhnāti. p. 108, Pañ. Pā.). Also "Tadevaṁ bhāva-rūpājñānam anātmānam anāvṛtyaiva tatra vikṣepa-mātraṁ janayti, ātmānam tu āvṛtya tatrāham idaṁ mamedam ityevaṁ vyavahāra-yogyān adhyāsān api janayati". p. 163, VPS., Vasumatī ed.). The nacre-silver does not exist before its cognition and hence it cannot serve as defining consciousness ; so, it follows that it can have no nescience enveloping it. Since then it is unenveloped, no psychosis is necessary here to remove the veil of nescience which

5. "Prathamaṁ doṣa-sahitena indriyeṇa idantāmātra-viṣayā antaḥkaraṇavṛttiḥ janyate ; tata idantāyāṁ tad-grāhaka-vṛttau ca caitanyam abhivyajyate, taccaitanya-niṣṭhā cāvidyā doṣavaśāt saṁkṣubhnāti, tatredamaṁśāvacchinnacaitanyasthāvidyā saṁkṣubhitā satī sādṛśyād udbodhita-rūpya-saṁskārasahāya-vaśāt rūpyākāreṇa vivartate. Vṛttyavacchinna-caitanyasthā avidyā tu rūpya-grāhi-vṛtti-saṁskārasahakṛtā vṛttirūpeṇa vivartate" (P. 216, VPS.) See also Mm. A. K, Śāstrin's ed. of VP, Pp. 110-111.

is absent in this case. The witness-consciouness reveals it with the help of Avidyā-vṛtti only.

The Advaitin points out that, though he accepts two separate vṛttis, namely 'idaṁ-vṛtti (or antaḥ-karaṇa-vṛtti) and rajatākāra-vṛtti(or avidyā-vṛtti), his theory does not suffer from the defect of assuming two discrete cognitions, as the Prābhākara's does, to explain error. For, the consciousness reflected in both the vṛttis is one and the same and this indivisible unity is imposed upon cognition also ("...jñānaikyam api upacaryate" P. 217, VPS). Also "Na ca jñāna-dvayāṅgīkārād akhyāti-prasaṁgaḥ. Idamaṁśāvacchinna-sākṣi-caitanyasyaiva adhiṣṭhāna-jñāna-phala-bhūtasya svamāyāvivarta-rajatādi-siddhi-tvāt. Antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti-lakṣaṇa-jñānadvayānaṅ-gīkārāt." p. 64, T. Pra.). If it is asked how the illusory silver, which is in the locus of consciousness, may be in apposition with 'idam', the Advaitin says that this occurs simply because the silver is in the locus of consciousness as delimited by 'idam'. This silver, in the ultimate analysis, is superimposed upon the witness-consciousness ; still, one does not have the cognition of the form 'I am silver' even like 'I am happy' simply because the creation of this nacre-silver by avidyā is assisted by the impression of the previous cognitions of the form 'this is silver'. The difference between the phenomenal objects and the prātibhāsika objects is that the former are caused by avidyā alone, while the latter are brought into being by avidyā in co-operation with adventitious defects. Hence, the dream-objects, whose creation is facilitated by the defect in the shape of sleep, are prātibhāsika. The dream-objects like the elephant, the chariot etc. are, according to some, direct transformation of Māyā, while, according to others, they are transformation of Māyā through the instrumentality of the psyche.

Some Advaitins are of the opinion that 'sopādhika-bhramas' are to be explained as anyathākhyāti, the rest being called anirvacanīya-khyāti. Thus the cognition of the red crystal, the yellow conchshell etc. may be easily explained with anyathākhyāti. There is no necessity here of assuming any anirvacanīya redness or yellowness. This seems to be the view preferred by Advaitānanda as it transpires from his Brahma-vidyābharaṇam (cf. "Santi ca kevala-saṁsargādhyāsāḥ, yathā

darpaṇe mukhādhyāsaḥ. Tatrahi darpaṇaṁ mukhaṁ vā parasparam adhyasyata iti nānirvacanīya-khyātau vaktuṁ śakyam etc." (p. 17). Indeed, some of the older Advaitins seem to advocate anyathākhyāti in cases of 'sopādhika bhrama' or 'saṁsargādhyāsa', as it is designated by some; but, they hardly bring the matter into limelight. In cases of 'parokṣa-bhrama', however, it is generally accepted on all hands that the older Advaitins adhere to anyathākhyāti (cf. "Siddhi-granthasya parokṣa-bhramasthale prātibhāsikānabhyupa-gantṛ-prācīna-vedānti-matābhiprāyakatvāt." P. 3, Nyāyabhāskara-khaṇḍanam). The first writer, who categorically and positively asserts anyathākhyāti, is Dharamarājādhvarīndra, author of vedānta-paribhāṣā[6]. Sudarśanācārya in his Advaita-candrikā[7], Mm. A. K. Śāstrin in his comm. on VP.[8], Sri S. C. Bhāratī in his Khyātivāda[9] and some others stand by him in this regard. And it is refreshing to refer here to the law of prātibhāsika adhyāsa as laid down by Padmapāda and Prakāśātman to the effect that such an adhyāsa always necessitates the mixing up of two grades of reality, phenomenal and illusory, or trans-cendental and phenomenal quite in consonance with Śaṁkara's pithy remark 'satyānṛte mithunīkṛtya'. Still through-going meta-physicians of the Advaita school such as Apyaya Dīkṣita in his sub-gloss Parimala[10], Advitānanda in his Brahma-vidyābha-raṇam (cf. "Parvato Vahnimān ityanumiti-rūpa-bhrame tu doṣa-vaśād vahnirutpadyate iti na kutrāpynyathākhyātiḥ" p. 23), Brahmānanda in his Advaita-siddhānta-vidyotanam (vide Pp. 71-73) and also in his Laghu-candrikā and Subrahmaṇya Śāstrī in his Nyāya-bhāskara-khaṇḍanam refute such a position and hold fast universally to the theory of anirvacanīya-khyāti.

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6. "Yatrāropyam asannikṛṣṭaṁ tatraiva prātibhāsika-vastūtpatte-raṅgī-kārāt. Ata eva indriya-sannikṛṣṭatayā japākusumagata-lauhityasya spha-ṭike bhānasambhavāt na sphaṭike'nirvacanīya-lauhityotpattiḥ" (Pp. 135-136, VP., Cal. Uni.ed.).

7. Vide P. 38

8. Vide Paribhāṣā-prakāśikā ṭīkā on VP., P. 136.

9. "Na ca japā-kusuma-sānnidhye sphaṭike lauhityānyathā-khyāti-Svīkāravat etc." (P. 69, khyātivāda).

10. Cf. "Tatrādarśa-mukhayoḥ ādhārādheya-bhāvasya anirvacanīyasya utpattyā' nyathā-khyāti-vaiṣamyāt. Anyathā anyeṣu anubhūyamānāropeṣu kā gatiḥ" (P. 31, Mm. A, K. Śāstri's ed.).

These scholors are afraid that if once anyathākhyāti is given quarter, it would eventually signal the complete doom of anirvacanīya-khyāti. Their zeal in this regard is the delight of a die-hard systematizer, but the despair of realistic epistemology. Vidyāraṇya in his VPS. makes a searching analysis of the cognition of red crystal and concludes that the "redness" in the crystal is 'mithyā'. He argues that the redness cannot be explained by assuming refraction of optical rays from the crystal towards the red flower, nor by assuming the reflection of the colour only of the flower or the pervasion of the crystal by the lustre of the flower, or new redness being generated in the crystal by that lustre. So, the redness in the crystal must be taken to be 'mithyā' occasioned by the flower as 'nimitta'. (Pp. 88-91, VPS., Vol. II, Vasumatī ed.)

We have seen that the nacre-silver is, according to the Advaitin, the 'pariṇāma' of Avidyā, but the vivarta of Brahman (i.e. consciousness). But, extreme subjectivists like Prakāśānanda, who advocate dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda and outright dispense with the pragmatic difference between 'vyāvahārika' and 'prātibhāsika', hold that the nacre-silver is a mere vivarta. A vivarta is not something beyond the substratum. For, the substratum itself, appearing in a different form, is called vivarta. If it is asked whose different form it is, Prakāśānanda would reply that, in fact, it belongs to no entity. If then it is redargued that this is but veiled asatkhyāti, he would rejoin that the khyāti itself is super-imposed because of the apprehension of something unqualified as qualified[11].

Barring a few such glorious exceptions (Gauḍapāda is one and what else is Śaṁkara himself ?), the Advaitins en masse accept the somehow objective existence of the illusory silver etc. in the locus of the nacre etc. in order to do justice to the perceptual character of cognition in these cases. They, therefore, speak of 'arthādhyāsa' beside 'jñānādhyāsa' (cf. "Dvividho hyadhyāso jñāna-viśiṣṭo'rtho'rtha-viśiṣṭaṁ jñānaṁ ceti. p. 174, VPS., Vasumatī ed.). When an entity, similar to the recollected entity,

11. "Na hi adhiṣṭhāna-svarūpātiriktaṁ vivarto nāma kiñcid vastu asti, yadāśritya Kārtsnyaikadeśa-vikalpāvatāraḥ syāt ; Kintu adhiṣṭhānam eva doṣa-vaśāt vilakṣaṇākāreṇa bhāsamānaṁ vivarta iti ucyate" (P. 274, VSM.).

is apprehended in something else, it is arthādhyāsa. But, when there is apprehension, similar to recollection, of something as some other thing, it is jñānādhyāsa (Vide. PPV., p. 22, Vizi. Skt. Se.). Though any one of these two-fold adhyāsa implies the other, still the two are separately mentioned lest the definition of arthādhyāsa alone be too narrow to include the other one. (vide TD., p. 162). The latter seems to be more fundamental with the older Advaitins. For, they hold that an objective existence can be vouched for only through presentation in cognition and not vice versa (Vide. PPV, p. 21)[12]. Some, however, explain jñānādhyāsa and arthādhyāsa as saṁsargādhyāsa and svarūpādhyāsa respectively[13]. The later vedantins take long ingenious strides to assert that in the case of an adhyāsa (say) of the nacre-silver type, the creation of the silver and of its cognition will not suffice ; there will also come into being 'rajata-viṣayatvam' and 'rajata-tādātmya-viṣayatvam'[14]. Need we call it objectivity with vengeance ?

Now, we are to understand the ontological status of the prātibhāsika phenomenon from the Advaita stand-point. We have seen above that the nacre-silver etc. has a large amount of 'given-ness' and is not subsistent. But, it cannot be taken as real ; for, then, no error and its subsequent recantation can find any scope. It cannot be called unreal either ; for, then again, its apprehension and subsequent reprehension become unaccountable. The Advaitin does not accept the immediate apprehension of the non-existent. He only concedes the mediate verbal cognition of the non-existent. So, it follows that if the nacre-silver be non-existent, it cannot be apprehended at all. It is, therefore, neither sat, nor asat. It can neither be sat and asat at the same time ; for, that involves contradiction. So it must be taken to be

12. But, does not Śaṁkara hold a diametrically opposite view when he says, "Na hi tat puruṣa-tantram, vastutantram eva hi tat" ? (P. 595, ŚBhā. on BS,, Śrī Vāṇī Vilās Press).

13. Cf. "Keṣucid grantheṣu jñānasya Brahmaṇo' dhyasta-pratiyogikata-yādhyāsa eva jñānādhyāsa-śabdena vyavahṛtaḥ etc." (P. 66, KV. of Mr. Bhāratı).

14. Cf. "Na Kevalaṁ rajatādi-bhrame jñāna-rajatayoreva Utpattiriti mantavyam, viṣayatā api jāyante" (P. 67, Ibid).

'anirvācya', in other words, 'mithyā'[15]. Presumption itself proves that unless the apprehended nacre-silver be taken as 'mithyā', its subsequent sublation does not stand to reason[16]. As we have already said, the Advaitin does not take reality and unreality as mutually contradictory, but make room for a third category in between them. This third category is 'mithyātva' and it does not appear illogical to them[17]. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī advances an inferential evidence of the 'mithyātva' of the prātibhāsika entity[18]. Thus, through various means of proof the Advaitins arrive at the conclusion that the nacre-silver etc. is 'mithyā. And if the cognitum be 'mithyā', the cognition must necessarily be 'mithyā' ; for, otherwise, they argue it would no longer be the cognition of that 'mithyā' cognitum. (Cf. "Na hi jñeyasya anirvacanīyatve taj-jñānasya nirvacanīyatvaṁ nyāyyam, tajjñānatva-hānāt jñānāntaravat" IS., p.48). This 'mithyātva' pervades the whole of the universe, in the ultimate analysis, excepting Brahman, which is pure sat, and the sky-flower etc., which is pure asat. The world is the architecture of the 'mūlā avidyā' (i.e. primal nescience), while the nacre-silver etc. is the creation of 'tūlā avidyā' (i.e. individual nescience) which is but 'pūrva-pūrva-vibhrama-saṁskāra' according to Amalānanda. The individual nescience is certainly temporal and has a beginning ; still, it is called beginningless because it is grounded in consciouness which is eternal[19]. That the whole ponorama of existence is 'mithyā' is quite in the fitness of things ; for, Avidyā, its material cause, is 'Mithyā, being 'sadasadbhyām anirvacaniyā'. If it be asked, following up this logic of causality, whether the nacre-silver etc. is 'bhāva-

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15. Cf. "Sattve na bhrānti-bādhau stāṁ nāsattve khyāti-bādhakau etc." (P. 47, Is.) Also "Vimataṁ rūpyādi saccet etc." (P. 630, AS., Nirnaya Sāgar).

16. "Dṛṣṭārthāpattiḥ yathā śuktāvidaṁ rajatam ityanubhūyamānasya rajatasya nedaṁ rajatam iti bādhyatvaṁ dṛṣṭaṁ tasya mithyātvam antareṇa satyatve' nupapannaṁ sat mithyātvaṁ kalpayati" (Pp. 215-216, Ad. ci. Kau.)

17. Cf. "Gotvāśvatvayoḥ paraspara-viraha-vyāpyatve' pi tadabhāvayoruṣṭrādau ekatra sahopalambhāt" (P. 52, AS., Nirṇaya sāgar).

18. "Vimataṁ sattva-rahitatve sati asattva-rahitatve sati' sattvāsattva-rahitam, bādhyatvāt doṣa-prayukta-bhānād vā,yannaivaṁ tannaivam, Yathā Brahma" (P. 627, Ibid.).

19. "Jñāśrayaṁ hi tat, jñaścānādiḥ" (P, 56, IS.)

rūpam' like its matrix avidyā, the Advaitins will assert that avidyā also is not really 'bhāvarūpam' ; It is called 'bhāva-rūpam' only to imply its difference from 'abhāva' (cf. 'Bhāvatvaṁ cātra abhāva-vilakṣaṇa-tva-mātraṁ vivakṣitam" (p. 544, AS.). In fact, it is neither 'bhāva', nor 'abhāva', but is 'anirvācya' even in this regard[20]. It is not clear, however, whether the nacre-silver etc. is 'anirvācya' not only in regard to its existence or non-existence, but also from the point of its positivity or negativity. The predication of the 'mithyātva' of both the erroneous cognition and its cognitum is, however, necessary ; for, the reality of the one cannot co-exist with the 'mithyātva' of the other[21].

Now, arises the important question whether this all-out 'mithyātva' is real, or 'mithyā'. The question is generally raised in regard to the cosmic illusion, though it may be very reasonably extended to cover the illusions of the nacre-silver type as indicated by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. The Advaitin points out, at the outset, that this question cannot reasonably arise at all inasmuch as it involves a kind of fallacious wrangle known as 'nitya-samā jāti'. For, it rides roughshod over the specification ('vaiśiṣṭyabhaṅga') of the attribute of 'mithyātva' inhering in the world. Still, the Advaitin faces the question and answers that the 'mithyātva' of tbe world as also of the nacre-silver etc. is again 'mithyā' ; but, that does not make them real as somc might be deluded into thinking. What the Advaitin means to imply is that the 'mithyātva' of the world etc. has the same kind of existence as the world possesses. He does not in the least concern himself with the question whether this 'mithyātva' is sublated or not. For, it is patent that so long as the world lasts, its attribute 'mithyātva' will also last, and when it will be sublated, the latter also will be sublated. In fact,

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Also "Rūpyopādānam ajñānam api anādi-caitanyāśritatvāt anādyeva, udīcyaṁ śuktyādikaṁ tu tad-avacchedakam iti na tatrāvyāptiḥ" (P. 544, AS., Nirṇayasāgar).

20. "Avidyā bhāvābhāva-vilakṣaṇaṁ yatkiñcid vastu sattva-rahitatve sati asattvarahitatve sati sadasattva-rahitatvāt" (Ibid.).

21. "Yathā jñeyasya satyatve nānṛtaṁ jñānam iṣyate/Tathā jñānasya satyatve nānṛtaṁ jñeyam iṣyatām//Parasparānṛta-tvena parasparānṛtatvataḥ/ Ato dvayānṛtatvaṁ hi vaktavyaṁ bhrānti-rūpakam//" (P. 155, Vārttika of Nārāyaṇa Sarasvatī on SB).

the point of the argument at bottom is that the substantive, the world, being itself 'mithyā' cannot have any attribute, say 'mithyātva', which is real. So, it must also be 'mithyā'. Furthermore, the Advaitin argues that of two opposite attributes, the reality of one is assured by the 'mithyātva' of the other only when the determinant of the negation ('niṣedhyatāvacchedaka') does not abide in both of them. But, in the case under reference, the determinant of negation is 'dṛśyatva' (i.e. 'cognisability) and it abides equally in both 'satyatva' and 'mithyātva', the two opposite attributes. Hence, the negation of one does not imply the affirmation of the other. So, according to the Advaitin, the world and the nacre-silver etc. have 'mithyātva' which is 'mithyā'[22].

Now, we are to discuss what the Advaitin means by 'bādha', what its object is and what the result of 'bādha'. 'Bādha' or contradiction means, as Prakāśānanda says, that the superimposed entity is not,—a cognition which follows immediately in the wake of the apprehension of the substratum of superimposition[23]. It is not mere negation, as is held by some, but a tri-temporal negation in its accredited locus, or, to state it more metaphysically, in its material cause[24]. Bādha, which literally means contradiction, practically implies the demonstration that a certain thing has existential lapse in consciousness, that the 'what' of a cognition ceases to be predicative of its 'that'. This 'bādha' may be of two kinds. The first, which is 'bādha' properly so called, arises out of the direct apprehension of the substratum of what is contradicted. Through its operation the contradicted entity along with its material cause is done away with. The second, which is occasioned by a contrary psychosis or through the cessation of defect, is called 'nivṛtti'. If the nacre-silver be taken to be the transformation of the personal nescience residing in consciousness delimited by the nacre, then the cognition of the nacre will effect the 'bādha' of the silver

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22. "Mithyātva-mithyātve' pi prapañca-satyatvānupapatteḥ·etc." (Pp. 212-213, AS., Nirṇaya Sāgar).

23. "Sākṣāt-kṛte tvadhiṣṭhāne samanantara-niścitiḥ/Adhyasyamānaṁ nāstīti bādha ityucyate budhaiḥ" (P. 127, VSM).

24. "Bādhaśca ekāvacchedena svopādāne traikāliko'bhāvaḥ" (P. 19, Bra. Vi. Bha).

along with the nescience. But, if it be taken to be the transformation of the cosmic nescience, the cognition of the nacre will only bring about the cessation of the silver even like the cessation of a pitcher through cudgelling[25]. 'Bādha' par exeellence, then, reduces the apprehended entity to its substratum only[26].

This 'bādha' is effected by a subsequent cognition, whlch is universally called the 'bādhaka-jñāna'. This contradicting cognition is assumed to annul the object of erroneous cognition by some, the erroneous cognition itself by others, the volition consequent upon the erroneous cognition by some others and all alike by yet other scholars. But, the Advaitin holds himself apart from all these views and asserts that a cognition can do none of these things directly. He points out that it is ludicrous to maintain that one cognition cancels another. For, then, all cognitions, arising as they do, only one at a time, will be equally both 'bādhya' and 'bādhaka' and as such 'invalid' and 'valid' at the same time ("Sarva-jñānānāṁ bādhya-bādhakatvāt bhrānty-abhrāntitva-prasaṅgaḥ" P. 112, IS). It is, again, silly to argue that a cognition is annulled by another cognition having a contrary cognitum. For, the one clearly has no bearing upon the other. It would, however, be the height of foolishness to argue now that a cognition contradicts another cognition having a similar (or rather identical) cognitum ("Na ca bhinnārthayoḥ abhinnārthayośca jñānayoḥ bādhya-bādhaka-bhāvo rūpa-rasa-jñānayo rūpa-jñānayoriva ca ityuktam". P. 134, IS). In fact, one cognition may be quite different from another in its logical import or may simply confirm another ; but it can never serve to annul another cognition. Nor does a cognition annul the cognitum of another cognition ("Na hi jñāna-prāptaṁ rūpyādi jñānāntaraṁ niṣedhati......iti matpakṣaḥ" Pp. 126-127, IS). Indeed, a contradicting cognition cannot negate an entity ; it only serves to reveal the true nature of a thing[27]. It can only be 'bodhaka' and never 'bādhaka'. It can only remove the veil

25. "Kārya-vināśo hi dvividhaḥ—kaścid upādānena saha. Kaścit tu vidyamāna eva upādāne. Ādyo bādhaḥ, dvitīyastu nivṛttiḥ etc." (Pp. 128-130, VP., Cal. Uni. ed.)

26. "Bādhena hi...rajatasya,...adhiṣṭhāna-mātra-pariśeṣatā-sampādanāt". (P. 2I, Bra. Vi. Bha.)

27. "Na hanti bādha-dhīrvastu sā hi tattva-prakāśikā" (P. 154, IS.).

of nescience pertaining to an unknown object and reveal it. This nescience is the logical contradictory of vṛtti-jñāna and the latter annuls this 'ajñāna' only[28]. But, since this ajñāna is the source of the illusory silver etc. and its cognition too, it may be said to cancel them indirectly[29]. In this indirect manner, the contradicting cognition may be said to contradict 'vyavahāra' also.

Now, arises the question as to what should be the verbal form of the contradicting judgment. The Advaitin points out that it should not be of the form (say) 'nātra rajatam, kintu āpaṇādau', or 'nedaṁ rajata-vyavahāraḥ' inasmuch as the existence of the silver as an elsewhere entity and the contradiction of 'vyavahāra' do not find favour with him ; nor does he accept it being either 'antārajatam, na bahiḥ', or 'asadeva rajataṁ pratyabhāt'. He, on the contrary. maintains that the contradicting judgment may take three different verbal forms : "nedaṁ rajatam', 'mithyaiva rajatam abhāt' and 'nāstyatra rajatam'. The first form registers a negation of the anyonyābhāva (i.e. numerical difference) type, while the last one of the atyantābhāva type[30].

According to vidyāraṇya, the first form of negation arises with the cognition of nacre, the substratum of the illusory silver. Thereafter occurs the third form of negation, which is of a tri-tempornl character ; the second form occurs as the final stage of recantation[31]. The ontological difference between the first negation and the other two is that while the latter directly express the illusoriness of the silver, the former only implies it. Some Advaitins, however, are reluctant to accept the third form as a representative form of negation from the stand-point of Anirvacanīya khyāti. They point out that this form cannot

28. "Tasmājjñānānām abādhyatvāt ajñānam eva bādhyam ityanye pakṣā niryuktikā iti siddham", (P, 134, Ibid.)

29. "...ajñātam arthaṁ bodhayat jñānaṁ tadajñānaṁ nivartayati, tannivṛttau ca tajjaṁ rūpyādi nivartate tantu-nivṛttāviva paṭa iti" (P. 127, IS).

30. "Nedaṁ rajatam" iti vākyābhilapya-pratīteḥ anyonyābhāva-viṣayatvam eva..."Nātra rajatam" iti vākyābhilapyā tu pratītiḥ atyantābhāvaviṣayā". (P. 515, AS, Vol. II, Mm. Jogendranāth's ed.)

31. "Evaṁ ca sati uttarakālīno nāstyatra rajatam iti pratyayaḥ paramārtharajata-viṣayo mithyaiva rajatam abhāt iti pratyayaśca mithyā-rajata-viṣaya ityubhayam api upapadyate". (P. 180, VPS, Vasumatī ed.)

maintain unity of substratum as between 'bhrama' and 'bādha'; on the contrary, it brings in difference in substratum ('Vaiyadhikaraṇya) which is a positive defect[32].

But, what is contradicted by the contradicting judgments stated above? What, indeed, is the negatum of negation? Prakāśātmayati and other earlier Advaitins in general, vidyāraṇya not excepted, hold that the phenomenal silver is the negatum of negation ("Traikālika-niṣedhaṁ prati svarūpeṇa āpaṇastha-rūpyam...pratiyogī" Vivaraṇa quoted in AS., P. 482, Mm. Jogendranāth's ed.)[33]. Vidyāraṇya argues that such a view is not committed to the charge of negation of one that has no scope (i.e. of the unpredicated—'aprasakta-pratiṣedha') inasmuch as the phenomenal silver is proved to have scope here by the volitional activity of the erring percipient[34]. He asserts that both the first and third forms of negation negate the phenomenal silver. The second form of contradicting judgment is, however, an affirmation and it pertains to the 'illusory' silver. But, in the teeth of such a time-honoured view, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī asserts that the illusory silver is really the negatum of both the first and third forms of negation. He points out that the acceptance of the phenomenal silver as the negatum would lead to mutual 'hetero-locativity' ('vaiyadhikaraṇya') of 'bhrama' and 'bādha' and to the negation of the unpredicated. Then, he, however, adopts an ingenious interpretation of the words of Prakāśātman, following citsukha, with a view to accommodating it into his view. He says that the illusory silver as apprehended in identity with the phenomenal silver is the negatum[35]. In

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32. "Anirvacanīya-khyātyapagame sāmānādhikaraṇyena bādhākārāsambhavāt...tatra rajatam iti na tvatra iti tadākāraḥ syāt" (*Ad.* Br. Si., P. 179).

Also "Nātra rajatam iti saṁsarga-bādha-pratītyāpatteśca. Na caivaṁ dṛśyate". (P. 83, Vārttika of Nārāyaṇa Sarasvatī).

33. Also Cf. "Taduktam Tattva-pradīpikāyām-"Tasmāt 'laukika-paramārtharajatam eva nedaṁ rajatam iti niṣedha-pratiyogi" " (P. 515, As., Vol. II, Mm.'s ed).

Also "Tasya niṣedhasya loka-prasiddha-paramārtha-rajata-viṣayatvāt". (P. 180., VPS., Vasumatī ed.)

34. Vide P. 180, VPS.

35. "Na ca tatra laukika-paramārtha-rajatam eva svarūpeṇa niṣedha-pratiyogi iti vācyam, bhrama-bādhayoḥ vaiyadhi-karaṇyāpatteḥ, aprasakta-pratiṣedhāpatteśca...Asya ācārya-vacasaḥ pāramārthika-laukika-rajata-tādāt-

other words, to state it in a scholastic manner, the 'pratiyogin' of negation is the phenomenal silver, but its 'anuyogin' is the illusory silver (Cf. P. 534, As., Mm.'s ed.). To state it differently, the negatum is the illusory silver, though the delimiting adjunct of its 'pratiyogitā' is phenomenality, or 'svarūpa', or even 'pāramārthikatva' ("Tat ca svarūpeṇa pāramārthikatvena vā......" (P. 482, As., Mm,'s ed.). Dharmarājādhvarīndra also says that the illusory silver as characterised by the 'vyadhikaraṇa' attribute of 'phenomenal silverness' is the negatum[36]. But, Madhusūdana retraces his steps in his Advaita-ratna-rakṣaṇam and asserts that even the phenomenal silver, presented to the mind through recollection, may be the negatum. But, then, the phenomenal silver is the negatum of the negation of the 'anyonyābhāva' type, not of the atyantābhāva type[37].

But, here a question arises quite in conformity with the complex Advaitic gradation and cross-connection of reality. Is the negation of the nacre-silver etc. the negation of the 'pāra-mārthika' reality of the nacre-silver, or its phenomenal reality, or again, its illusory reality ? Mm. Jogendranāth, developing a pithy remark of Madhusūdana[38], says that 'mithyātva' is that kind of tri-temporal negation which does not possess a lower degree of reality than that of the negatum[39]. So, the negation may be of any degree of reality which does not fall short of the reality of the negatum. Thus 'mithyātva' will occur in all the following cases which conform to the condition of 'anyūna-sattākatva' :—

(a) The transcendental ('pāramārthika') or phenomenal negation of the phenomenal negatum.

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myena pratītaṁ prātibhāsikam eva rajataṁ pratīyogi ityarthaḥ" (P. 482, AS., Mm.'s ed).

36. "Na hi tatra rajatatvāvacchinna-pratiyogitākābhāvo niṣedha-dhīviṣayaḥ, Kintu laukika-pāramārthikatvāvacchinna-prātibhāsikarajata-pratiyogitākaḥ, vyadhikaraṇa-dharmāvacchinna-pratiyogitākābhāvābhyupagamāt. (Pp. 131-133, V. P., A. K. Sāstri's ed.)

37. Vide P· 28, Advaita-ratna-rakṣaṇam.

38. "Niṣedhasya bādhyatvaṁ pāramārthika-sattvāvirodhitve na tantram, kintu niṣedhyāpekṣayā nyūna-sattākatvam" (P. 386, Vol. II, AS.)

39. "Tathāca pratipannopādhau traikālika-niṣedhasya pratiyogyanyūna-sattākatvaṁ vācyam" (P. 414, Ṭīkā of Mm. Jogendranāth, AS., Vol. II).

(b) The transcendental, phenomenal or illusory negation of the illusory negatum. So, the negation may be either transcendental, or phenomenal, or illusory without doing any injury to 'mithyātva'. The negation will be transcendental when it is taken as merely the substrate-consciousness ; it is phenomenal when looked at as delimited by the substantive (say) 'Idam' (of the erroneous judgment) which serves as the delimiting adjunct of substrate-ness ('adhiṣṭhānatāvacchedaka') ; and it is illusory when taken as Qualified by 'nirūpitatva' of the illusory phenomenon[40].

Now, we shall present a refutation of this theory by the philosophers of rival schools. In this connection we shall have to bear in mind the all-important fact that the theory holds good equally in matters of ontology as in epistemology.

Let us at the outset present a refutation of the philosophic foundation of the theory. Mādhavamukunda in his Para-pakṣa-giri-vajra raises a pointer to the effect that it cannot be proved that a cognition does only remove illusory nescience ; for, it is common experience that any cognition destroys its prior absence ('prāgabhāva') which is real ; a pitcher-cognition rules out a real cloth-cognition, a recognition evaporates a corresponding real impression and so on and so forth. So, it must be accepted that what is contradicted may be real and as such the nacre-silver and the world are also real. Moreover, it is a general experimental truth that the recanting agent and the object of recantation are of the same order of reality. Hence, it transpires that nescience must be of a phenomenal nature just like its removal (which must be held to be phenomenal because it is effected by the psychosis, as the Advaitin says), and not illusory. Indeed, a phenomenal rejection of an illusory silver is not admissible at all ; for, the two have no contradiction. Moreover, it is agreed on all hands that a cognition and its object, a substratum and the defect tainting it must always be of the same order of reality. Hence, it must be accepted that nescience is real even like Brahman. Further, the Advaitin cannot explain the volition of Īśvara who is omniscient according to him also (cf. "Māyā-Bimbo Vaśīkṛtya tāṁ syāt sarvajña.

40. Vide P. 429, Mm. Jogendranāth's Tātparya, Vol. II, AS.

īśvaraḥ" P, 9, PD) ; for, one who sees the true nature of the nacre, which is the substratum of the so-called illusory silver, cannot be prompted towards seizing the nacre-silver. Hence, Īśvara, who always sees the true nature of all things, should not devote Himself to the maintenance of a world that is illusory[41].

Mādhavamukunda goes deeper still in the earlier sections of his treatise and tries to prove that the grand cosmic superimposition ('adhyāsa') is impossible. He points out that the world cannot be a super-imposition on Brahman. Flrst, it is impossible because Brahman, who is devoid of all 'viśeṣa' and 'sāmānya', as the Advaitin avers, cannot become the substratum of superimposition. For, a thing to be such a substratum must be partially or generally known, and partially or specifically unknown ("Śāmānyato jñātatve sati ajñāta-viśeṣa-vattvasya adhiṣṭhānatva-prayojakasya nirviśeṣe niḥsāmānye ca Brahmaṇi asambhavāt". P. 84, PPGT ; Also "Adhiṣṭhānasya kārtsnyena bhāne' bhāne ca na bhramaḥ/Bhātābhātākṛti-bhidā saviśeṣatva-sādhikā" P. 227, Nyāya-Siddhāñjana of Veṅkaṭa.) Secondly, in the absence of any thing other than Brahman, one can conceive nothing that can be super-imposed on the latter. For, whatever is super-imposed is bound to be existent elsewhere whose impression through previous cognition makes super-imposition at all possible. Verily, the impression of a silver previously cognised (technically called 'pradhāna') makes possible the super-imposition of silver upon nacre. But, since the Advaitic Brahman is the Sole reality, devoid of all manner of difference (namely, 'svagata', 'sajātīya' and 'vijātīya), the world-illusion is impossible for want of a 'pradhāna' in this regard. The Advaitin cannot argue that 'adhyāsa' necessitates impression only as its pre-condition and not also the reality of the impressing object. For, he does not accept any cognition of the

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41. "Kiñca na hi jñānam ajñānasyaiva mithyābhūtasya nivartakam iti niyamaḥ ; Jñāna-mātreṇa...satyasya taj-jñāna-prāgabhāvasya, ghaṭādi-jñānena paṭādi-jñānasya, pratyabhijñādinā saṁskārasya...satyasyaiva nivṛttidarśanāt ...kiñca loke nivṛtti-nivartyayoh samāna-sattākatva-niyamāt ajñāna-nivṛtti-vat ajñānam api tāttvikaṁ syāt. Prātibhāsikasya rūpyasya pradhvaṁso vyāvahārikaścet tayoḥ virodho' pi na syāt...kiñca jñāna-jñeyayoḥ doṣādhiṣṭhānayośca samāna-sattākatva-niyamāt Brahmavad ajñānaṁ api satyaṁ syāt...Adhyaste pravṛttiḥ adhiṣṭhāna-sākṣāt-kārābhāva-vata eva puruṣasya dṛśyate ghaṭate ca etc." (Pp. 655-59, PPGV.).

non-existent, which, therefore, cannot make any impression whatsoever. If the world-illusion is endeavoured to be accounted for only with the help of defect (i.e. nescience), that must at least be taken to be real in order that it may be cognised. Thirdly, the assemblage of causes and conditions of 'adhyāsa', namely, 'saṁskāra', 'sādṛśya', 'samprayoga' (sense-inter-course) etc., are conspicuous by their absence in the case of world-illusion. For, 'saṁskāra', if available at all, must be held to be real contrary to the Advaitic hypothesis. Then, Brahman cannot be the seat of 'saṁskāra' lest it loses its purity. Nor can the Jīva, who is the effect of 'adhyāsa', be its resort. If it is argued that the Jīva is beginningless, being merely conditioned by nescience ('māyāprayukta'), and not created by it ('māyā-janya')[42], then redemption from Jivahood would result from the removal of its cause and not of nescience. Moreover, the Advaitic postulate that the cognita are super-imposed upon the mental mode by shaping it in their likness, seems to founder in the case of the final psychosis before liberation since Brahman, an unknowable, according to the Advaitin, cannot shape it. Furthermore, the definition of 'adhyāsa' of the Advaitin cannot be applied to the 'adhyāsa' of 'mūlā avidyā'. Indeed, no one has the cognition 'this is avidyā' just like the invalid cognition 'this is silver'. Neither has avidyā any similarity with any other thing. Hence 'adhyāsa' of the Advaitic conception is an impossibility[43].

Jayatīrtha argues that, granting that the world is super-imposed upon the self, it follows that the world should, then,

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42. "Jīva īśo viśuddhā cit vibhāgaśca tayordvayoḥ/
Avidyā-taccitoryogaḥ ṣaḍasmākam anādayaḥ//"
(Quoted in Ṭīkā on AS., P. 500, Vol. II, Mm.'s ed.)

43. "Atha āropyāsiddhyāpi adhyāsāsiddhiḥ, yat yat āropitaṁ tat tat sapradhānaṁ dṛṣṭam, śukti-rūpyādivat" etc. (P. 88). "Na cārope tadviṣayaka-pratīti-mātram evāpekṣitam, na tu tadviṣayasya satyatvamapīti vācyam, asataḥ pratīterevāsambhavāt...doṣātmaka-kāraṇasyāpi asattva-sāmyena tava pakṣe pratīti-lakṣaṇa-kāryotpatterasambhavāt". (P. 91)

"Atha adhyāsa-sāmagryabhāvādapi tadasiddhiḥ. Saṁskāra-sādṛśya-samprayogādīnām adhyāse hyāvaśyakānām abhāvena katham adhyāsopapattiriti bhāvaḥ. etc." (P. 93) "Carama-vṛttau Brahmaṇo' dhyāsāsambhavena jñeyādhyāsa-niyama-bhaṅgācca". (P. 105) "Mūlāvidyādhyāse tad-asambhavasya durvāratvāt. (P. 116)

not be perceptible as different from the self just as the nacre-silver is not perceived as different from the nacre. But, since it is perceived as separate and different from the self, it is not super-imposed upon the latter (Cf. "Kiñca yadi jagad ātmani āropitaṁ syāt tadā ātmano bhinnatvena na dṛśyeta etc." P. 78, Vādāvalī). Exploiting the situation of the argument in a different way, we may point out here that if the world were a super-imposition upon the self, the world only would have been perceptible and not the self also just as the nacre-silver alone is perceptible and not the nacre also.

Madhvācārya points out that since, according to the Advaitin, what is 'mithyā' is different from both 'sat' and 'asat', it follows that 'truth' is that which is non-different ("sad-vilakṣaṇatvam asad-vilakṣaṇatvaṁ ca mithyeti avilakṣaṇameva satyaṁ syāt'. P. 242, Tattvoddyota). He further points out that if a psychosis removes nescience pertaining to an object, then a jar, being cognised by one, should not remain uncognised by others ("Viṣayāśrayaṁ cedajñānaṁ nivartate tarhi ekena jñātasya ghaṭasya anyaiḥ ajñātatvaṁ na syāt" Ibid). [For, if one removes darkness of a room by bringing in a lamp, all become capable equally of seeing the things of that room].

Jayatīrtha further asserts that as the Advaitin concludes that the world has neither reality nor unreality, because they are unascertainable, so it might be maintained that the world is neither 'anirvacanīya' since that too is unascertainable ('......tathā anirvacanīyatāyā api durnirūpatvena tadabhāvo dhruvaḥ syāt" p. 5, vādāvalī). Further, he points out that the presumptive evidence put forward by the Advaitin to establish the indescribability of the nacre-silver etc. is unsound. For, in his thesis 'sat cetna bādhyeta', what does he mean by the word 'sat' ? Does it mean 'existent', or 'uncontradicted', or 'of the nature of Brahman' ? All the three alternatives are equally inadmissible. In the first alternative, since the world, which is existent, is contradicted, the invariable concomitance between existence and absence of contradiction as proposed by the Advaitin falls through. The second alternative assumes what is desired to be

"Idaṁ rajatam iti pratītivat iyam avidyā iti kasyacit kadācidapi pratītyabhāvāt" (P. 117) "Kiñca avidyā-sādṛśyaṁ kasmin vartate iti vaktavyam" (P. 118).

proved and the third only proves the proven. The other thesis 'asat cet na pratīyeta' also shares the same fate. For, does he deny the cognition of 'asat' as 'asat', or as 'sat'? The first alternative cuts at the root of all usage of 'asat' and the second proposes to gag all talk of error[44].

Veṅkaṭanātha in his Nyāya-siddhāñjana argues that the Advaitin takes the world as different from sat and asat and, then, denies even that difference and thus makes it 'sadasat' ("Sadasad-vyatiriktasya siddhā sadasadātmatā" p. 92). He points out, in this context, that the Advaitin cannot maintain the general vedantic hypothesis of universal knowledge through the knowledge of one *i.e.* Brahman in as much as the cognition of 'sat' will certainly exclude that of 'other than sat and asat'. He boldly asserts that if the illusoriness of the world or the nacre-silver etc. be false, the illusoriness will be not and likewise the reality of an entity will be established only when the reality is real. What he means to say may be conveniently summed up in the words of Taraṅginī, the celebrated commentary on Nyāyāmṛta of Vyāsa-tīrtha, "If once a degree of reality be admitted, infinite regress will necessarily follow; for, one might ask whether the absolute reality is absolutely absolute or relatively absolute". In this connection, we may refer to the very cogent argument of Puruṣottama Prasāda in his Śrutyanta-sura-druma where he says that once the Advaitin accepts three degrees of reality, he is compelled to accept many others also. For, the invalid cognition of a silver in a dream-nacre necessitates the hypothesis of a reality lower than prātibhāsika and the cognition of the cessation of nescience, which is neither phenomenal nor transcendental, requires the postulation of another reality higher than the phenomenal, though lower than the transcendental[45].

Veṅkaṭa further asserts that invariable constancy ('anuvṛtti') and variability are not the grounds of reality and unreality respectively as proclaimed by the Advaitin. For, now a rope

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44. "Yathā khalu sattvāsattve bhavanmate durnirūpatvāt na jagato vidyete, tathā anirvacanīyatāyā api durnirūpatvena tad-abhāvo dhruvaḥ syāt" (P 5, Vādāvalī), Alsa "Saccet na bādhyeta ityatra kimidam sat vivakṣitam etc." (Pp. 9-10, Ibid).

45. "Svāpna-Śuktau bāhya-rūpyādeḥ upasaṁgrahāya prātibhāsikādapi nikṛṣṭasya etc." (P. 174, SSD.).

appears as a snake and then a piece of bamboo appears as a snake. Here the snake is an invariable constant and still it is not ; but, the rope and the piece of bamboo, which are variable, are still real. If invariability be the test of reality, even 'difference' and 'negation' would be real, contrary to the ruling of the Advaitin[46]. Veṅkaṭa further castigates the 'shameless ardour', as he says, of the Advaitin to establish 'anirvācyatva' (and thereby define it) through the rejection of four extremes of reality. He boldly lays bare the hollowness of the conception of 'anirvācya' which is neither something different from the expressible, nor something devoid of expression, nor something different from sat and asat, nor something different from both Brahman and the utterly naught. The Advaitin refutes all definitions and concludes that everything is, therefore, undefinable. But, here Veṅkaṭa objects and takes the plea that the Advaitin cannot define 'anirvacanīya' and hence, it being not established, everything may be equally well said to be definable. Further, the Advaitin cannot define his refutation of 'definability' and hence the definability of the world remains unhurt. (kiñcā-nirvacanīyatva-khaṇḍanoktyaniruktitaḥ/viśva-nirvacanīyatvam akhaṇḍitam apekṣyatām" (p. 418, TMK.).

Vācaspati Miśra in his Nyāya-Vārttika-Tātparya-ṭīkā asserts that indefinability does not involve the unreality of an experienced fact ("Anirvācyam api anubhūyamānam aśakyāpahnavam'). Rāmānuja's vitriolic diatribe against the Māyāvāda of the Advaitins as summed up by him in his celebrated thesis styled 'seven-fold inconsistencey' has really been never satisfactorily countered[47]. But, among the later dualists, Vyāsatīrtha seems to deal the final death-blow to Māyāvāda beyond all hope of revivifying it except through cavilry and unmeaning sophistical claptrap. In his Nyāyāmṛta he tries all the five definitions of 'mithyātva' as offered by the Advaitins and

46. "Vyāvṛttyanuvṛtti-mātraṁ tu na mithyātvādi-prayojakam ; Tathā hi—Vyāvṛtte' pi hi satyatvaṁ rajju-vaṁśādike sphuṭam/Tatraiva cānuvṛttasya mithyātvam api bhoginaḥ//...//Sat sad ityanuvṛttyā cet sataḥ Satyatvam iṣyate etc. (P. 94, Nsi.).

47. The 'saptadhā anupapattiḥ of Rāmānuja is as follows :—

(1) Avidyāsvarūpānupapattiḥ, (2) Āśrayatvānupapattiḥ, (3) Tirodhānānupapattiḥ, (4) Pramāṇānupapattiḥ, (5) Anirvacanīyatvānupapattiḥ, (6) Avidyā-nivartakānupapattiḥ, (7) Avidyā-nivṛttyanupapattiḥ.

dismisses them as unsound. He argues that the tri-temporal negation of the world as proposed by the Advaitin may be either real, or phenomenal, or illusory. The first alternative leads to dualism since, besides Brahman, there will occur the reality of the negation also. If it is argued by the Advaitin that the real negation would be but Brahman itself, then this 'mithyātva' being identical with Brahman would be uncognisable contrary to the general Advaitic postulate that only illusory entities are cognisable. If the negation be phenomenal, the world would turn out to be real and if it be illusory, the Advaitic inference will be open to the charge of proving the proven and the world would again be real[48]. However, is this negation a negation of the world or the nacre-silver etc. in its own intrinsic nature ('svarūpa') or as transcendentally real ? The first alternative is admissible only if the negatum be 'asat' ; for, tri-temporal negation of something different from 'asat' is inadmissible. So, if the 'anirvācya' suffers tri-temporal negation in its own intrinsic nature, it becomes indistinguishable from 'asat'. The second alternative will lead to the fallacy of inter-dependence and to the negation and consequent 'mithyātva' of the self also ("Rūpyādestāttvikatvena niṣedha-stvātmano' pi ca" P. 84, Nyāyāmṛta, Mm.'s ed.).

Vyāsa-tīrtha now, for argument's sake, takes for granted any account of 'mithyātva' and asks whether it is uncontradicted or not. If it is uncontradicted i.e. real, this 'mithyātva' of the world would be another real beside Brahman, thus damaging the Advaita theory. If, however, it is contradicted, the world would be real even like the self ("Mithyātvaṁ yadyabādhyaṁ syāt, sad-advaita-mata-Kṣatiḥ/Mithyātvaṁ yadi bādhyaṁ syāj-jagatsatyatvam āpatet" P. 112, Ibid.). The Advaitin cannot reasonably raise the charge of 'nitya-samā jati' against this argument ; for, this argument neither involves any self-contradiction, nor does it lay violent hands on the specific quality of the qualificand ("Svavyāghātādeḥ abhāvāt" Loc. cit.). The Advaitin might argue here, as he really does, that since the qualificand is illusory, its qualification of 'satyatva' and 'mithyātva' would

48. "Traikālika-niṣedhasya tāttvikatve advaita-hāneḥ, prātibhāsi-katve siddha-sādhanāt, vyāvahārikatve' pi tasya bādhyatvena tāttvika-sattvāvirodhi-tvena arthāntarāt". (P. 53, Nyāyāmṛta, Mm.'s ed).

equally be illusory and the negation of one would not affirm the other ; for, the negation of one of the contradictory qualities means the affirmation of the other only when the qualificand is real lest the negation of blackness of a barren woman's son mean the affirmation of his blondness[49]. To this Vyāsa-tīrtha retorts that negatum-hood ('pratiyogitvam') as a qualification does not depend upon the reality of the qualificand like other qualities. The unreality of the qualificand makes the qualification unreal only when the latter depends upon the reality of the former. Here, however, 'mithyātva' is antagonistic to the reality of the qualificand, the world. Hence, the Advaitin's plea is hollow. Moreover, the argument of the Advaitin will lead him to interminable difficulties. For, if, as the Advaitin holds, the 'mithyātva' of the silver, though not negated in its locus, be illusory simply because of its connection with the illusory silver, then the qualities that are denied of the real Brahman would be real, thus leading to dualism. Similarly, the nacre, which is the locus of the illusory silver, would be illusory ; the difference from the real as pertaining to the nacre-silver and the world would be real and the difference from the unreal would likewise be unreal ; furthermore, if the silver and its 'mithyātva' both be 'mithyā', then the silver-cognition (i.e. error) and the cognition of its 'mithyātva' would both be invalid thus shutting out all scope for recantation. So, the Advaitic standpoint is fraught with interminable inconsistencies and is completely indefensible[50]. Vyāsa-tīrtha further discredits the Anirvacanīya view by pointing out that one never intuits that the silver is destroyed by the nacre-cognition, nor does one have the cognitions 'śuktya-

49. "Nanu rūpya-dharmo mithyātvam api mithyaiva...Dharmiṇo mithyātve viruddhayorapi dharmayoḥ mithyātvāt. Paraspara-viruddhayoḥ ekasya abhāve anyasya sattva-niyamastu yatra dharmī satyaḥ tatraiva. Na hi Vandhyā-sutasya śyāmatvādyabhāve gauratvaṁ satyam". (P. 104, Nyāyāmṛta, Mm.'s ed)

50. "Na ca pratiyogitvaṁ dharmāntaravat dharmi-sattāpekṣam...Dharmyasattve dharmāsattvaṁ tu dharmi-sattāsāpekṣa-dharma-viṣayam, mithyātvaṁ tu tat-pratikūlam...kiñca pratipannopādhau aniṣiddhaṁ pratyuta bādhaka-jñānena vihitam api rūpya-mithyātvaṁ yadi prātibhāsika-rūpya-sambandhamātreṇa prātibhāsikam, tarhi sati Brahmaṇi niṣiddhā api dharmāḥ santaḥ syuḥ. Rūpyādhiṣṭhāna-śuktirapi prātibhāsikī syāt etc. etc." (P. 104, Ibld.)

jñānaṁ nāsīt' and 'bhramo nāsīt' after the recanting cognition of the nacre. The former proves that there was really no silver to be destryed by the nacre-cognition and the latter shows that 'ajñāna' and 'bhrama' are real like their substratum. The Advaitic postulate that if the cognitum be illusory, the cognition would also be so, is unsound on his own showing. For, according to him, the real witness-consciousness is the cogniser of false pleasure and pain ; so, error need not be illusory, though the nacre-silver be such[51].

Mādhavamukunda (and Vyāsa-tīrtha too) raises an interesting pointer against the Advaita view in the following manner :— The Advaitin holds that the psychosis characterised by the pitcher removes the individual nescience pertaining to the consciousness delimited by the pitcher, though the cosmic nescience still persists. But, this is inadmissible ; for, if the consciousness, which is the object of the psychosis, be real, it can no longer be cognisable ('dṛśya') i.e. an object of a cognition ; if, however, it be unreal, it cannot be the substratum of the super-imposed pitcher inasmuch as it possesses no greater reality than the pitcher. Moreover, though the individual nescience is removed, the cosmic nescience still persists to veil the pitcher ("Na ca śuddha-viṣayaka-mūlājñānānivṛttau api ghaṭādyākāra-vṛttyā tūlājñāna-nivṛttyā ghaṭa-prakāśopapatti-riti vācyam, ghaṭākāravṛttyā viṣayīkṛtasya cetanasya satyatve dṛśyatvasya vyabhicārāpatteḥ. Mithyātve ca adhyastādhika-sattākatvābhāvena adhiṣṭhānatvāsambhavāt. Kṣudrājñāna-nivṛttāvapi mahājñānāvṛtasya aprakā-śakatvācca." (P. 103, PPGV.)

The Advaitic theories of reflection ('pratibimba-vāda'), of adjunctive semblance ('ābhāsavāda') and of delimitation ('avaccheda-vāda') also have been violently impugned by the rival philosophers. The sovereign argument against all these theories is that Brahman, who is devoid of all limiting adjuncts and specification and is formless, can on no computation accommodate itself to these theories. We do not like to embark on the traditional arguments against these theories, but we shall here refer to only one argument of Rākhāldās Nyāyaratna from his Māyāvāda-nirāsaḥ. The theory of reflection may somehow

51. Vide Pp. 86-87, Nyāyāmṛta, Mm.s ed.

explain the various visual forms ; but, it cannot explain the diverse kinds of olfactory, tactual, auditory and gustatory sensations ; for, no one apprehends in a reflection any odour, sound etc. So, the world, which lends itself to all the five senses, is a direct challenge to the theory of reflection ("Tat-pratibimbeṣu rāsanaspārśanā-deḥ katham api nirvāhāsambhavāt ; na hi rasādikam kasminnapi pratibimbe ko'pi sākṣāt-karoti. Etena Pratibimba-vādo' pi nirākṛtaḥ").

Jayatīrtha in his Nyāyasudhā asserts that whatever inference the Advaitin might hatch up to prove the illusoriness of the nacre-silver etc., that would invariably be found to be fallacious. Presumptive evidence ('arthāpatti'), which is called into request by the Advaitin to prove the point, is also unavailing. For, the negation of both 'sat' and 'asat' separately as demonstrated by them does not stand to reason. And perception, particularly the recanting perception, proves to the contrary that it is merely 'asat'. So, its illusoriness cannot be logically proved ("Nānumānāt śukti-rajatādeḥ anirvācyatā-siddhiḥ. Khyāti-bādhānyathānupapattiśca anenaiva nirākṛtā veditavyā"). The invalid cognition of the nacre-silver cannot be said to be generated by nescience as defect. For, the cognition of the substratum as 'this' is through the psychosis and as such it is valid, not being generated by defect ; the cognition of the predicate 'silver' is due to defect certainly, but it is not 'cognition', being apprehended through avidyā-vṛtti ; And the witness-cognition is not generated at all. The Advaitin cannot explain why the illusory silver should, contrary to its illusoriness, be apprehended as real at the time of its cognition and as unreal at the time of recantation. Moreover, if the nacre-silver be the transformation of avidyā, which pertains to the self, it should be apprehended as 'I am silver' (or, at least, 'in me is silver'). If it is argued that, the self as consciousness being ubiquitous, the silver, which is the transformation of avidyā pertaining to the consciousness delimited by the nacre, is apprehended in identity with the latter wherefore it appears not as 'I am silver', the retort would be that, in the circumstances stated, there would arise the contingency of the entire nacre (or even the whole world of things) being apprehended ('Tathā sati sarvopalabdhi-prasaṅgāt.). The nacre-silver, again, cannot be assumed to be apprehended through sense-contact ; for, its apprehension is said to be synchronous

with its creation. Nor can it be apprehended through (the revival of) impressions ; for, our intuition does not dictate such a conclusion, nor can it be said to be apprehended by the witness-consciousness since that would cut across the serviceability of sense-operation in this regard. It may be argued against this position that though the silver is apprehended directly by the witness-consciousness, it is apprehended in identity with the nacre which is intuited through the sense. So, sense-operation is not shut out. But, Jayatīrtha here replies that there is nothing to warrant the regulation that the silver thus apprehended should be apprehended in identity with the nacre ("Śukti-sambheda-pratītiniyame niyāmakābhāvāt").

Further, if the silver and its substrate be apprehended respectively by the 'sākṣin' and the visual organ, it would affiliate the Advaitin's position to the Prābhākara Akhyāti and post-cognitional volitional activity would be inexplicable ("......akhyāti-matānumati-prasaṅgena pravṛttyādyanu-papattiḥ"). If it is argued that the sākṣin apprehends also the identity of the silver with the nacre, even then the theory suffers from the defect of assuming two discrete cognitions contrary to our experience. If, now, it is urged that the two cognitions have an identity of result ('phalaikyāt') in the witness-conciousness through apperception, Jayatīrtha would demur to the effect that this scheme of the operation of Sākṣin as drawn up by the Advaitin is wholly wide of the mark and unjustifiable (cf. "Sudṛḍho nirṇayo yatra jñeyaṁ tat sākṣi-darśanam" Madhva quoted in Tarka-tāṇḍavam of Vyāsatīrtha, p. 120).

We may submit in this connection that if this scheme of Sākṣin's operation be admissible, then any two succeeding cognitions, whether direct and/or indirect, mediate and/or immediate severally may be integrated by the Sākṣin to form one cognition ; the invalid cognition and the subsequent recanting cognition may thus be integrated with the result that the unified cognition would take the form of a doubt which rocks between a pair of alternating certitude—an absurd situation. It is clear that if we extend this our humble argument in the field of cosmic illusion, it would be proved that the world can never be sublated : for, this sublating cognition would always remain unified with the previous uncontradicted experience of the world.

So, the contingency of two discrete cognitions, contrary to our experience, and the consequent absence of volitional activity is unavoidable.

That is why Nṛsiṁha Bhaṭṭa, a later Advaitin, denies the existence of the psychosis 'this' before the emergence of the invalid psychosis. For, he thinks that the assumption of its previous existence leads to the admission of two discrete cognitions, contrary to our experience. ("Na tāvad bhrama-rūpa-vṛtti-vyatirekeṇa idamākārā vṛttiranubhava-siddhā jñāna-dvitvānanu-bhavāt". p. 38, SLS). He points out that the subject of the erroneous judgment cannot be cognised as apart from its predicate. This remark holds good particularly in the case of the invalid judgment 'the conch-shell is yellow'; for, in this case, the eye cannot apprehend the conch-shell as apart from its colour ("Tathā sati pīta-śaṅkha-bhrame cakṣuranapekṣā-prasaṅgāt......rūpaṁ vinā kevala-śaṅkhasya cakṣu-rgrāhyatvā-yogāt" p. 41, Ibid.). He, therefore, suggests a single psychosis through sense-contact which comprehends the silver in identity with 'this' (vide p. 43, SLS). Against this, however, we need only say that this is pathetically absurd and symptomatic of die-hard bigotry.

Jaya-tīrtha now directs his offensive on Anirvacanīya-khyāti in another direction in common with many other scholars. The question is :—does the illusory silver of the Advaitic conception appear in the invalid cognition as illusory, or as existent, or as non-existent ? It is clear that the last two alternatives, apart from other defects, lead to an admission of Anyathākhyāti ; for, the illusory appears not as illusory, but as real or unreal. The first and the third alternatives are contrary to our experience and, even if conceded, will signal the complete absence of any volitional urge. So, in deference to our experience and the consequent volition, the silver must be taken to appear as existent. Certainly there can be no cognition which steers clear of both affirmation and negation. Hence, the silver must appear as real. But, now the question arises :—is this reality or existence real, unreal or illusory ? The first alternative contradicts illusoriness and is, therefore, inadmissible. If the third alternative be welcomed, that is to say, if the reality apprehended be illusory i.e. merely apprehensional, then it boils down to this that the illusory silver

appears as real, whose reality is, again, illusory i.e. mere appearance. Naturally, then, there will again arise the contigency of absence of volition (Tasya Sattvasya anirvacanīyatve prātītikatve tathaiva pratītau svarūpa-mātra-pratītau vā syādevānavasthitiḥ/avyavasthitiḥ/pravṛtteriti śeṣaḥ" NS.) (To my mind, it appears that 'anavasthiti' here means infinite regress also ; for, to avoid the contingency of absence of volition, the illusoriness of the apprehended reality of the illusory silver must be taken to appear as real, whose reality again would be illusory and so on). If, however, the second alternative be accepted, the Advaitin will have to give his seal of approval on the 'asat' being even immediately apprehended. But, the Advaitin might worm out of this impasse by asserting that the reality apprehended in the illusory silver is real, the real reality of the nacre being transferred to it. So, according to him, the mutual relation between 'this-ness' and 'silver-ness' and the relation of the reality of 'this' with the silver are both indescribable i.e. illusory. But Jayatīrtha would readily retort that this would also lead to infinite regress ("Idantā-rajatatvayoḥ itaretara-saṁsargasya tathā rajate śuktikā-sattva-saṁsargasya anirvacanīyatve" ṅgīkriyamāṇe anavasthitiḥ syāt" Ibid.). For, here also it might be asked whether this 'anirvacanīyatā' of the two-fold relation appears as 'prātibhāsika' or 'vyāvahārika'. The first alternative cuts at the root of 'pravṛtti'. The second alternative gives rise to the following question :—Is this phenomenality real or unreal ? The first is absurd, since it contradicts illusoriness and the second leads to the acceptance of 'asat' as being immediately apprehended. If, however, the phenomenality be again illusory, then the whole array of arguments against the theory will have to be rehearsed, thus leading to infinite regress.

Mādhavamukunda points out that nescience cannot be taken as the material cause of the object of invalid cognition. For, had it been so, then the super-imposed yellowness of the conch-shell would not have outlived the removal of nescience pertaining to whiteness of the conch-shell. The plea that the adventitious adjunct ('upādhi') is responsible for this is unsound ; for, the cessation of the material cause means the cessation of its effect (vide PPGV., p. 657). The argument may be advanced from the other end also. It is common knowledge that a man with

jaundiced eyes sees a conch-shell yellow though he knows quite well its real colour. So, here the origin of the yellowness is not certainly caused by nescience ("Adhiṣṭhāna-jñāne'pi śaṅkha-pītimotpatteḥ adhiṣṭhāna-jñānasya utpādakatvāyogāt". p. 47, Bhā. Ci.).

Mahādeva punatāmakara argues that the admission of the illusory silver cannot prompt any purposive activity. If the Advaitin explains activity by assuming the cognition of identity between the phenomenal silver and the illusory one, Mahādeva will argue that in the case of the erroneous zinc-silver ('raṅga-rajatam'), it would be more apposite to assume the cognition of identity between zinc and silver. This would be all the more welcome because it would not encourage the complex assumption of the origin of infinite series of silver, its destruction and its causes and conditions.

Now, I shall take the liberty of trying to say something in my humble way against the theory of Anirvacanīya-khyāti. It has already been shown, following the scholars of the opposite camp, that since the 'anirvacanīya' silver appears in intuition as real and is subsequently recanted as characterised by the hetero-locative ('vyadhikaraṇa') attribute of 'vyāvahārikatva', the Advaitin must acquiesce in psychological Anyathākhyāti at least. But, now I would try to show that Anyathākhyāti is at the very root of Anirvacanīyakhyāti. The advaitin holds that the 'anirvācya' nescience creates all illusion and error with the help of its two potencies. The first called 'āvaraṇa' screens an entity, while the second called 'vlkṣepa' makes it appear as something else. A discerning mind will not fail to notice here that the potency called 'vikṣepa' has but the function of anyathākhyāti. So, it is quite clear that the concept of Vikṣepa itself is the unswerving guarantee for ontological anyathā-khyāti. So, when the Advaitin refutes that theory and dubs it as illogical and unpsychological, he cuts at the very root of his own theory also.

Next, it is difficult to understand how the two potencies of nescience, namely, āvaraṇa and vikṣepa, may operate on the same entity simultaneously or successively. For, what is screened cannot reveal itself, whether in its own or in some different from. Moreover, why should not this screening potency

shut out the transforming potency from operating on the entity? It may be argued that ajñāna lies embedded in the entity itself, and, though the entity be screened, the vikṣepa-potency may very well function from within it. But, even then the result of vikṣepa will not be perceived, the entity being screened by the āvaraṇa-potency. So, when there is 'āvaraṇa', vikṣepa cannot operate, and when 'āvaraṇa' is absent, vikṣepa has no scope at all. It may further be asked here if there is any causal relation or any other necessary concomitance between the two potencies. If not, one may not follow the other, and the cessation of one may not signal the cessatfon of the other. If, however, they are somehow causally related, the universal process of involution or dissolution demands that the effect (i.e. the vikṣepa here naturally) should go first, unless the two be something like a screen and its shadow. But, the Advaitin postulates in many cases a straggling vikṣepa, particularly in the case of the world-illusion, which would be unreasonable.

The next question that may be raised against the theory is as to when the two potencies operate on an entity. Do they operate when the entity is perceived, or when it is not? If they operate when the entity is not perceived, their operation will remain absolutely in the dark; for, the moment it is perceived, they will cease to operate. It further means that our perception will give proper shape and form to an erstwhile distorted entity, though its previous distortion will not be known to us. A cognition, then, will always be a rectifying cognition and there will be no erroneous cognition. If, however, they operate when the entity is perceived, it will really not be perceived, or else its transformation will be perceived, if at all. In other words, our act of perceiving will transform the entity. So, we shall never come to know the real entity and, for the matter of that, the transformed entity as transformation. Hence the potencies postulated will remain unknown and unknowable. If the Advaitin has still the hardihood of arguing that nescience will be intuited by the witness-consciousness, we shall point out that it should be known as unknown and unknowable and that also only when it is previously ascertained to be existent. Otherwise, why should not the Advaitin accept the immediate cognition of 'asat'?

Now, it may be asked how the illusory silver is produced. Apart from the theistic objection that no individual other than God Himself can create anything—even Vidyāraṇya accepts this position (Cf. "Īśa-Kāryaṁ jīvabhogyaṁ jagad dvābhyāṁ samanvitam" P. 90, PD.)[52]—and also apart from the objection that Ajñāna cannot immediately evolve into a silver in the absence of its material constituents and suitable environment, I want to point out here that the very supposition of the erroneous silver evolving from the 'this'-delimited nescience is inadmissible. For, the mental mode generated through sense-contact with the 'this' certainly removes its nescience, which, therefore, is non-existent at the moment. Here the removal of nescience must signify the removal of its vikṣepa-potency ; for, the majority of Advaitins do not postulate any āvaraṇa in insentient entities ("jaḍeṣu āvaraṇānaṅgīkāre na Ko'pi doṣaḥ" P. 151, VPS). This, again, proves that vikṣepa would pre-exist sense-contact, thus making the theory open to the charges put forward in the previous paragraph. But, that apart, no nescience is available here which would evolve into the silver. The advocacy of Vidyāraṇya that the charge may be successfully countered by holding that the form as 'this' is known, but as 'nacre' is unknown (vide P. 149, VPS) is ludicrous and may be dismissed unceremoniously. So. nescience cannot evolve into silver. Moreover, the Advaitin cannot cite another instance where nescience directly evolves into material objects.

Again, in the case of 'sopādhika bhrama' like the yellow conch-shell, the recanting mental mode cannot remove vikṣepa, the other potency of nescience being non-operative on it ; for, the experience persists even after the recanting cognition. Hence, it must be conceded that a mental mode cannot remove nescience.

But, the Advaitins, far from being silenced by these arguments[53], would exhibit superb calisthenics and conjure up

52. Vidyāraṇya says in the next śloka : "Māyā-vṛttyātmako hīśa-saṅkalpaḥ sādhanaṁ janau/Mano-vṛttyātmako jīva-saṅkalpo bhoga-sādhanam//" (P. 90, PD). So, God creates and not jīva. *Again*, Vidyāraṇya says : "Mṛnmayo māna-meyaḥ syāt sākṣi-bhāsya-stu dhīmayaḥ" (P. 94, PD.). This shows that the illusory silver is only 'dhīmayaḥ' i. e. mental.

53. Aptly does Rākhāldās Nyāyaratna say : "Advaitavādināṁ tṛptirna syād yuktiśatairapi/Na bhūri-vāriṇa śāmyet pipāsā sānnipātikī"//

a new line of defence. Now, they would say that ajñāna may be of three kinds according as it resorts to the existence-part, knowledge-part or bliss-part of consciousness, though they would caution in the same breath that 'Sattā', 'caitanya' and 'ānanda' are not three different attributes. So, the mental mode may very well remove the first two varieties of ajñāna, while the third may straggle on till liberation and create a silver etc. But, this is clear dualism, however much the Advaitins might assert to the contrary. Moreover, if this third variety, the material of silver, persists till liberation, the silver also must share its lot ; if, however, it is removed earlier, bliss will be experienced ; but, it is not. Therefore, the position does not stand scrutiny.

Then, we may point out another incongruity to the following effect :—The silver persists so long as the cognition of nacre does not arise. But, how can the cognition of nacre arise at all, the nacre being now screened by the silver ? All subsequent vṛttis, that would arise, should, therefore, necessarily take the form of silver and the nescience of the nacre will not be removed at all. Even if the nescience be removed somehow, the avidyā-vṛtti should not cease to function since it is supposed not to depend on sense-contact with the object. It cannot be argued that since two vṛttis cannot operate simultaneously, the avidyāvṛtti will not withstand the emergence of the nacre-vṛtti. For, this may hold good in regard to mental modes ; but, avidyā-vṛtti, being different from antaḥ-karaṇa-vṛtti, and being cognised by the witness-consciousness which is different from the mind-delimited consciousness that apprehends the mental mode, should in all fairness to logic, not cease to exist. Hence, the silver would persist even after the intuition of the nacre, its substratum.

The Advaitin holds that the nacre-silver is indescribable and hence its cognition also is indescribable (Cf. "Na hi jñeyasya anirvacanīya-tve taj-jñānasya nirvacanīya-tvaṁ nyāyyam". p. 48, IS.). But, this does not stand to reason. The cognition may only be called 'indescribable' in the sense that its object is 'indescribable' ; but, it cannot mean that it itself is 'indescrib-able' i.e. devoid of being ascertained as 'sat' or 'asat'. One cannot certainly argue that since the cognitum is black or white, the cognition also is black or white. So, it cannot be

proved in the manner of IS. that the cognition of the nacre-silver is also 'mithyā'.

In fact the word 'anirvācya' itself proves that there is no logical category between real and unreal which two are incontrovertibly contradictory, not merely contrary. Moreover, the Advaitin distorts the temporal frame of reference to arrive at the fetish of 'anirvacanīya'. For, the non-existence of an entity today need not logically injure its existence yesterday. If the Advaitin says that the recanting cognition takes the form 'rajataṁ nāsīt'—which, however, is extremely doubtful—, then we must say that the silver is in that case a clear non-entity. So, the Advaitic acrobatics does not transport the theory to an inviolable sphere.

The Advaitin holds that thc 'Prātibhāsika' reality is rejected by the 'vyāvahārika' reality, which latter again, is sublated by the 'pārāmārthika' reality. But, how can the Advaitin prove thgt the reality coming third in the ascending order is really 'pāramārthika' and will not be rejected by a subsequent reality ? Hence, it is clear that the Advaitin's supposition leads to infinite regress and thus shuts out all possibility of arriving at the ultimate, indubitable truth.

The Advaitic analysis of 'Jāgrat', 'svapna' and 'suṣupti' states with a view to proving the invariable, non-remittent pervasion of consciousness through all these states and its consequent reality to the exclusion of others is open to question[54]. For, analysis shows that not 'jñāna' merely, but 'jñātā' also, pervades all these states and he also should, therefore, be called real—a position which would be the undoing of the Advaita.

The Advaitin holds that the 'mithyātva' of the world is itself 'mithyā'. It means that the 'mithyātva' of the world is not ascertainable in terms of 'sat' and 'asat'. Now, when the 'mithyātva' is 'asat', the world will be real again. The Advaitin might demur that he does not affirm existence and non-existence in turn, but only negates them both. But, this has already been shown to be unsound. It can be proved further by rebutting the Advaitic presumptive argument "Sat cet na bādhyeta, asat cet na pratīyeta" in the manner : "pratīyate iti sat, bādhyate iti

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54. Vide vidyaraṇya's PD., Pp. 2-4, Beng. ed.

asat". So, according to our argument, which stands, the world would sometimes remain real even after sublation.

I like to bring this array of objections of my own making to a close with a humourous addendum. Suppose I mistake somebody else's wife (I do devoutly avoid calling her Advaitin's) for mine ; then, according to the Advaitic theory, my wife would be created upon that somebody else's wife. But, why should not that other good lady at least feel the weight of my wife's body, granting she cannot see her since the nescience is not hers ? So, the Advaitin has to face such ludicrous situations if he obdurately holds fast to his illogical theory of Anirvacanīyakhyāti.

Finally, we may submit that the theory denies appearance, and in so denying, it denies itself, which is a part of that appearance. Without appearance no objectivity is possible, and when objectivity evaporates, thinking follows suit. To deny thinking is to deny all philosophy. In the circumstances, the theory cannot be even asserted. In fact, the Advaitic māyā, the matrix of all manner of inconsistencies, was assumed by the Advaitin to salvage his philosophy from the sea of inimical diatribes by stupefying the logical thinking of his rivals, but, ultimately it has landed him in interminable contradictions and paved the way for its final undoing.

CHAPTER XV

ACINTYA-KHYĀTI

Now, I shall briefly present a theory which is metaphysically perhaps the nearest approach to Advaitavāda, excluding its māyāvāda, and is at the same time ethically its deadliest enemy. This theory of error is called Acintya-khyāti by its protagonist, Jīva Gosvāmin, a devout ascetic follower of Śree Caitanya, the founder of the Bengal School of Vaisnavism characterised by (so-called) emotional abandon. This theory of error is based on the metaphysical theory of Acintya-bhedābheda as propounded orally by Śree Caitanya and then transmitted into writing by Jīva Gosvāmin in his ṣaṭ-sandarbha and Sarva-Sambādinī. This theistic school holds that non-dualistic consciousness is the ultimate all-sustaining truth which manifests itself in the ascending order in the forms of Brahman, Paramātman and Bhagavān[1]. The first two are only imperfect truth, while the latter is the whole of Truth, because it conserves within itself the other two forms. The world is not an indescribable phantasy, but a reality, though transitory. The Jīva also is not 'mithyā', but a real infinitesimal manifestation of the potency of God. God has three potencies :—Cit-śakti, Jīva-Śakti and Māyā-Śakti. The Jīvas and the world are the real transformation of the second and the third potencies, respectively. So, they are real. This transformation of God's potency does not make him mutable in nature. The omnipotent God is unchangeable just like the philosopher's stone. God is possessed of infinite benefic qualities and is 'saviśeṣa', though Brahman is 'nirviśeṣa'. The relation between God and Jīva is acintya-bhedābheda ; for, God and Jīva are both 'saccidānanda' ; but, God is ubiquitous and the lord of Māyā, while the Jīva is infinitesimal and under the thraldom of Māyā. This 'bheda' and 'abheda' conceived together is 'acintya'. The relation between the potency and the potentate also is one of 'acintya-bhedābheda'.

Scholars generally think that 'acintya' and 'anirvacanīya' are interchangeable terms. But, that is furthest from the truth.

1. The word is 'sambādinī' from the root √bada Sthairye, and not from the root √vada, as is generally misunderstood.

When the facts of experience or scriptural knowledge are related one to the other without pruning or distorting them through logical see-saw and are found to be contradictory, both are accepted together and this relation of the contradictories is called 'acintya'. But, 'anirvacanīya' starts and ends by denying the facts of experience through logic and affirms none of the extremes. Moreover, 'anirvacanīya' means a grade of reality, while 'acintya' has no such sense.

While explaining the quatrain 'Vikalpaḥ khyāti-vādinām' of the 24th śloka of the 11th Skandha of Bhāgavatam, Jīva Gosvāmin says the following : "......te ca vikalpā mama śaktimayā eveti na parasparam adyāpi vyucchidyante. Tatastat-pratipādyasya śakteścācintyatvaṁ vijñāpya tanmayatvāt sarvatra acintya-khyātitvam eva pratipāditam" (Krama-sandarbha). It is difficult to ascertain what Śrī Jīva exactly means by the expression 'acintya-khyātitvam' here. It may mean that all the 'vikalpas' i.e. the different conflicting khyāti-vādas are to be accepted together with a view to making amends for the deficiencies of the one by the others ; Or, it may mean that the logical antipodes must fraternise to explain an invalid cognition. We shall presently see, while going into details, that Śrī Jīva has a fancy for Anyathākhyāti mixed with a type of Anirvacanīyakhyāti (if that term be at all applicable here) in the field of epistemological error ; still, his view may be called acintya-khyāti in the sense that all kinds of apprehension (not only the invalid ones) are 'acintya' from the stand-point of logical categorisation (Cf. "Śaktayaḥ sarvabhāvānām acintya-jñāna-gocarāḥ" VP.).

Jīva Gosvāmin introduces his discussion of error with the assertion of three pre-conditions of error, which are as follow :—(1) Error pertains to determinate cognition and to a 'saviśeṣa' entity, not to indeterminate cognition and to an entity devoid of all characterisation (Nirvikalpa-pratyaye bhramābhāvāt saviśeṣe eva pravartate" P. 98, Sarvasambādinī, vangīya Sāhitya pariṣat ed.), (2) That alone may be superimposed which has an existence somewhere ("Anyatra-siddhasya vastuna eva anyatrāropo mithyā-kha-puṣpāderāropāsambhavāt" P. 248, ṣaṭ-sandarbha), and (3) error generally thrives on similarity. From the first pre-condition it follows that the attributeless Brahman of the Advaitic conception cannot be the object of error. The second condition

coupled with the third implies that error depends upon superimposition of an existent entity upon another through cognition of similarity. A totally non-existent entity like the hare's horn cannot be super-imposed anywhere. The perception of a mirage, he says, is due to the awakening through similarity, of the psychosis, having the form of water, which was generated previously through the perception of water and lay so long latent. So, water is not an utter naught ; nor is the water-psychosis, which is a recollection, and the mirage which is similar to water, 'mithyā'. But, the superimposition in identity is 'mithyā' ("Kintu tadabhedena āropa evāyathārthatvāt mithyā P. 248"). So, there is no entitative falsity ; but, falsity pertains only to the superimposition ("Tasmāt vastutastu na Kvacidapi mithyātvam" Ibid). So, according to Śrī Jīva, there is no objective falsity, but mere subjective falsity. He does not hesitate to assert that superimposition of (say) a silver, which exists elsewhere, is possible only in a locus (say, a nacre) where it is really not in all the dimensions of time ("Yatra hi yannāsti kintu anyatraiva dṛśyate tatraive tadāropah siddhaḥ" P. 290 ; Also "Yadyapi tasya trikālameva so' ṛtho nāsti". P. 271, ṣaṭ-sandarbha). So, the silver in the locus of the nacre is 'mithyā' i.e. non-existent. The nacre-silver has mere cognitional existence, but has no purposive activity. According to Śrī Jīva, that alone is real which may be apprehended and may prompt purposive activity ("Śuktyādāveva prātītika-mātra-sattākaṁ rajatādikaṁ mṛṣā. Anyatra yatra ubhayam pratītimarth-kriyā-kāritvañca yunakti bhajate tatra na tathā mṛṣeti" P. 257, Ibid.). The points to be noted here are the following :—(1) Śrī Jīva generally uses the word 'mithyā' in the sense of 'asat', though sometimes he may doubtfully seem to use it in the Advaitic sense of 'sad-asad-bhyām anirvacanīyam'[2], (2) the nacre-silver is 'pratītimātra-sattākam' i.e. has only apprehensional existence and that also in 'śuktyādāveva' ; outside nacre, however, it has objective existence. It is not 'pratīti-samaya-sattāka' as the Advaitins aver. So, according to Śrī Jīva, there is no question of alternating negation of existence and non-existence of the silver. Indeed, he clearly asserts that the nacre-silver is not created from the nacre, but is

2. Perhaps the second sense in which he uses the word 'mithyā' is not the Advaitic sense, but is 'svātantryeṇa anirūpya'.

superimposed upon it ("rajataṁ na śuktyuttham, kintu tasmin adhyastam eva". P. 147, Sarvasambādinī).

Dream-objects also are not creations ; nor are they 'mithyā' in the Advaitic sense. Even the dream-cognition of being beheaded is nothing but the super-imposition by the Māyā of God upon the cogniser of a similar situation that occurred elsewhere.

The world is neither 'mithyā' in the Advaitic sense, nor 'asat', but is merely transitory, though real. So, according to Śrī Jīva, the world is not a tissue of Advaitic 'mithyātva', nor is the Jīva-hood 'mithyā' ; but, identification of the body and the self and such other kinds of super-imposition are alone 'mithyā' in the Advaitic sense. The point needs being stated once again in clear terms that the nacre-silver is 'mithyā' only in the sense of 'asat', while the super-imposition here is 'mithyā' in the Advaitic sense. Hence, the theory partly adopts an intermixture of Anyathākhyāti and Asatkhyāti and partly Anirvacanīyakhyāti. Here the cognition of superimposition is anirvacanīya, though the cognitum is not so, being clearly 'asat'.

But, the world, the identification of the body and the self etc. are 'mithyā' in a deeper metaphysical sense. God is different from the world, the Jīva etc., but the latter are non-different from Him, being manifestations of His potency. So, when these latter are viewed as different from and independent of God, they are 'mithyā'. But, this mithyātva means 'unascertain-ability as an independent entity' i.e. 'acintyatva'. It is from this metaphysical stand-point that one may speak of acintyakhyāti in all the spheres of human experience. In the narrower field of errors, acintyakhyāti is applicable in the sense that all these errors are due to Māyā, a real potency of God, which baffles and is beyond all thinking ("yā ca nayena tarkeṇa viruddhyate tarkātītatayā seyam api acintyā" P. 270, Saṭ-sandarbha),

CHAPTER XVI

TOWARDS A THEORY OF ERROR

Now, I shall try to construct a theory of Error, according to my poor lights and poorer power of cerebration. This my endeavour may smack of blinking prudery, may seem to betray vaulting vanity, or, at its worst, may appear diabolically blasphemous to diehard bigotry. But, as a sincere and meek seeker after truth, I must assert that Platos are dear, but truth is dearer still. And I must further submit, though very modestly, that I have an advantage over the illustrious galaxy of philosophers whose views have been presented here. I am a freelance, owing no allegiance to any particular system of thought, and, in trying to formulate a theory of Error, am not going to fit it into an all-out philosophical system of my own. So, my theory would offer the least scope for self-contradiction and, consequently, for dogmatic assertion. The theories discussed previously suffer mostly from their sectarian bias. Their methodology also, which thrives mostly on the discovery of self-contradiction of the rival theories and on Lāghava Tarka, are highly suspect. For, self-contradiction need not necessarily disprove the conclusion ; the conclusion may very well be factually right, though the premises be wrong. Likewise, 'Lāghava' may lead us to extravagant falsity, while 'Gaurava' may be shown in many cases to represent reality precisely (Cf. "Kiñcaivam antya-tantu-saṁyoga-paryanta-kāraṇa-kalāpam upādāya paṭo'pi nāṅgīkaraṇīyaḥ ; tanmātreṇa sarvasya upapatteḥ" NS). I shall, therefore, carefully avoid such methodology and shall try to base my arguments on experience so that they may not make wild excursion into unrealistic abstraction of thought.

The phenomenon of the invalid cognition of the form 'this is silver' when analysed, yields the following facts :—

A nacre is in front of the perceiver. His eye has contact with it and he perceives certain features of the nacre that are present in a silver also. But, before he perceives the specific features of the nacre, the cognition of the features common to the nacre and the silver arouses in his mind the latent impressions of silver previously cognised and the recollected silver is now superimposed upon the nacre, thus giving rise to the cognition 'this

is silver'. The 'this' here refers to the nacre, which must be taken as the 'ālambana' of the cognition, no matter whether we take 'ālambana' in one sense or the other. For, 'arthāpatti' or 'anvaya-vyatireka' proves indisputably that the nacre must be the 'ālambana' here, in the absence of sense-contact with which the cognition would not arise at all. The cognition as 'this' is not an indeterminate cognition ; for, the 'this' does not appear uncharacterised ; it, on the contrary, appears characterised, though only by properties common to both the nacre and the silver. So, it cannot be called indeterminate cognition according to the Sankarite, the Bhāṭṭa, the Prābhākara, the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika or the Śaṁkhya-yoga or the Vaisnavite views. *It is, therefore, determinate ; still it is devoid of recognition and this fact, to my mind, draws the line of demarcation between such invalid cognitions and valid determinate cognitions.* Recognition is absent here since the cognition of the common attributes instantly revives the latent impressions of silver which is immediately ideally projected upon the nacre with the result that its specific properties remain undiscovered.

From the above discussion we may conclude that an invalid cognition involves an element of smṛti, projection of the recollected entity upon the presented datum and absence of recognition. Now, two questions will arise : First, if it be smṛti, why do we seem to perceive the silver ? Secondly, the invalid cognition being a complex of two discrete cognitions, perception and recollection, how do we have the cognition as being one and how, again, is volitional activity possible from these two discrete cognitions ? The answers to these, as I understand them, are not far to seek. The time-scheme of the invalid cognition may be presented thus :—At the first moment my eye has contact with the nacre. At the second moment the eye perceives the nacre characterised only be the features that it shares in common with the silver. At the third moment there is recollection of silver and at the fourth moment follows unawares the super-imposition of this silver upon the nacre. Finally, at the fifth moment, I have the cognition 'this is silver'. The above objections are raised on the misconception that the cognition of the first moment combined with the recollection of the silver and its super-imposition at the third and fourth moments gives rise to the invalid cognition. But, that is not a fact. The sense-object-contact

and the cognition of 'this' persists through all these moments and it is the perception of the fifth moment which gives rise to the invalid cognition. So, it is out and out a single perception and not a complex of perception and recollection as urged above. So, there should not be any bar to volitional activity. From this we can make two deductions ; First, the silver, which is really a recollected entity, does not appear as such thus leading to Akhyāti i.e. non-apprehension of the recollective character. Secondly, this recollected silver is apprehended as a perceived one, thus paving the way for Anyathākhyāti.

Thus psychologically, every invalid cognition involves both Akhyāti and Anyathā-khyāti. But, what is the ontological position of the invalid silver ? Clearly the silver cognised in the nacre is non-existent even at the time of its cognition. For, the silver cognised is nothing but a mental construct projected outwards upon the nacre. So, it may be said to have only subjective objectivity, not objective objectivity. The Mādhvas rightly point out that the recanting cognition 'asadeva rajataṁ pratyabhāt' proves that the silver is 'asat'. The Advaitin is right when he says in regard to it that 'sat cet na bādhyeta' ; but, he definitely contradicts himself when he says 'asat cet na pratīyeta' ; for, he himself asserts almost in the same breath that the recanting cognition proclaims the tri-temporal negation of the silver. And this tri-temporal negation is possible only of an 'asat'. To assert that 'sat' and 'asat' are mere contraries and not contradictories, is to commit oneself to the charge of confusing two different provinces of discourse and their temporal frame of reference. So, the silver must be taken to be 'asat'. Hence, the invalid cognition ontologically involves Asat-Khyāti and, so psychologically too.

But, the silver is not unqualified 'asat' like the hare's horn. Really a totally non-existent entity cannot be super-imposed upon anything. Super-imposition presupposes the existence of the super-imposed entity elsewhere. Hence, the silver, though non-existent in the nacre, is existent elsewhere in the jeweller's shop etc. So, the invalid cognition may be called sad-asat-khyāti from two different spatio-temporal standpoints considered together. It may also be called Anyathākhyāti ontologically, where 'anyathātva' will mean 'spatio-temporal distortion' or 'characterisation by heterolocative attributes'.

Incidentally I beg to submit that I do not find much weight in the current contention that the hare's horn, the sky-flower, the barren woman's son etc. should be distinguished from the nacre-silver, the rope-serpent, the yellow conch-shell etc. In this regard I am toeing the line of no less a philosopher than Kumārila himself who makes no distinction between the two (Vide Ch. XI). Indeed, both the above two groups involve equally the mental operation in the shape of super-imposition. What, for instance, is a hare's horn but the result of superimposition of an elsewhere horn upon a hare in which it is not ? Just as a nacre-silver is nowhere super-imposed, so a hare's horn also is not super-imposed. Perhaps the distinction between the two groups is asserted because the hare's horn and the like are taken as simple phenomena, though factually they are complex. It would not do to point out that the hare's horn is never perceived and so it forms a separate class. For, the error may be merely conceptual. But, the sky-flower may be called perceptual illusion also. So, the distinction does not stand to reason. That is why the nacre-silver is said to be 'asat' in the locus of the nacre by many just like the hare's horn.

The efficient cause of invalid cognition is defect of various kinds which has been discussed in the Introductory. But, ajñāna as conceived by the Advaitins cannot be taken even as its efficient cause, it being the material cause being completely out of the question. Defects are not privative in nature. They may distort and pervert, but cannot rule out the effect. When the defect is removed, the illusion no longer exists. The illusions like the yellow conch-shell, the bent stick, the parallax etc. persist, even though they are known to be otherwise, simply because the defects on which they depend are not removed. This proves that ajñāna is not any cause of illusion, nor does its removal mean the cessation of the illusion.

Bādha on the psychological or factual plane is effected only when the defect is removed. But, mere conceptual bādha may occur through the knowledge of the proper nature of the illusory phenomenon. So, the Advaitic dogma of knowledge removing nescience only may be conceded, if at all, in the sphere of conceptual bādha only. But, psychological bādha only makes one infer

that the defect has already been removed. So, it contradicts the previous cognition and its cognitum also.

It appeare pretty sure to me that Śaṅkara, left to himself, must have held a view which does not essentially differ from the view outlined above. Śaṅkara says that disputationists are all at one in accepting 'adhyāsa' as the cause of illusion. While explaining the genesis of 'adhyāsa', he asserts that it is due to false knowledge ('mithyā-jñāna-nimittaḥ') and occurs through the pairing of truth and falsity ("satyānṛte mithunīkṛtya"). He further says that the 'adhyāsa' is mithyā ("adhyāso mithyeti bhavituṁ yuktam"), not the 'adhyasta' i.e. the super-imposed entity. Indeed, nowhere does Śaṅkara say that a prātibhāsika silver is generated (Cf. "na tu ahibuddhikāle tad-apagama-kāle ca vastunaḥ kaścid viśeṣaḥ syāt" (SB., P. 239, Vol. I, vāṇī Vilās press). Instead he says that the super-imposing cognition is false. His definition of adhyāsa as 'smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrva-dṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ' clearly points to the elements of smṛti, anyathā-khyāti and asatkhyāti as going together to form adhyāsa. This point becomes further clear when he says that adhyāsa means 'atasmiṁstadbuddhiḥ' and 'anyasya anyadharmāvabhāsatā'. Though the commentators explain Śaṅkara's expression 'mithyā-jñāna-nimittaḥ' as 'mithyā-ajñāna-nimittaḥ', we cannot accept it. For, a few pages afterwards Śaṅkara himself says 'adhyāso mithyā-pratyaya-rūpaḥ'. That he admits an element of akhyāti also is clear from his following statement : "Tathāpi anyonyasmin anyonyātmakatām anyonyadharmāṁśca adhyasya itaretarāvive-kena etc." (P. 2, SB., Vāṇī Vilās Press). So whatever the commentator might say, we think that Śaṅkara gives his seal of approval on akhyāti, anyathākhyāti and asat-khyāti equally, but does not seem to advocate anirvacanīya-khyāti as advanced by his followers.

Now, from the stand-point of Śrī Jīva it may be said that since an invalid cognition makes room for akhyāti, anyatha-khyāti and asat-khyati equally, it may very well be called acintya-khyāti ; for, to explain it by excluding any of these khyātis is impossible and to affirm them necessarily together involves 'acintyatā'.

But, nevertheless it is 'ātmakhyāti' also ; For, the silver is nothing but cognitional. Thus, we see that an invalid cognition

shall have to be explained by calling into request anyathā-khyāti, akhyāti, asat-khyāti and ātma-khyāti, all taken together. Anirvacanīya-khyāti, however, is an atrocity of logic in the background of illogicality and definitely has no scope here.

So, the truth about illusion seems to us to be of an eclectic nature which disapproves extreme, logical hair-splitting that generally turns out to be abortive. I do not undermine logical thinking, but I only want to make myself conscious of the inherent contradictions of thought ; I beg to submit that thinking, which normally feeds on experience, commits the most monstrous atrocities and brings about its own undoing, when it becomes divorced from experience. When logic straightaway denies apprehension, it kills not only the apprehension, but kills itself too. The abstractionist tendencies of thought must be kept under check so that it may be of any use to us. Thinking, which moves in a world of relations, may transcend itself only by negating everything as the Advaitin does, but thereby it negates negation. The bias for a simple system is what generally vitiates the outlook of a philosopher and encourages him to discard experience and take refuge in abstract logic. Truth need not necessarily yield to a simple system ; it may be a unity-in-diversity like all physical organisms. A forced and forged system, that does not answer to reality, is a travesty of Truth. If, then, somebody complains that my thesis makes a philosopher's occupation gone and his empire liquidated, I must assert that the genocide of experience, that he has committed, justifies the liquidation of his empire and that he would be rehabilitated in his rightful occupation the moment he realises the sovereign principle of peaceful co-existence, divested of all coercion and expansionism. So, we conclude that to say that an erroneous entity is in every sense unreal is as much pernicious as calling it real in every sense ; but, the most pernicious is to deny both reality and unreality of it. Hence, it must be adjudged real in one sense, unreal in another and 'acintya' from a synthetic standpoint. An invalid cognition, therefore, must resolve itself into (general) sat-khyāti, anyathā-khyāti, akhyāti, ātma-khyāti, and asat-khyāti without prejudice to one another and consequently to acintya-khyāti, which is not the negation of thought, but its crowning realisation in and through the pasture of experience.

THE END

Appendix A

Ref.—Nirviṣaya-khyāti (Ch. II)

Veṅkaṭa in his TMK. refers to a Buddhist theory (Sl. 28 in Ch. IV), which may possibly be interpreted as offering a variant of Nirviṣaya-Khyāti discussed above. He says there that a certain section of Buddhist realists, though denying any form to both cognition and the external object in themselves, affirms it as consequential upon the contact between cognition and the object. To explain, an object left to itself has no definitive character ; it is neither (say) a nacre, nor a silver, but a mere 'it' or 'that'. It, however, assumes the particular form of a nacre or a silver only when it has intercourse with cognition. This particular form is the objective joint property of cognition and the physical object as is also advocated by Broad, Whitehead and other modern realists in regard to illusory phenomena. So, the illusory cognition of silver cannot be explained as being occasioned by a nacre as the sense-datum ; for, the nacre even like the silver is not a pre-existent entity in this theory. So, there being no definitive sense-datum to occasion a particularised cognition, the cognition in question becomes a Nirviṣaya-Khyāti, an emergence even like that of redness from an admixture of betel-leaf and betel-nut. But, Veṅkaṭa refutes this theory which he condemns as 'pūga-tāmbūla-nīti'.

Appendix B

Ref.—Niradhiṣṭhāna-khyāti (Ch. III)

The Pañcapādikā and the Vivaraṇam on it offer an altogether different argument for the above theory from the Mādhyamika stand-point. It may be argued that an illusory cognition need not necessitate a substratum outside the cognitional sphere ; for, there may be mutually existing loci of cognition and cognitum and the illusory silver may very well be the ground of cognition and the latter again may serve as the ground of the former and so on even like the seed-and-sprout series. But, the Advaitin points out that such an argument involves the fallacy of inter-

dependence which is absent in the seed-and-sprout series where the causality at every antecedent stage is formed by a new seed and a new sprout. It cannot be argued now that cognition would have silver for its ground and the latter would have the antecedent cognition for its ground and this one again would be grounded in its cognitum which would have the preceding cognition for its substratum and so on thus relieving it of the charge of interdependence. For, the Advaitin would then opine that such an assumption would go against the Mādhyamika postulate of momentariness and would be open to the charge of infinite regress not sanctioned by experience.

Moreover, a sublation never assumes the form of a mere negation, but refers to something positive as its substratum. So, a groundless error is an utter impossibility. (Vide Pp. 63-65, Pañca-pādikā and Pp. 186-187, PPV.—Madras ed.)

Appendix C

Ref.—Sadasat-khyāti (Ch. VIII)

In the 'Bhūmikā' of the Madras Government edition (1958) of the Pañca-pādikā it is stated that Nāgeśa, while treating of 'sphoṭa', discussed at length in his Vaiyākaraṇa-laghu-mañjūṣā the traditional Anirvacanīya-Khyāti theory, disaffiliated it in many respects from the views of Śaṅkara which latter he then equated with the Sadasat-Khyāti of the Sāṁkhya. I did not go through this 'Bhūmikā' earlier and so I wrongly surmised that the Mañjūṣā was a gloss on the Sāṁkhyasūtras by Nāgeśa. But, now that the source-book of Nāgeśa's theory is identified, I present here a brief summary of his deliberations in point. Nāgeśa starts the discussion with the assertion that just as a conceptual sphoṭa-word only has the potency of denotation, so also does the word denote a conceptual something only, without referring to its external existence ("Evaṁ śakyo'rtho'pi buddhi-sattā-samāviṣṭa eva na tu bāhya-sattāviṣṭaḥ".). Hence the words like 'bandhyāsuta', 'śaśa-śṛṅga' etc., which are non-sensical, can take case-terminations and form into sentences. So, our linguistic usage refers to such conceptual objects at least at the first instance and such a contention is quite in accord with the

Yoga-sūtra "Śabda-jñānānupātī vastuśūnyo vikalpaḥ". In this connection Nāgeśa criticises the Advaitic concept of beginningless, positive Ajñāna and the dogmas of the creation of the illusory object and of arthādhyāsa. He points out that ajñāna is nothing but non-apprehension and false knowledge along with its retentum and it is in no way something positive as the Advaitins aver. Arthādhyāsa and the dogma of the creation of (say) an illusory silver are also unnecessary assumptions which merely complicate the situation without rhyme or reason and he thinks that in this regard he is fully borne out by the great Śaṁkara himself. Nāgeśa asserts that 'anirvacanīya' cannot mean something different from both sat and asat. On the contrary, an illusory silver turns out on scrutiny to be both sat and asat, since it is asat being different from sat and is again sat being different from asat. So, the Sadasat-Khyāti theory of the Sāṁkhya stands to reason. But, if one subscribes to the view of the creation of an illusory object, one has to suppose transformation in Brahman thereby even as clay is transformed through the creation of a jar. Our experience, on the contrary, shows that an error does not transform and vitiate the object, for, the impassioned apostrophes of the lover do not change the beloved even a whit. Moreover, when the Advaitin asserts the creation of silver in nacre even in the absence of its material cause only on the strength of the potency of ajñāna, why does he not accept the origin of the cognition through that potency even without the presence of the object ? Even if the creation of an illusory silver be conceded, the cognition will not be erroneous in as much as that silver has silverness inhering in it. As a matter of fact, a nacre-silver is merely a conceptual reality ('buddhi-sadvā tat'). Its reality is superimposed, while factually it is unreal ('Tasmād-āropitaṁ sattvaṁ paramārthatastu asattvam ityeva yuktam'). Nāgeśa sums up his discussion in the following manner :—The object of both empiric and illusory cognition is equally unreal and as such it has neither creation, nor destruction, nor externality. All these are only superimposed by māyā which reveals the unreal. This type of Anirvacanīya-Khyāti is called 'Sadasat-Khyāti' in the Saṁkhya-sūtras.

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Advaita-cintāmaṇiḥ by Raṅgojī Bhaṭṭa—ADCI.
Advaita-ratna-rakṣaṇam by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī.
Advaita-siddhānta-vidyotanam by Gauḍa Brahmānanda—AD. Si. Vid.
Advaita-siddhiḥ by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī with Laghucandrikā—AS.
Advaita-vāda-khaṇḍanam by Rākhāladās Nyāyaratna.
Aṇu-bhāṣyam by Madhva.
Aṣṭādhyāyī by Pāṇini.
Bāla-bodhinī Ṭīkā.
Bhāmatī by Vācaspati Miśra—Bhā.
Bhāṣā-paricchedaḥ by Viśvanātha with Siddhānta-muktāvalī—BP.
Bhāskara-bhāṣyam (on the Brahma-sūtras)—Bhā. Bhā.
Bhāṭṭa-cintāmaṇiḥ by Gāgā Bhaṭṭa—Bhā. Ci.
Bṛhatī by Prabhākra—Bṛ.
Bodhicaryāvatāraḥ by Śāntideva with Pañjikā.
Brahma-siddhiḥ by Maṇḍana Miśra—Br. Si.
Brahma-vidyābharaṇam by Advaitānanda—Br. Vi.
Gādādharī by Gadādhara Bhattācarya.
Iṣṭa-siddhiḥ by Vimuktātman with Vivaraṇam (Viv./Vi.) by Jñānottama—IS.
Jñāna-yāthārthya-vādaḥ by Anantārya.
Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādyam by Śrīharṣa—Kha. Kha. Khā./KKK.
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Khyāti-vādaḥ by S. C. Bhāratī—KV.
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